为什么以色列支持库尔德人的公投？ [美国媒体]

Why Did Israel Support the Kurdish Referendum?

为什么以色列支持库尔德人的公投？



Israel was alone in its support for the Iraqi Kurdish referendum in September, and it has since become evident that KRG President Masoud Barzani miscalculated in deciding to hold the vote then. The Kurds overestimated both U.S. support for their independence movement and their own internal solidarity, while simultaneously underestimating the intensity and the near unanimity of the international community’s opposition to Kurdish independence. Erbil is now paying the price for its mistake, as the Iraqi federal government has retaken much of the disputed territory that the Peshmerga controlled since 2014 and closed the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) airspace. Israel, too, will likely suffer negative consequences as a result of Erbil’s overreach—so did Jerusalem commit a strategic error in supporting Barzani’s secessionist agenda?

9月，以色列单独表示了对伊拉克库尔德人全民公投的支持，自此之后，库尔德地区政府的主席马苏德·巴尔扎尼在决定举行投票的时候便做出了错误的判断。库尔德人高估了美国对其独立运动的支持，高估了自己的内部团结，同时也低估了国际社会对库尔德独立强烈且近乎一致的反对态度。埃尔比勒这座城市现在正为自己的错误付出代价，因为伊拉克联邦政府已经收复了库尔德自由战士自2014年以来控制的许多争议领土，关闭了伊拉克库尔德斯坦地区的领空。以色列也可能会因为埃尔比勒的越界行为而受到负面影响——那么，耶路撒冷是否在支持巴尔札尼的分裂主义议程上犯了战略错误?

It is true that Israel could suffer negative consequences as a result of the Kurds’ failed bid for independence. The PUK and Gorran parties, rivals of Barzani’s KDP, stand to gain from Barzani’s misstep and the ensuing crisis, and they are far more oriented towards Iran and against Jerusalem. The rise of pro-Iranian forces in a previously friendly environment could make Israel’s reported use of KRI territory for intelligence collection and operations significantly more difficult. In addition, U.S. influence will likely be damaged as a result of the Iraqi-Kurdish confrontation: Washington’s abandonment of its long-standing Kurdish allies (once more) and its apparent incompetence or impotence in mediating an imminent military clash between its two allies undoubtedly tarnished its reputation among friends and enemies alike. What is good for America is good for Israel when the latter derives the benefit of increased deterrence as a result of its relationship with the former, and this development has negative repercussions for both.

的确，由于库尔德人未能争取到独立，以色列可能会遭受负面影响。巴尔札尼的库尔德民主党的对手——库尔德爱国联盟和变革党，开始从巴尔札尼的错误和随后的危机中渔利，他们更倾向于伊朗而反对耶路撒冷。在以前友好的环境中，亲伊朗力量的崛起可能会使传闻中以色列利用库尔德自治区领土收集情报和占星行动的难度大为增加。此外，由于伊拉克和库尔德人的对抗，美国的影响力可能会受到损害：华盛顿(再一次地)放弃其长期的库尔德盟友，以及其在调停两个盟友之间即将发生的军事冲突时显而易见的无能，无疑损害到了它在盟友和敌人中间的声誉。对美国有利的便是对以色列有利的，后者因其与前者的关系而获得威慑的好处，但是这种局势发展对双方都有着负面影响。

However, Israel’s declaration of support for Kurdish independence was probably not an important factor in Erbil’s decision to hold the referendum. Unless the Kurds vastly overestimated the degree to which Israel would diplomatically and/or militarily support their bid for independence, Israel’s rhetorical support and limited under-the-table cooperation should not have significantly altered Erbil’s calculations. Furthermore, in light of Washington’s policies regarding Iran’s presence in Syria and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, it would have been a serious analytical error to assume Jerusalem’s ability to influence U.S. foreign policy, even on issues that are of critical interest to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

然而，以色列宣布支持库尔德独立，可能并不是埃尔比勒方面决定举行公投的一个重要因素。除非库尔德人大大高估了以色列在外交上和军事上支持他们独立的程度，以色列的口头支持和有限的地下合作不应该会显着地改变埃尔比勒方面的筹算。此外，有鉴于华盛顿针对伊朗在叙利亚的存在势力以及巴以和平进程的政策，认为耶路撒冷能够影响美国的外交政策——即使是与内塔尼亚胡总理相关的重要利益问题上——是一个严重的分析错误。

Even if it were to threaten to withdraw its support from the Iraqi Kurds, Israel likely could have done little, if anything, to change Barzani’s decision to hold a referendum. In fact, the Kurds had a number of compelling reasons for moving towards independence at this time, including: the belief that they had a small window during which they would receive U.S. support before Washington disengaged from Iraq, deflecting attention from domestic economic and political problems, and Barzani’s desire for a legacy before stepping down from the presidency. These considerations touch on critical KRG interests and likely factored into Barzani’s decision far more than the prospect of Israeli support for Erbil.

