美国可以与日本展开更多合作来遏制中国 [美国媒体]

America Can Do More with Japan to ContainChina

美国可以与日本展开更多合作来遏制中国



Increased economic and strategiccooperation would keep down Beijing.

经济和战略方面合作的增加将令北京感到沮丧。

The twenty-first century seems destined tobe an Asian century with China’s growing hegemony. For the foreseeable future,therefore, the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to be a fulcrum of U.S.foreign policy in advancing democratic norms, economic prosperity, andmultilateral cooperation around the world.

21世纪似乎注定是一个中国日益增长的亚洲世纪。因此，在可预见的未来，美日联盟将继续成为美国外交政策在促进世界各地的民主规范、经济繁荣和多边合作方面的一个支点。

Japan has been a reliable partner of theUnited States since 1945, and the U.S.-Japan alliance continues to informTokyo’s strategic vision for responsible governance, open markets, and globalinstitutions. However, the gap in U.S.-Japan Cold War relations has widenedsince the Soviet Union’s collapse, China’s rise to great power status, and NorthKorea’s development of a credible nuclear deterrent.

自1945年以来，日本一直是美国的可靠伙伴，美日联盟将继续为东京提供负责任的政府治理、开放市场和全球机构方面的战略构想。然而，自苏联解体、中国崛起为大国、朝鲜发展出可确证的核威慑力量以来，美日冷战关系的鸿沟已经有所扩大。

Today, U.S. policymakers understand that,as a close ally and Asia’s largest economy behind China, Japan is well-placedto become a principal advocate of U.S. interests in Asia. To date, thispotential has been largely underutilized, with U.S. interference in Japan’sefforts to establish an Asian Monetary Fund after the 1997 East Asian financialcrisis stymieing Tokyo’s initial forays into regional multilateralism.Recently, however, Japan has become a more active proponent of regionalintegration independent of the United States, stepping up its involvement inregional institutions like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Furthermore, Tokyo is spearheadingpassage of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-PacificPartnership in 2018.

今天，美国决策者明白，作为亲密盟友和仅次于中国的亚洲最大经济体，日本处于有利地位，它能够成为美国在亚洲利益的主要倡导者。到目前为止，这一潜力基本上没有得到充分利用，美国在1997年东亚金融危机后干预日本建立亚洲货币基金组织的努力，阻碍了日本最初对地区多边主义进行的尝试。然而，最近，日本已成为独立于美国的区域一体化的更积极支持者，加强了对亚太经济合作组织和东南亚国家联盟等区域机构的参与力度。此外，东京方面还带头在2018年通过《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》。

While Japan’s independence and leadershipis a positive development, its growing assertiveness creates new risks for theUnited States. In particular, Japan may begin to hedge against its commitmentsto the United States if the U.S.-led liberal international order continues tosplinter from the frictions caused by globalization, technological disruption,and the fallout of the Great Recession. Already, Japan has demonstratedpragmatic instincts for alliance management. Tokyo’s economic investmentsacross the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s growing trade with China—which offsets thegeopolitical tensions between them—and even Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’stentative outreach to Russia’s Vladimir Putin, underscore this.

虽然日本的独立性和领导地位有着积极的进展，但它日益增长的自信给美国带来了新的风险。特别是，如果由美国所领导的自由主义国际秩序继续因为全球化、技术瓦解和大衰退的影响所造成的摩擦而分裂的话，日本就可能会开始回避它对美国的承诺。日本已经表现出对联盟进行管理的务实本能。东京在印太地区的经济投资、日本与中国日益增长的贸易规模——它抵消了两国之间的地缘政治紧张关系——甚至是日本首相安倍晋三与俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京的试探性的接触，都突显了这一点。

Going forward, Japan will retain itscritical ability to shape the contours of U.S. policy in Asia. As such, theUnited States should be cognizant of Japan’s shifting domestic economicpriorities as an aging society, as well as its security prerogatives as anisolated island nation lacking in vital natural resources and surrounded byexpansionist neighbors.

展望未来，日本将保持塑造美国亚洲政策轮廓的关键能力。因此，美国应该认识到，日本作为一个缺乏重要自然资源、被扩张主义的邻国包围的孤立岛国，其国内经济优先事项正在发生变化，其安全特权也在发生变化。

Adapting to Japanese Assertiveness

适应日本人的自信

Beginning with President Obama’s pivot toAsia, and continuing with the Trump administration’s “Free and OpenIndo-Pacific” strategy, which resurrects a concept submitted by Abe in 2006,the United States has begun to scale back its self-imposed limits on militaryengagement in Asia since the Vietnam War. The informal Quadrilateral SecurityDialogue (Quad), comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and India,also reconfirms Washington’s commitment to a robust Japan.

