经济学人：一带一路或重塑全球经济 [美国媒体]

Foreign policy

外交政策

Ourbulldozers, our rules

我们的推土机，我们的规则

China’s foreign policycould reshape a good part of the world economy

中国的外交政策可能在很大程度上重塑全球经济

THEfirst revival of the Silk Road—a vast and ancient network of trade routes linking China’s merchants with those of Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa andEurope—took place in the seventh century, after war hadmade it unusable for hundreds of years. Xi Jinping, China’s president, looks back on that era as a golden age, a time of PaxSinica, when Chinese luxuries were coveted across the globe and the Silk Roadwas a conduit for diplomacy and economic expansion. The term itself was coinedby a German geographer in the 19th century, but China has adopted it withrelish. Mr Xi wants a revival of the Silk Road and the glory that went with it.

丝绸之路——在公元七世纪建立，在战乱中废弃了数百年后，这个曾连接中国和中亚，中东，非洲和欧洲的商人的庞大而古老的贸易路线网络首次复兴。中国主席习近平回顾了那个黄金时代，那个在中国主导下的世界秩序。中国奢侈品被全世界垂涎，丝绸之路被作为一个外交和经济扩张的渠道。这个词最初是19世纪由一位德国地理学家所创造，但被中国欣然接受。习近平希望复兴丝绸之路，重现它过去的荣光。

Thistime cranes and construction crews are replacing caravans and camels. In Aprila Chinese shipping company, Cosco, took a 67% stake in Greece’s second-largest port,Piraeus, from which Chinese firms are building a high-speed rail networklinking the city to Hungary and eventually Germany. In July work is due tostart on the third stage of a Chinese-designed nuclear reactor in Pakistan,where China recently announced it would finance a big new highway and put $2billion into a coal mine in the Thar desert. In the first five months of thisyear, more than half of China’s contracts overseas weresigned with nations along the Silk Road—a first in thecountry’s modern history.

这一次起重机和建筑工人取代了大篷车和骆驼。中国的一家船运公司中远集团，在四月份从一家中国公司手中获得了希腊第二大港口比雷埃夫斯67%的股权，这家公司正在建设一条连接这座城市到匈牙利最终到德国的高速铁路。七月份中国在巴基斯坦建立的核反应堆工程将进入第三阶段，中国也在最近宣布了它将在巴基斯坦给一个大型高速公路注资并给塔尔沙漠中的一个煤矿投资20亿美元。在今年的前五个月，超过半数的中国海外合同是与丝绸之路的沿线国家签署的----这是新中国历史上前所未有的。

Politicianshave been almost as busy in the builders’ wake. In June Mr Xi visited Serbia and Poland, scattering projectsalong the way, before heading to Uzbekistan. Last week Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, made a brief visit to Beijing; he, MrXi and Mongolia’s leader promised to link their infrastructureplans with the new Silk Road. At the time, finance ministers from almost 60countries were holding the first annual meeting in Beijing of an institutionset up to finance some of these projects, the Asian Infrastructure InvestmentBank (AIIB). Like a steam train pulling noisily out of a station, China’s biggest foreign-economic policy is slowly gathering speed.

习近平在六月访问了塞尔维亚和波兰，在前往乌克兰之前，一路上都在推广项目。上星期俄罗斯总统普京到北京做了一个简短访问；他和习近平以及蒙古总统承诺将他们的基础设施计划与新丝绸之路打通。当时，近60个国家的财政部长在北京参加注资这些项目的机构的首次年会，这个机构就是亚投行（AIIB）。像一列正拉响汽笛出站的蒸汽火车，中国的最大经济外交政策也正缓缓加速。

Chineseofficials call that policy “One Belt, One Road”, though they ofteneviscerate its exotic appeal to foreigners by using the unlovely acronym OBOR.Confusingly, the road refers to ancient maritime routes between China andEurope, while the belt describes the Silk Road’sbetter-known trails overland (see map). OBOR puzzles many Western policymakersbecause it is amorphous—it has no official list ofmember countries, though the rough count is 60—andbecause most of the projects that sport the label would probably have beenbuilt anyway. But OBOR matters for three big reasons.

