美媒：封锁，赢得对华战争的最终途径？ [美国媒体]

Blockade: The Ultimate Way to Win a War Against China?

美媒：封锁，赢得对华战争的最终途径？



by Sean Mirski July 30, 2018
If the United States were able to assemble its minimum coalition of India, Japan and Russia—a task that would hinge on China’s aggressive behavior—then China’s rate of economic exhaustion would sharply accelerate even as the United States gained the political support it would need to continue a blockading strategy indefinitely. In this context, while the United States would not be able to use Beijing’s dependence on maritime trade to defeat China decisively in one short blow, it would still be able to help sap Chinese strength until Beijing eventually submitted.

如果美国能够组建一个由印度、日本和俄罗斯组成的最低限度的联盟——这项任务将取决于中国的侵略行为ーー那么中国的经济衰竭速度会急剧加速，即使美国获得了政治支持，也需要无限期地继续实施封锁战略。 在这种情况下，虽然美国无法利用北京对海上贸易的依赖在短暂的一击中快速地击败中国，但它仍将有助于在北京最终屈服之前削弱中国的实力。

The mounting challenge presented by China’s military modernization has led the United States to review existing military strategies and to conceptualize new ones, as illustrated by the ongoing debate over AirSea Battle (ASB), a new concept of operations put forward by the Department of Defense. But in the universe of possible strategies, the idea of a naval blockade deserves greater scrutiny. By prosecuting a naval blockade, the United States would leverage China’s intense dependence on foreign trade—particularly oil—to debilitate the Chinese state. A carefully organized blockade could thus serve as a powerful instrument of American military power that contributes to overcoming the pressing challenge of China’s formidable anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) system. A blockade could also be easily paired with alternate military strategies, including those based on ASB.

中国军事现代化带来的日益严峻的挑战促使美国重新审视现有的军事战略，并将新的战略概念化，正如正在进行的关于“空海一体战”(ASB)的辩论所表明的那样，这是美国国防部提出的一个新的作战概念。 但是在可能的战略范围内，海上封锁的想法值得更仔细的研究。
通过诉诸海上封锁，美国将利用中国对外贸的强烈依赖，特别是对石油的依赖，来削弱中国的国力。 因此，精心组织的封锁可以成为美国军事力量的有力工具，有助于克服中国强大的反通道和区域封锁体系的紧迫挑战，封锁也可以很容易地与相应的军事战略匹配，包括那些基“空海一体战”(ASB)的战略。

In the context of a Sino-American war, the United States could try to take China’s greatest national strength—its export-oriented, booming economic-growth model—and transform it into a major military weakness. To do so, the United States would implement a naval blockade of China that attempted to choke off most of China’s maritime trade. Under the right conditions, the United States might be able to secure victory by debilitating China’s economy severely enough to bring it to the negotiating table.

在中美战争的背景下，美国可以尝试利用中国最强大的国力来源ーー以出口导向型、蓬勃发展的经济增长模式ーー并将其转变为一个重大的军事弱点。 为此，美国将对中国实施海上封锁，试图切断中国的大部分海上贸易，在适当的条件下，美国或许能够通过严重削弱中国经济，将其带到谈判桌上，从而取得胜利。

Yet until recently, a blockade strategy was largely overlooked, perhaps because economic warfare strategies seem inherently misguided given the close commercial ties between China and the United States. But if a serious conflict between the two nations erupted, then their immediate security interests would quickly override their trade interdependence and wreak enormous economic damage on both sides, regardless of whether a blockade were employed.

然而，直到最近，封锁战略一直在很大程度上都被忽视了，也许是因为考虑到中美之间密切的商业联系，经济战略似乎天生就被忽视，但是，如果两国之间爆发严重冲突，那么它们的直接安全利益将很快压倒双方的贸易相互依存关系，对双方造成巨大的经济损害，无论是否实行了封锁。



The Strategic Context

战略背景

A blockade would not be employed lightly by the United States, given its significant potential costs. Accordingly, Washington would likely only consider employing a blockade in a protracted conflict over vital interests; anything less would simply fail a basic cost-benefit analysis.
More importantly, though, a blockade strategy would depend on the cooperation of several third parties in the region. After all, China’s trade is borne on the seas largely as a result of economic considerations rather than physical limitations; if China were blockaded, it would turn to the countries on its borders for help.