从奥巴马总统提出的重返亚洲战略开始，一直延续到特朗普政府的“自由开放的印度洋-太平岗”战略——它重新启用了安倍在2006年提出的一个概念，自越南战争以来，美国已经开始缩减自己强加的在亚洲的军事事务参与方面的限制。由美国、日本、澳大利亚和印度组成的非正式四方安全对话也重申了华盛顿对一个强大的日本的承诺。

Key to U.S. support for Japan is itsforward defense emplacements protecting the freedom of navigation and rule oflaw in the Western Pacific. The U.S. military presence in Japan, however, is aperennial source of animus for Japanese left-wing ideologues and extremepacifists, as well as for the people of Okinawa—which hosts half of thefifty-four thousand American troops currently stationed in Japan. Noisepollution, violent crime, and aircraft accidents have been recurrent problemsaffecting Okinawans. The United States favors relocating its primary militaryoutpost in Okinawa to a less populous coastal area on the island, but first, itmust contend with local political posturing to end military operations thereentirely.

美国支持日本的关键是，日本在西太平洋部署了保护航行自由和法律规则的前沿防御工事。然而，美国在日本的军事存在是日本左翼空想家和极端和平主义者以及冲绳岛人民长期以来的敌意来源。目前驻扎在日本的5.4万美军中，有一半驻扎在冲绳岛。噪音污染、暴力犯罪和飞机事故是影响冲绳人的经常性问题。美国倾向于将其在冲绳的主要军事前哨基地搬迁到人口较少的冲绳岛沿海地区，但首先，它必须与当地的政治局势斗争，以完全结束在那里的军事行动。

Given China’s military buildup in the SouthChina Sea and encroachment on the Senkaku Islands, the United States will beunder increasing pressure to mitigate Okinawan dissatisfaction with itsmilitary bases. A recent proposal by former Deputy Secretary of State RichardArmitage and Harvard scholar Joseph Nye, to introduce jointly-operated bases onthe Japanese mainland, could reduce the potential for Okinawa to become a wedgeissue in the bilateral relationship.

有鉴于中国在南中国海的军事集结和对钓鱼岛的侵占，美国将面临越来越大的减轻冲绳人对其军事基地的不满的压力。美国前副国务卿阿米蒂奇和哈佛大学的学者约瑟夫·奈最近提出的在日本大陆建立联合军事基地的建议，可能会降低冲绳成为两国关系中一个分裂问题的可能性。

During the Cold War, successive U.S.administrations sought a larger role for Japan in the defense of Korea andTaiwan from communist encroachment. While Japan’s pacifist orientation hasgradually eroded, Article 9 of Japan’s constitution remains a confoundingobstacle for military expansion. Efforts to adjust the scope of Article9—including security legislation in 2015 reinterpreting the article to permitcollective defense—face staunch public resistance. A motion by Abe to amendArticle 9 by 2021 remains unlikely to pass political muster. However, publicopinion surveys also demonstrate a majority believe that constitutionalrevision will be necessary in the future.

在冷战期间，历届美国政府都希望日本在保卫韩国和台湾地区免受GC主义侵略方面发挥更大的作用。虽然日本的和平主义倾向已逐渐受到侵蚀，但《日本宪法》第九条仍然是军事扩张的一个令人困惑的障碍。调整第九条适用范围的努力——包括2015年的安全立法，重新解释该条以允许实施集体防御——面临着公众的坚决抵制。安倍提出的到2021年修改第九条的动议仍不太可能通过政治审查。然而，民意调查也显示，大多数人认为未来将有必要修改宪法。

Japan’s conflicted view towards Article 9dovetails with recent policy adjustments by the Abe government. These include(1) the establishment of a National Security Council modeled after the White HouseNSC in 2013; (2) the reversal of a half-century ban on arms exports in 2014;(3) the streamlining of defense technology acquisition guidelines also in 2014;(4) the launch of a government program funding scientific research with“dual-use” military and civilian applications in 2015; and (5) the erasure of aforty-year cap on military spending at 1 percent of GDP in 2017. The animatingfeatures of Japan’s threat horizon—China’s military expansion and North Korea’snuclear ambitions—will continue stoking Tokyo’s resolve to undertake a moreenergetic foreign policy and defense posture.

