50年后未调查是美国煽动1965印尼大屠杀吗？ [美国媒体]

Peter Dale Scott
It is now fifty years since the so-called “G30S” or “Gestapu” (Gerakan September Tigahpuluh) event of September 30, 1965 in Indonesia, when six members of the Indonesian army general staff were brutally murdered. This event was a decisive moment in Indonesian history: it led to the overthrow of President Sukarno, his replacement by an army general, Suharto, and the subsequent massacre of a half million or more Indonesians targeted as communists.1 It is also forty years since I first wrote to suggest that the United States was implicated in this horrendous event,2 and thirty years since I wrote about it again in 1985 in the Canadian journal Pacific Affairs.3

发生在1965年9月30日的印度尼西亚被称作G30S或者930事件已经过去了五十年了，六名印尼军队总参谋部成员被残忍杀害。这次事件成为了印尼历史上一个决定性的时刻，它导致总统苏加诺被推翻，他被苏哈托将军取代，随后超过五十万印尼人被认为是共产党而惨遭屠杀。从我第一次揭露美国与这一骇人听闻的事件有关已经过了四十年了，距我1985年加拿大太平洋事务期刊上在第二次揭露也已经过了三十年了。

Strikingly, there has been very little follow-up investigating these events inside the United States. A new generation of scholars, notably John Roosa and Bradley Simpson, have documented U.S. involvement in the exploitation of Gestapu to justify the subsequent mass murder, in the massacre project itself, and in the formation of the subsequent capitalist New Order.4 But there has been, I shall try to show, little or no American response to facts I presented then suggesting U.S. involvement in inciting the specific event of September 30 itself.



令人吃惊的是，在美国几乎没有关于这一事件的跟踪研究。值得一提的是，新生代学者们，John Roosa 和Bradley Simpson,记录了美国参与了引发930事件并为后来的大屠杀辩护，包括大屠杀本身，以及随后的资本主义新秩序形成。
但是即便如此，我仍然试图去表明，面对这些我发表的关于美国参与了煽动930事件本身的证据，美国当局几乎没有任何回应。

The Indonesia massacre of 1965
Consider five facts about the U.S. and Indonesia in 1965, facts that (apart from the first) have been little noted or greeted in America with silence.

仔细思考这五个关于1965年美国和印度尼西亚的事实，在美国的沉默以对下，他们（除了第一个）从未被记录或者提到。



Fact No. 1) Prior to Gestapu, a number of U.S. academics and policy intellectuals with connections to the CIA and RAND Corporation publicly urged their contacts in the Indonesian Army "to strike, sweep their house clean” (Guy Pauker), while “liquidating the enemy's political and guerrilla armies” (William Kintner).

事实1.  930事件之前，一批美国和中情局与发展研究协会有公开联系的学术和政治情报人员与印尼军接触并挑唆他们“突然，打扫干净”(Guy Pauker语),“清洗政敌和游击队派”(William Kintner语).
【和美帝当代手法差不多，基金会和特务先行挑动】

Text of my article in Pacific Affairs

太平洋事务上我的文章

In a RAND Corporation book published by Princeton University Press, Pauker, a Rand Corporation analyst and consultant to the National Security Council, urged his contacts in the Indonesian military to assume "full responsibility" for their nation's leadership, "fulfill a mission," and hence "to strike, sweep their house clean."42 [From fn. 43:] William Kintner, a CIA (OPC) senior staff officer from 1950-52, and later Nixon's ambassador to Thailand, also wrote in favor of "liquidating" the Indonesian Communist Party [PKI] while working at a CIA-subsidized think-tank, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, on the University of Pennsylvania campus.

在波士顿大学出版的一本发展研书中，波克尔，一名发展研的为国安委工作的分析师和顾问，提到他与印尼军队接触并建议他们为本国领导权“完全负责”，“履行使命”，因此要“突然，打扫干净”。William Kintner，1950-52任中情局政策协调处高级官员，后任尼克松政府驻泰国大使，他在中情局资助的智囊团——外交政策研究所，在宾夕法尼亚大学校内——工作的时候，同样支持“清洗”印尼共产党。

【TIPS：OPC政策协调处，CIA秘密战争部门，负责包括对外心理战和直接的特务行动。该处虽隶属于CIA，但却由国务院直接拨款，在人事和财务上有更大的自主权。按照OPC的行动章程，其任务包括：宣传，经济战，防范性的直接行动包括阴谋、反阴谋，破坏和疏散行动，对敌对国家的颠覆包括帮助地下组织；难民解放组织行动；以及支持在“对自由世界构成威胁”的国家中的反共行动等等。OPC同时还成立了一个特别活动组负责对“妨碍美国利益的人”包括背叛美国的双重间谍施行绑架和暗杀等行动。】

Documentation in my article for Fact No. 1

我文中关于事实1的引用

Fn. 42. Guy J. Pauker, “The Role of the Military in Indonesia,” in John H. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 222-24. The foreword to the book is by Klaus Knorr, who worked for the CIA while teaching at Princeton. The book was based on papers delivered to a conference at Princeton in 1962 attended by military officers from other third-world countries, including Brazil, whose U.S.-backed army coup in 1964 preceded Indonesia’s by a year.

注42 
Guy J. Pauker,,“军队在印尼的作用”，John H. Johnson编写。《军队在不发达国家所扮演的角色》(Princeton, NJ: 波士顿大学出版社, 1962)。 为中情局工作并在波士顿教书的Klaus Knorr撰写本书前言。这本书基于在1962年参加波士顿大会的第三世界军官的报告撰写，包括巴西，就在美国支持的印度尼西亚军事政变前一年。

Fn. 43. William Kintner and Joseph Kornfeder, The New Frontier of War [London: Frederick Muller, 1963], pp. 233, 237-38): "If the PKI is able to maintain its legal existence and Soviet influence continues to grow, it is possible that Indonesia may be the first Southeast Asian country to be taken over by a popularly based, legally elected communist government.... In the meantime, with Western help, free Asian political leaders -- together with the military -- must not only hold on and manage, but reform and advance while liquidating the enemy's political and guerrilla armies."