鉴于封锁的潜在代价巨大，美国不会轻易实行封锁。 因此，华盛顿可能只会考虑在一场旷日持久的冲突中对重大利益采取封锁措施，否则的话，根本就无法进行基本的成本效益分析。
然而，更重要的是，封锁战略将取决于该区域若干第三方的合作。 毕竟，对中国贸易的封锁在很大程度上是出于经济方面的考虑，而不是物理上的限制，如果中国被封锁，它可能会求助于其边界上的国家。

While many of its neighbors would be unable to make a strategic difference because of their rugged geography or their small size, three could prove vital: India, Japan, and Russia. The latter two would be important in helping the United States by cutting off China’s trade routes in its south and east, respectively, through implementing national embargoes on China and pressuring their smaller neighbors to do the same. Without their cooperation, the United States’ task would become much more difficult.

虽然它的许多邻国由于地理崎岖或面积小而无法发挥战略作用，但有三个国家可能被证明是至关重要的：印度、日本和俄罗斯，后两者将在帮助美国的同时，通过对中国实施国家禁运，并迫使其较小的邻国采取同样的措施，将有助于美国切断中国在南部和东部的贸易路线，没有他们的合作，美国的任务将变得更加困难。

The last of the three neighbors—Russia—would be the lynchpin of a successful blockade, and could tip the balance of a blockade in favor of either China or the United States. On the one hand, Russia is remarkably well-positioned to alleviate the blockade’s effects on China. Russian trade would be immune to American interdiction, since Russia’s nuclear arsenal and significant conventional assets preclude any serious American attempts at military coercion. But on the other hand, China’s northern neighbor could also sound the death knell for China’s ability to resist a blockade. On the political level, Moscow continues to exert sway over the decisions made in the capitals of China’s Central Asian neighbors and could convince them to refuse Chinese entreaties to act as transit states. It could also guarantee that China’s two neighboring oil producers would no longer supply it with petroleum.

三个邻国中的最后一个邻国ーー俄罗斯ーー将成为成功封锁的关键，并可能打破封锁的平衡，使天平偏向中国或美国。 一方面，俄罗斯在缓解封锁对中国的影响方面处于非常有利的地位，俄罗斯的贸易不会受到美国的阻拦，因为俄罗斯的核武库和重要的常规武力排除了美国任何严重的军事胁迫企图。
但另一方面，中国的北方邻居也可能为中国抵御封锁的能力敲响丧钟。在政治层面上，莫斯科继续对中亚各国的决策施加影响，并且能够说服他们拒绝中国过境的请求， 它还可以保证中国的两个邻国石油生产商不再向中国供应石油。

Accordingly, for the United States to implement a strategically effective blockade of China, it would strive to build a “minimum coalition” with India, Japan, and Russia. If all three states made common cause with the American blockade, then China would be placed in both an economic and a political stranglehold. If not, however, a blockade strategy would regionalize a Sino-American war in a way that would be fundamentally unfavorable to American interests.

因此，为了让美国对中国实施战略上有效的封锁，美国将努力与印度、日本和俄罗斯建立一个"最低限度联盟"。 如果这三个国家都与美国的封锁达成共识，那么中国将被置于经济和政治的双重扼杀之中，然而，如果不这样做，封锁战略将会使中美战争以一种从根本上不利于美国利益的方式进行区域化。

Such a minimum coalition could only arise in one way: on the heels of an assertive Chinese push for regional hegemony that precipitates local support for a drastic American response. Short of anything but an aggressive China, collective embargo action will be deterred by the potential consequences of a blockade, not least of which is the possibility of a larger regional conflict with China. The four states are unlikely to coalesce together around an implicit containment policy until each feels that its national interests may be threatened by China in the future.

