苏联可以在冷战中获胜的5种方法（上） [美国媒体]

Five Ways the Soviet Union Could Have Wonthe Cold War

苏联可以在冷战中获胜的物种方法



In 1969, a Sovietdissident named AndreiAmalrik wrote an essay called “Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?” It predicted the demise of the Soviet system, most likelyin a conflict with China. Amalrik, as it turned out, was wrong about a war withChina, but he was only off about the end of the USSR by a few years. No onetook Amalrik very seriously at the time; I was assigned his book, like mostyoung graduate students in Soviet affairs, primarily to critique it. Today,people with almost no memory of the period accept the Soviet collapse as justanother inevitable historical moment.

1969年，苏联异议人士安德烈·阿玛里克写了一篇名为《苏联能撑到1984年吗?》它预言了苏联体制的灭亡，最有可能的是与中国发生冲突。事实证明，阿玛尔里克关于与中国开战的看法是错误的，但他只是在苏联解体的问题上错了几年。当时没有人把阿玛里克当回事;和大多数研究苏联事务的年轻研究生一样，我的任务主要是评论这本书。今天，几乎对那段时期没有记忆的人们认为，苏联解体只是又一个不可避免的历史时刻。

But did it have to happen? Could the Soviet Union havewon the Cold War? Or at the least, could the Soviet Union have survived untiltoday, and remained a viable competitor to the United States while celebratingthe 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution in 2017, or the centennial ofthe founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 2022?

但这必然发生吗?苏联能赢得冷战吗?或者，至少，在2017年庆祝俄罗斯革命100周年，或者2022年庆祝苏联社会主义共和国联盟成立100周年时，苏联能活到今天，并仍然是美国的一个可行的竞争对手吗?

Counterfactual history, the game of “what if,” is anintellectually hazardous exercise. No one can really explain what didn’tactually happen. And in any case, why bother? Maybe the Persians could havebeaten the ancient Greeks; maybe Columbus could have taken a wrong turn andbeen lost at sea; maybe the first atomic bomb could have been a dud andconvinced everyone to go back to the drawing board. But the Persians did lose,Columbus did make it across the Atlantic, and the Trinity test did light thesky with nuclear fire. It would take a lifetime to imagine the alternatives,none of which are real.

反事实的历史，即“如果”的游戏，是一种智力上的危险实践。没有人能真正解释到底发生了什么。无论如何，为什么要自寻烦恼呢?也许波斯人可以打败古希腊人; 也许哥伦布走错了方向，在海上迷失了方向;也许第一颗原子弹本可以是一颗哑弹，说服所有人重新开始。但是波斯人确实失败了，哥伦布确实成功穿越了大西洋，三位一体的测试确实用核火焰照亮了天空。想象替代方案需要一生的时间，这里没有一个是真实的。

The reason we even think about these alternatepossibilities, however, is to prevent us from making the mistake of believingin inevitability. The inability to see alternatives leads to lazy strategicthinking, which is why so many programs—including the department I once chairedat the Naval War College, Strategy and Policy—use counterfactual history.Otherwise, we risk failures of strategic imagination. I will never forget, forexample, the military student I had many years ago who insisted that theAmerican victory in the War of Independence was inevitable. What would it evenlook like, he sputtered, if North America had stayed British?There was a long silence in the room until one of hisclassmates quietly suggested the alternative with two words: “Like Canada?”

然而，我们考虑这些可能性的原因，是为了防止我们犯相信必然性的错误。看不到替代方案会导致懒惰的战略思考，这就是为什么有那么多项目——包括我曾在海军战争学院担任系主任的战略与政策系——使用反事实的历史。否则，我们就有战略想象力失败的风险。例如，我永远不会忘记多年前我的一位军校学生，他坚持认为美国独立战争的胜利是不可避免的。他气急败坏地说，如果北美一直是英国的，它会变成什么样子? 房间里沉默了很长时间，直到他的一个同学用两个词平静地提出了另一个选择:“像加拿大?”

