陆克文：中美两国能避免战争吗? （二） [美国媒体]

Strategic Engagement Vs. Strategic Competition

战略接触Vs.战略竞争



If China’s operational strategy toward the United States has been largely constant over the past 40 years, albeit with a new clarity and operational intensity under Xi, the U.S. response to this Chinese strategy has changed fundamentally. This was articulated clearly in the 2017 National Security Strategy and is stated plainly in the U.S. National Defense Strategy of 2018. It is shown by the trade war launched in June 2018 and intensified during the summer. And we have seen it most clearly in the October 2018 speech by U.S. Vice President Mike Pence at the Hudson Institute.

如果说过去40年中国对美国作战策略基本保持不变，新一代领导人的领导下这些战略更清晰和强度更大，不过美国对中国战略的反应已经发生了根本性的变化。这一点在2017年的《国家安全战略》中得到了明确阐述，2018年的《美国国防战略》也提到了。最终中美两国贸易战在2018年6月爆发、并且愈演愈烈。2018年10月，美国副总统迈克•彭斯在哈德逊研究所的演讲中得到了淋漓尽致的体现。

Taken together, these various statements of changing U.S. declaratory intent lead to the conclusion that the period of “strategic engagement” between China and the United States in the post-1978 period has ended.

综上所述，那些关于美国战略意图已经转变的各种声明让大家得出这样的结论：1978年开始的中美“战略接触”已经结束了。

Engagement did not produce sufficiently open Chinese markets for U.S. firms for export and investment. China, rather than becoming a “responsible stakeholder” in the global rules-based order, instead is constructing an alternative order with “Chinese characteristics”; and rather than becoming more democratic in its domestic politics, China has decided to double down as a Leninist state.

中美虽然有了接触，但是中国并没有想美国公司开放出口和投资市场。中国没有成为基于规则的全球秩序中的“负责任的利益攸关方”，而是构建了具有“中国特色”的秩序;在国内政治上没有变得更加民主，而是决定加倍努力成为列宁主义国家。

In addition, China intends to push the United States out of East Asia and the Western Pacific, and in time to surpass the United States as the dominant global economic power.

此外，中国打算把美国赶出东亚和西太平洋，并适时超越美国，成为全球经济的主导力量。

China seeks to achieve its national and international dominance through the hollowing out of U.S. domestic manufacturing and technology by means of state-directed industry; through a range of economic incentives and financial inducements to U.S. partners, friends, and allies around the world; and through the rapid expansion of China’s military and naval presence from the East China Sea, the South China Sea, across the littoral states of the Indian Ocean and Djibouti in the Red Sea.

中国打算通过美国国内制造业和技术空心化的空当。通过国家主导的产业，通过对美国世界各地的伙伴、朋友和盟友的一系列经济激励和财政激励;并通过中国军事和海军力量从东海、南海，跨越印度洋沿岸国家和红海的吉布提迅速扩张来实现其国家和国际主导地位。

These factors, along with Russia, combine to form the central strategic challenge to U.S. security and prosperity for the future, warranting an urgent change in course away from strategic engagement with China to a new period formally characterized as “strategic competition.”

这些因素，再加上俄罗斯，一起构成了对美国未来安全与繁荣核心战略的挑战，这就要求美国从与中国“战略接触”紧急转向称为“战略竞争”的新时期。

This new U.S. analysis of China’s national capabilities, intentions, and actions will be translated into a new multidimensional operational strategy aimed at rolling back Chinese diplomatic, military, economic, and ideological advances abroad.
If this new direction in U.S. declaratory strategy toward China is reflected in future U.S. operational policy, 2018 will indeed represent a fundamental disjuncture in the U.S.-China relationship.

美国对中国能力、意图和行动的新分析将转化为一种新的多维作战战略，旨在遏制中国在海外外交、军事、经济和意识形态方面的进步。
根据美国宣称的对华战略，如果这一战略方向反映在美国未来的行动政策中，那么2018年将确实地成为中美关系的转折年。

The Future of U.S. Strategy

美国的未来战略

There are a number of questions the U.S. administration should consider as it operationalizes its new competition with Beijing. I will leave discussion of the wisdom of this strategy to the U.S. public, but U.S. friends and allies around the world will be considering these factors as well.