这样一个最低限度的联盟只能以一种方式出现：紧随着中国强硬地推行地区霸权主义，促使地区支持美国的激烈反应。除非中国咄咄逼人，否则集体禁运行动将被封锁的潜在后果所吓倒，尤其是与中国发生更大规模地区冲突的可能性。这四个国家不太可能团结在一项含蓄的遏制政策上，直到每个国家都觉得自己的国家利益在未来可能受到中国的威胁。

While such a possibility may appear distant at present, the United States, Japan, India and Russia all fear that Beijing might someday conclude that it must use force in order to protect its interests and to resolve its security dilemma on favorable terms. All four powers have increasingly hedged their bets against this possibility. If China’s power and influence in Asia continues to increase, then the bonds between all four states will strengthen, not out of any conviction about China’s belligerent intentions, but rather because of a profound uncertainty as to their future disposition.

尽管目前这种可能性似乎还很遥远，但美国、日本、印度和俄罗斯都担心，中国有朝一日可能会认为它必须使用武力来保护自己的利益，并以有利的条件解决其安全困境，四个大国都越来越多地对这种可能性进行了分析，如果中国在亚洲的力量和影响力继续增强，那么四国之间的联系将会加强，这并不是出于对中国好战意图的任何信念，而是因为他们未来的处置方式存在着深刻的不确定性。

The Central Operational Challenge

中央作战挑战

Even assuming that the United States can rally the necessary coalition together, it would squarely face an operational challenge that bedevils all modern-day blockade strategies.
Operationally, blockades are characterized by their distance from the coast of the blockaded state, and they come in two forms: close and distant. A close blockade is typically enforced by stationing a cordon of warships off an enemy’s shores to search all incoming or outgoing merchant ships and to impound those carrying contraband. Over the last century and a half, though, close blockades have become increasingly dangerous as belligerents developed the technology to project power from their coasts. In response, blockading powers have turned to distant blockades. A distant blockade avoids the military hazards of being located near the enemy’s shores by stationing itself at a distance, albeit still astride the enemy’s sea lanes, and it then chokes off the enemy’s trade in a similar manner to the close blockade.

即使假设美国能够团结起必要的联盟，它也会直面一个困扰所有现代封锁战略的行动挑战。
在作战上，封锁的特点是与被封锁的国家海岸有距离，它们有两种形式：近距离封锁和远距离封锁。 封锁通常是通过在敌人海岸设置一道军舰警戒线，搜查所有进出的商船，并扣押运送违禁品的船只，以此来实施封锁。 然而，在过去的一个半世纪里，交战各方开发了从海岸投射能量的技术，封锁的危险性越来越大，作为回应，封锁势力转向了远距离封锁，远距离封锁避免了靠近敌人海岸的军事危险，在一定距离内驻扎，仍然跨越在敌人的海道上，然后以类似于封锁的方式扼杀敌人的贸易。

Neither a close nor a distant blockade of China alone would be successful thanks to the constraints imposed by military requirements and the nature of maritime commerce. On the one hand, a conventional close blockade would be severely complicated by the United States’ desire to minimize the military risk to American warships. As American forces came closer to China, they would increasingly place themselves within range of China’s A2/AD complex, possibly limiting their operational freedom and resulting in heavy losses. American forces could avoid the perils of China’s A2/AD system by implementing a close blockade enforced by submarines, long-range air power, and mines; but by so doing, the blockade would also lose much of its ability to differentiate between neutral and enemy commerce.