Especially for many of my younger students, the victoryof the American-led coalition of democracies now seems like a natural end to astruggle that really wasn’t all that dangerous, and whose outcome wasforeordained. But to the people who fought the Cold War, there were many dayswhere it all seemed to be a lot more tenuous. There were many moments wherethis planetary conflict— as I called it in a 2003 book, the fight to “winthe world” —with the Soviet Union seemed a near-run thing. With that inmind, let’s consider five historical periods where different choices could haveled, if not to global victory, at least to survival and a fighting chance for thesince-departed Land of the Soviets.

尤其是对我的许多年轻学生来说，美国领导的民主联盟的胜利现在看来是一场斗争的自然结束，这场斗争其实并不那么危险，其结果是命中注定的。但对那些打过冷战的人来说，在很多时候，这一切似乎都很脆弱。在很多时候，我在2003年出版的一本书《战胜世界》(the fight to" win the world ")中称，与苏联的这场全球冲突几乎是一场持久战。考虑到这一点，让我们来考虑五个历史时期，在这五个历史时期，不同的选择即使不能带来全球性的胜利，至少也能让苏联幸存下来，并继续奋斗。

1938: Stalin doesn’t kill all the smartCommunists

1938年:斯大林没有杀死所有聪明的GC主义者

Was Stalinism an inevitable outcome of theSoviet experiment? This is one that historians of the Soviet period havelong loved to argue about , and it won't be settled here. But it isundeniable that Stalin's purges of the Soviet military and the Communist Partystruck down some of the best and brightest from the generation of theRevolution. Shortly after leading Bolshevik Sergei Kirov was gunneddown (on Stalin’s secret orders) in Leningrad in 1934, Stalin initiated acyclone of murder and repression that exterminated mostly imaginary enemies inthe Party and the military.

斯大林主义是苏联试验的必然结果吗?这是苏联时期的历史学家一直喜欢争论的问题，而且这个问题不会在这里解决。但不可否认的是，斯大林对苏联军队和GCD的清洗，摧毁了革命一代中一些最优秀、最聪明的人。1934年，在领导布尔什维克的谢尔盖•基洛夫(Sergei Kirov)在列宁格勒被斯大林秘密下令枪杀后不久，斯大林发动了一场谋杀和镇压的旋风，消灭了党内和军队中多数假想的敌人。

To replace all this slaughtered talent,Stalin promoted younger people with little experience (but whose loyalty wasnow beyond question) into positions of great authority. Western Sovietologistsused to call these people "The Class of '38," because theyleapfrogged into senior jobs when the purges ended in 1938 to replace the menwho'd been shot. This resulted in bizarre personnel situations; in themilitary, for example,Stalin wiped out so many officers that the militaryacademies had to be graduated early when the Nazis attacked in 1941. Youngtwenty-somethings who might have been lieutenants were suddenly given seniorcommands as majors, colonels, even generals.

为了取代所有这些被屠杀的人才，斯大林提拔了没有什么经验的年轻人(但他们的忠诚现在是毋庸置疑的)担任大权独揽的职位。西方的苏联问题专家过去称这些人为“38年的阶级”，因为1938年清洗结束后，他们跳槽到高级职位，以取代那些被枪杀的人。这导致了奇怪的人事情况;例如，在军队中，斯大林消灭了如此多的军官，以至于在1941年纳粹袭击时，军事学院不得不提前毕业。二十多岁的年轻人，可能是中尉，突然间被授予少校、上校、甚至将军的高级指挥权。

In the Party, the young civilians who were brought to the fore not onlylacked expertise, they lacked courage and initiative. They had, really, onlyone important skill: they knew how to survive in Stalinist Russia. Their senseof self-preservation would serve them well in the daily grind of Soviet life,but they had no vision and no ability to deal with crises. Stalin, like theancient Greek solons, cut down the tallest stalks of wheat in his field, andall that was left was the kind of mediocrity that led to Nikita Khrushchev,Leonid Brezhnev and a host of lesser, deservedly forgotten incompetents.

