限制中国在南中国海宏伟计划的战略 [美国媒体]

Wanted: A Strategy to Limit China's Grand Plans for the South China Sea

限制中国在南中国海宏伟计划的战略



Dean Cheng
January 30, 2018
成斌（Dean Cheng）：华盛顿智囊机构，美国传统基金会亚洲研究中心的高级研究员。
2018年1月30号

Image: The aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) steams through the South China Sea July 8, 2012. George Washington was under way conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Paul Kelly, U.S. Navy/Released). Flickr / U.S. Department of Defense

图片:美国乔治·华盛顿号航空母舰于2012年7月8日在中国南海上空飞行。乔治·华盛顿正在指挥美国第七舰队的海上安全行动和战区安全合作。(美国防部图片由大众传播专家保罗凯利，美国海军/释放)。Flickr /美国国防部。

The United States needs to play an active role in helping broker resistance to the Chinese political push.

美国需要在帮助代理人抵制中国政治压力方面发挥积极作用。

The United States has significantly accelerated the pace of it freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. Last year it conducted four such operations in the span of five months. This contrasts with the four FONOPs conducted during President Barack Obama’s entire second term.

美国在南中国海的航行自由行动(FONOPs)的步伐明显加快。去年，它在五个月的时间里进行了四次这样的行动。这与美国总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)整个第二任期期间实施的四次航行自由行动形成了鲜明对比。

On January 17, the USS Hopper, a U.S. Arleigh-Burke-class destroyer, conducted the first FONOPs of 2018. This one occurred near Scarborough Shoal, much farther north than the previous operations. Like those earlier FONOPs, it rapidly drew a rebuke from the People’s Republic of China.

1月17日，美国阿利尔-伯克级驱逐舰“霍珀号”(USS Hopper)进行了2018年的第一次航行自由行动。这一次行动发生在斯卡伯勒浅滩（黄岩岛）附近，比之前的行动要更靠近北方。就像那些之前进行的航行自由行动一样，这次行动很快受到了中华人民共和国的谴责。

China’s Defense Ministry spokesman declared that the repeated “illegal” entry (feifa jinru; 非法进入) of American warships to Chinese island groupings and maritime regions in the South China Sea endangered both sides. He condemned the operations as a threat to Chinese sovereignty and security and said they disrupted regional security and stability.

中国国防部发言人称，美国军舰反复“非法”进入(feifa jinru;非法进入)中国在南中国海地区的群岛和海域使双方都陷入危险之中。他谴责这些行动是对中国主权和安全的威胁，并说这些行动破坏了地区安全与稳定。

Scarborough Shoal has been a source of ongoing friction. Claimed by both China and the Philippines, it was the scene of a confrontation between Manila and Beijing in 2012. The United States brokered what was supposed to be a mutual withdrawal, but which saw the Chinese remain establishing effective control over the area. Thus far, however, Beijing has refrained from engaging in the kind of island reclamation or building at Scarborough that it has conducted in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.

斯卡伯勒浅滩（黄岩岛）一直是不断摩擦的根源。中国和菲律宾都宣称拥有该岛的主权，起源于2012年马尼拉和北京之间的对峙局面。美国作为中间人促成了双方所谓的相互撤离，但中国仍然对该地区建立了有效的控制。但是，到目前为止，北京方面保持了克制，并没有在斯卡伯勒浅滩（黄岩岛）上进行填海造岛或建设建筑物，如同他们在西沙群岛和南沙群岛所做的那样。

But that restraint may be coming to a close. China’s state-run news agencies nowopenly acknowledge that the nation has, indeed, engaged in significant land reclamation and artificial island building in the South China Sea region. Chinese media have also unveiled a number of new dredges. This includes theTian Kun Ho, one of the most powerful excavation vessels in Asia. The 140-meter-long vessel can reportedly dredge six thousand cubic meters per hour, and reach thirty-five meters below the ocean surface. Beijing appears to be warning that it can engage in rapid island development at any time—and Scarborough Shoal is potentially one of those sites.