由于军事需求的限制和海上贸易的性质，光靠对中国的近距离或远距离封锁是不可能成功的。一方面，由于美国希望尽量减少对美国军舰的军事风险，传统的封闭封锁将严重复杂化。随着美军越来越接近中国，他们将越来越多地置身于中国A2/AD综合体的范围内，这可能会限制他们的行动自由，并造成严重的损失。美国军队可以通过实施由潜艇、远程空中力量和水雷实施的严密封锁来避免中国的A2/AD系统的危险，但这样一来，封锁也就失去了区分中立和敌国贸易的许多能力。

On the other hand, the logic behind conventional distant blockades has similarly been undermined by the exigencies of modern commerce. Today’s cargoes of raw materials and merchandise can be sold and re-sold many times in the course of a voyage, so the ultimate ownership and destination of a ship’s cargo is often unknowable until the moment it docks. Although the United States might be able to set up a conventional distant blockade that quarantined all Chinese-owned or -flagged vessels, China could still simply buy neutral vessels’ cargoes after they had passed through the blockade, defeating its entire purpose.

另一方面，传统的远距离封锁背后的逻辑也同样被现代商业的迫切需要所破坏。今天的原材料和商品可以在航行过程中多次出售和转售，因此一艘船货物的最终所有权和目的地往往是直到它停靠的那一刻才知道的。尽管美国或许能够建立一种传统的远距离封锁，对所有中国拥有或悬挂中国国旗的船只进行隔离，但中国仍可以在中立船只通过封锁后直接购买它们的货物，从而战胜封锁。

The Solution: A Two-Ring Blockade

解决方案：双环封锁

To remedy the infirmities of the two blockades, the United States would take the best of both worlds and implement a “two-ring” blockade made up of two concentric rings around China’s shores.
The heart of the two-ring blockade would be its “inner ring,” which would be an unconventional close blockade primarily aimed at neutralizing vessels bound for China without having to board them first. This ring would establish an exclusion zone around China’s coast—an area that is declared off-limits to commercial shipping, and enforced by a “sink-on-sight” policy—through the use of attack submarines, long-distance airpower, and mines. Unlike other military assets, these three capabilities could operate with relative impunity within the range of China’s A2/AD complex by taking advantage of China’s feeble anti-submarine warfare capabilities and attenuated mine-countermeasure forces. While this trifecta of military assets would not guarantee total impassibility, the exclusion zone could still achieve the blockade’s aims because the fulcrum of the United States’ campaign would be grounded in deterrence rather than in force. As soon as American forces conspicuously sank several large merchant vessels, the majority of other shipping would be deterred from trying to run the blockade and much of the regular flow of China’s maritime commerce would quickly dry up.

为了弥补这两个封锁的弱点，美国将充分利用这两种封锁的优点，在中国海岸周围实施由两个同心圆环组成的“双环”封锁。两环封锁的核心将是其“内环”，这将是一种非常规的封闭封锁，主要目的是使开往中国的船只不再需要先登船。这一圈将在中国沿海建立一个禁区，这一区域被宣布禁止商业航运，并通过使用攻击潜艇、远程空中力量和水雷来实施“见底”政策。
与其他军事手段不同的是，这三种军事手段可以利用中国薄弱的反潜作战能力和被削弱的水雷对抗力量，在中国A2/AD综合体的范围内相对不受威胁地行动。虽然这三种军事手段不能保证完全的不可通过性，但禁区仍然可以实现封锁的目的，因为美国行动的支点是以威慑而不是武力为基础的，一旦美国军队击沉几艘大型商船，大多数其他船将被吓阻，而中国海上贸易的大部分正常流动将迅速枯竭。

But while submarines, long-distance airpower and mines could effectively enforce an exclusion zone as part of the inner ring blockade, they are all blunt instruments that can neither tell the difference between a ship carrying Chinese cargo and one carrying Japanese cargo, nor stop, board, and search suspicious vessels. As a result, an inner ring blockade on its own would likely spawn considerable political problems as the United States unintentionally destroyed neutral vessels, and Washington could face further political consequences from the exclusion zone’s inability to allow medical care and basic necessities through to China.