在党内，年轻的平民不仅缺乏专业知识，而且缺乏勇气和主动性。他们实际上只有一项重要的技能:他们知道如何在斯大林主义的俄罗斯生存。他们的自我保护意识在苏联的日常生活中很有用，但他们没有远见，也没有能力处理危机。斯大林，就像古希腊的梭伦一样，砍掉了他地里最高的麦秆，剩下的就是那种导致赫鲁晓夫、勃列日涅夫和许多被人遗忘的平庸的无能之辈。

Could the murdered generation of Bolsheviks have saved the USSR? If youread Stephen Cohen's classic book, Bukharin and theBolshevik Revolution , you certainlymight think so. Others counter that without Stalin, the Soviet Union wouldnever have survived World War II. (A few of us might argue, of course, thatStalin's idiocy and misplaced egomania also helped spark thatwar.) Still, assuming Hitler was defeated, the Soviet Union would at least haveentered the 1950s with battle-hardened revolutionaries at the helm, instead ofthe cautious bureaucrats who rammed the whole thing into the ground.

被谋杀的一代布尔什维克能拯救苏联吗?如果你读过史蒂芬·科恩的经典着作《布哈林与布尔什维克革命》，你肯定会这么认为。其他人则反驳说，如果没有斯大林，苏联就不可能在第二次世界大战中幸存下来。(当然，我们中的一些人可能会说，斯大林的愚蠢和错位的自大狂也引发了那场战争。)尽管如此，假设希特勒被击败，苏联至少会在进入20世纪50年代时，由久经沙场的革命者来掌舵，而不是由谨小慎微的官僚们把整件事都压下去。

Before he died, Stalin warned his inner circle that without him, theywould be as helpless as kittens. He had a point—but only because he had takenevery step to ensure it.

在他死前，斯大林警告他的核心集团，如果没有他，他们会像小猫一样无助。他是有道理的，但只是因为他采取了每一步来确保这一点。

1947: Truman loses his nerve

1947年:杜鲁门失去了勇气

In early Cold War history, 1949 looks likea really bad year: the Soviets exploded their first nuclear bomb, and Chinaemerged from the wreckage of world war and civil struggle in Asia as theworld’s largest communist power. The West by this point had endured repeatedSoviet challenges: Stalin, now in control of several conquered European states(including a quarter of Germany) had already tried to leave troops in Iranin 1946 , among other daring plays. No one needed convincing that NATO,formed during the West’s annus horribilis in 1949, was agood idea. Leaders in the U.S. policy establishment, such as PaulNitze , were already warning of doom while drafting documents likeNSC-68 , and the North Korean attack on South Korea a year later made suchwarnings seem prescient.

在冷战早期的历史上，1949年看起来确实是糟糕的一年:苏联引爆了第一颗核弹，而中国作为世界上最大的GC主义国家，从世界大战和亚洲内战的废墟中崛起。此时的西方已经经受了苏联的多次挑战:现在控制着几个被征服的欧洲国家(包括四分之一的德国)的斯大林，在1946年就曾试图从伊朗撤军，以及其他一些大胆的举动。没人需要让人相信，1949年西方恐怖之年成立的北约(NATO)是个好主意。保罗·尼采等美国政策机构的领导人在起草NSC-68等文件时就已经发出了厄运的警告，而一年后朝鲜对韩国的攻击让这种警告似乎具有先见之明。

The real test of American nerve, however,came two years earlier. In 1947, President Harry Truman had to decide whetherAmerica really was going to step into Britain's shoes as Europe's postcolonialpolice officer. Greece was in the middle of a civil war with Communist rebels.Other parts of Western Europe, broken in spirit and bankrupt from two worldwars in thirty years, were also ripe for revolution and conquest. Sovietideology chief Andrei Zhdanov had proclaimed the "two camps"thesis , in which there were only two choices—socialism or capitalism—forthe rest of the world. The pieces were in place. All that was necessary for aSoviet advance was an American retreat.