注43
William Kintner 和Joseph Kornfeder，《战争新边疆》：如果印尼共产党有能力持续存在和苏联影响力继续增长，印度尼西亚有可能成为东南亚首个被普罗阶级接管的，合法当选的共产主义政府……此时，通过西方帮助，自由亚洲的政治领导人们——与军队一起——必将不仅在保有权力的同时，改革与推进清洗政敌和游击队。

Reception of Fact No. 1

接受事实1

Googling for “pauker + kintner + indonesia” yields many results. Of the first ten, five are to my work, and five are to works sourcing me. I failed to discover any independent discussion. But this first fact, unlike those following, was relatively widely received, because the quotations from Pauker and Kintner were picked up and reproduced by Noam Chomsky.

谷歌“pauker + kintner + 印度尼西亚”产生的许多结果。首先的十条，五个是我的工作成果，五个是来源于我。我未能找到其他独立的研究。但是这是第一个事实，与下面的不同，它相对地被广泛的接受，原因是有关于Pauker 和Kintner的内容被 Noam Chomsky  引用和剪切重加工。

Fact No. 2) Gestapu was a false flag operation: it claimed to have acted to defend Sukarno, but the pro-Sukarno generals in the Indonesian Army General Staff were in fact among the first to be assassinated.

事实2  
930事件是个打着假旗号的阴谋：它声称是为了保卫苏加诺，但是印尼军总参谋部中忠于苏加诺的将军被首先刺杀。

Text of my article

我的文中写道

According to the Australian scholar Harold Crouch, by 1965 the Indonesian Army General Staff was split into two camps. At the center were the general staff officers appointed with, and loyal to, the army commander General Yani, who in turn was reluctant to challenge President Sukarno's policy of national unity in alliance with the Indonesian Communist party, or PKI. The second group, including the right-wing generals Nasution and Suharto, comprised those opposed to Yani and his Sukarnoist policies.5 All of these generals were anti-PKI, but by 1965 the divisive issue was Sukarno.

根据澳大利亚学会的Harold Crouch，印尼总参谋部分裂成等两个阵营。中立的是被任命的印尼总参谋长，忠诚的军队总司令雅尼上将，不愿意挑战印尼总统苏加诺的民族平等政策和共产党联盟政策。第二股势力，包括右派将军纳苏蒂安和苏哈托，组成了反对雅尼和他的苏加诺路线的同盟。所有的将军都是反对印尼共产党的，但是1965年面对如何对待苏加诺时产生了分歧。

The simple (yet untold) story of Sukarno's overthrow is that in the fall of 1965 Yani and his inner circle of generals were murdered, paving the way for a seizure of power by right-wing anti-Yani forces allied to Suharto. The key to this was the so-called Gestapu coup attempt which, in the name of supporting Sukarno, in fact targeted very precisely the leading members of the army's most loyal faction, the Yani group.6 An army unity meeting in January 1965, between "Yani's inner circle" and those (including Suharto) who "had grievances of one sort or another against Yani," lined up the victims of September 30 [the Yani faction] against those who came to power after their murder [the anti-Yani faction including Suharto].7 Not one anti-Sukarno general was targeted by Gestapu, with the obvious exception of General Nasution.8 But by 1961 the CIA operatives in Washington had become disillusioned with Nasution as a reliable asset, because of his "consistent record of yielding to Sukarno on several major counts."9 Relations between Suharto and Nasution were also cool, since Nasution, after investigating Suharto on corruption charges in 1959, had transferred him from his command.10

苏加诺倒台的简单故事就是1965年雅尼和他的势力被屠杀了，为右翼反雅尼势力苏哈托掌权铺平了道路。这其中关键的是被称之为930事件的政变，以支持苏加诺的名义，事实上目标非常明确的指向绝大多数忠诚的军队力量—雅尼的势力。一个军队联合会议在1965年1月在雅尼的内部圈子和那些（包括苏哈托）有这样或那样反对雅尼的团体之间召开，之后在930事件中雅尼的势力遭到那些掌权者（反雅尼）的排队屠杀。没有一个反苏加诺派的将军在930事件中被作为目标，但明显的例外就是将军纳苏蒂安。1961年的CIA在华盛顿的报告中对于纳苏蒂安作为一个可靠的反（苏加诺）力量已经彻底失望，因为他连续的在几个主要方面对苏加诺屈服。



The duplicitous distortions of reality, first by Lt. Colonel Untung's statements for Gestapu, and then by Suharto in "putting down" Gestapu, are mutually supporting 
Suharto, the beneficiary of the Gestapu plot

欺诈而扭曲的现实,首先翁东中校发动了930运动,然后由苏哈托“平息”了930事件,（这两件事）是相互支持的，苏哈托是930阴谋的受益人。

Documentation for Fact No. 2 

事实2的引用记录

Fn. 5. Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 79-81.

注5
哈罗德·克劳驰：（印度尼西亚的军队与政治》，康奈尔大学出 版社1978年版

Fn. 6. In addition, one of the two Gestapu victims in Central Java (Colonel Katamso) was the only non-PKI official of rank to attend the PKI's nineteenth anniversary celebration in Jogjakarta in May 1964: Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 432.5 Ironically, the belated "discovery" of his corpse was used to trigger off the purge of his PKI contacts.