在与北京展开新的竞争之际，美国政府应该考虑几个问题。这需要美国公众老讨论这一战略，但美国在世界各地的朋友和盟友也将考虑下面这些因素。

First, what is the desired end-point of U.S. strategy? What does Washington do if China does not acquiesce to the demands outlined in the Vice President’s speech, but instead explicitly rejects them? What happens if the strategy not only fails to produce the desired objective, but instead produces the reverse, namely, an increasingly mercantilist, nationalist, and combative China?

首先，美国战略的最终目标是是什么？如果中国不甘心接受彭斯在演讲中提出的要求，而旗帜鲜明地拒绝，美国应该怎么做？如果新战略不仅没有达到预期效果，反而适得其反，导致中国更偏向重商主义、民族主义，更好战，又应该怎么办？

Second, if we are now in a period of strategic competition, what are the new “rules of the game?” How is a common understanding to be reached with Beijing as to what these new rules might be? Or are there now to be no rules, except those that will be fashioned over time by the dynamics of this new competitive process? During 40 years of bilateral strategic engagement, culture, habits, norms, and—in some cases—rules evolved to govern the bilateral relationship and became second nature to several generations of political, diplomatic, military, and business practitioners. What will replace them now, to govern the avoidance of incidents at sea (such as recently occurred between a Chinese warship and the USS Decatur[DDG-73]); incidents in the air; cyberattacks; nuclear proliferation; strategic competition in third countries; the purchase and sale of U.S. Treasury Notes; or the future of the exchange rate and other major policy domains?

其次，如果我们现在处于战略竞争时期，那么新的游戏规则是什么？如何与中国就这些新规则达成共识？还是说，除了随着战略竞争的进行逐渐形成新的规则外，再也没有其他规则了？在中美两国40年的双边战略接触中，文化、习惯、规范，某些情况下，甚至规则都随着双边关系的发展发生的改变，陈伟了几代政治、外交、军事和商业实践的第二天性。现在有什么能取代呢，如何去管控海上冲突（例如不久前中国军舰迫近美军迪凯特舰事件）、空中事故、网络攻击，以及核扩撒、第三国的战略竞争、美国国债的购买和销售、汇率变化等主要政策领域的变化？

Third, is any common strategic narrative between China and the United States now possible, to set the conceptual parameters for the future of the bilateral relationship? Strategic engagement implied a set of mutual obligations that the United States now argues China has fundamentally breached. But having already skipped through a short-lived concept of strategic coexistence and in the absence of new rules to govern the relationship, how can the two countries arrest any rapid slide between strategic competition and containment, confrontation, conflict—and even war?
If history is any guide, these changes can unfold more rapidly than many postmodern politicians might expect. The escalation from a single incident in Sarajevo in summer 1914 is a sobering point, even if the age of nuclear weapons has deeply changed the traditional strategic calculus since then.

第三，中美是否还能达成战略共识，为两国未来的关系设定概念性参数?战略接触就意味着相互尊遵守一整套义务，而美国认为中国从根本上违反了这些义务。但是，两国已经跳过了短暂的战略共存概念，而且在缺乏新规则管理两国关系的情况下，两国如何避免从战略竞争与遏制的关系迅速滑向对抗、冲突甚至战争?
如果历史可以借鉴，这种转变可能比许多后现代政治家所预期的更为迅速。1914年夏天萨拉热窝发生的单一事件的迅速升级就发人深省，尽管核武器时代已经深刻改变了传统的战略演算。

Fourth, if some U.S. strategic planners are indeed considering the possible evolution of strategic competition with China into full-blooded containment, comprehensive economic decoupling, or even a second Cold War, then they would do well to examine closely the underlying logic of U.S. diplomat George Kennan’s famous 1946 “Long Telegram” and his subsequent “X” article on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” published in Foreign Affairs the following year. Kennan argued that if properly “contained,” the Soviet Union ultimately would break up under the weight of internal pressures. It would be a heroic assumption, however, to expect that the Chinese system would do so should a similar policy be applied. It might. But it probably will not, given the resilience of the Chinese domestic economy, its capacity to secure its energy needs from other U.S. adversaries, and the fresh potentialities offered by the various new technologies of political and social control now available to Beijing. On this point, it is worth noting that on 28 September 2018 the People’s Republic of China surpassed the Soviet Union as the longest-lasting communist state in history.