然而，真正考验美国人勇气的是两年前。1947年，哈里•杜鲁门总统不得不决定，美国是否真的要取代英国，成为欧洲后殖民时代的警察。希腊当时正处于与GC主义叛军的内战之中。西欧的其他地区，由于三十年来两次世界大战而精神崩溃和破产，革命和征服的时机也已经成熟。苏联意识形态负责人Zhdanov曾宣称“两个阵营”的观点，即世界其他地区只有两个选择——社会主义或资本主义。各部分已经就位。苏联前进所必需的一切就是美国的撤退。

Imagine that in 1947, Truman abandons theGreeks. He pulls America home, politically as well as militarily. That means,among other things, the Marshall Plan is never implemented. It alsomeans that Truman will never have to respond to the Berlin Blockade ,because the Blockade never happens: without American leadership, the currencyreforms in Germany's western zones never take place. The Federal Republic ofGermany is never created, and with the western zones left to rot in economicruin, they likely fall prey to Soviet "aid" over time.

想象一下，1947年杜鲁门抛弃了希腊。他在政治上和军事上都把美国拉回了国内。这就意味着，马歇尔计划从来没有实施过。这也意味着杜鲁门将永远不必对柏林的封锁做出回应，因为封锁永远不会发生:没有美国的领导，德国西部地区的货币改革永远不会发生。德意志联邦共和国从来没有建立过，随着西部地区在经济崩溃中腐烂，随着时间的推移，它们很可能成为苏联“援助”的牺牲品。

Likewise,Truman decides that America's disengagement from Europe means no CIAmeddling in the Italian elections in 1948 . Italy (like unfortunateCzechoslovakia the same year) gets pulled into the Soviet orbit by electingCommunists. France, already home to a strong Communist party, follows suit. TheGreek Communists, unopposed, complete their conquest, and the Iron Curtain nowextends from the English Channel to the Aegean, and across to the Sea of Japan.

同样，杜鲁门认为美国脱离欧洲意味着中情局不会干涉1948年意大利的选举。意大利(就像当年不幸的捷克斯洛伐克一样)通过选举GCD人而被拉进了苏联的轨道。已经是强大的GCD大本营的法国也紧随其后。希腊的GC主义者，在没有反对的情况下，完成了他们的征服，铁幕现在从英吉利海峡一直延伸到爱琴海，一直延伸到日本海。

NATO is never formed. Some version ofAmerica’s "special relationship" with the United Kingdom remains,with America and the British Commonwealth facing a Europe ruled, either overtlyor by proxy, from Stalin's chambers in the Kremlin. Awash in Europe'sresources, Stalin builds an empire that lasts, and America remains a navalpower left to patrol the seas with its British, Canadian, and Australianfriends—mostly to make the world safe for Communist shipping.

北约也从未成立。美国与英国“特殊关系”的某些版本仍然存在，美国和英联邦面临着一个欧洲的统治，要么是公开的，要么是由克里姆林宫的斯大林幕僚代理的。在欧洲资源的洪流中，斯大林建立了一个经久不衰的帝国，而美国仍然是一个海军强国，与英国、加拿大和澳大利亚的朋友们一起在海上巡逻——主要是为了确保世界上GC主义航运的安全。

Of course, Truman actually did plunge intothe Cold War competition, and the Soviet chance for victory slipped away foranother quarter-century. Democrat or Republican, U.S. presidents after Trumanwere all dedicated Cold Warriors. America and Europe, taking their haltingfirst steps in 1949 as an alliance, soon became a nuclear-armed porcupine theSoviets could attack only at their own peril.
In the 1970s, the window would open again.

当然，杜鲁门确实投入了冷战的竞争，苏联获胜的机会又溜走了四分之一个世纪。无论是民主党还是共和党，杜鲁门之后的美国总统都是献身于冷战的斗士。美国和欧洲在1949年以联盟的形式迈出了蹒跚的第一步，很快就变成了一只拥有核武器的豪猪，苏联只能在自己承担风险的情况下发动进攻。
到了20世纪70年代，这扇窗户又打开了。