但是，尽管潜艇、远程空中力量和水雷可以作为内环封锁的一部分，有效地强制实施隔离区，但它们都是生硬的工具，既不能分辨运载中国货物的船只与运载日本货物的船只之间的区别，也不能拦截、登上和搜查可疑船只。其结果是，内部封锁本身可能会引发相当大的政治问题，因为美国无意中摧毁了中立船只，而华盛顿方面可能面临进一步的政治后果，因为隔离区无法允许医疗服务和基本必需品进入中国。



The United States could also implement a system similar to the British navicert system in World War II, which would give the United States a fairly accurate spatial map of the positions and trajectories of all commercial vessels in the region. The United States would then integrate the navicert spatial map with the inner ring’s firepower to exert deadly force against blockade runners while also decreasing the rate of accidental sinkings—especially of humanitarian vessels. While an imperfect process, the navicert system would nevertheless substantially raise the risks of deviation for vessels to the point where running the blockade was so sufficiently perilous that it was no longer attempted, except by the most risk-loving vessels. Perhaps more importantly, though, it would help mollify the political repercussions that would flow from the inner ring blockade’s non-discriminatory and lethal neutralizations.

美国还可以实施一个类似于第二次世界大战期间英国海军准运系统的系统，该系统将为美国提供该地区所有商业船只位置和轨迹的相当准确的空间地图。然后，美国将把准运空间地图与内环的火力结合起来，对封锁者施加致命的武力，同时也降低意外沉没的比率——特别是人道主义船只的沉没率。虽然这是一个不完美的过程，但海军准运系统将极大地提高船只偏离的风险，以至于除了喜欢风险的船只外，其他船只都不会再尝试突破封锁。然而，也许更重要的是，它将有助于缓和内环封锁的无差别性和致命的中立所产生的政治影响。

A Blockade’s Consequences

封锁的后果

Although the consequences of a blockade would be exceedingly complex, manifold, and interdependent, a blockade would likely prove to be a cogent instrument of exhaustion as part of the United States’ overall campaign.In the first place, however, it is worth recognizing that even the most effective blockade would not completely interdict Chinese trade, because even under ideal conditions, China would still be able to acquire the vital goods and resources courtesy of the inescapable laws of supply and demand. The more effectively the United States established a regional embargo, the higher the profit margins on selling imports to China. Even if all of China’s neighbors agreed to embargo, the United States would still have to resign itself to rampant smuggling at the substate level.

尽管封锁的后果将是极其复杂、多方面和相互依存的，但作为美国整体行动的一部分，封锁很可能被证明是一种令人信服的、有力的疲敌工具。
然而，首先，首先值得一提的是，即使是最有效的封锁也不会完全阻止中国的贸易，因为即使在理想的条件下，中国仍然能够凭借不可避免的供求规律获得重要的商品和资源。美国建立的地区禁运越有效，向中国出售进口商品的利润率就越高，即使中国的所有邻国都同意禁运，美国仍将不得不屈从于次于国家一级的猖獗走私活动。

A blockade would also not be able to directly debilitate the Chinese military. Simply put, China could use its reserves and stockpiles, along with a limited degree of imports and domestic production, to fuel its military machine for the length of the conflict.

封锁也不能直接削弱中国军队的力量。 简单地说，中国可以利用其储备和库存，以及有限程度的进口和国内生产，在冲突期间为其军事机器提供燃料，直至冲突结束。

Therefore, the real value of a blockade would be its ability to exact an incredibly high financial toll on Beijing. In particular, a blockade would send the Chinese economy into a tailspin by hitting three distinct pressure points: China’s dual dependency on both intermediate and raw material imports and its low levels of domestic innovation. China has structured much of its export-oriented economy around the importation of intermediate goods, a phenomenon particularly evident in its high-technology sectors. This vulnerability is further compounded by its incredible dependence on raw materials (including oil) and foreign innovation as the basis of its production processes.