但这种克制可能即将结束。中国的国有新闻机构现在公开承认，中国确实在南中国海地区从事了重要的土地开发和人造岛屿建设。中国媒体也公开了一些新的挖泥船。这其中包括亚洲最强大的挖掘船之一的天鲲号(Tian Kun Ho)。据报道，这艘长140米的船每小时可以疏浚6千立方米的泥沙，并且最深可以在海平面35米以下工作。北京方面出现了它可以在任何时候进行快速的岛屿开发的警告，而斯卡伯勒浅滩（黄岩岛）可能就是其中之一。

China’s Position on the South China Sea

中国在南海问题上的立场。

The People’s Republic of China has long promulgated a map of the South China Sea that includes a “nine dash line” encompassing most of the region. Based upon a map initially published by the Republic of China, Beijing has been ambiguous over what exactly the nine-dash line represents. Is it a claim over the land features within it, including the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal? Or is it an assertion that the entire region, including the waters, belongs to Beijing, essentially making the South China Sea its territorial waters? Its behavior, including repeatedly interfering with American warships and military aircraft transiting the region, would seem to suggest the latter. Beijing, however, has protested this view, arguing that it has never interfered with civilian ships on the sea lanes that traverse the area.

中华人民共和国长期以来发布了一份包括“九段线”在内的包含大部分海域的南中国海地图。根据《中华民国》最初发表的一份地图，北京对九段线的确切含义一直模棱两可。它是对包括西沙群岛、南沙群岛和斯卡伯勒浅滩（黄岩岛）在内的岛屿部分拥有主权的要求吗?还是说整个地区，包括水域，都属于北京，本质上是使南中国海成为其领海?它的行为，包括多次干扰美国军舰和军用飞机经过该地区，似乎暗示了后者。然而，北京方面对这一观点提出了抗议，称其从未干扰过穿越该地区的海上航道的民用船只。

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled on a complaint against China filed by the Philippines, as part of the binding arbitration applicable to signatories of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which both the Philippines and China are parties. The PCA ruled on a number of elements, in almost all cases dinding finding in favor of Manila. This included a ruling that China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, within the area encompassed by the nine-dash line was contrary to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and without lawful effect.

2016年，海牙常设仲裁法庭(PCA)就菲律宾提起的对中国的诉讼作出裁决，这是适用于《联合国海洋法公约》(UNCLOS)签署国的具有约束力的仲裁的一部分，菲律宾和中国都是该公约的缔约国。海牙常设仲裁法庭对很多方面都做出了裁决，几乎所有的裁决都支持马尼拉。其中一项裁决表明，中国在九段线所涵盖的区域内对历史权利的主张，或其他主权权利或管辖权，违反了《联合国海洋法公约》(UNCLOS)，没有法律效力。

But Beijing bluntly rejected the findings, often in very intemperate terms. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang described the PCA as a “law-abusing tribunal” engaging in a “farce.” China’s ambassador to the United States, Cui Tiankai, accused the tribunal of “professional incompetence” and “questionable integrity.” Indeed, since the ruling, Beijing has expanded its military presence, despite promises to President Obama not to “militarize” the South China Sea.

但北京方面以非常激烈的言辞直截了当地拒绝了这些裁决结果。中国外交部发言人陆康称海牙常设仲裁法庭（PCA）是一个制造闹剧的“滥用法律的法庭”。中国驻美国大使崔天凯指责法庭“没有专业资格”并存在“诚信问题”。事实上，自这项裁决以来，中国政府已经扩大了其军事存在，尽管它曾承诺奥巴马总统不会“军事化”南中国海。

Meanwhile, Chinese actions have also increasingly worried Indonesia. Indonesian territory extends to Natuna Island and an associated array of natural gas fields in the southwestern portion of the South China Sea. Chinese fishing boats have steadily encroached on its waters—much like they had on Scarborough Shoal. More alarming, one Chinese fishing boat detained by Indonesian authorities for illegal fishing has been seized back by the China Coast Guard. China’s growing naval capabilities have therefore also raised concerns. Most worrisome, Indonesian requests to clarify whether Natuna Island (and the surrounding waters) are encompassed within the nine-dash line have not received official clarification from Beijing. Instead, the PRC has said that, while it recognizes Indonesian sovereignty over Natuna island, it still retains “overlapping claims to maritime rights and interests.”