日本对第九条的矛盾看法与安倍政府最近的政策调整相吻合。其中包括：（一）效仿2013年白宫国家安全委员会之例建立国家安全委员会；（二）在2014年取消了长达半个世纪的武器出口禁令；（三）2014年国防技术采购指南的精简；（四）2015年启动“军民两用”科研经费资助项目；（五）在2017年取消军事开支占国内生产总值 1%的长达四十年的上限。日本即将面临的威胁——中国的军事扩张和朝鲜的核野心——将继续坚定日本采取更积极的外交政策和防御姿态的决心。

Harnessing Japan in Asia

在亚洲驾驭日本

However, Tokyo’s efforts to become aregional leader are counterpoised by the unrelenting burden of war memory onJapan’s relations with China and Korea. Despite the complications posed byChina’s and Korea’s co-option of history for strategic gain, Japan can assumethe mantle of an honest broker in the region. But first, it will need to squareits official statements of apology and regret for World War II, not so muchwith the undercutting views and actions of a few right-wing politicians, butwith the general antipathy that younger Japanese feel for Chinese and Koreans.By so doing, Japan has the potential to support the United States through constructiveengagement with China and Korea—key stakeholders in the ongoing debatesconcerning weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and climate change, amongother important transnational issues.

然而，日本想要成为地区领导人的努力，与日本与中国和韩国关系中挥之不去的战争记忆负担相抵消了。尽管中国和韩国为了战略利益而在历史方面展开合作的做法带来了复杂性，但日本可以在该地区担当起诚实中间人的角色。然而首先，它需要将其对二战的道歉和遗憾的官方声明与少数右翼政客的观点和行动联系起来，而不是与日本年轻人对中国和韩国人的普遍反感联系起来。通过这样做，日本有可能通过与中国和韩国的建设性接触来支持美国。在目前有关武器扩散、全球恐怖主义和气候变化等重要跨国问题的辩论中，中国和韩国是关键的利益攸关方。

At the same time, while reaffirmingtraditional security and trade expectations for Japan, the United States shouldexplore new avenues for bilateral cooperation, further opening Japan’s domesticeconomy and bolstering its international profile through joint investment inAsia. The intermittent U.S.-Japan Economic Dialogue , chaired by Vice PresidentMike Pence and Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, offers a preliminary frameworkfor sectoral cooperation in digital, energy, and transportation infrastructuredevelopment. The reconstituted “free, fair, and reciprocal” talks between U.S.Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and Economic Revitalization Minister ToshimitsuMotegi, among other dialogues, should move beyond bilateral tradenegotiations towards a similar comprehensive program of joint investment in theIndo-Pacific.

同时，在重申对日本传统安全和贸易期待的同时，美国应探索双边合作的新途径，进一步开放日本国内经济，通过在亚洲的联合投资提升日本的国际形象。美国副总统彭斯和日本副首相麻生太郎主持的断断续续的美日经济对话会议为数字、能源和交通基础设施发展等领域的合作提供了初步框架。美国贸易代表罗伯特·莱特希泽和日本经济产业大臣茂木敏充之间重新组建的“自由、公平和互惠”会谈，以及其他对话，应该超越双边贸易谈判，朝着在印太地区进行共同投资的类似全面计划迈进。

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific and Quadoffer a further means of harnessing the U.S. alliance network in a cohesiveAsia strategy pressuring China and Russia to respect international norms.American can help cultivate Tokyo’s relations with Canberra and New Delhi.Moreover, Washington has the opportunity to proactively engage criticaldecision makers like Beijing, Moscow, and ASEAN on any number ofnon-traditional security challenges affecting the region. In particular,ASEAN’s opposition to the rise of a hegemon in Asia aligns with U.S. andJapanese efforts to limit China’s influence, offering a strong basis fortrilateral cooperation. However, recent trade frictions threaten to decouplethe web of global production systems and trade agreements which are the ballastof the liberal international order. The next several years will be critical forthe preservation of U.S. strategic preeminence in the region.

自由开放的印度洋-太平洋和非正式四方安全对话提供了进一步利用美国联盟网络的手段，形成一个紧密结合的亚洲战略，迫使中国和俄罗斯尊重国际准则。美国可以帮助培养东京与堪培拉和新德里之间的关系。此外，华盛顿将有机会积极接触北京、莫斯科和东盟等关键决策者，共同应对影响该地区的任何非传统安全挑战。特别是，东盟反对亚洲霸权的崛起，与美国和日本限制中国影响力的努力是一致的，从而为三边合作提供了强有力的基础。然而，最近的贸易摩擦有可能使作为自由国际秩序基石的全球生产体系和贸易协定的网络脱钩。未来几年对于保持美国在该地区的战略优势而言是至关重要的。

Japan has the potential to emerge as a keybroker in the crucial discussions taking shape, given its strong tiesthroughout Southeast Asia and economic symbiosis with China. Therefore, theUnited States should double down on Japan as a champion of liberal values inAsia.
鉴于日本与东南亚各国的紧密关系，以及与中国的经济共生关系，日本有可能成为正在形成的关键谈判中的关键中间人。因此，作为亚洲自由价值观的捍卫者，美国应该对日本加倍下注。