注6
并且，在1964年4月位于中爪哇的日惹，两名屠杀受害者之一的Katamso上校是唯一的未以印尼共官方身份前往出席印尼共十九周年庆典的。具有讽刺意味的是，迟来的“发现”他的尸体这一事实被用来引发对印尼共的清洗。
雷克斯·莫蒂默《苏加诺时期印度尼西亚的共产主义，意识形态与政 治，1959-1965》

Fn. 7. Four of the six pro-Yani representatives in January were killed along with Yani on October 1. Of the five anti-Yani representatives in January, we shall see that at least three were prominent in "putting down" Gestapu and completing the elimination of the Yani-Sukarno loyalists (the three were Suharto, Basuki Rachmat, and Sudirman of SESKOAD, the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School): Crouch, The Army, p. 81n.

注7
六名亲雅尼委员继雅尼10月1号被杀后在1月被杀。1月，在五个反雅尼的委员中，我们也看到至少三个在930事件中执行对苏加诺-雅尼派系的疯狂杀戮。
（那三个人是苏哈托，Basuki Rachmat, 印度尼西亚参谋与指挥学校的Sudirman）

Fn. 8. While Nasution's daughter and aide were murdered, he was able to escape without serious injury and supported the ensuing purge.

注8
正是纳苏蒂安的女儿和副官被杀，（替他做了挡箭牌），纳苏蒂安才能从残酷的杀戮中逃出，并支持接下来的大清洗。

Fn. 9. Indonesia, 22 (October 1976), p. 165 (CIA Memorandum of 22 March 1961 from Richard M. Bissell, Attachment B). By 1965 Washington’s disillusionment with Nasution was heightened by Nasution's deep opposition to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

注9

Reception of Fact No. 2

接受事实2

Not mentioned, as far as I know, in the United States.

在美国从没提到过，至少就我个人来说

Fact No. 3) The Johnson Administration misled members of the 88th US Congress, in order to continue aid to the Indonesian army following a Senate amendment prohibiting it.

事实3
约翰逊政府误导了第88届美国国会，为了免于参议院通过禁止法案以继续帮助印尼军队。

Footnote 75 to my article: A Senate amendment in 1964 to cut off all aid to Indonesia unconditionally was quietly killed in conference committee, on the misleading ground that the Foreign Assistance Act "requires the President to report fully and concurrently to both Houses of the Congress on any assistance furnished to Indonesia" (U.S. Cong., Senate, Report No. 88-1925, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, p. 11). In fact the act's requirement that the president report "to Congress" applied to eighteen other countries, but in the case of Indonesia he was to report to two Senate Committees and the speaker of the House: Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620(j).

我文中的注释75：
1964年的削减所有无条件援助印尼的法案被参议院委员会悄悄废除了，外国援助法案的不完善之处是要求总统在援助印尼的事务中事无巨细的同时向国会两院报告。(U.S. Cong., Senate, Report No. 88-1925, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, p. 11).
事实上这项事务需要总统报告国会的内容涉及到18个其他国家，但是由于印度尼西亚的特殊情况总统只向参议院常委会和众议院议长说明：外国援助法案，620章。

Text of my article: After March 1964, when Sukarno told the U.S., "go to hell with your aid," it became increasingly difficult to extract any aid from the U.S. congress: those persons not aware of what was developing found it hard to understand why the U.S. should help arm a country which was nationalizing U.S. economic interests, and using immense aid subsidies from the Soviet Union to confront the British in ，Malaysia.

在我的文中：1964年3月，当苏加诺告诉美国，“只让你的援助见鬼去吧”这使得从美国国会会的各种援助变得越来越困难了：那些人不理解什么是发展，他们发现自己很难理解为什么美国要帮助一个要把美国有兴趣的利益收归国有化并同时借助巨额苏联援助对抗在马来西亚的英国的国家

Thus a public image was created that under Johnson "all United States aid to Indonesia was stopped," a claim so buttressed by misleading documentation that competent scholars have repeated it. In fact, Congress had agreed to treat U.S. funding of the Indonesian military as a covert matter, restricting congressional review of the president's determinations on Indonesian aid to two Senate committees, and the House Speaker, who were concurrently involved in oversight of the CIA.75

因此在约翰逊总统下令“所有给印尼的援助全部停止”之后，错误的公众印象就这样产生了，由误导性的文件引起的索赔要求也被公众支持，主管学者也重复了这一请求。事实上，国会早已同意秘密向印尼军方提供资金，限制国会（包括参议院两个委员会和众议院议长，他们一同监察中情局）对总统决定的向印尼援助的审查。

Ambassador Jones' more candid account admits that "suspension" meant "the U.S. government undertook no new commitments of assistance, although it continued with on going programs.... By maintaining our modest assistance to [the Indonesian Army and the police brigade], we fortified them for a virtually inevitable showdown with the burgeoning PKI."76

Jones大使更是坦率的承认，“暂停”的意思是虽然美国政府会继续执行进行中的（援助）工作，但不会承诺有新的援助。印尼军队和警察机关为了请求保持我们微薄的援助，我们将促使他们与新兴的印尼共产党不可避免的摊牌。

Only from recently released documents do we learn that new military aid was en route as late as July 1965, in the form of a secret contract to deliver two hundred Aero-Commanders to the Indonesian Army: these were light aircraft suitable for use in "civic action" or counterinsurgency operations, presumably by the Army Flying Corps whose senior officers were virtually all trained in the U.S.77



只有从最近发行的档案中我们才得知新的军事援助推迟到了1965年7月，同时以一个秘密合约的形式为印尼军队培训200名空军指挥官：这些援助的轻型飞机适用于“公民行动”和“平叛行动”，大概是由于这些陆军航空兵的高层都是在美国培训过的。

Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Jakarta in 1965, said to have approved lists of candidates for the purge

Marshall Green，1965年美国驻雅加达大使，据说批准了对名单上的人进行清洗。

Documentation for Fact No. 3

事实3的引用文件

Reception of Fact No, 3

接受事实3

A Google search for “Indonesia + Senate Report No. 88-1925” (the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964) yields seven results, five in English and two in German. All seven are to my 1985 article in Pacific Affairs.