与此同时，中国的行动也越来越让印尼担忧。印度尼西亚的领土延伸到的纳图纳岛和南中国海西南部分的天然气田相重叠。中国渔船不断地侵占其水域，就像在斯卡伯勒浅滩（黄岩岛）一样。更令人担忧的是，一艘被印尼当局扣押的非法捕鱼的中国渔船被中国海岸警卫队夺回去了。因此，中国日益增长的海军实力也引发了担忧。最令人担忧的是，印尼要求澄清纳图纳岛(以及周围水域)是否在九段线以内，尚未得到北京方面的官方澄清。相反，中国表示，尽管它承认印尼对纳图纳岛的主权，但它仍保留“重叠地区的海洋权益的主张”。

These issues led Indonesia to expand military facilities near Natuna in 2016. This has included expanding the island’s runway and increasing the number of troops deployed there. In 2017, Djakarta announced that it would rename the area near Natuna, within its own Exclusive Economic Zone, the North Natuna Sea. The Chinese promptly rejected this move, warning that it would not be “conducive” to good relations.

这些问题导致印尼在2016年扩大了在纳图纳附近的军事设施。其中包括扩大该岛的跑道，增加部署在那里的军队数量。在2017年，雅加达宣布，它将把纳图纳附近的地区改名为北纳图纳海。中国立即反对了这一行动，并警告称，这不会“有利于”双方良好的关系。

The name change has been implicitly endorsed by the United States, however. Secretary of Defense James Mattis used the term while visiting Indonesia,saying, “We can help maintain maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea, the North Natuna Sea. . . . This is something that we look forward to doing.”

然而，改名已经被美国暗中认可。美国国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯在访问印尼时使用了这个词，他访问印尼时说:“我们可以帮助维护南中国海的领海权意识，北纳图纳海……这是我们期待着做的事情。”

An Integrated Course of Action for the Future

未来的综合行动方针。

There is no reason to think the Chinese will back away from their increasingly assertive stance toward the South China Sea. Far from opening to compromise, Beijing has steadily tightened its grip over the area, while its actions toward Indonesia suggest that its ambitions may extend even further. Beijing is clearly engaged in a long-term effort. It is essential, then, for the United States to have short-, medium-, and long-term responses.

没有理由认为中国会放弃对南中国海日益强硬的立场。北京方面非但没有妥协，反而稳步收紧了对该地区的控制，而其对印尼的行动表明，它的雄心可能会进一步扩大。中国政府显然在长期努力。因此，美国有必要采取短期、中期和长期的应对措施。

Short-Term: Slowing Down Chinese Actions

短期:减缓中国的行动。

One of the great challenges has been China’s island construction. Literally moving earth and sea, Beijing has built entirely new islands, complete with airfields and military installations, and thereby changing the facts on the ground. The growing strength of all parts of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—including the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and the PLA Rocket Forces—makes challenging China an ever more dangerous proposition.

中国的岛屿建设是最大的挑战之一。北京已经填海造陆，建造了全新的岛屿，包括机场和军事设施，从而根本上改变了的现实。中国人民解放军(PLA)的所有部队，包括PLA海军、PLA空军、和PLA火箭部队的不断增强的力量，使得挑战中国成为一个更加危险的命题。

But China’s ability to build these islands rests upon certain companies, such as the state-owned China Communications Construction Company, and their attendant ability to build and maintain dredging capabilities. Insofar as their dredging equipment relies on imported parts, restricting the sale and supply of those parts can affect the pace of operations. The Tian Kun Hao’s predecessor, the Tianjing, clearly relies on imported equipment.