第四,如果美国某些战略规划者确实考虑将对华政策从战略竞争升级为全面遏制和全面经济脱钩,甚至和中国进行第二次冷战,那么他们就要好好研究一下1946年乔治• 凯南着名的“长电报”和随后发表在《外交事务》杂志上署名“X”的文章：《苏联行为的根源》。凯南认为，如果遏制政策适当，苏联最终将在内部压力的重压下解体。然而，如果指望对中国采取类似政策也能取得同样的结果，那真是一个大胆的假设。也许可能。但考虑到中国国内经济的韧性、从美国对手那里获得能源的能力，以及新技术给北京带来的控制政治和社会的新潜力，基本不会成功。在这一点上，值得注意的是，中国于2018年9月28日超越苏联，成为历史上存在时间最长的共产主义国家。

Fifth, is the United States convinced that the emerging Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism represents a potent ideological challenge to democratic capitalism, whether it be of the conservative, liberal, or social democratic variant? The Soviet Union constructed client regimes around the world of a similar ideological nature to its own. Is there evidence that China is doing the same? Or is China interested in a more limited version of supportive state relations, without any appeal to ideology, without armed intervention, relying instead on extensive, continuing, and significant infrastructure investment and direct financial aid?

第五，难道美国真的认为中国威权资本主义模式对民主资本主义的意识形态领域带来和严峻的挑战吗，不管是保守的、自由的还是社会民主资本主义？苏联在世界各地扶植了大批意识形态类似的附庸政权。有证据表明中国也在这样做吗?或者，中国打算建立更有限的支持型国家关系，不诉诸意识形态，不进行武装干预，而是依赖广泛、持续、重大的基础设施投资和直接财政援助?

Sixth, will the United States be prepared to provide the world a strategic counteroffer to the financial commitment reflected in China’s multitrillion-dollar programs of the BRI, concessional loans, and bilateral aid flows? Or will the United States continue to slash its own aid budgets and reduce the size of its foreign service? Recent U.S. support for a new capital injection into the World Bank is a welcome development. But it pales into insignificance compared with the dimensions of the BRI. In time, the World Bank’s global balance sheet may be eclipsed by the lending capacity of the China-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

第六，面对中国价值数万亿美元的“一带一路”倡议、特惠贷款、对口援助等金融承诺，美国是否有对等的战略方案？还是会继续削减援助预算和海外服务规模?美国最近向世界银行注入了新的资金，这是可喜的进展。但与一带一路相比，就显得微不足道了。随着时间的推移，总部位于中国的亚洲基础设施投资银行的放贷能力可能会令世界银行的全球资产负债表黯然失色。

Seventh, how will the United States compete over time with the magnitude of China’s trade and investment in Asia and Europe? How will the cancellation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership with Asia and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe affect the relative significance of the United States and China as trade and investment partners? China already is a bigger economic partner with most of these countries than the United States—how will the United States resist the effect of the centripetal force of the Chinese economy in drawing these regions increasingly into China’s orbit?

第七，随着时间的推移，美国拿什么来与中国在亚洲和欧洲的巨大贸易和投资竞争?取消了与亚洲国家的“跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”以及与欧洲的“跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系协定”，将怎样影响未来美国在亚欧地区贸易、投资和技术合作中的重要性？对于这些国家来说，中国已经是比美国更大的经济伙伴了，美国将如何对抗中国将这些地区纳入轨道的经济向心力?

Eighth, how confident is the United States that its friends and allies around the world will fully embrace its new strategy of strategic competition with China? After President Donald Trump’s imposition of import tariffs on Japan and India or his sustained public attacks on major U.S. allies Germany, the United Kingdom, and Canada—and NATO in general—is the United States confident these countries will embrace this new strategy against China? Or will these countries continue to hedge their bets in their relations with Washington and Beijing? Will they wait until it becomes clearer whether this shift in U.S. policy toward China is permanent, whether it will be translated into real policy—and whether it will succeed? And what about countries in southeast Asia, or the Middle East, where China is now a bigger buyer of oil and gas than the United States?

第八，美国有多大信心，世界各地的朋友和盟友会完全接受美国与中国进行战略竞争的新战略?在特朗普总统对日本和印度征收进口关税，或者持续攻击主要盟国德国、英国和加拿大，以及北约之后，美国是否相信这些国家会接受这些针对中国的新战略?抑或是这些国家会继续在华盛顿和北京之间两面下注?在美国对华政策的转变是否是永久性的、是否会转化为真正的政策、是否会成功等问题变得更加明朗之前，这些国家都会静观其变?那么东南亚或中东国家呢?在这些国家，中国可是超越美国了美国的更大的石油和天然气买家。

Ninth, what constitutes the appeal to the rest of the world to support this new U.S. strategy as an alternative to a China-dominated region and world? Vice President Pence’s address was consciously and eloquently couched in terms of U.S. interests and values. But it made no appeal to the international community’s common interests and values, historically shared with the United States and articulated through the U.S.-led global rules-based order crafted after the last world war. Instead, the world has seen the current administration walk away from a number of critical elements of the order constructed by its predecessors over seven decades (human rights, multilateral trade regimes, climate change, the International Criminal Court, and U.N. aid agencies) under the rubric of the nationalist call of “America First.”

