《国家利益》：（美国）权力平衡的回归 [美国媒体]

Return of the Balance of Power

（美国）权力平衡的回归

But the problem is neither nationalism nor globalism. In today’s world, the two are complementary.

但问题既不是民族主义，也不是全球化。在当今世界，这两者是互补的。



America is getting a third chance to strike the right balance between nationalism and globalism. The first chance dates back to its origins: as a new and vulnerable republic in a world of warring monarchs, it opted for nationalism, pursuing George Washington’s admonition “to steer clear of foreign entanglements.” Even as late as the 1930s, under the Neutrality Act, it refused to take sides in the momentous conflicts brewing in Europe and Asia. The second chance came after World War II. America turned to globalism, adopting Woodrow Wilson’s and Franklin Roosevelt’s internationalist strategy to transform the decentralized nation-state, balance of power system into the centralized global institutions of the United Nations (UN). When the Cold War paralyzed the UN, the United States became the superpower leader of a politically and economically integrated Western world. It assumed disproportionate burdens and nurtured the West to victory in the Cold War.

美国正在获得第三次在民族主义和全球化之间取得正确平衡的机会。它的第一次机会可以追溯到它的起源：作为一个崭新的、脆弱的共和国，在一个充满争斗的君主的世界里，它选择了民族主义，遵循乔治·华盛顿的忠告，“避免外国的纠缠”。甚至在上世纪30年代，根据《中立法》，它还拒绝在欧洲和亚洲酝酿的重大冲突中偏袒任何一方。第二次机会是在第二次世界大战后。美国转向了全球化，采用伍德罗·威尔逊和富兰克林·罗斯福的国际主义战略，将分散的民族国家、均势的权力体系转变为联合国的中央集权式全球机构。当冷战使联合国陷入瘫痪时，美国成为政治和经济一体化的西方世界的超级大国领导人。它承担了不成比例的负担，并让西方在冷战中取得了胜利。

Now America is getting a third chance. It can’t make up its mind. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush perpetuated internationalist strategies to spread democracy and markets across Eastern Europe (NATO, EU), Asia (China in the WTO) and the Middle East (Middle East Democracy Initiative). When costs mounted, however, especially the costs of unending wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump tacked back toward nationalism. Obama gave up the military playbook altogether, trusting in persistent diplomacy to reset relations with Iran, Russia and China. Trump put America’s interests first, sparking fears that nationalism would now destroy the liberal international order.

现在美国得到了第三次机会。但它还拿不定主意。美国总统比尔?克林顿和乔治?布什延续了在东欧(北约、欧盟)、亚洲(中国加入世贸组织)和中东(中东民主倡议)传播民主和市场经济的国际主义战略。然而，当成本上升时——尤其是阿富汗和伊拉克无休止战争的成本上升时，美国总统巴拉克?奥巴马和唐纳德?特朗普又回到了民族主义的道路上。奥巴马完全放弃了军事策略，相信通过坚持不懈的外交努力能够与伊朗、俄罗斯和中国重启关系。特朗普则把美国的利益放在首位，这引发了人们的担忧，即民族主义将破坏自由主义的国际秩序。

But the problem is neither nationalism nor globalism. In today’s world, the two are complementary. In the 1920s, when nationalism was authoritarian and the balance of power pernicious, nationalism was a destructive force. When nationalism became liberal and globalism built the democratic peace of the 1990s, nationalism became a more constructive foundation of global politics. Today, all major industrialized nations are democracies. In this kind of world, nationalism is not a destructive force but a democratic check on global elites and institutions. Globalism empowered financial, cultural and bureaucratic elites, and they act to this day largely outside democratic control. Not a single official in the European Union (EU), UN, WTO and IMF is directly elected or accountable to a popular vote.