因此，封锁的真正价值在于它能够给中国造成难以置信的高金融损失。 特别是，封锁打击了三个不同的压力点，导致中国经济陷入混乱：中国既依赖中间材料又依赖原材料，以及国内创新水平低下，中国大部分出口导向型经济都是围绕着中间产品的进口来构建的，这一现象在其高科技领域尤为明显，由于其对原材料(包括石油)和作为其生产工艺基础的外国创新的极度的依赖而进一步加剧。

Because a blockade targets all three areas, it would exact a staggering cost. Of course, China might discover ways as time passed to substitute for its inability to trade and it might rebuild its economy from the ground up, but an ongoing conflict could nevertheless impose a devastating rate of economic attrition that exceeds Beijing’s compensating abilities.

因为封锁针对所有这三个方面，这将使中国付出惊人的代价。当然，随着时间的推移，中国可能会找到一些方法来替代其贸易能力，中国可能会从根本上重建经济，但一场持续的冲突可能会造成毁灭性的经济耗损，超出中国政府的补偿能力。

Conclusion

结论

The context, conduct, and consequences of an American blockade of China would be deeply embedded in the mire of global politics. To overcome the blockade’s various challenges successfully, the United States and its allies would have to carefully balance the strategic repercussions of their actions with their contribution to the efficacy of the overall blockade. In almost any context, this trade-off would be extremely difficult politically, and would require a high degree of flexibility and innovation on the United States’ part. The exact trade-offs would be made with a variety of considerations in mind, above all the value of the American interests implicated in the conflict.

美国封锁中国的背景、行动和后果将深深植根于全球政治的泥潭。 为了成功克服封锁带来的各种挑战，美国及其盟国必须谨慎地平衡其行动的战略影响和它们对全面封锁效力的贡献。 在几乎任何情况下，这种权衡在政治上都极其困难，需要美国方面具有高度的灵活性和创新性。 精确的权衡将考虑到各种各样的因素，尤其是美国在冲突中所涉及的利益的价值。

Nevertheless, despite considerable challenges, a naval blockade is both operationally and strategically possible, albeit only within certain limits. Even against a maximally effective blockade, China would be able to meet its military needs indefinitely, and it could survive on its strategic petroleum reserves, stockpiles, and massive foreign-exchange reserves for an extended period of time. As a result, the effectiveness of a blockade would turn on its ability to impose debilitating economic costs on China.

然而，尽管面临相当大的挑战，海上封锁在行动上和战略上都是可能的，尽管只是在某些限度内。 即使在最有效的封锁下，中国也能够无限期满足其军事需求，并且能够在很长一段时间内依靠其战略石油储备、储备和大规模外汇储备生存下去，因此，因此，封锁的有效性将取决于它是否有能力给中国带来破坏性的经济代价。


John 2 days ago
US think Tanks have gone insane. US is throwing out Russian diplomats in dozens and do US think russians are so thick skinned that Trump WILL .. And Russia become US ally in a war with China. First look at real world in BRICS, SCO, etc and how China and Russia conducting military drills together. Russia is selling off all her US treasuries too... Trump can continue his delusions from reality is otherwise.. A multipolar world construct.. Not US hegemony..

美国的智囊团都疯了。美国将数十名俄罗斯外交官赶回老家，美国认为俄罗斯人脸皮会厚到这个程度以至于顺从于特朗普的意愿。。俄罗斯会在与中国的战争中成为美国的盟友？
先看看金砖国家、上海合作组织等的现实世界的状况吧，以及中俄两国是如何共同进行军事演习的，俄罗斯也在抛售她所有的美国国债，特朗普可以脱离现实，继续他的妄想，多极世界的建构是不可阻挡的，而不是美国霸权。

life form a day ago
Russia has never owned much in US Treasuries, so Russia selling hers is not a problem. Russia isn't in the top 14
"Current Foreign Ownership of U.S. Debt
In May 2018, China owned $1.18 trillion of U.S. debt. It's the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities. The second largest holder is Japan at $1.05 trillion. ...
...Ireland is third, holding $301 billion. Brazil is fourth at $299 billion. The United Kingdom and Switzerland are next at $265 billion and $243 billion respectively.
Luxembourg is seventh at $209 billion. The Bureau of International Settlements believes it is a front for sovereign wealth funds and hedge funds whose owners don't want to reveal their positions. So are the Cayman Islands, holding $185 billion, and Belgium, at $151 billion.
After Luxembourg, the next largest holders are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and India. They each hold between $149 billion and $191 billion."
https://www.thebalance.com/...