第九，美国要如何去争取世界其他国家来支持美国的新战略，而不是支持中国主导的地区和世界?彭斯副总统的讲话有意识地、富于表现力地表达了美国的利益和价值观。但演讲并没有呼吁国际社会的共同利益和价值观，世界大战后和美国共享，而且是后美国领导的以规则为基础的全球秩序。相反,全世界都看到了现在的美国政府以醒目的民族主义标题“美国第一”，背离了过去七十年里美国前几届政府建立的很过关键因素（人权、多边贸易体制、气候变化、国际刑事法庭和联合国援助机构)。

Last is the immediate question of the potential impact on the global economy and climate change action of a major cleavage in U.S.–China relations. If bilateral trade collapses or even reduces significantly as a result of radical decoupling, what will be the impact on U.S. and global growth in 2019 and beyond, and what are the prospects of it triggering a global recession? Similarly, in light of the October 2018 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change pointing to potential planetary disaster because of inadequate action by the world’s major greenhouse-gas emitters, what will happen if the current global climate change regime becomes a major casualty of the implosion in the U.S.–China relationship? Will China revert to its own limited national measures?

最后，一个迫在眉睫的问题是，一旦中美关系出现大的分裂，将对全球经济和气候变化有什么潜在影响。如果中美关系脱钩，双边贸易崩溃，或者大幅减少，2019年以后的美国和全球经济会产生什么影响，并有可能引发全球经济衰退?同样，根据政府间气候变化专门委员会(IPCC) 2018年10月的报告，由于世界主要温室气体排放国未能充分行动，地球可能面临灾难，如果全球环境变化体制收到中美两国关系破裂的影响，将会发生什么？中国是否会恢复受到限制的国家标准？

U.S. and other policy makers should be considering these ten significant questions as they seek to put flesh on the bones of the administration’s new era of strategic competition with China. The United States should embrace such a new approach with its eyes wide open. In navigating these uncharted waters, no one wants to see the triggering of unintended consequences, least of all accidental conflict; 100 years on, the warnings of 1914 still ring loudly in all our ears.

在与中国进行战略竞争的新时代，美国和其他政策制定者指定细化政策是，应该考虑这十个重大问题。美国应该睁大眼睛采用这种新方法。在未知水域航行时，没有人希望看到意外后果，尤其是意外冲突；一百年过去了，1914年的警告仍在我们耳边回响。

It is in no way in China’s interest to want either an economic war or physical confrontation with the United States, because China knows it would in all probability lose both. China knows that it is still the weaker power. Nonetheless, history teaches that nationalism can be a potent force often defying classical strategic logic, whether that of China’s “Seven Military Classics” that collectively urge caution, or Carl Von Clausewitz, or even Alfred Thayer Mahan.

从中国利益角度来考虑，与美国打经济战争或实体对抗没有任何好处，因为中国知道，极有可能同时输掉这两场战争。中国知道自己实力仍然较弱。不过历史教训告诉我们，无论是要求谨慎的“武经七书”，还是卡尔•冯•克劳塞维茨（《战争论》的作者），甚至是阿尔弗雷德•塞耶•马汉（创立了海权论），民族主义都能变得非常强大，经常违背这些经典战略逻辑。

The reasons for the relationship’s changing nature are largely structural: China has now assumed such a global and regional critical mass in its economic and military capacity that a revision of the U.S.–China relationship has become essentially inevitable. That comes even before considering the radically different ideological traditions and future aspirations of what are now the two largest economies—and militaries—in the world. China’s global and regional policy has changed significantly over the past decade. Whether in the South China Sea, South East Asia, Eurasia, Africa, Latin America, or the current structure of the international order, China indeed has been the dynamic factor, whereas until recently the United States has been the constant.