中国官方称这一政策为“一带一路”，虽然他们经常无视全称的异国情调对外国人的吸引力而使用缩写OBOR。令人困惑的是，“路”指的是古代中欧之间的海上航线，而“带”却形容丝绸之路更为人熟知的陆上路线（见地图）。一带一路困扰着很多西方政策制定者，因为它是模糊的——它没有成员国家的官方名单，虽然粗略的数字是60个——而且还因为大多数故意展示这个标签的项目都已经开始建设了。但一带一路因为三大原因而显得相当重要。


  
First,the projects are vast. Official figures say there are 900 deals under way,worth $890 billion, such as a gas pipeline from the Bay of Bengal throughMyanmar to south-west China and a rail link between Beijing and Duisburg, atransport hub in Germany. China says it will invest a cumulative $4 trillion inOBOR countries, though it does not say by when. Its officials tetchily rejectcomparison with the Marshall Plan which, they say, was a means of rewardingAmerica’sfriends and excluding its enemies after the second world war. OBOR, they boast,is open to all. But, for what it is worth, the Marshall Plan amounted to $130billion in current dollars.

首先，这些项目规模巨大。官方数据称共有900个交易正在进行，价值8900亿美元，譬如从孟加拉湾经缅甸到中国西南部的天然气管线，以及连接北京和德国交通枢纽杜伊斯堡的铁路。中国表示将在一带一路沿线国家累计投资4万亿美元，虽然它没有说在什么时候完成投资。它的官员愤怒地拒绝了与马歇尔计划的对比，他们说马歇尔计划不过是二战后美国奖励其盟友而排挤其敌国的手段。一带一路则被他们吹嘘为面向所有人。但是值得注意的是，马歇尔计划的投入换算成现在的购买力约合1300亿美元。

Next,OBOR matters because it is important to Mr Xi. In 2014 the foreign minister,Wang Yi, singled out OBOR as the most important feature of the president’s foreign policy. Mr Xi’s chief foreign adviser, Yang Jiechi, has tied OBOR to China’s much-touted aims of becoming a “moderatelywell-off society” by 2020 and a “strong, prosperous” one by mid-century.

其次，习近平很重视一带一路。2014年，中国外长王毅单独将一带一路列为习主席外交政策中最重要的特色。习近平的首席外交顾问杨洁篪则将一带一路和中国经常标榜的2020年“全面建成小康社会”以及本世纪中叶建成“强大，繁荣”国家的目标相联系。

Mr Xiseems to see the new Silk Road as a way of extending China’s commercial tentaclesand soft power. It also plays a role in his broader foreign-policy thinking.The president has endorsed his predecessors’ view thatChina faces a “period of strategic opportunity” up to 2020, meaning it can take advantage of a mostly benignsecurity environment to achieve its aim of strengthening its global powerwithout causing conflict. OBOR, officials believe, is a good way of packagingsuch a strategy. It also fits with Mr Xi’s “Chinese dream” of recreating a great past.It is not too much to say that he expects to be judged as a leader partly onhow well he fulfils OBOR’s goals.

习近平似乎看到了新丝绸之路可以作为扩张商业触角和增强软实力的途径。新丝路也在习近平更广泛外交政策的思维中发挥作用。这位主席已经认可了前辈的观点，即中国在2020年之前面临着一段“战略机遇期”，它的意思是中国可以在一个相当温和的安全环境中达到加强其全球力量而又不引发冲突的目的。官方相信，一带一路是包装这种战略的好方式。它也很符合习近平再现辉煌历史的“中国梦”。不夸张地说，他希望自己作为领袖被评判的标准在一定程度上就是将一带一路的目标实现得有多好。

Third,OBOR matters because it is a challenge to the United States and its traditionalway of thinking about world trade. In that view, there are two main tradingblocs, the trans-Atlantic one and the trans-Pacific one, with Europe in thefirst, Asia in the second and America the focal point of each. Two proposedregional trade deals, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Tradeand Investment Partnership, embody this approach. But OBOR treats Asia andEurope as a single space, and China, not the United States, is its focal point.

第三，一带一路挑战了美国及其思考世界贸易的传统方式。在传统观点下，世界有两大主要贸易集团，跨大西洋以及跨太平洋的，前者是与欧洲贸易，后者是与亚洲贸易，美国则是欧亚两方共同关注的焦点。两个区域贸易协议，跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP）、跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴关系协定（TTIP）的提出，象征着这种思维模式。但一带一路将亚洲和欧洲视为一个整体，而美国并不是其中的焦点，中国才是。

Mr Xifirst spoke of a new Silk Road during a visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, a yearafter he took power. The first contracts bearing OBOR’s name—about 300 of them, including a huge hydropower plant in Pakistan—followed in 2014, though many of those deals were already welladvanced. The past two years have seen a frenzy of institution-building. Mr Xihas set up a “small leading group” to oversee OBOR. This is an informal high-level body linkinggovernment and party organisations. Its boss is Zhang Gaoli, who is a member ofthe Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s innermostcircle. It also includes the leadership’s chief spindoctor and a deputy prime minister responsible for foreign trade. All the mainbits of the bureaucracy have been corralled into OBOR.