谷歌搜索“印度尼西亚+参议院报告88-1925号”（1964年外国援助法案）只有七个结果，五个英文两个是德文。所有的七个都是引用于我1985在太平洋研究所的报告。

Fact No. 4) In May 1965, months before the September coup, CIA-related Lockheed payments shifted from a Sukarno backer to a Suharto backer.6

事实4
在1965年4月，九月政变之前数个月，中情局联系的洛克希德资助对象从苏加诺支持者转为苏哈托主持者。



Sasakawa Ryoichi: a recipient of CIA-related Lockheed payments, who boasted of his involvement in Indonesia's regime change

笹川良一：与中情局有关的洛克希德资助金的获得者，吹嘘他参与了印尼的政权更迭

It is now generally accepted that (as Tim Weiner documents in the case of Japan), “Instead of passing suitcases filled with cash in four-star hotels, the CIA used trusted American businessmen as go-betweens to deliver money to benefit its allies. Among these were executives from Lockheed, the company then building the U-2.”7

现在被广泛接受的是（来自日本的TimWeiner的文件），“中情局通过可信的美国商人作为中间人给予那些同盟者利益，而不是简单的在四星级酒店里传递装满钱的箱子”。在这之中负责执行的是洛克希德，就是那个造U-2飞机的公司。

Text of my article

我的文中提到

From as early as May 1965, U.S. military suppliers with CIA connections (principally Lockheed) were negotiating equipment sales with payoffs to middlemen, in such a way as to generate payoffs to backers of the hitherto little-known leader of a new third faction in the army, Major-General Suharto -- rather than to those backing Nasution or Yani, the titular leaders of the armed forces. Only in the 1980s was it confirmed that secret funds administered by the U.S. Air Force (possibly on behalf of the CIA) were laundered as "commissions" on sales of Lockheed equipment and services, in order to make political payoffs to the military personnel of foreign countries.85

遭遇1965年4月，美国军方供应商与中情局合作（主要是指洛克希德）进行谈判设备销售和有关做中间人的收益，他们通过这样的方式产生收益，联系印尼军中到那时候为止的鲜为人知第三派领导人苏哈托的支持者，而不是其他诸如军队的名义领袖雅尼和纳苏蒂安。到1980年代才证实，由美国空军管理（更可能是中情局的马甲）的秘密资金被洗白为洛克希德设备和服务的佣金，目的是买通外国军事人员获取政治利益。

A 1976 Senate investigation into these payoffs revealed, almost inadvertently, that in May 1965, over the legal objections of Lockheed's counsel, Lockheed commissions in Indonesia had been redirected to a new contract and company set up by the firm's long-time local agent or middleman.86 Its internal memos at the time show no reasons for the change, but in a later memo the economic counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta is reported as saying that there were "some political considerations behind it."87 If this is true, it would suggest that in May 1965, five months before the coup, Lockheed had redirected its payoffs to a new political eminence, at the risk (as its assistant chief counsel pointed out) of being sued for default on its former contractual obligations.

参议院1976年的调查报告透漏，1965年4月，几乎在不经意间，这些收入通过洛克希德公司的法律顾问，注入了重订了新章程的洛克希德驻印尼委员会的并成立的以常驻当地代理和中间人为主的新公司。它的内部备忘录并没有注明那个时候做出这样改变的原因，但是后来美国经济顾问备忘录中写明了。美国驻雅加达大使馆报告中说到，这变化背后有一些政治上的考量。如果这是真的，这就表明了，1965年4月，在政变之前五个月，在面临被以拖欠其合同义务的（作为其助理首席律师指出的）风险之前，洛克希德已经把转向新的政治目标作为获得收益的方法。

The Indonesian middleman, August Munir Dasaad [Agus Musin Dassad], was "known to have assisted Sukarno financially since the 1930's."88 In 1965, however, Dasaad was building connections with the Suharto forces, via a family relative, General Alamsjah, who had served briefly under Suharto in 1960, after Suharto completed his term at SESKOAD. Via the new contract, Lockheed, Dasaad and Alamsjah were apparently hitching their wagons to Suharto's rising star:

印度尼西亚中间人，Agus Musin Dassad，是“苏加诺自1930年以来的经济助手”闻名的。然而1965年，Dasaad和苏哈托派建立了联系，通过家庭的关系，Alamsjah将军，在苏哈托于印尼军事指挥学院完成他的任期之后的1960年短暂在苏哈托部下任职。通过这个新通道，洛克希德，Dassad和Alamsjah搭上了苏哈托这位后起之秀的车。

When the coup was made during which Suharto replaced Sukarno,Alamsjah , who controlled certain considerable funds, at once made these available to Suharto, which obviously earned him the gratitude of the new President. In due course he was appointed to a position of trust and confidence and today Alamsjah is, one might say, the second important man after the President.89

当政变成功后苏加诺被苏哈托取代，控制着大量资金的Alamsjah，立即把这些资金提供给苏哈托，这显然为他赢得了新总统的感激之情。在适当的时候，他被任命为苏哈托信任和信赖的心腹，然后今天的Alamsjah，可以说是总统之下第一人。

Thus in 1966 the U.S. Embassy advised Lockheed it should "continue to use" the Dasaad-Alamsjah-Suharto connection.90

因此美国大使馆在1966年建议洛克希德可以继续使用Dasaad-Alamsjah-苏哈托这条线。



Reception of Fact No. 4

接受事实4

Googling for “Lockheed + August Munir Dasaad” yields 207 results, only one more than if you google for “’Peter Dale Scott’ + ‘August Munir Dasaad.’” All the hits are either directly to my work, in Indonesian, or both. Of the first fifteen results for “Lockheed + Alamsjah,” two are irrelevant and the rest are to my work.