但中国建造这些岛屿的能力取决于某些公司，比如国有的中国交通建设公司(China Communications Construction Company)，以及与之相关的建造能力和维持的疏浚能力。由于他们的疏浚设备依赖进口部件，限制销售和供应这些部件会影响岛屿开发的速度。天鲲号的前身天鲸号，显然依赖进口设备。

It is also possible to restrict the operations of some companies engaged in Beijing’s dredging operations. Not all are state-owned enterprises. Some are commercial entities, based in China and Hong Kong. Denying them the ability to bid on commercial contracts in the United States (and, ideally, Japan, Australia and Europe), would compel them to assess whether South China Sea operations are worth the price. State-owned enterprises, too, can be vulnerable to sanctions. Even though they are less vulnerable to sanctions, China would nonetheless like to expand their global footprint. By publicizing their role in South China Sea activities, and imposing sanctions on their operations, it may be possible to limit their international presence, or at least affect perceptions of them.

限制一些参与北京的疏浚工程的公司的业务也是有可能（减缓中国的行动）。不是所有的都是国有企业。一些是位于中国（大陆）和香港的商业实体。拒绝他们在美国(日本、澳大利亚和欧洲加入则更为理想)投标商业合同的能力，将迫使他们评估南中国海的行动是否物有所值。国有企业也能被制裁。尽管他们相对来说不太容易受到制裁，但中国仍希望扩大他们的全球足迹。通过宣传他们在南中国海活动中的作用，并对他们的行动实施制裁，可能会限制他们在国际上的存在，或者至少影响对他们的看法。

Medium-Term: Improving Local Coordination and Capacity

中期:改善地区的协调和能力。

Perhaps the greatest political challenge to limiting Chinese action is the lack of coordinated responses among the other claimants. In the Spratly Islands, it is not a matter of ASEAN states versus China, but rather an array of mutually challenging claims. Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines all claim at least parts of the Spratly Islands. For there to be any hope for balancing the Chinese political push, the local states must first reach a common negotiating stance among themselves. The United States needs to play an active role in helping broker such a stance among Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Hanoi.

限制中国行动的最大政治挑战或许是其他声索国缺乏协调一致的回应。在南沙群岛，不是东盟国家整体与中国相抗衡，而是一系列声索国相互挑战彼此的主张。马来西亚、越南、文莱和菲律宾都声称至少有部分南沙群岛。要想平衡中国的政治压力，这一地区的政府必须首先在自己之间达成一种共同的谈判立场。美国需要在吉隆坡、马尼拉和河内的斡旋中发挥积极作用。

Similarly, any kind of common Southeast Asian response to China must eventually include Indonesia, the most populous of the ASEAN members. ASEAN is unlikely to assume a direct military-security role, but enhancing the members’ mutual information-sharing, maritime domain awareness, and general situational awareness would facilitate intra-ASEAN confidence. The inability to determine the fate of Malaysian Airlines MH17 underscores the general utility such improved information sharing could have, regardless of Chinese claims in the region.

同样，东南亚对中国的任何一种共同回应，最终都必须包括东盟成员国中人口最多的印尼。东盟不太可能直接发挥军事安全作用，但加强成员国之间的信息共享、海上领海权的意识和总体态势的认知，都将有助于东盟内部的信心。无法确定马航MH17航班的命运，这突显出，无论中国在该地区的主张如何，这种改进的信息共享都有可能实现。

Improving local coordination will also require rehabilitating relations with Thailand. Within ASEAN, Thailand is the fourth most populous nation, boasting the second largest GDP (in nominal terms) and one of the largest militaries. It is also a U.S. ally and has been a key partner in many U.S. military interventions in the post–Cold War era. It is also centrally located as part of the “Indo-Pacific” region.

改善地区之间的协调也需要恢复与泰国的关系。在东盟内部，泰国是第四大人口大国，其国内生产总值(名义GDP)位居第二，拥有世界上最大的军队之一。它不仅是美国的盟友，也是冷战后美国很多军事干预行动的主要伙伴。而且位于“印度-太平洋”地区的中心位置。

But Thailand’s 2014 coup and the regime’s subsequent suppression of public dissent are inconsistent with American sensibilities, severely complicating Washington’s relations with Bangkok. The United States should certainly not approve of such moves, and should strive to shift Thailand back on a path to civilian rule and orderly civil-military relations. But just as the United States nonetheless maintained coordination and interaction with the Egyptian military in the wake of its toppling of Mohammed Morsi, strategic calculations should be integrated into our handling of Thailand.

