美国军事最可怕的噩梦:与中俄(同时)开战 [美国媒体]

US Military's Worst Nightmare: A War with Russia and China (at the SameTime)

美国军事最可怕的噩梦:与俄中(同时)开战

Robert Farley
August 26, 2016

2016年8月26日



Image: A B-1B Lancer soars over the Pacific Ocean as it maneuvers infor aerial refueling by a KC-135 Stratotanker on September 30, 2005. WikimediaCommons/U.S. Air Force

配图：一架B-1B枪骑兵翱翔在太平洋上空，准备与一架KC-135同温层加油机进行空中加油，时间是2005年9月30日。来自维基百科/美国空军

The United States discardedits oft-misunderstood “two war” doctrine, intended as a template for providingthe means to fight two regional wars simultaneously, late last decade. Designedto deter North Korea from launching a war while the United States was involvedin fighting against Iran or Iraq (or vice versa,) the idea helped give form tothe Department of Defense’s procurement, logistical and basing strategies inthe post–Cold War, when the United States no longer needed to face down theSoviet threat. The United States backed away from the doctrine because ofchanges in the international system, including the rising power of China andthe proliferation of highly effective terrorist networks.
But what if the United Stateshad to fight two wars today, and notagainst states like North Korea and Iran?What if China and Russia sufficiently coordinated with one another to engage insimultaneous hostilities in the Pacific and in Europe?

美国在上个十年的后期放弃了其经常被误解的"两场战争"学说，该学说为同时进行两场地区战争提供了模式范例。这个学说是美国为与诸如在向伊朗或者伊拉克开战时防止朝鲜同时发动战争（反之也如是）而设计的，冷战后美国不再需要面对苏联的威胁，国防部的采购、后勤与战略基础均基于这个想法。美国因为国际体系的变化而放弃了这个学说，这些变化包括中国之崛起和高效的恐怖网络之蔓延。

Political Coordination

政治协作

Could Beijing and Moscow coordinatea pair of crises thatwould drive two separate U.S. military responses? Maybe, but probably not. Eachcountry has its own goals, and works on its own timeline. More likely, one ofthe two would opportunistically take advantage of an existing crisis to furtherits regional claims. For example, Moscow might well decide to push the BalticStates ifthe United States became involved in a majorskirmish in the South China Sea.

北京与莫斯科会同时协同分别带来两场引致美国军事回应的危机吗？可能会，也可能不会。两国都有自己各自的目标与日程表。更有可能的是，他们中的一个会利用另一个的现有危机、投机取巧式的将自己的区域领土要求更进一步。例如，如果美国卷入南海的小型冲突中时，莫斯科可能会认定是个好时机动动波罗的海诸国。

In any case, the war wouldstart on the initiative of either Moscow or Beijing. The United States enjoysthe benefits of the status quo in both areas, and generally (at least wheregreat powers are concerned) prefers to use diplomatic and economic means topursue its political ends. While the U.S. might create the conditions for war,Russia or China would pull the trigger.

不管怎样，战争都会是莫斯科或者北京主动挑起。美国在两个地区都享有现状带来的红利，因而一般来说（至少对超级大国而言）倾向选择外交及经济手段去达到其政治目的。如果美国去制造战争导火索，俄罗斯或中国将会扣动扳机。

Flexibility

灵活性

On the upside, only some ofthe requirements for fighting in Europe and the Pacific overlap. As was thecase in World War II, the U.S. Army would bear the brunt of defending Europe,while the Navy would concentrate on the Pacific. The U.S. Air Force (USAF)would play a supporting role in both theaters.

好的一面是，欧洲与太平洋方向的作战需求只有有限的重合点。正如二战那样，美国陆军的主战场是欧洲，而海军的主要方向是太平洋。美国空军在两个方向上提供支援。远程战机，包括隐形轰炸机及类似资产，将会根据需要在两个方向上使用。

Russia lacks the ability tofight NATO in the North Atlantic, and probably has no political interest intrying. This means that while the United States and its NATO allies canallocate some resources to threatening Russia’s maritime space (and providinginsurance against a Russian naval sortie,) the U.S.Navy (USN) can concentrate its forces in the Pacific.Depending on the length of the conflict and the degree of warning provided, theUnited States could transport considerable U.S. Army assets to Europe to assistwith any serious fighting.

俄罗斯无力在北大西洋与北约作战，很大可能也无此政治意愿。这意味着美国及其北约盟国可以调配部分资源威慑俄罗斯海域（防止俄方海上袭扰），美国海军可以将大部分军力集中在太平洋方向。取决于冲突的长短及威胁的程度，美国可以将可观的陆军资产转移到欧洲以应对任何大战。

The bulk of Americancarriers, submarines and surface vessels would concentrate in the Pacific andthe Indian Oceans, fightingdirectly against China’s A2/AD system and sitting astride China’s maritimetransit lanes. Long range aviation, includingstealth bombers and similar assets, would operate in both theaters as needed.