谷歌搜索“洛克希德+ August MunirDasaad”产生了207个结果，只比谷歌“'Peter Dale Scott'+'August Munir Dasaad”多了一个结果。所有的点击都直接指向我的成果，在印尼，或两者兼而有之。前十五个结果“洛克希德+ Alamsjah，”两个是不相关，其余的都是我的成果。

Fact No. 5) The Lockheed payment was paralleled, two months before Gestapu, by a similar payoff to Suharto’s business associate Bob Hasan, on a US military contract involving Rockwell Aero-commanders

事实5
930事件两个月之前，与洛克希德资助事件同时发生的是，在有关美军罗克韦尔基地培训AC型飞机飞行员的合同中包含了一个类似的内容，给予苏哈托商业助手Bob Hasan贿赂。

Text of my article
In July 1965, at the alleged nadir of U.S.-Indonesian aid relations, Rockwell-Standard had a contractual agreement to deliver two hundred light aircraft (Aero-Commanders) to the Indonesian Army (not the Air Force) in the next two months.91 Once again the commission agent on the deal, Bob Hasan, was a political associate (and eventual business partner) of Suharto.92 More specifically, Suharto and Bob Hasan established two shipping companies to be operated by the Central Java army division, Diponegoro. This division, as has long been noticed, supplied the bulk of the personnel on both sides of the Gestapu coup drama -- both those staging the coup attempt, and those putting it down. And one of the three leaders in the Central Java Gestapu movement was Lt. Col. Usman Sastrodibroto, chief of the Diponegoro Division's "section dealing with extramilitary functions."93

1965年7月，被指为所谓的美-印尼援助关系的最低点，罗克韦尔基地已经达成了契约，同意在接下来的两个月交付两百架轻型飞机（AC型）给印尼军队（不是给印尼空军）。再次在合同中与苏哈托的政治代理人Bob Hasan（也是商业掮客）达成了交易。进一步的说，苏哈托与Bob Hasan建立了由中爪哇军区运作的两个航运公司——Diponegoro。这个早已被人们所注意到的军区，在930政变这场大戏中为两个阵营都提供了大量人员——掀起政变的一方，被打倒的一方。
三名参加了930事件的中爪哇军区领导中的一人是中校Usman Sastrodibroto，他就是Diponegoro航运部队的负责非军事行动的长官。

Thus of the two known U.S. military sales contracts from the eve of the Gestapu Putsch, both involved political payoffs to persons who emerged after Gestapu as close Suharto allies.

因此，两个已知的930事件前夕的美国军事销售合同，都涉及了政治贿赂930事变后上台的苏哈托亲信。

Reception of Fact No. 5

接受事实5

A Google Books search for “Rockwell + 1965 + ‘Bob Hasan’” yields 201 results, mostly in Indonesian  Indonesia). Of the first nine, all four of the hits in English, and at least one hit in Indonesian, are to my 1985 article in Pacific Affairs.

在谷歌中输入“Rockwell + 1965 + ‘Bob Hasan’”得到201个结果。绝大多是是印尼语（Bahasa是印尼语）.为首的九个，其中四个是英文，至少牵扯到一点印度尼西亚的是我在1985年在环太平洋研究所的文章。



Bob Hasan, Suharto's business associate, who received U.S. payoffs on the eve of Gestapu

Bob Hasan, 苏哈托的商业代理人，在930事件前夕收取了美国的贿赂。

Insert picture with caption] Bob Hasan, Suharto’s business associate, who received U.S. payoffs on the eve of Gestapu
Reception in general of these facts, and of my article

接受所有的这些事实，回到我的文章

To my knowledge, I am not aware that any of the above facts (other than the first, picked up by Noam Chomsky) have been discussed in any American source, or indeed in any countries other than Indonesia, even since 1998.

据我所知，自从1998年以来，我没发现任何的上述事实（除了第一条由 Noam Chomsky拼贴过的）在美国的媒体中被讨论过，或者是在其他不是印度尼西亚的国家被讨论过。

As for my article, I am aware of two academic references to it in the United States before Suharto’s ouster in 1998. Along with other works by Benedict Anderson, Ruth McVey, and Ralph McGehee, it was cited in a single footnote as part of an article by H. W. Brands, “The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn't Topple Sukarno,” in the Journal of American History, (December 1989).

正如我文中所说，我知道在苏哈托下台之前，有两个学者引用过我的文章。
在 Benedict Anderson, Ruth McVey, and Ralph McGehee的“操控的极限：为什么说美国没有推翻苏加诺，”一书和其他作品的，它被引用在一个单独的脚注里——H. W. Brand，美国历史杂志，（1989年12月）。

Brands did not mention the arguments for U.S. involvement. Instead his claim Brands

没提到美国的介入（印尼930事件），代之以他自己的观点

(that“In fact, Sukarno’s overthrow had little to do with American machinations”) 
relied on documents in the LBJ library: “The story they tell,” he assured readers, “does render largely untenable the notion that Sukarno’s demise and the accompanying bloodbath originated in the USA.”

(“事实上，苏加诺的倒台并不是因为美国政府的阴谋”)在LBJ的文中写道：“他们编的故事这样说”,他使读者相信，“苏加诺的下台和随之而来的血腥屠杀是因为美国的缘故，这一理论是这站不脚的”。

His method, in short, was to trust what U.S. government documents said on the topic, a na瘀攀 method that I fear one finds all too frequently among what I call archival historians. Brands concedes that “Certain communications remain classified [and] some may have been consigned to the shredder” (p. 788). But he writes as if unaware that the CIA is quite capable of falsifying releases of its own internal records, when it serves to protect operational secrecy from outsiders.9

他的意见是，简而言之，相信美国政府的官方声明，多么天真的想法，我害怕就是这种频繁出现的我称之为档案历史学家。Brands 承认“一些通讯文件仍然被列为机密并且一些已经被塞入碎纸机”。但是他的作品写道，为了防止向外部泄密，中情局完全有能力秘密的伪造自己公开的内部纪录。

