俄国大战略：普京如何利用叙利亚冲突把土耳其变成莫斯科的代理人 [美国媒体]

Russian president Vladimir Putin (R) andTurkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan (L) meet in Sochi, Russia, on September17, 2018

（图解：俄罗斯总统普京和土耳其总统埃尔多安在索契会面，2018年9月17日）

Turkey, Russia and Iran have activelyinvolved themselves in the Syrian conflict, each with their own divergentinterests. Moscow and Tehran have put their support behind the regime of theSyrian president, Bashar al-Assad, hoping it retains its influence over thestrategic Syrian region. Meanwhile, since the very beginning of the crisis in2011, Turkey has been obsessed with removing Assad.

土耳其、俄罗斯和伊朗出于各自不同的利益考虑，已经很积极地介入了叙利亚冲突。莫斯科和德黑兰方面已经在背后撑持叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德的政权，希望能保住其对叙利亚战略性地区的影响力。与此同时，从这场危机一开始的2011年起，土耳其就一直痴迷于让阿萨德走人。

So far, the three countries have managed toaccommodate their various aims. And the meetings between the three powers in2017 and 2018 – in Sochi, Astana, Tehran and then again in Sochi – have allplayed a part in this. In fact, it appears that Russian president VladimirPutin’s main strategy since 2017 has been the continuation of thisaccommodation.

到目前为止，这三国经过调合已经勉强适应了彼此不同的目标。而三强于2017、2018年在索契、阿斯塔纳、德黑兰乃至重回索契的会面都对此起到了作用。事实上，看起来俄总统普京自2017年以来的主要战略一直是调和的延续。

On September 17, for example, Putin and hisTurkish counterpart, president Erdogan, met in Sochi to discuss Syria’srebel-controlled Idlib province. Interestingly, at that meeting, Putinrenounced his plan (announced in Tehran on September 7) to stage an all-outassault on Idlib. This was an apparent concession, as Turkey had opposed theplan at the Tehran summit and had called for a ceasefire instead. Back then,Putin had ignored Turkey’s objections and underlined his view that theelimination of terrorists in the region was the priority. Consequently, hislatest concession looks like a significant volte face.

比如在9月17日，普京和土耳其总统埃尔多安在索契会面，讨论叙利亚被叛军控制的伊德利卜省问题。有趣的是，在那场会谈中普京宣布放弃他对伊德利卜发动全面进攻的计划（是9月7日在德黑兰宣布的）。这是一个很明显的让步，因为土耳其已经在德黑兰峰会上反对了这个计划并转而呼吁停火。那时，普京不理睬土耳其的反对，并强调消灭该地区的恐怖分子是首要任务的观点，他最新的让步看上去像是一次重大转向。

At their 2017 Astana summit, Russia, Iranand Turkey had all declared four regions – Idlib province, eastern Ghouta,northern rural Homs, and southern Syria (to include Quneitra and parts of Daraagovernorate) – as de-escalation zones. But the Syrian regime, with thecooperation of Russia and Iran, subsequently launched offensives into some ofthese regions on the pretext of eliminating terrorist groups. One by one, theregions set up as de-escalation zones have been devastated.

在他们2017年的阿斯塔纳峰会上，俄罗斯、伊朗和土耳其一同宣布四个地区，伊德利卜省、东古塔、北胡姆斯乡和叙利亚南部（包括库奈特拉以及德拉省的一部分）为缓冲区。但与俄罗斯和伊朗合作的叙利亚政权，随后以消灭恐怖组织为借口，对这些地区中的几个发动了攻势。这些作为缓冲区的地区一个接一个被摧毁。

Amberin Zaman, a columnist for Al-Monitor’sTurkey Pulse, argues that a full-scale assault in Idlib would result in theErdogan government losing its sway over the rebels in the area and make Turkeya potential target for more radical jihadists. According to some sources, forexample, nearly 60% of Idlib is controlled by the HTS, a radical jihadist groupdesignated as a terrorist organisation by the United Nations.

Al-Monitor网站土耳其脉动板块的专栏作家安伯林·扎曼认为，对伊德利卜省的全面进攻会导致埃尔多安政府失去对该地区叛乱分子的影响力，并使土耳其成为更多激进圣战分子的一个潜在目标。根据一些消息来源，例如，伊德利卜省有几乎60%被HTS控制，这是一个被联合国指定为恐怖组织的激进圣战组织。

Moreover, an invasion such as that tabledby Russia would likely cause another massive influx of refugees from Idlib intoneighbouring countries – especially Turkey – and from there on into Europe.Russia’s bullish stance on Idlib has therefore also been condemned by theWestern members of the UN Security Council.

此外，比如被俄国搁置的那次入侵可能会导致另一波难民从伊德利卜省大量涌入邻国，尤其是土耳其，并从那里进入欧洲。俄罗斯对于伊德利卜省的牛气姿态也已经遭到了联合国安理会中西方成员的谴责。 Putin’s game plan 普京的策略 The question is whether these criticismswere behind Putin scrapping his decision to invade or whether he has anothermotive.