但是，泰国2014年的政变以及随后政府对民众的不满情绪的压制与美国人的情感相矛盾，严重影响了华盛顿与曼谷的关系。美国当然不应该赞成这样的举动，应该努力把泰国重新回到平民统治和有秩序的军民关系的道路上来。但正如美国在推翻埃及总统穆罕默德•穆尔西(Mohammed Morsi)之后，仍保持与埃及军方的协调和互动，战略计算应该纳入到我们对泰国的处理中来。

Long-Term: Building New Approaches

长期：建立新的路径

At the end of the day, these moves underscore that the United States cannot, by itself, manage, much less resolve, the South China Sea issue. But as President Trump indicated at the recent World Economic Forum, “America first” is not the same as America alone. Similarly, while there are many things that America can do to help balance China, more can be achieved in conjunction with other states.

考虑到所有情况后，这些举措凸显出，美国不能独自应对南中国海问题。但正如特朗普总统在最近的世界经济论坛(World Economic Forum)上指出的那样，“美国优先”与美国孤立不同。同样，尽管美国可以做很多事情来帮助（地区国家）来平衡中国，但更多的事情应该与其他国家一起实现。

The nascent “quad” of the United States, Japan, Australia and India offers a potential new path for addressing some of the South China Sea issues. When officials from the four states met during President Trump’s November circuit of Asia, it gave new life to the concept, which has hibernated for nearly a decade.

美国、日本、澳大利亚和印度的新兴的“四方”为解决南中国海的问题提供了一条可能的新途径。当这四个国家的官员在特朗普总统11月的亚洲巡回会议期间的会面，给这个已经持续了近十年的概念注入了新的活力。

The “quad” is not—and should not be—an effort at creating a regional-alliance structure. The four states have very divergent views on security, as well as national constraints on their ability to interoperate. But facilitating political and diplomatic coordination among these states, and perhaps advancing certain economic and political policies jointly, can provide a significant underpinning for individual- and bilateral-security moves.

这“四方”不是也不应该是努力建立一个区域联盟结构。这四个国家在安全问题上的意见分歧很大，而且各国对它们的互操作能力也存在限制。但是，促进这些国家之间的政治和外交协调，并共同推进某些经济和政治政策，可以为个人和双边安全行动提供重要的基础。

At the same time, should China choose to adjust its approach and refrain from further destabilizing the region with its artificial island construction efforts, an informal “quad” is far better placed to respond positively than a formal alliance which presupposes incipient hostilities.

与此同时，要使中国选择调整自己的做法，并避免在其人造岛屿建设努力下进一步破坏该地区的稳定，一个非正式的“四方”比一个预先假定的敌对行动的正式联盟要积极得多。

Prospects: Still a Question Mark

前景:仍然是个问号。

The Trump administration continues to be a work-in-progress. For that matter, so is Xi Jinping’s administration. We have yet to fully understand the impact of the personnel changes announced in the 19th Party Congress, including the elevation of Yang Jiechi to the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and Wang Huning to the Politburo Standing Committee. The next several years may see a mutual focus on domestic economic development, and, if so, then there will be a significant likelihood of cooperation.

特朗普政府仍在继续努力工作。对于这一点，中国也是如此。未来几年，双方可能会把重点放在国内经济发展上，如果是这样的话，那么合作的可能性就会很大。

But the past decade suggests that there is growing friction in the South China Sea, and recent events give us little reason to believe that trend is changing. What will follow in the wake of the USS Hopper FONOPs remains to be seen, but it might be best to batten the hatches.

但过去的十年表明，南中国海的摩擦日益加剧，最近的事件让我们没有理由相信，这种趋势正在发生变化。在美国海军霍珀号驱逐舰航行自由行动之后将会发生什么还有待观察，但最好是未雨绸缪。