The same na瘀攀 method marks the only other response (as far as I know) to my argument, this in a book by the journalist Victor Fic implicating China in Gestapu (and published in India):

同样天真的想法诸如（据我所知）剩下的另一个对我的文章的回应，记者 Victor Fic暗示中国参与了930事件（印度出版）。

Peter Dale Scott is the leading theorist about the alleged American role in this conspiracy…. However CIA and other documents declassified and published by the Government of the United States… render Scott’s theory implausible as the CIA, by its own admission, did not have assets in Indonesia to carry out such a ‘coup’ to depose Sukarno or destroy the PKI.10

Peter Dale Scott是声称美国在这场阴谋中扮演的角色很可疑这一理论的带头人。

然而中情局和美国政府其他解密和印刷档案，（中情局解密和印刷档案）使Scott的理论受到怀疑，因为中情局自己宣称，没有在印尼资助推翻苏加诺或摧毁印尼共产党的“政变”。

Fic’s argument deserves a little more attention, since he also refers to an editorial in support of Gestapu which appeared in the October 2, 1965, issue of the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat. Once again, if taken at face value, this support for the generals’ murder from a Communist paper would seem to corroborate that Gestapu was, as Fic claimed, a left-wing putsch attempt.

Fic的理论值得多一点关注，因为他还提到支持930事件的社论出现在1965年10月2日，发布在印尼共报纸Harian Rakjat上。再一次的，如果你信以为真，共产党报纸对大规模屠杀的支持更证明了930事件，正如Fic宣称的，是左翼的阴谋。

However Fic simply ignored the arguments referred to in my essay that the Harian Rakjat “editorial” was in fact a propaganda forgery, perhaps from the CIA.
 
然而Fic根本就是无视了我的文章中的论点，Harian Rakjat 报的社论，根本就是伪造的宣传品，这大概是中情局的手笔。

How to Explain the Fifty Years of Silence?

怎样解释这五十年来的沉默？

It is obvious why American Indonesianists were reluctant to mention my article or to investigate the avenues that it opened up as long as Suharto was in power: their careers depended on the ability to visit the country they wrote about. Professor Benedict Anderson at Cornell, was one of the first scholars to question the official account of Gestapu, in the so-called Cornell Report of 1971.11 Later he was famously turned back in Jakarta airport, even though he had arrived on a valid visa.

很明显为什么美国的印度尼西亚人都不愿意提到我的文章或者去调查真相，因为苏哈托仍然掌权：他们的职业生涯取决于他们是否具有访问他们采访的国家的权力。康奈尔大学的Benedict Anderson教授，第一个质疑930事件的官方人员，在1971.11的康奈尔大学报告会上，之后很有名的是他在雅加达机场被遣返，即便他已经获得了有效签证。

Another obvious reason is methodological. Diplomatic historians are accustomed to work with government records, rather than concern themselves (as I did) with released internal documents from companies like Lockheed which, in my analysis, operate as part of the American deep state.12

另一个很明显的原因是方法论。外交历史学家更习惯于依照政府记录工作，而不是（正如我做的那样）注意到诸如洛克希德公司他们自己发行的内部文件，在我所做的分析美国深层次的操作。

Recently, in an essay that explicitly noted CIA involvement in the 1958 Permesta rebellion, Anderson acknowledged U.S. support in 1965 for the violent response to Gestapu, but as distinguished from Gestapu itself.13 Bradley Simpson, in a definitive account of that support, says of Gestapu itself only that “American historians in particular [he cites my essay in an endnote] have spilled much ink on the question of Washington’s involvement.”14 Today it has become common to see discussion of U.S. involvement in targeting PKI members after Gestapu, as well as in the general repression that followed Gestapu.15 But one does not yet see much discussion of U.S. involvement in Gestapu itself.

最近，一篇文章明确的指出中情局参与了1958年的苏拉威西叛乱（TIPS:百度词条：全面斗争约章集团）， Anderson承认美国支持了1965年930事件中的暴力屠杀，但是这要并不是说美国支持了930事件。【这洗地没水平啊 屠杀我支持，叛乱我不支持，难道引起屠杀的叛乱不是你美帝支持的？】
Bradley Simpson，谈到930事件本身只说到美国历史学家已经在华盛顿是否参与这一问题上已经着墨甚多了（他引用我的文章做尾注）。今天，美国是否参与了930事件后压制和清洗印尼共产党成员已经引起了普遍的讨论。但是仍然几乎没有人探讨美国参与了930事件本身。

My article’s reception outside the United States has been quite different. Published first in Canada in 1985, it was subsequently translated and/or published in Amsterdam (1985, in Dutch), Paris (1986), West Berlin (1988, in Bahasa Indonesia), Hull, England (1990), and since then, starting in 1998, at least six other times in Bahasa Indonesia, inside Indonesia itself.16

我的文章在在美国之外的地方接受度早已不可同日而语。1985年（我的着作）首先在加拿大出版，然后被翻译并在出版阿姆斯特丹（1985荷兰）出版，巴黎（法国1986），西柏林（1988，用印尼语），赫尔（英格兰1990），自此1998年之后，被翻译成印尼语至少六次，包括印尼本国的翻译。

I am in no position to estimate the reception in Indonesia of the article (it was actually published there as a book). A sign that the bootleg 1988 translation from West Berlin was being circulated clandestinely in Indonesia is the fact that the book was officially banned by Suharto’s Bureau of Censorship.17 To this day. to my knowledge, the only newspaper reference anywhere to my hypothesis of U.S. involvement in Gestapu was in the English-language Jakarta Post of July 25, 2013.18

我没有能力来估算我的着作在印尼的接受度（着作已经在印尼作为书籍出版了）。
标志是1988年我的作品从西柏林被盗版翻译并秘密传到印尼后广为流传，一个要注意的事实是，这本书是被苏哈托的审查机关正式禁止的。

Now that Indonesia itself is becoming more open to discussions of Gestapu and its aftermath, it is high time for a similar change of attitude in the United States. And internationally.