即使以色列威胁要撤回对伊拉克库尔德人的支持，它可能也几乎不会做任何改变，如果有改变的话，也是改变巴尔札尼举行全民公投的决定。事实上，这一时期库尔德人迈向独立有很多引人注目的原因，其中包括：他们相信在从伊拉克撤军的华盛顿方面将注意力转向国内经济和政治问题之前，他们有着获得美国支持的一个小窗口，以及巴尔札尼对卸任主席一职之前对获得政治遗产的渴望。这些考虑触及了库尔德斯坦地区政府的关键利益，并可能比以色列支持埃尔比勒的前景更加深远地影响到了巴尔札尼的决定。

At the same time, Israel had much to gain and very little to lose from supporting Kurdish independence.

与此同时，在支持库尔德独立这件事上，以色列有很多收获，却几乎没有什么损失。

Kurdish independence itself is not necessarily a positive development for Israel, but it creates the possibility for Israel to reap a major strategic advantage: a well-positioned ally. Having an ally along the Iranian and Turkish borders could have provided Israel with a platform to counterbalance the strategies of Teheran and Ankara, which seek to apply pressure on Israel by allying with hostile entities on its border. In addition, unlike the other countries in the region with which Israel has either peace treaties or under-the-table cooperation, the Kurds are not preoccupied with the Palestinian issue. As a result, the potential Jerusalem-Erbil relationship would not have necessarily stalled at a cold peace. Of course, there is no guarantee that a Israeli-Kurdish relationship would have come to fruition even if the Kurds did achieve independence with Israeli support; nonetheless, Jerusalem’s lone voice of support for Kurds would likely have increased the goodwill in Erbil and hence the likelihood of achieving that outcome.

对于以色列来说，库尔德独立这件事本身并不一定是一种积极的发展动向，但它给以色列带来了一个收获重大战略优势的机会：一个位于战略要冲的盟友。在伊朗和土耳其边境拥有一个盟友可以为以色列提供了一个平台来抗衡德黑兰和安卡拉的战略，后者试图通过在边境上与敌对势力结盟来对以色列施加压力。此外，与这一地区和以色列牵涉和平协议或保持地下合作的其他国家不同，库尔德人并并不关注巴勒斯坦问题。因此，潜在的耶路撒冷-埃尔比勒之间的关系不一定会在冷和平时期停滞不前。因此，潜在的耶路撒冷-埃尔比勒的关系不会在一个冷的和平时期停滞不前。当然，即使库尔德人在以色列的支持下取得独立，也不能保证以色列-库尔德人的关系会结出硕果；尽管如此，耶路撒冷对库尔德人的唯一支持很可能增加了埃尔比勒的善意，以及出现这一结果的可能性。

The largest risk that Israel assumed by supporting Kurdish independence is that doing put it at odds with U.S. support for maintaining the integrity of Iraq—for which Washington has already committed hundreds of billions of dollars. However, support for Abadi instead of Barzani was hardly consensus in Washington: even senior Republican officials like Senator John McCain came out in support of the Kurds. If top U.S. officials can declare their support for the Kurds, Washington could hardly be annoyed that Israel did the same. Furthermore, Washington’s main goal in delaying Kurdish aspirations was to avoid a clash between Baghdad and Erbil. Now that the dispute is underway, it is not clear whether the United States considers it to be in its interest that it Kurdish partners are strangled by questionable friends and irrefutable enemies.

以色列认为支持库尔德独立的最大风险在于这么做与美国对于维护伊拉克完整性的支持相违背，而华盛顿已经在这一件事上投入了数以千亿美元计的资金。然而，支持阿巴迪而不是巴尔札尼这件事在华盛顿几乎没有达成共识：甚至像参议员约翰·麦凯恩这样的资深共和党官员也站出来支持库尔德人。如果美国高级官员能够宣布支持库尔德人，华盛顿方面也不会对以色列的这一做法感到恼怒。此外，华盛顿方面拖延库尔德人期许的主要目的是避免巴格达和埃尔比勒之间的冲突。现在争论还在进行中，尚不清楚美国是否认为它的库尔德合作伙伴被存在问题的朋友和无可辩驳的敌人一同绞杀。

Israel was probably not a significant factor in the Kurdish decision to move forward with the referendum; it is not a global power, it does not share a border with the KRI, and it does not have trade relations with it comparable to those of Turkey or Iran. That being said, Israel had much to gain from a potential Jerusalem-Erbil alliance and little to lose by supporting the Kurdish efforts in motion. Despite the failure of the Kurdish bid, Israel was right to bet on Barzani.

在库尔德人决定推进全民公决的问题上，以色列可能不是一个重要的因素；它不是一个全球性大国，它与库尔德自治区不接壤，而且它与后者的贸易关系也无法和土耳其以及伊朗的相提并论。话虽如此，以色列仍然从潜在的耶路撒冷-埃尔比勒联盟中获得了很多好处，而且在支持库尔德人行动方面几乎没有什么损失。尽管库尔德人失败了，但以色列对巴尔札尼的押注是正确的。