但问题既不是民族主义，也不是全球化。在当今世界，这两者是互补的。在20世纪20年代，当民族主义曾是威权主义，权力平衡颇为有害的时候，民族主义是一股破坏性的力量。当民族主义成为自由主义、全球化建立了20世纪90年代的民主和平时，民族主义则成为全球政治更有建设性的基础。今天，所有主要工业化国家都是民主国家。在这样一个世界里，民族主义不是一种破坏性的力量，而是对全球化精英和制度的民主制衡。全球化赋予金融、文化和官僚精英权力，他们的行动至今基本上都不受民主的控制。欧盟、联合国、世界贸易组织和国际货币基金组织中没有一名官员是直接选举产生的，也没有一名官员要对普选负责。

Globalist leaders need to take a deep breath. National interests do come first in a globalized democratic world. They express the free will of local democratic peoples and institutions. Until global leaders are elected, nations provide the only direct manifestation of democracy in world affairs. And as long as these nations remain liberal, a globalized world has nothing to fear from them.

全球化领导人需要深吸一口气。在全球化的民主世界中，国家利益是第一位的。它们表达了地区民主的人民和机构的自由意志。在选出全球领导人之前，国家是民主在世界事务中的唯一直接体现。只要这些国家保持自由，全球化的世界就没有什么好害怕的。

Nationalism comes in many forms—ethnic (blood), cultural (history), territorial (soil) and ideological (creedal)—but liberal nationalism requires that all of these forms respect republican virtues. These are individual rights, competing political parties rotating in power, independent judiciary and a free press. And, because it opposes authoritarian forms of nationalism, liberal does not always mean more interdependence and centralized institutions like the UN; it also means decentralized, independent national republics with robust private economies and citizens voting to choose and hold their leaders accountable.

民族主义有多种形式——民族(血统)、文化(历史)、领土(土地)和意识形态(信仰)——但自由民族主义要求所有这些形式都尊重共和美德。它们是个人权利、轮流执政且相互竞争的政党、独立的司法机构和自由的新闻媒体。而且，由于自由主义反对威权形式的民族主义，它并不总是意味着更多的相互依赖和像联合国这样的中央集权机构；它还意味着拥有强大的私营经济、公民可以投票选出并追求其领导人责任的权力分散、独立的国家共和国。

In short, globalism means a federalist or conservative internationalism, one premised on limited global government that protects, not usurps, republican virtues. The threat to the liberal order comes not from political shifts within democratic societies from liberal to conservative parties; that’s the normal cycle of democratic politics. It comes from resurgent autocrats in Russia, China, North Korea and Iran who do not tolerate such political shifts. Authoritarianism, not nationalism, poses the real threat to the liberal order.

简而言之，全球化意味着一种联邦主义或保守的国际主义，其前提是保护而不是篡夺共和国美德的有限的全球政府。对自由秩序的威胁并非来自民主社会内部从自由主义到保守主义政党的政治转变；这是民主政治的正常循环。它来自俄罗斯、中国、朝鲜和伊朗重新崛起的独裁者，他们无法容忍这种政治转变。对自由秩序构成真正威胁的是威权主义，而不是民族主义。

WHEN THE United States went isolationist in the 1920s, the world was a colossal mess. There were only a few democratic countries, principally the United States and Great Britain. Most other countries were either old monarchies in transition, such as Germany, or empires convulsed in revolution and war, such as Russia and Turkey (the Ottoman Empire). There were no security arrangements of any consequence, the League of Nations was a dead letter and most countries were more interested in regaining lost territory, colonies and pride than in preserving the status quo. The world economy grew substantially in the 1920s, but its foundations were weak. Global finance sprouted to fund reparations and fiscal deficits, while global trade sputtered and then collapsed in the 1930s.

当美国在20世纪20年代走向孤立主义时，世界是一片混乱的。当时只有几个民主国家，主要是美国和英国。其他大多数国家要么是处于转型期的旧君主制国家，如德国，要么是在革命和战争中动荡不安的帝国，如俄罗斯和土耳其(奥斯曼帝国)。没有不会招致任何后果的安全举措，国际联盟就是一纸空谈，大多数国家更感兴趣的是收复失去的领土、殖民地和尊严，而不是维持现状。20世纪20年代，世界经济大幅增长，但基础却是薄弱的。为了赔款和给财政赤字提供资金，全球金融开始萌芽，而全球贸易在上世纪30年代则停滞不前，然后崩溃。

In this period, American nationalism was not the problem. It had served the country well for more than a century, both by exploiting America’s geographic advantages and keeping the United States out of World War I until very late, incurring fewer casualties than other nations suffered. America’s power was not preeminent, as it would be in 1945, and the world was surly and unwilling to be led. No country had actually been defeated, just betrayed or “stabbed in the back”; many were just hankering for the next fight. Perhaps it was better to stay out of that kind of world. “Foreign influence,” George Washington had warned, “is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.”