现在印尼本国已经开放对930事件及其后果的讨论，是美国同样改变态度的时候了。国际社会也应该同样如此。



Epilogue

后记

My views on Sukarno’s overthrow have evolved since the 1980s. In that era, seeing Sukarno in contrast to the repressive dictator Suharto, I described Sukarno as “an undeniably popular and reasonably constitutional civilian leader.”19 Today I recognize that in the last years of his rule the country was becoming more and more unstable, major economic problems were not being addressed, and Sukarno sought to placate public unrest by an ill-advised military campaign against his neighbor Malaysia.

我的观点自从1980年代（可能是作者笔误 苏加诺1970年已死）苏加诺倒台后经过了很多发展。在那个时代，看到苏加诺压制独裁者苏哈托，我就把他视为一位广受拥护的宪法平民领袖。今天，我承认在他治国的最后几年，国家变得越来越不稳定，主要的经济问题没能解决，苏加诺试图通过一个不明智的对邻国马来西亚的军事行动来平息公众的焦虑。

I also attribute greater importance to the fact that Sukarno thus contributed unwittingly to his own downfall, since the secret army special operations unit OPSUS, created by Suharto to handle a peace initiative towards Malaysia of which Sukarno knew nothing, evolved into part of the apparatus plotting for his removal, perhaps indeed the planning core of it.20龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com

我还注意到更重要的事实，苏加诺因此不知不觉的促进了自己的垮台，苏哈托创建了一个秘密军事作战部应对马来西亚的和平倡议，苏加诺对此毫不知情，此组织演变成推翻他的计划的一部分，或许正是政变计划的核心。
【看来早期的印尼军方势力就是不小啊，苏加诺竟然不知情，枪杆子没握紧啊】

Although my 1985 article mentioned OPSUS only in a footnote, I now suspect it may have supplied the milieu for a second coup-minded plot, piggy-backed within the first. I mean by this that there was at first an OPSUS plot, pushed by Suharto and sanctioned by Yani, to negotiate peace with Malaysia against Sukarno’s wishes; but then some of the people conspiring may have had a second agenda, to purge (by means of the false-flag pretext of Gestapu) the army general staff of Yani and other overall Sukarno loyalists, thus clearing the way for the coup and the massacre. Such a sophisticated two-level plot, like the propaganda forgery of the Harian Rakjat “editorial,” may have been beyond the capabilities of Indonesians acting alone.21

虽然我在1985年的文中只在脚注中提到秘密军事部，现在我认为秘密军事部可能为第二政变指挥部，为第一提供背后支持。我的意思是，最初是秘密军事部的阴谋策划，苏哈托推动雅尼批准，违背苏加诺的意愿与马来西亚谈判。但当时的一些人借机勾结起来进行另外的阴谋，图谋（借着930事件中假标志的名义）清洗印尼军总参谋部中雅尼和其他苏加诺嫡系，为政变和屠杀扫清道路。这样一个复杂的两重阴谋，如同Harian Rakjat伪造的宣传社论，可能已经超出了印尼人单独行动的能力。

Piggy-backed plots are however are a staple of the CIA, and before them of the British MI6. And in 1965 the British Foreign Office, working with MI6, sent its top propaganda expert, Norman Reddaway, to Singapore. In 1998, shortly before his death, Reddaway went public, to describe how “the overthrow of Sukarno was one of the Foreign Office's ‘most successful’ coups, which they have kept a secret until now:”

然而，背后阴谋是中情局的主业，之前是英国军情六处的。并且，1965年英国外交部，与军情六处一起，派遣顶尖宣传专家Norman Reddaway到新加坡。1998年，在他（死前不久，Reddaway公开承认，苏加诺的到态势外交部最成功的政变计划，他们已经把这个保密至今。
【TIPS：Norman Reddaway英国外交部的信息研究部宣传专家，对印尼共产党、印尼华人与苏加诺展开一系列的反宣传，此计旨在复制英国对付马来西亚共产党的成功经验，他炮制了印尼共将血洗雅加达的谣言，促使动摇的部队加入苏哈托一方】

A covert operation and psychological warfare strategy was instigated, based at Phoenix Park, in Singapore, the British headquarters in the region. The MI6 team kept close links with key elements in the Indonesian army through the British Embassy. One of these was Ali Murtopo, later General Suharto's intelligence chief, and MI6 officers constantly travelled back and forth between Singapore and Jakarta.22

英国秘密行动和心理战策动已经开始，指挥部设立在新加坡英军总部地区的凤凰公园。军情六处行动队一直通过英国大使馆和印尼军中的关键人物保持联系。其中之一是Ali Murtopo，后来的苏哈托将军的情报主管，军情六处的特工频繁在新加坡和雅加达之间穿梭。

Stephen Dorril’s book MI6 confirms that “In South-East Asia MI6 was working hand in glove with the CIA to ‘liquidate’ Indonesia’s President Sukarno.”23

Stephen Dorril’的书证实军情六处和美国中情局一直在东亚狼狈为奸图谋清算印尼总统苏加诺。

In the same period Ali Murtopo, the head of OPSUS, also traveled back and forth, not just to negotiate clandestinely with the Malaysian government, but also to smuggle “rubber and other goods” to generate money for OPSUS and accumulate $17 million in banks in Singapore and Malaysia.24 Yani had authorized Murtopo’s clandestine MI6 contacts; he would have no way of knowing if these talks had turned to plans to eliminate Yani himself.