美国航母、潜艇及水面舰艇的主力将会集中在太平洋与印度洋，直接攻击中国的A2/AD反介入和区域封锁武器系统，扼守中国的海上运输通道。

The U.S. military would beunder strong pressure to deliver decisive victory in at least one theater asquickly as possible. This might push the United States to lean heavily in onedirection with air, space and cyber assets, hoping to achieve a strategic andpolitical victory that would allow the remainder of its weight to shift to theother theater. Given the strength of U.S. allies in Europe, the United Statesmight initially focus on the conflict in the Pacific.

美国军方将会迫切需要在其中至少一个方向上尽快取得决定性的胜利。这将迫使美国将大部分的空中、太空及网络资产投入其中一个方向，以便在获得战略性和政治上的胜利后，将中心转移到另外一个方向上。由于美国欧洲盟友力量强大，美国可能会首先聚焦于太平洋上。

Alliance Structure

盟国构成

U.S. alliance structure inthe Pacific differs dramatically from that of Europe. Notwithstanding concernover the commitment of specific U.S. allies in Europe, the United States has noreason to fight Russia apart from maintaining the integrity of the NATOalliance. If the United States fights, then Germany, France, Poland and theUnited Kingdom will follow. In most conventional scenarios, even the Europeanallies alone would give NATO a tremendous medium term advantage over theRussians; Russia might take parts of the Baltics, but it would suffer heavilyunder NATO airpower, and likely couldn’t hold stolen territory for long. Inthis context, the USN and USAF would largely play support and coordinativeroles, giving the NATO allies the advantage they needed to soundly defeat theRussians. The U.S. nuclear force would provide insurance against a Russiandecision to employ tactical or strategic nuclear weapons.

美国在亚太的盟友与欧洲区别甚大。尽管对某些欧洲盟国的承诺有些担心，美国没理由会因为维护北约盟友的完整而孤独作战。美国打起来，德国、法国、波兰及英国都会跟上。对于大部分的场景而言，甚至欧洲盟友就能够独自给予北约对俄罗斯极大的中期优势；俄方可能会攫取部分波罗的海国家领土，但它将在北约的空中打击下损失惨重，长远而言很可能守不住那些盗取来的土地。在这种情形下，美国海空军将会主要扮演支援及协调角色，增加北约的优势、从而完胜俄罗斯。美国的核力量将会用于阻止俄罗斯使用战术及战略核武器。

The United States faces moredifficult problems in the Pacific. Japan or India might have an interest in theSouth China Sea, but this hardly guarantees their participation in a war (oreven the degree of benevolence of their neutrality.) The alliance structure ofany given conflict would depend on the particulars of that conflict; any of thePhilippines, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan or Taiwan could become China’s primarytarget. The rest, U.S. pressure aside, might well prefer to sit on thesidelines. This would put extra pressure on the United States to establishdominance in the Western Pacific with its own assets.

美国在太平洋方向上困难更多。日本与印度虽然对南海有兴趣，不过这个很难担保他们会否介入战争（甚至是中立的偏向程度）。盟友结构将会取决于冲突的特性；菲律宾、越南、韩国、日本或台湾都可能成为中国的主要目标。其余国家，除了美国之外，很可能会选择作为旁观者。这样会让美国以一己之力为建立西太平洋主导权承担额外压力。

The United States can stillfight and win two major wars at the same time, or at least come near enough towinning that neither Russia nor China would see much hope in the gamble. TheUnited States can do this because it continues to maintain the world’s mostformidable military, and because it stands at the head of an extremely powerfulmilitary alliance. Moreover, Russia and China conveniently pose very differentmilitary problems, allowing the United States to allocate some of its assets toone, and the rest to the other.

美国仍然有能力同时进行并赢得两场重要的战争，或者说更接近胜利的边缘、且让俄中在冒险中都看不到多少获胜的可能。美国可以做到，是因为它一直维持着世界上最具威力的军事力量，而且是世界上无比强大军事同盟的首领。另外就是，通常俄中所带来的军事挑战侧重点不同，让美国可以将资源从容分配。

However, it bears emphasisthat thissituation will not last forever. The UnitedStates cannot maintain this level of dominance indefinitely, and in thelong-term will have to choose its commitments carefully. At the same time, theUnited States has created an international order that benefits many of the mostpowerful and prosperous countries in the world; it can count on their support,for a while.

然而，需要强调的是局势并非永远如此。美国无法无限期的维持主导权，长期来说必须谨慎的选择其承诺。而在这同时，美国所创立的国际秩序，让许多最强大富裕的国家获益甚多，美国可以期盼在一段时间内，获得这些国家的支持。

RobertFarley, a frequent contributor to the National Interest, is author ofThe Battleship Book. He serves as a senior lecturer at the Patterson School ofDiplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His workincludes military doctrine, national security and maritime affairs. He blogs atLawyers, Guns and Money,Information Disseminationand theDiplomat.

RobertFarley，经常为National Interest撰文，是The Battleship Book一书的作者。他还是肯塔基大学帕特森外交与国际商务学院的高级讲师。着作涵括军事学说、国家安全和海事等方面。在Lawyers, Guns and Money,Information Dissemination及 theDiplomat这三个网站上均有博客。