问题在于，这些批评是否就是普京废止入侵决定的原因，还是另有动机。



People carry Syrian revolutionary flags andplacards during protests in rebel-held Idlib province, Syria, September 14,2018.

（图解：在由叛军控制的伊德利卜省的抗议中，人们拿着解放叙利亚的旗帜和海报，2018.9.14）

At their September summit, Putin andErdogan agreed there should be a demilitarised buffer zone established in Idlibby October 15, separating the rebels from Assad’s government forces. Erdogansaid:

在他们9月的峰会上，普京和埃尔多安同意在10月15日前，应在伊德利卜省建立一个非军事缓冲区，将叛军与阿萨德的政府军隔开。埃尔多安说：

The opposition will remain where they are,but the groups that we will determine jointly with Russia won’t beallowed to operate. The boundaries of the demilitarised zone will be supervisedjointly.

反对派将保持原状，但我们和俄罗斯共同确定的激进组织将不允许活动。非军事区的边界将受到共同监管。

Nevertheless, one thing is clear – whileTurkey has managed temporarily to stall an invasion of Idlib, Russia will bekeeping a close eye on the situation. The deal requires those designated“radical” rebels to withdraw from the demilitarised zone – and if they don’t,Russia and Assad will have a pretext to return to their original plan.

尽管如此，有一件事是很清楚的，虽然土耳其暂时拖延了对伊德利卜省的一次入侵，但俄罗斯会密切关注这种局势。该协议要求那些被指为“激进”的叛军退出非军事区，如果他们不这么做，俄罗斯和阿萨德会以此为借口，回归他们原本的计划。

Doubtless Russia will also incrementallyapply pressure on Erdogan, at least tactically, by making Turkey responsiblefor removing the “radical” jihadist groups from Idlib. This would make Turkeymore vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and a vulnerable Turkey would needfurther help from Russia, as the new hegemon of the region.

毫无疑问，俄罗斯也会通过让土耳其为“激进”圣战组织退出伊德利卜省负责，至少在战术上对埃尔多安施加不断增强的压力。这会使土耳其更容易遭受恐怖分子的攻击，而一个易受攻击的土耳其，会需要作为该地区新霸主的俄罗斯更多的帮助。

It is clear, therefore, that Putin’sstrategy is not merely to support his main ally, the Assad regime, in Syria. Itis also to use the conflict to break the influence of the Western alliance inthe region and tie NATO member Turkey more closely to Moscow. It seems thatRussia has never abandoned its Cold War strategy to invest in growing tensionsbetween NATO allies.

因此显而易见，普京的战略并不仅仅是支持他在叙利亚的主要盟友阿萨德政权。也是要利用这场冲突打破西部联盟对该地区的影响力，并使北约成员土耳其同莫斯科的关系更为紧密。看起来俄罗斯从未抛弃其在北约盟国之间加剧紧张局势的冷战策略。

Indeed, Cengiz Çandar, a veteran Turkishjournalist and author, theorises that Putin is prioritising this dismemberingof the Western alliance over supporting the Syrian regime, its traditionalally. In this context, the recent Sochi summit can be seen as Putin’s way ofbringing Erdogan closer to Russia. This, it seems, is Putin’s “grand strategy”.

事实上，土耳其资深记者兼作家Cengiz Çandar推测：相比支持传统盟友叙利亚政权，普京正优先考虑的是分化西方联盟。在这种背景下，近期的索契峰会可以看成普京把埃尔多安拉近俄罗斯的手法。这似乎就是普京的“大战略”。

Breaking NATO

使北约破裂

Although Turkish interests in Syria appearto conform with those of the West and NATO, this growing asymmetric dependenceon Russia is forcing Erdogan to make concessions to Russia at many levels, fromsecurity to the economy. Turkey’s recent move to purchase S400 air defencemissiles from Russia is one example of many. In fact, the trajectory of thisasymmetric dependency is raising the question of whether Turkey is becoming aRussian proxy. A Russian proxy which is also a NATO member would be the verything Russia wants in order to gain further leverage in its global contest withthe US and NATO.

虽然土耳其在叙利亚的利益看似符合西方和北约的利益，但这种对俄罗斯日益增长的不对称依赖，正迫使埃尔多安在许多从安全到经济的层面上对俄罗斯作出让步。土耳其最近从俄罗斯购买S400防空导弹的举动就是很多例证之一。事实上，这条不对称依赖的轨道提出了土耳其是否正变成俄罗斯代理人的问题。俄罗斯的代理人同时又身为北约成员这一点恰恰是俄罗斯想要的，为的是在与美国和北约的全球竞争中获得更深远的影响力。

From NATO’s perspective, the politicalrapprochement between Russia and Turkey has so far been seen as tactical. Butthe conversion of this rapprochement into a growing asymmetric interdependencethat favours Russia is casting doubt on Turkey’s already fragile commitment tothe Western alliance. And, as Turkey gets ever more sucked into the Syrianconflict, so it becomes harder for Erdogan to disengage from Putin. With theSyrian conflict right on its borders, and Russia and Iran increasingly shapingthe region’s politics, Turkey is becoming beholden to NATO’s enemies.