俄罗斯从未持有多少美国国债，所以它抛售美国国债不是问题，美国国债的持有率俄罗斯甚至不在前14之列。
“目前外国对美国债务的所有权。2018年5月，中国持有1.18万亿美元的美国国债，它是美国国债的最大外国持有者。第二大持有国是日本，持有1.05万亿美元，爱尔兰位居第三，持有3010亿美元，巴西以2990亿美元排在第四位。其次是英国和瑞士，分别为2650亿美元和2430亿美元，卢森堡排在第七位，为2090亿美元。国际清算局认为，这是主权财富基金和对冲基金的一个幌子，它们的所有者不愿透露自己的身份，开曼群岛和比利时分别为1850亿美元和1510亿美元，仅次于卢森堡，再往后是是香港、台湾、沙特阿拉伯和印度，它们各自持有1490亿至1910亿美元。“
https://www.thebalance.com/...

BasicRules 21 hours ago
you are getting the point.
US is expecting an alliance with Russia against China. But Russia is dumping US treasuries and russian diplomats are being thrown out...Now explain why would Russia ally with bully US.

你说到重点了。
美国期待与俄罗斯结盟对抗中国，但俄罗斯正在抛售美国国债，而俄罗斯外交官正被赶出去，现在解释一下为什么俄罗斯会与霸凌者美国结盟？

life form 19 hours ago
I don't agree with the author that such an alliance is likely, or with your assertion...that the US is expecting an alliance.
Are you having difficulty understanding my point
Russia now holds very few treasuries, so it doesn't hurt the US if they dump them.
Did you see the treasury auction two weeks ago Treasuries sold very well. Russia can dump them all and the US won't be hurt a bit.
Don't condescend to me, it is you that doesn't understand.

我不同意作者所说的，这样一个联盟是不可能的，也不同意你的断言，即美国正在期待一个联盟。
你理解我的观点有困难吗？
俄罗斯现在持有的美国国债很少，因此，如果抛售美国国债，也不会对美国造成伤害。
你看到两周前的国债拍卖了吗？美国国债卖得很好呢，就算俄罗斯全部抛弃它们，美国也不会受到任何伤害。
别秀你的优越感，是你不明白。

BasicRules 14 hours ago
Hahaha....
The US think tank or trump or the writer gone insane..Thinkink US, Will ally along with other Chinese neighbours like Japan etc to contain China.
I never say that US will be hurt badly by Russia selling off US treasuries.But its trade war that will hurt US longer term and China overtaking US finally...

哈哈哈。。
美国的智库，或者川普，或者写手们都疯了，认为美国，会与其他中国的邻国，如日本等盟友遏制中国。
我从来没有说过，俄罗斯抛售美国国库会对美国造成严重伤害，但美国的贸易战将对美国造成长期伤害，最终中国将超过美国.

life form 2 days ago
I'm surprised you would say that. I think it is clear that the US has allied with Japan etc. in an attempt to contain China.
But i don't think Russia will take one side or the other. They will sometimes cooperate with both the US and China when it suits them, but mostly stand clear and see if there are any benefits to be had. Anyway, that's what I would do, if I was Russia.

我很惊讶你会这么说。我认为很明显，美国已经与日本结盟，试图遏制中国。
但我认为俄罗斯不会偏袒一方或另一方。他们有时会在合适的时候与美国和中国合作，但大多数时候都会站得很清楚——看看是否有好处可捞，不管怎样，如果我是俄罗斯，我就会这么做。

BasicRules 2 days ago
Neither China nor Russia seek hegemony. Its US that's the problem for the world which wants to enslave the world with her whims and coercion. Both China and Russia fights to preserve their independence. Its called Multilateralism with multipolar powers.