在这一时期，美国的民族主义不是问题所在。一个多世纪以来，它为这个国家带来了巨大的利益，它利用了美国的地理优势，并让美国一直置身于第一次世界大战之外，直到很晚才退出，造成的伤亡却比其他国家要少。美国的实力并不像1945年那样出众，当时的世界暴戾且不愿被领导。没有一个国家真正被打败过，只是被出卖了或者被“背后捅了一刀”；许多人只是渴望着下一场战斗。也许远离那种世界是最好的选择。乔治·华盛顿曾警告说：“外国势力是共和国政府最恶毒的敌人之一”。

World War II destroyed that dystopian world. Almost every nation suffered significant, if not total, destruction. Nationalism was spent, and the United States, unmarked by territorial destruction and swollen by wartime production and technology, enjoyed unqualified preeminence. It seized the opportunity, by default if not by design, to reconstruct the world on radically different terms—break up colonial empires, create republican institutions at the global level, invite universal membership but also give great powers special privileges, rebuild war torn countries but now as democratic not authoritarian societies, and foster open societies, borders and markets. The idea was to replace the Westphalian balance of power system, not restore it. The world would be organized as a liberal republic, just as the United States was organized as a liberal republic. At the San Francisco Conference inaugurating the UN, President Harry Truman compared the UN Charter to the American Constitution.

二战摧毁了那个反乌托邦的世界。几乎每个国家都遭受到了严重的破坏——如果不是彻底的破坏的话。民族主义被消耗殆尽，美国在没有领土遭破坏的情况下，其实力因为战时的生产和技术大为扩张，因而享有绝对的优势。它抓住了这个机会——如果不是通过设计而是通过默认的方式——来重建一个截然不同的世界——在全球层面上瓦解殖民帝国、建立共和制度，邀请全球的国家充当会员，但也给予大国特权，重建遭战争蹂躏的国家——但现在是要建成一个民主社会，而不是威权主义社会，培育开放的社会、边界和市场。当时的想法是取代威斯特伐利亚体系的权力平衡，而不是恢复它。世界将以自由共和国的形式组织起来，就像美国以自由共和国的形式组织起来一样。在旧金山联合国成立大会上，杜鲁门总统将联合国宪章比作了美国宪法。

That the United States abandoned nationalism for globalism after World War II is hardly surprising. Its preponderant power explains a lot. What was unique was American nationalism: it was intrinsically internationalist. American nationalism built a Western world premised on liberal (or republican) values and institutions, something which no authoritarian power would have done. It did not try to preserve its empire; it deliberately accepted relative decline by helping other countries grow faster than the United States. It also supported liberal institutions, the necessity of opposing parties within democratic countries and contentious politics among democratic countries (today’s conflicts between the United States, eu and Japan). Liberal meant competition, not centralization. This strategy began with the defeated powers, Germany and Japan, and continued throughout the postwar era with each succeeding generation of developing nations. Most recently, it included America’s greatest gamble of all: China and India. Imagine an authoritarian Russia or China pursuing such policies, then or today. This is the essential difference between liberal and authoritarian nationalism.