习近平在他掌权一年后的2013年访问哈萨克斯坦期间，首次进行关于新丝绸之路的演讲。在包括巴基斯坦的一个巨大的水力发电厂在内大约300个与一带一路的名字有关系的协议中，最早的一个协议在2014年签署，尽管其中很多都是早早就规划好的。过去的两年见证了一场基础设施建设的狂潮。习近平成立了一个“领导小组”来监督一带一路。这是一个联系党和政府的非正式高级别团体。它的组长是中共中央政治局常委张高丽，而政治局常委处于党的权力中心。这个领导小组还包括领导班子的首席幕僚（王沪宁）以及一位负责外贸领域的副总理（汪洋）。官僚系统中的主要成员都进入了一带一路。

Afinancial structure to support it has also taken shape. In 2015 the centralbank transferred $82 billion to three state-owned “policy banks” for OBOR projects. China’s sovereign wealthfund backed a new Silk Road Fund worth $40 billion and the government set upthe AIIB with $100 billion of initial capital. The bank is not formally part ofOBOR but the loans approved at its first general meeting—roads in Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, for example—are all in Silk Road countries.

一个支持它的金融体系也初具规模。2015年，央行提供820亿美元给三家为一带一路项目服务的国有“政策性银行”。中国的主权财富基金用400亿美元支持新丝路基金，并且政府用1000亿美元的初始资本设立了亚投行。这家银行并不是一带一路正式组成部分，但在它的第一次股东大会上被批准的贷款——比如巴基斯坦，塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的道路项目——都位于丝绸之路的沿线国家。

Nowthe rest of the Chinese state is mobilising. Two-thirds of China’s provinces haveemphasised the importance of OBOR for their development. For example, Fuzhou,the capital of coastal Fujian province, has told its companies to “start businesses in the countries and regions along the maritimeSilk Road”; it has set up a free-trade zone to attractfirms from such countries in South-East Asia. Many big state-owned enterprises(SOEs) have an OBOR department, if only in the hope of getting money for theirprojects.

现在中国其余的省份也正在被动员。三分之二的中国省份都强调了一带一路对它们发展的重要性。例如，沿海省份福建的省会福州告诉它们的企业“在海上丝绸之路的国家和区域开展商业活动”；它建立了自由贸易区来吸引东南亚这些国家的公司。许多大型国有企业都有一带一路的部门，只为有望获取这些项目的资金。

As aresult, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasingly going along theSilk Road. In 2015, by official reckoning, its FDI in OBOR countries rose twiceas fast as the increase in total FDI. Last year 44% of China’s new engineering projects were signed with OBOR countries. In thefirst five months of 2016, the share was 52%.

结果是，中国在丝绸之路沿线的对外直接投资持续增长。据官方测算，2015年中国在一带一路国家的对外直接投资增速比总的对外直接投资增速快两倍。去年，44%的中国新工程项目是与一带一路国家签署的。而在今年的前五个月，这个比例是52%。

China’s approach toinvestment seems to be changing, too. Its OBOR contracts are now more likely toinvolve Chinese firms managing the infrastructure they build, rather than (asin the past) building them and simply handing them over. In theory, this shouldgive China an interest in working for the long term in Silk Road countries.

中国投资的方式似乎也正在改变。一带一路的合同现在更可能涉及由中国公司管理他们建造的基础设施，而非像过去那样将这些设施简单移交。理论上，这将给予中国长期在丝路沿线国家工作的兴趣。

Yetwhile OBOR gathers momentum it is also encountering problems. These are especiallyglaring in South-East Asia. China is planning a 3,000km (1,900-mile) high-speedrail line from Kunming, in its south-west, to Singapore. But in June talks withThailand over its section of the line broke down; the Thais said they wouldbuild only part of the project, and would finance it themselves. There havebeen many other such failures.

然而，当一带一路方兴未艾的时候，它也遇到了问题。这些问题在东南亚尤其明显。中国计划修建一条3000公里（1900英里）的高速铁路，从它西南部的城市昆明连接到新加坡。但在六月，与泰国关于这段铁路的谈判宣告破裂；泰国人表示他们将只修建其中的一部分，而且将自筹资金。谈判已经出现了许多诸如此类的失败。

Alsoworrying are signs that there are not yet enough viable projects for the vastsums being earmarked. The Silk Road Fund was set up to invest in infrastructureabroad. But two of its first investments were in initial public offerings byChinese firms in Hong Kong.