中国和俄罗斯都不谋求霸权。正是美国，才这是这个世界的问题所在，它想用它的心血来潮和胁迫来奴役这个世界。中国和俄罗斯都在为维护自己的独立而战，这叫多极力量的多边主义。



BasicRules life form 2 days ago
Do you think tibetans, uighers and taiwanese aren't chinese..probably hkies and macao too...hahaha.. If you have such self interested one sided anti China view, it useless for to me write anything...
What do you say about calexit with plan for restoration of some semblance of native americans auntomous nation after Yes california has referendum? Are you ready for a independent California? Also, do you ever feel ashamed of your forefathers that exterminated native americans and stole their lands so that today you enjoy prosperity and development from the extermination and stolen native americans lands.
Talking of Uigher and tibetans as not Chinese and chinese imperialism is extreme interpretation of hypocrites..Go to India and see real imperialism...India doesn't have right to exist as a nation but some 500+ countries.
Today US got semi colonised countries still like japan, skorea, guam, san diego, puerto rico, hawaii, etc.. what is your opinion on these colonised americans lands? US is a land of hypocrites with a mask of democracy, freedom and equality.
US is the problem of the world. US inherited the anglo saxon plunderings of the world, enslavement etc from britain. While Russia and China are powers that counter american evil enslavement of the world..

你认为Z人、维W尔族人和台湾人都不是中国人吗？香港人和澳门人也不是？笑死人了，如果你有的是这样一种利己主义的片面反华观点，那我写什么东西都没有用。
在加州举行全民公投之后，你怎么看待加州恢复一些美国原住民国家形象的计划？你准备好要一个独立的加州了吗？另外，你是否曾为你的祖先灭绝了美洲土着人并偷走了他们的土地而感到羞耻，而今天你就享受着被灭绝和掠夺的美洲土着人土地带来的繁荣和发展。
把维吾尔族和藏族人说成不是中国人、是中国的帝国主义，这是对伪君子的极端解读，去印度看看真正的帝国主义，印度甚至没有权利作为一个国家存在，而是500个以上的国家。
今天，日本，韩国，关岛，圣地亚哥，波多黎各，夏威夷等仍然像是美国的半殖民地，你对这些如同殖民地的土地有什么看法？美国是一个以民主、自由和平等为面具的伪君子之地。
美国才是世界的问题。美国从英国继承了盎格鲁撒克逊人对世界的掠夺、奴役，而俄罗斯和中国是对抗美国对世界邪恶奴役的力量。

Zsari Maxim 2 days ago
So Russia is going to ally with the US to take down China so it can be on the next hit list of the US The US policy has always been to retain its global supremacy by destroying any potential challenger, as such even India will not be spared.

所以呢，俄罗斯将与美国结盟，打倒中国，然后让自己使登上美国的下一个打击名单？美国的政策一直是，通过摧毁任何潜在挑战者来保持其全球霸权，因此，即便是印度也无法幸免。

Adam Thomas Olinde an hour ago
India is a democracy. India is not a challenger to the US, it is a potential ally and at worst a friendly competitor.

印度是一个民主国家。印度不是美国的挑战者，它是一个潜在的盟友，最坏的情况也是一个友好的竞争对手。

Zsari Maxim 28 minutes ago
System of government is irrelevant when it comes to power balance, and there is no such thing as a friendly competitor. Any potential competitor will need to be neutralized to maintain its global dominance. That's the Thucydides Trap, and the US foreign policy since its superpower ascendance.
And no, India clearly harbors the aspiration to become a superpower.

当涉及到权力平衡时，政府体制是无关紧要的，也不存在什么“友好的竞争对手 ”。
任何潜在的竞争对手都需要被排除在外，以维持其全球主导地位，这就是修昔底德陷阱，以及美国自超级大国崛起以来的外交政策。
而且，你说的也不对，印度显然怀有成为超级大国的愿望。

Cde Wong 12 hours ago
Good observation, especially now that the US has lost credibility as a reliable ally.

观察得很好，尤其是现在美国已经失去了作为可靠盟友的可信度。