二战后，美国放弃民族主义而转向全球化，这并不奇怪。它的优势能够解释很多东西。独特的是美国的民族主义：它本质上是国际主义。美国的民族主义建立了一个以自由主义(或共和主义)价值观和制度为前提的西方世界，这是任何威权国家都不会去做的事情。它没有试图保护自己的帝国；它通过帮助其他国家实现比美国更快的增长的方式有意地接受了相对的衰落。它还支持自由主义制度，支持民主国家内部出现对立党派的必要性，支持民主国家之间有争议的政治格局(当今美国、欧盟和日本之间的冲突)。自由主义意味着竞争，而不是集权。这一战略始于战败的德国和日本，并延续到战后的每一代发展中国家。最近，它还包括了美国最大的赌博：中国和印度。想象一下，一个威权主义的俄罗斯或中国正在推行这样的政策，无论是当时还是今天。这是自由民族主义与威权民族主义的本质区别。

It is helpful to recall this postwar policy because it created the globalism we have today—a globalism that does not reject nationalism but is based on liberal nationalism. America’s third chance comes in a world that is vastly better than the world of 1919. There is no need to find safety from this world by withdrawing. Nor is there a need for the United States to assume disproportionate burdens. There are other powerful liberal nations capable of sharing leadership responsibilities. The United States can focus on overlapping not overarching interests. It can ask other democratic nations to do more, and it can use its relative leverage of geographic distance and open markets to achieve a more equitable balance of burdens and responsibilities.

回顾这一战后政策是有益的，因为它创造了我们今天所拥有的全球化——一种不排斥民族主义但以自由民族主义为基础的全球化。美国的第三次机会出现在一个比1919年要好得多的世界里。没有必要通过后撤来从这个世界上寻求安全。美国也没有必要承担不成比例的负担。还有其他强大的自由主义国家有能力分担领导责任。美国可以专注于相互形成交集的利益，而不是去支配一切的利益。它可以要求其他民主国家做得更多，它可以利用其地理距离和开放市场的相对优势，实现更公平的负担和责任平衡。

Globalism tends to make all conflicts universal; nationalism prioritizes conflicts on a nation’s borders. Regionalism mediates between the two. Most conflicts today are not universal. Terrorism is not a global war like the Cold War; nor is it primarily a territorial matter located in a single spot (though a caliphate did and could once more emerge). Russia’s threat does not extend to Asia and Cuba as the Soviet threat did during the Cold War; it centers on restoring the former Soviet space in the Caucasus, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states. And while China’s threat is increasingly global, its military capabilities are still largely local (e.g., South China Sea) and its economic capabilities are constrained by its dependence on world markets—an entanglement with the United States that never existed in the case of the former Soviet Union. China and Russia might still combine to pose a global threat, but they no longer have a common ideology as they did under communism. They have common interests in opposing the Western liberal order and might use Iran and North Korea as regional conflicts to project Russian influence into the Middle East and Chinese influence into Asia.

全球化倾向于使所有冲突都具有普遍性；民族主义优先考虑国家边界上的冲突。区域主义在两者之间起着中介作用。今天的大多数冲突并不是普遍的。恐怖主义不是冷战那样的全球性战争；它也不是一个单一地点的领土问题(尽管哈里发国确实存在过，而且有可能再次出现)。俄罗斯的威胁不像冷战期间苏联的威胁那样延伸到了亚洲和古巴；它的重心是恢复前苏联在高加索、乌克兰、波兰、匈牙利和波罗的海国家的领土。虽然中国的威胁日益全球化，但其军事能力仍主要局限于局部地区(如南中国海)，其经济能力也因其对世界市场的依赖而受到限制——这种与美国的纠缠在前苏联从未存在过。中国和俄罗斯可能仍会联合起来构成全球性的威胁，但它们不再像在共产主义时代那样拥有共同的意识形态了。他们在反对西方自由秩序方面有着共同利益，可能会利用伊朗和朝鲜作为地区冲突，将俄罗斯的影响投射到中东，将中国的影响投射到亚洲。

PRESIDENT TRUMP seems to be finding his way to this new combination of globalism and nationalism. He is more nationalist than any president since Franklin Roosevelt in the mid-1930s. But because the world is different and better, he also accepts realist aspects of the world that did not exist in the 1930s. He accepts the new world as it is with its Cold War democratic alliances, not the old world of authoritarian nationalism as it was under the balance of power. Yes, he sharply criticizes the alliances, but he does so to make them stronger, not weaker. He wants the allies to do more, not the United States to do less. He has increased both U.S. defense spending and U.S. NATO contributions.