同时，Ali Murtopo，秘密军事部的主官，也在来回穿梭，他不仅秘密与马来西亚政府谈判，而且走私“橡胶和其他稀有物品”为秘密军事部筹集资金，存在新加坡和马来西亚总计1700w美元。雅尼授权了Murtopo和军情六处的秘密联络，但他不知道谈判已经转变成消灭雅尼自己。

Like his close ally Suharto, Murtopo rose up through the Diponegoro Divisision, the division which played a central role both in staging Gestapu, and also in putting it down.25 

就像他的亲密战友苏哈托，Murtopo通过蒂博尼哥罗师——这个师在930事件中扮演了核心角色——爬上来，也是因为它倒下去。

As I wrote in 1985:

正如我1985年写的：

From the pro-Suharto sources -- notably the CIA study of Gestapu published in 1968 -- we learn how few troops were involved in the alleged Gestapu rebellion, and, more importantly, that in Jakarta as in Central Java the same battalions that supplied the "rebellious" companies were also used to "put the rebellion down." 

根据亲苏哈托派的说法--特别是中情局1968年印制的930事件报告--我们了解到有多少士兵参加了所谓930叛乱，还有，更重要的是，在中爪哇的许多与“叛乱”相同阵营的连队也被用作平息“叛乱”。

Two thirds of one paratroop brigade (which Suharto had inspected the previous day) plus one company and one platoon constituted the whole of Gestapu forces in Jakarta; all but one of these units were commanded by present or former Diponegoro Division officers close to Suharto; and the last was under an officer who obeyed Suharto's close political ally, Basuki Rachmat.17

三分之二的伞兵旅（前一天苏哈托曾视察过）加上一个连队和一个排构成整个在雅加达的930政变部队；除了一个之外剩下的所有单位，都由现任或前任蒂博尼哥罗师主官指挥靠向苏哈托；那个例外的由苏哈托的亲密政治盟友Basuki Rachmat指挥。

Two of these companies, from the 454th and 530th battalions, were elite raiders, and from 1962 these units had been among the main Indonesian recipients of U.S. assistance.18 This fact, which in itself proves nothing, increases our curiosity about the many Gestapu leaders who had been U.S.-trained. 

其中两个连，来自454营和530营，是精锐部队，而且自从1962年以来这些部队已经是美国援助印尼的主要受益者。事实上，这本身就证明了什么，更增加了我们对有多少930政变的领头人曾在美国受过训练。

The Gestapu leader in Central Java, Saherman, had returned from training at Fort Leavenworth and Okinawa shortly before meeting with Untung and Major Sukirno of the 454th Battalion in mid-August 1965.As Ruth McVey has observed, Saherman's acceptance for training at Fort Leavenworth "would mean that he had passed review by CIA observers."20

中爪哇的领导，Saherman，从利文沃斯堡和冲绳训练基地返回，并在1965八月中旬之前与翁东中校和忠于苏加诺的454营会面。正如 Ruth McVey 观察到的，Saherman接受在利文沃斯堡的训练意味着他通过了中情局观察员的审查。

I would now suspect, admittedly without proof, that if one wanted to research CIA and/or MI6 input into the 1965 Gestapu plot, the MI6/Ali Murtopo connection would be a good place to begin.

我现在怀疑，虽然没有证据，如果有人想研究美国中情局或军情六处介入1965 年930事件的情况，军情六处/Ali Murtopo之间的联络将是一个良好的开始之处。

In other words, my opinion of Sukarno and his downfall has somewhat changed. However, I continue to view as monstrous the criminal plans made 50 years ago to eliminate both him and the PKI through bloodshed, even if we concede that the actual massacre may have gone way beyond whatever had been planned.

换句话说，我的观点自从苏加诺倒台后有了稍微的改变。然而，我仍然认为50年强通过屠杀消灭他和印尼共产党是极为可耻的犯罪行为，即使我们承认实际上大屠杀可能已经超越了任何之前的计划。

Looking back, we can see the last century as a period when a number of new great powers emerged, and every one of them, not just the United States, have had a lot of innocent blood to account for. To understand U.S. policy in postwar Asia it is essential to determine the exact process by which the criminal decisions surrounding Gestapu were made and to examine them in light of covert interventions elsewhere.

回顾过去的一个世纪，我们可以看到每当一个新的巨大力量出现的时期，每一个国家，而不仅仅是美国，付出很多无辜的血液作为代价。要了解美国的政策在战后亚洲的关键是要确定具体的过程，通过围绕造成930事件的罪恶决定，去检视他们的暗中干预其他国家之处。

The purpose of investigating the September 1965 event is not to punish its perpetrators, most of whom are now dead. It is to determine what forces capable of such a plot still exist, including in the United States and Indonesia, and to strive to reduce the probabilities of such crimes occurring again in the future.

调查930事件的目的不是惩罚肇事者，他们中的大部分人现在已经死了。这是要确定能够在美国和印度尼西亚等地的实施这种阴谋的力量，并努力减少这些罪行在未来再次发生的可能性。
【这块作者的意思很微妙？不就是美帝英帝指示的嘛，还调查什么】

作者简介

Peter Dale Scott is a former Canadian diplomat and English Professor at the University of California, Berkeley. His latest book is The American Deep State: Wall Street, Big Oil, and the Attack on U.S. Democracy, published by Rowman & Littlefield. He is also the author of Drugs Oil and War, The Road to 9/11, The War Conspiracy: JFK, 9/11, and the Deep Politics of War, and American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection and the Road to Afghanistan. A contributing editor of the Asia-Pacific Journal, his website, which contains a wealth of his writings, is here.

Peter Dale 是前加拿大外交官和英国加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校的教授。他最新的书是美国深层状态：华尔街，大石油，对美国民主的威胁，由Rowman & Littlefield出版。他也是油和战争的作者，9 / 11路，战争阴谋：JFK，9 / 11，和深入政治和战争，美国的战争机器：深层政治，美国中央情报局的全球情报连接到阿富汗的道路。一位亚太杂志的编辑，他的网站上罗列了作者丰富的着作。