还有担忧指出在总数巨大的项目中仍没有足够的有可行性的项目被敲定。丝路基金是为投资海外基础设施而设立的。但是它最初的两个公开投资都提供给了位于香港的中国公司。

Problemshave arisen too with OBOR’s leadership. Mr Zhang, the most senior person in charge, is thoughtto be out of favour after blotting his copybook in March by saying that theeconomy had had “a tremendous start” to 2016. This contradicted the views of people close to Mr Xi whoargue that a slowdown is necessary.

关于一带一路领导的问题也已浮现。其中级别最高的管理者张高丽，在其三月份关于2016年经济取得“开门红”的言论被否定之后，就被认为失宠了。习近平的智囊反驳称经济减速是不可避免的。

Thetravails of the European Union—and especially of Britain, which has claimed to be enjoying a “golden age” of relations with China—might make Chinese leaders nervous about Europe’s willingness to support OBOR, though it might also in the long runmake it easier for China to exploit rivalry between European countries whendoing deals with them.

欧盟，尤其是声称与中国关系进入“黄金时代”的英国所面临的阵痛，可能使中国领导人担忧欧洲支持一带一路的意愿，虽然这种阵痛从长期来看也会让中国在与欧洲国家做生意的时候更容易利用它们的相互竞争来谋利。

Morebroadly, China has many competing bureaucratic interests at stake in the SilkRoad project. Reconciling them will be tough. OBOR is supposed to extendChinese commercial influence, reduce the Chinese economy’s dependence oninvestment in infrastructure at home and export a little of China’s vast excess capacity in steel and cement. Tensions between theseaims are inevitable. Should China give priority to underperforming provinces orunderperforming SOEs? Can it help poor western provinces while reducing itsspending on domestic infrastructure?

更广泛的说，中国在丝绸之路的项目中有许多相互竞争的官僚利益。协调他们将会很艰难。一带一路应该扩展中国的商业影响力，减少中国经济对于国内基础设施投资的依赖并转移一些中国过剩的钢铁和水泥产能。这些目标之间的矛盾是不可避免的。中国应该把优先权给那些经济表现不佳的省份或是效益不好的国有企业吗？这能在减少国内基础设施投资的同时帮助贫穷的西部省份吗？

Readyor not, here they come
Allthat said, there are reasons for thinking the new Silk Road will be paved,albeit not with gold. Most important, Asia needs new infrastructure—about $770 billion ayear of it until 2020, according to the Asian Development Bank. This demandshould eventually ease today’s worries about a lack ofprojects. Bert Hofman, the World Bank’s chief inBeijing, adds that individual countries will benefit more if they align theirplans with one other and with China. It does not pay to plan and buildseparately.

准备好，他们来了
所有这一切都表明，有理由相信新丝绸之路将被铺就，虽然不是用黄金铺成的。最重要的是，亚洲需要新的基础设施——据亚洲开发银行称，在2020年前每年需要7700亿美元。这种需求最终会缓解人们今天对于缺乏项目的担忧。世界银行中国代表处首席经济学家伯特·霍夫曼补充说，单一国家如果将他们的计划与其它国家和中国进行协调，它将获益更多。它们不需要分别单独花钱去计划和建设。

Next,China needs OBOR. At home, its businesses are being squeezed by rising costsand growing demands that they pay more attention to protecting the environment.It makes sense for them to shift some manufacturing overseas—as long as theinfrastructure is there.

其次，中国需要一带一路。在国内，它的商业正被不断提高的成本和日益增长的环保需求所挤压。对他们来说，向海外转移部分制造业是合情合理的——只要那里有基础设施。

Lastly,Xi Jinping needs it. He has made OBOR such a central part of his foreign policyand has gone to such lengths to swing the bureaucracy behind the project thatit is too late to step back now.

最后，习近平需要一带一路。他已经将一带一路作为外交政策的核心部分并且在让官僚机构支持一带一路的方面走得太远，想要打退堂鼓为时已晚。

Noneof this means the new Silk Road will be efficient, nor does it mean China’s plans will always bewelcome in countries suspicious of its expanding reach. But the building blocksare in place. The first projects are up and running. OBOR is already beginningto challenge the notion of Europe and Asia existing side by side as differenttrading blocs.

所有这些都不意味着新丝绸之路将效率出众，也不意味着中国的计划在那些怀疑它扩大影响的国家会始终受到欢迎。但准备工作已经就绪了。第一批项目都已顺利启动。一带一路已经开始挑战现有的欧亚作为不同的独立贸易集团的固有观念。