特朗普总统似乎正在寻找实现这种全球化和民族主义新的结合道路。他是自上世纪30年代中期富兰克林?罗斯福以来最具民族主义色彩的总统。但因为世界不同了，变得更好了，他也接受了20世纪30年代所不存在的现实主义世界观。他接受新世界与冷战时期民主联盟的现状，而不是权力平衡下的威权民族主义旧世界。是的，他尖锐地批评联盟，但他这样做是为了让联盟更强大，而不是更弱小。他希望盟国做得更多，而不是美国做得更少。他增加了美国的国防开支和美国在北约中所作的贡献。

Trump even evinces some aspects of a conservative internationalist approach, defending the option of freedom in places like Ukraine and the Korean peninsula while not expecting authoritarian states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, North Korea, China and Russia to become free any time soon. He clearly rejects multilateralism and the liberal internationalist tradition: “I am skeptical of international unions that tie us up and bring America down, and will never enter America into any agreement that reduces our ability to control our own affairs.” That’s why liberal internationalists who champion centralized institutions accuse him of undermining the Western liberal order.

特朗普甚至表现出了保守的国际主义态度的某些方面，为乌克兰和朝鲜半岛等地的自由选择辩护，同时不指望沙特阿拉伯、伊朗、朝鲜、中国和俄罗斯等威权主义国家很快就会变得自由。他明确反对多边主义和自由国际主义传统。这就是为什么拥护中央集权体制的自由国际主义者指责他破坏了西方的自由秩序。

Trump defines America’s security interests nationally and regionally. He rejects the global war on terrorism and would like to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, and he firmly resists new troop commitments in Syria or Yemen. He prefers a nationalist strategy of offshore interventions to combat terrorism, now supported by many realists as well. Intervene if necessary to defeat or keep terrorists from controlling territory, but do not nation-build or promote democracy. Encourage local nations to provide the necessary boots on the ground. The quick military defeat of isis by offshore capabilities and Trump’s diplomacy to rally Saudi Arabia and other local nations to counterbalance Iran epitomize this localized approach.

特朗普定义了美国的国家和地区安全利益。他反对全球反恐战争，并希望从阿富汗和伊拉克撤军。他坚决反对在叙利亚或也门增兵。他更倾向于采用一种民族主义的离岸干预策略来打击恐怖主义，这种策略目前也得到了许多现实主义者的支持。必要时进行干预，以挫败或阻止恐怖分子控制领土，但不进行国家建设或促进民主的行动。鼓励当地国家提供必要的地面部队。伊斯兰国被离岸军事力量迅速击溃，特朗普利用外交手段团结沙特阿拉伯和其他地方国家对抗伊朗，这些都是这种本地化做法的缩影。

President Trump is clearly committed to defend democracy where it exists in Europe and Asia (and Israel). The idea that he is undermining NATO and coddling Russia is a media fantasy. Here is what Trump has done in the relationship with Russia: approved the deployment of NATO forces, including two U.S. battalions, on the border of Russia for the first time since 1991 (the real trigger for Article V); delivered lethal weapons, including anti-tank weapons, to the Kiev government to raise the cost of further Russian aggression in Ukraine; pressured allies to spend more for NATO while the United States does not spend less; expelled dozens of Russian diplomats and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle; maintained sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Crimea, including on many of Putin’s cronies; and killed over a hundred Russian mercenaries in Syria to push back against Russian-backed terrorist threats to Israel. At the same time, as a realist interested in stabilizing the status quo, he looks for opportunities to cooperate with Russia where interests overlap, as in Syria or possibly Iran.

特朗普总统显然致力于捍卫欧洲和亚洲(以及以色列)现存在的民主。他正在破坏北约、纵容俄罗斯的说法是媒体的幻想。特朗普在与俄罗斯的关系中所做的是：自1991年以来首次批准在俄罗斯边境部署北约部队，包括两个美国营(这是第五条款的真正导火索)；向基辅政府交付包括反坦克武器在内的致命武器，以抬高俄罗斯进一步侵略乌克兰的成本；向盟国施压，要求它们在美国不削减开支的情况下增加对北约的投入；驱逐了数十名俄罗斯外交官，关闭了俄罗斯驻西雅图领事馆；维持对俄罗斯入侵克里米亚的制裁，包括对普京许多亲信的制裁；为了反击俄罗斯所支持的对以色列的恐怖威胁，在叙利亚杀害了100多名俄罗斯雇佣兵。与此同时，作为一个对稳定现状感兴趣的现实主义者，他寻求与利益重叠的俄罗斯合作的机会，比如在叙利亚或伊朗问题上。