美中关系性质变化的根本原因在很大程度上是结构性的:中国在经济和军事能力上已经达到了全球和地区的临界状态，中美关系的修正已经变得不可避免。这甚至还没有考虑到世界上最大的两个经济体、军事大国，意识形态和未来前景的根本不同。过去10年，中国的全球和地区政策发生了重大变化。无论是在南海、东南亚、欧亚大陆、非洲、拉丁美洲，还是在当前的国际秩序格局中，中国确实是一个充满活力的因素，而美国呢，直到不久前还是稳定因素。

Most who take the U.S.–China relationship seriously struggle with the intellectual and policy complexity of the subject before us. It is not easy; it is hard, in fact. And the charged political atmosphere in which we find ourselves is a difficult environment in which to work. The proponents of one view are variously described, usually under the breath, as China appeasers (or less politely as “panda huggers”). Those of a different view are described as warmongers. We need to be wary of the reconstitution of any modern “Committee on the Present Danger,” where those seeking to explain the complexity of China’s rise are pronounced guilty of un-American (or in my case, un-Australian) activities if we offer a complex response to what is rendered as the simple question, “What to do about China’s rise?” The bottom line is that space is now contracting, both in the United States and Australia, for open, considered public debate and discussion on this question.

那些把中美关系看的比较严重的人，一直都对我们面前这些在智力和政策上比较复杂的问题比较纠结。这确实不容易;事实上，是很难。我们处在紧张的政治气氛下，我们发现在这种氛围下我们工作起来比较困难。如果支持一种观点，就会被支持者花样描述为对中国的妥协分子(不太礼貌一点就叫“拥抱熊猫的人”)，而那些拥有不同观点的人又被称为好战分子。我们需要警惕任何”当前危险委员会委员会“的重建，面对简单的“如何应对中国崛起”问题，如果我们进行复杂的回应，他们就会将中国崛起宣称为反美行为（对于我来说就是反澳大利亚)。最基本的是，问题是美国和澳大利亚公开和经过深思熟虑的公开辩论和讨论的空间正在缩小。

It is easy in politics simply to join the cheer squad. It is much harder to think through what might constitute sound, enduring public policy and be capable of realizing agreed objectives to preserve freedom, prosperity, and sustainability in the long term, while not producing unintended consequences along the way—least of all, crisis, conflict, or war.

在政界当拉拉队很容易。困难的是，如何制定健全、持久的公共政策，并能够实现保护自由、繁荣和可持续性等长期目标，同时又不会产生意想不到的后果——尤其是危机、冲突或战争。

Both China and the United States are old enough, experienced enough, and indeed battle-scarred enough to ultimately sort this out. When I helped establish the Asia Society Policy Institute, and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger became inaugural chair of its International Advisory Board, we asked him what our mission should be.

中国和美国有足够的时间、足够的经验，而且也确实身经百战，两国最终能够解决这个问题。当我帮助成立亚洲社会政策研究所，美国前国务卿亨利•基辛格担任第一位国际顾问委员会主席时，我们问他，我们的使命是什么。

In a classically Kissingerian haiku, Henry responded that we should seek to identify three things about the world today: First, what is really happening? Second, why is it happening? Third, and most important, what are we not seeing?

亨利•基辛格用其经典的俳句回应，当今世界我们应该探讨三件事:第一，到底发生了什么?第二，为什么会这样?第三，也是最重要的一点，有什么是我们没有看到的?

We in the policy community and the academy have a particular responsibility, at this critical stage of the process, to shed as much light as possible on what we are seeing, rather than simply applying additional heat. And shining light also requires us to understand reality as perceived through the eyes of others, even if we choose then to reject it.

我们正处在关键阶段，我们处在政策共同体中，学术界有着特殊的责任，那就是尽可能多地阐明我们看到的情况，而不是简单地施加额外压力。这就要求我们理解他人眼中的现实，即使我们选择过，后来又拒绝了。

I am on the side of the avoidable war. We must find a third way, beyond the extremes of either capitulation or confrontation, to help navigate our way through the Thucydidean dilemma that we now confront. At times like these, jingoism is easy, whether in Beijing or Washington. By contrast, solid strategy and good policy are hard. I look forward to the contributions of those of good heart and strong mind seeking to find a way through this most classical of modern security dilemmas.

我认为这是场可以避免的战争。我们必须找到投降和对抗之外的第三条道路，能帮助我们渡过现在的修昔底德困境的道路。在这种时候，无论是北京还是在华盛顿侵略主义都是最简单粗暴的。相比之下，实在的策略和良好的政策更难实现。我期待着那些善良和坚强的人们能做出贡献，寻求解决最经典的当今面临的安全困境的办法。