从北约的角度看来，俄罗斯和土耳其间的政治和解到目前为止仍被看成是战术层面的。但是，这种和解转变为日益增强且有利于俄罗斯的不对称相互依存关系，就会让人们怀疑土耳其对西方联盟本已脆弱的承诺。而随着土耳其越来越深地卷入叙利亚冲突，埃尔多安脱离普京就变得越难。叙利亚冲突就在其边界上发生，加上俄罗斯和伊朗对该地区政治的影响日益增强，土耳其正变得对北约的敌人感恩戴德。

The situation suggests that to achievesecurity within its borders Turkey may be asked to resign itself to the desiresof these two powers – two powers that would do anything to weaken the West andNATO.

这种态势表明：为了实现其境内安全，土耳其可能会被要求屈从这两强的意愿，而这两强为了削弱西方和北约会做出任何事情。

​1、I think you miss amajor point about Turkey’s aspirations. Turkey seeks to quell the kurdishuprising which started in 1978. In fact trump recently sanctioned Turkey whichhas further driven them away. Then they went and bought arms from Russia. Thesethings play into why Turkey has moved to Russia rather than the US. The otherreasons ought to be that Turkey in the last few years also commissioned aenergy pipeline from Russia. It seems rather obvious that after those kinds ofevents, Turkey would move away from the US. The natural option would be Russia.

我认为，关于土耳其的抱负你遗漏了一个重要要点。土耳其寻求平息始于1978年的库尔德起义。事实上，特朗普最近对土耳其的制裁把他们推得更远了。然后他们就去找俄罗斯买武器了。这些事情在土耳其倒向俄罗斯而不是美国的过程中发挥了作用。其他原因应该是土耳其在过去几年也委托俄罗斯建造过能源管道。在这类事件发生过后，土耳其抛弃美国似乎也就很明显了。俄罗斯将会是（土耳其）的天然选择。

As for whether it was putin’s plan or not,I think the recent stuff with Pastor Brunan and Jamal Kashoggi will actuallydecide Turkey’s fate.

至于这是否是普京的计划，我认为最近Brunan和Jamal Kashoggi的事情实际上将决定土耳其的命运。

（回复）Lets also not forget the geostrategic importance of the port turkeyhas as an entrance to the Black Sea which is fraught with major and largeexporters. If the US navy wants any power projection, these ports must be in UScontrol.

我们也不要忘记土耳其拥有黑海入口港口的地缘政治重要性，那里充满了重要的大出口商。如果美国海军想要投射任何力量，这些港口必须为美国所控制。

2、Nothing. SoonPutin’s presidential term will end. And then this country will live a normallife.

这不是问题。很快普京的任期就要结束了。到那时这个国家将过上正常的生活。

3、Putin is offeringTurkey a clear vision of how the trouble in Syria could end without anindependent Kurdish state. The US doesn’t.

普京给了土耳其一个清晰的图景，即在没有一个独立的库尔德国家的情况下，叙利亚的麻烦可以结束的方法。而美国给不出。

The S400 is just better quality for lessmoney compared to the Patriot. Don’t blame Erdogan for not allowing the US todictate him where to buy his weapons.

相比于爱国者系统，S400质量更好，价格也更低。不要怪罪埃尔多安不允许美国来指示他去哪里购买武器。

In the conquest of East Ghouta and DaraaRussia and the Syrian government showed some skill in achieving more with lesscasualties. Having Turkey forcing the rebels to withdraw in Idlib may well havebeen the plan from the beginning. But for it to work the threat of a militaryoperation needed to be clear.

在征服东古塔和德拉省的过程中，俄罗斯和叙利亚征服展现出了一些以更少的伤亡取得更大收获的技巧。很可能从一开始计划就是让土耳其迫使叛军退出伊德利卜省。但为了使其奏效，对军事行动的威胁需要有一个清晰的认识。

The biggest object of contest between theUS and Turkey is the “Gülen coup” for which Erdogan keeps Washingtonresponsible. Russia has very little to do with that.

美国和土耳其之间最大的争夺目标就是“葛兰政变”，这是埃尔多安一直想要美国负责的。而俄罗斯和此事无甚干系。

4、a good insight andlends credence to the argument that Putin’s strategy is to challenge NATO bydistracting/enticing its southern members while frustrating those members inthe east to drive a wedge through the Alliance and undermine its solidarity.

洞若观火，而且增加了这种主张的可信度，即普京的战略是通过分化和勾引其南方的成员国来挑战北约，同时挫败靠东地区那些成员国，通过联盟打入楔子并破坏其团结。