Alliance policies in Asia reveal similar intent. Trump has not only enthusiastically embraced the U.S.-Japan alliance, he deftly managed the alliance with South Korea through a transition from a hawkish to a dovish government. And he deployed both alliances aggressively to persuade Pyongyang and Beijing that they will gain no advantage from nuclear bluster outside negotiations and therefore should get serious about denuclearization inside negotiations. On that basis he opened discussions with North Korea—a result that eluded previous U.S. presidents for more than ten years.

亚洲联盟的政策也显示了类似的意图。特朗普不仅热情地拥抱了美国与日本的联盟，他也巧妙地处理了与韩国的同盟关系，从鹰派政府过渡到了鸽派政府。他积极地部署了两个联盟，以说服平壤和北京相信他们是不会从谈判外的核恫吓中获得任何好处的，因此应该认真对待谈判内的无核化问题。在此基础上，他与朝鲜展开了谈判，这一成果是十多年来的美国前总统都没有看到的。

Trump is not purely transactional, making deals with no purpose. In Poland in 2017, he sounded much like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher:
And above all we value the dignity of every human life, protect the rights of every person, and share the hope of every soul to live in freedom. This is who we are. Those are the priceless ties that bind us together as nations, as allies, and as a civilization.

特朗普不是纯粹的交易型人物，坐着没有目的的交易。在2017年的波兰，他看起来很像罗纳德?里根和玛格丽特?撒切尔：
最重要的是，我们珍视每个人生命的尊严，保护每个人的权利，并分享每个灵魂在自由中生活的希望。这就是我们。这些是将我们作为国家、盟国和文明被联系在一起的无价纽带。

He is at least as internationalist as Theodore Roosevelt, who also talked about American values in terms of Western civilization.

他至少和西奥多·罗斯福一样是国际主义者，后者也用西方文明来谈论美国的价值观。

Yes, but isn’t liberal democracy weakening? Freedom in the world has tailed off since 2006 and there is good reason to worry about right- (Hungary, Turkey) and left- (Venezuela, Cuba) wing governments that foreclose political competition and flaunt authoritarian systems. There is a backlash to liberalism, but this is in effect an affirmation of the strength of liberalism. Presidents Vladimir Putin and * resist it because it is strong, not because it is weak. The liberal order in most nations is not so fragile that every decision to tack back toward nationalism is equated with isolationism, and global elites are too glib when they compare conservative movements in liberal democracies with fascism and radicalism in authoritarian societies. America has never had a fascist or communist tradition. And the violent groups in America today are not only small, they are equally distributed on the left and right.

是的，但是自由民主不是在变弱吗？自2006年以来，全世界的自由逐渐减少，我们有充分的理由担心右翼(匈牙利、土耳其)和左翼(委内瑞拉、古巴)政府阻止政治竞争，炫耀威权体制。自由主义遭到强烈反对，但这实际上是对自由主义力量的肯定。俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔?普京和中国领导人抵制它，是因为它强大，而不是因为它软弱。大多数国家的自由秩序并非如此脆弱，以至于每一个回归民族主义的决定都等同于孤立主义，当全球化精英把自由民主国家的保守主义运动与威权社会的法西斯主义和激进主义相提并论时，他们显得过于油嘴滑舌。美国从来没有法西斯或共产主义传统。今天美国的暴力组织不仅规模小，而且分布在左右两边。

Trump’s behavior (not his tweets) also suggests that he accepts the existing world trading system. He is not advocating an Amerexit, taking America out of the world economy. He repudiates new agreements—the TransPacific Partnership, the Paris Accords on climate change—but negotiates intensely to revise and improve existing agreements: NAFTA, U.S.-EU, U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-China. He deploys tariffs as leverage but makes clear in recent G-7 and EU discussions that his goal is zero tariffs. It’s a risky strategy; reminiscent of Reagan’s strategy to deploy new INF missiles (tariffs) not to increase arms to higher levels (higher tariffs) but to reduce INF systems to zero levels (zero tariffs). Nevertheless, Trump must close trade deals soon, or tariff wars will acquire a life of their own.

特朗普的行为(而不是他的推文)也表明他接受了现有的世界贸易体系。他并不是主张美国退出，而是要把美国从世界经济中拉出来。他拒绝签署《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》和《巴黎气候变化协定》等新协议，但却积极谈判修订和完善现有协议：北美自由贸易协定、美国和欧洲之间的协定、美国与韩国和美中两国的协定。他利用关税作为杠杆，但在最近的七国集团和欧盟讨论中却明确表示，他的目标是零关税。这是一种冒险的策略；这让人想起里根部署新的中程核导弹(关税)的策略，其方式不是通过增加武器到更高的水平(更高的关税)，而是减少中程核导弹系统到零的水平(零关税)。然而，特朗普必须尽快达成贸易协议，否则关税战争将获得自己的生命力。

A better balance in trade is long overdue. U.S. allies have benefited disproportionately from both domestic and trade policies that shielded their societies relatively from trade dislocations. American workers, on the other hand, accepted unprecedented dislocation. To accommodate the Cold War strategy of building up the economies of other countries, American labor moved relentlessly across the United States to vacate lower technology jobs for the imports of other countries. True, American labor ultimately benefited as well. But can you imagine the labor force in Europe or Japan being that flexible and making that kind of contribution to the general welfare?

贸易平衡早就应该得到改善。美国的盟友们从保护他们的社会不受贸易混乱影响的国内和贸易政策中获得了不成比例的好处。另一方面，美国工人经历了前所未有的混乱。为了适应结社其他国家经济的冷战战略，美国劳工无情地在美国各地流动，为其他国家的进口产品腾出技术含量较低的工作岗位。诚然，美国劳工最终也从中受益了。但是你能想象欧洲或日本的劳动力是如此的灵活并为大众福利做出了贡献吗？

Trump is also looking for a better balance between globalism and nationalism on the immigration front. A nation’s first obligation is to its citizens not its immigrants. At the same time, America is unique, a nation made up almost entirely of immigrants. In the past sixty years, America admitted 59 million new immigrants, legal and illegal. As in trade, the nation benefited but individual communities were disrupted. Regularizing and slowing that flow may be the only way to sustain continued immigration.

特朗普还在移民问题上寻求全球化和民族主义之间更好的平衡。一个国家的首要义务是对其公民负责，而不是对移民负责。与此同时，美国还是一个独特的国家，它几乎完全是由移民组成的。在过去的60年里，美国接纳了5900万新移民，包括合法移民和非法移民。就像在贸易方面一样，国家从中受益，但个别社区却遭到了破坏。管理和减缓移民流动可能是维持持续移民的唯一途径。

GLOBALISM TODAY constitutes a better world than any since 1914. That world needs to be preserved. At the same time, it does not need to be aggressively expanded, either by military commitments, trade expansion or unlimited immigration. Liberal nationalism is calling globalism back to its democratic roots. Respect the people. Give them time to absorb unprecedented political, economic and social change. Don’t lose the liberal nationalism that built globalism, or globalism will simply become another form of authoritarianism. But, also, don’t lose the liberal globalism gained by the Cold War, or nationalism will become virulent again, as it was in the era of authoritarian nationalism.

今天的全球化构成了自1914年以来最美好的世界。这个世界需要被保护。与此同时，美国不需要通过军事承诺、贸易扩张或无限制移民来大举扩张。自由民族主义正在呼唤全球化回归其民主根源。尊重人民。给他们时间来吸收前所未有的政治、经济和社会变革。不要在建立全球化的自由民族主义的过程中失败，否则全球化只会变成另一种形式的威权主义。但是，也不要失去冷战中获得的自由主义全球化，否则民族主义将再次变得恶毒起来，就像威权民族主义时代那样。