制衡中国的方案 [美国媒体]

The Case for Congagement with China

制衡中国的方案

Zalmay Khalilzad  扎尔梅·哈利勒扎德
2017年6月19日



Image: People's Liberation Army soldiers shout as they hold guns and practice in a drill during a organized media tour at a PLA engineering school in Beijing, July 22, 2014. REUTERS/Petar Kujundzic/File Photo

图片：2014年7月22日，在北京解放军工程学校举办的一次有组织的媒体旅行中，人民解放军士兵一边举着枪一边操练。路透社/彼特 堀井达志科 /照片的文件

The Trump administration should not simply engage or contain China. It needs to blend the two together.

特朗普政府不应简单地接触或遏制中国。 而是要将两个办法融合在一起使用。

THE TRUMP administration’s China policy is currently focused almost exclusively on North Korea. But Beijing’s growing power and expanding regional and global objectives demand that Washington come to grips with a broader China strategy.

  特鲁普政府的中国政策现在几乎完全聚焦于朝鲜。但对于北京这个正在成长中的强权以及它扩张中的区域和全球目标需要华盛顿秉持一个更加广泛的中国战略。

It is imperative to assess China’s current and planned capabilities, its objectives and strategy. Unlike in its recent history, China is now a rising global power. Its economy is the second largest in the world, directly behind America’s. The United States supported China’s rapid industrialization after President Richard Nixon’s opening. Later, it took advantage of the U.S.-backed liberal international order, including the global trading system, to export goods in enormous volume to markets around the world. China has also committed economic espionage against America, using cyber and other tools to steal intellectual property. Additionally, China is using regulations to compel U.S. firms to share their core technologies as a condition for gaining access to Chinese customers, even as relatively unfettered access to American markets continues to fuel Chinese growth.

  对中国现在和将来计划拥有的能力、目标和战略进行评估势在必行。中国不像近几十年的中国，它现在是一个崛起中的全球强权。它现在是世界上第二大经济体，仅次于美国。在总统尼克松的开放政策之后，美国支持中国的快速工业化。而之后，在美国身后的自由国际次序之下，包括全球贸易系统，中国取得了优势，将海量的货物出口到全球市场。中国还对美国实施商业间谍活动，使用网络和其他工具窃取知识产权。此外，中国使用法律法规强迫美国公司共享他们的核心技术作为获得中国客户的条件，而与此同时，美国市场却不受限制的成为中国公司的成长养料。

China’s economic growth has brought hundreds of millions of its citizens out of poverty, but not without negative consequences: among them the long-standing one-child requirement, large-scale environmental pollution, and the growing gap between the very rich and everyone else.

  中国的经济增长让数亿民众脱离贫困，但这并不是没有消极后果的： 长时期的独生子女政策，大范围的环境污染，以及日益扩大的贫富差距。

China holds more than a trillion dollars in U.S. debt, and has become America’s largest trading partner. In 2015, U.S. trade with China totaled $659.4 billion—with the American trade deficit standing at $336.2 billion. Access to the American market has been vital for China’s spectacular growth and remains vital for its future.

  中国持有超过一万亿美元的美国国债，而且变成美国最大的贸易伙伴。在2015年，美国和中国贸易总额为6594亿美元，而美国贸易逆差高达3362亿美元。美国市场对于中国曾经的经济增长和未来继续维持如此惊人的经济增长是至关重要的。

China has leveraged its economic power to build up its military capabilities, including space and counter-space; information and electronic warfare; nuclear submarines and other systems needed to sustain a robust second-strike capability; aircraft carriers; amphibious ships; destroyers; transport aircraft and a number of different missile systems. It has the resources to further expand these capabilities and acquire new ones.

  中国已经使用其经济实力建设军事能力，包括太空和空间对抗，信息和电子战，核潜艇和其他具备二次打击能力的系统，航母，两栖舰艇，驱逐舰，运输飞机和不同的导弹系统，并拥有资源可以扩展其能力和获取新武器。

As China’s power has grown, it has developed a huge ambition: to return China to greatness and to replace the United States as the world’s dominant power. Beijing sees the domination of Asia as a necessary step to achieve its ultimate projection of global predominance. In the immediate future, China seeks to preclude any U.S. military intervention along its maritime periphery. Operationally, Beijing’s aim is to exclude others up to the “first island chain,” and seeks to project power all the way to the “second island chain.”
The two-island concept has both defensive and offensive dimensions. Defensively, China considers the island chains important for avoiding hostile encirclement. Offensively, they could enable an invasion of Taiwan. Beyond Taiwan and self-defense, China seeks not only to deter and defeat hostile intervention in the area, but also to minimize the U.S. regional role, and to gain dominance over Asia—first Southeast Asia and, over time, Central Asia.

  随着中国力量的增长，随之而来的是巨大的野心：中国的伟大复兴和取代美国成为统治力量的强权。北京将亚洲统治地位作为其终极目标即全球主宰的必要一步。在不久的将来，中国试图阻止任何美国的海上军事干预。具体操作上，北京瞄准的目标是驱逐第一岛链的敌人，并寻求所有向第二岛链投射战力的方法。两个岛链概念包括了进攻和防御两个方面。防御上，中国认为岛链对于避免敌意围困非常重要，进攻上，他们能够入侵台湾(译者注：原文如此)。除了台湾和自我防御，中国寻求的不仅阻止和击败地区干预，而且寻求尽量减少美国的干预，最后寻求主导亚洲--首先是东南亚，然后是中亚。

China’s regional strategy has a military and economic prong. Clearly, China aims to acquire the capability to use decisive force to defeat threats to its interests and resolve territorial disputes quickly, while precluding timely U.S. intervention. According to Rodrigo Duterte, Xi Jinping threatened war over disputed areas in the South China Sea.

  中国的区域战略在军事和经济上双管齐下。显然，中国的目标是获得决定性的力量，来打败威胁它的势力和快速解决领土争端，这样可以阻止美国的及时干预。根据杜特尔特的说法，中国威胁在南海争议地区进行战争。

The second prong is economic. China wants to bring into its orbit a network of countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) plan and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are key instruments in the service of this objective. Greater economic interdependence with regional powers is meant to undermine U.S. alliances by creating incentives to not follow the American lead. Beijing also warns authoritarian Asian friends that ties to Washington make them vulnerable to U.S. interference in the name of democracy promotion and human rights. In contrast, China’s policy is not to interfere in their domestic affairs.

  第二个方面是经济上，中国将欧洲 亚洲 非洲组成的网络纳入其势力范围。一带一路计划和亚洲基础设施投资银行都是服务于这个目标的关键工具。加强和区域强国的经济依赖来挖美国联盟的墙角，激励盟友们不再跟随美国的领导。北京还警告那些专制的亚洲朋友，与华盛顿的联系很容易受到民主促进和人权名义下的干涉，而相比之下，中国的政策是不干涉他们的国内事务。

While China’s near-to-mid-term focus is on projecting power in Asia, its long-term ambitions go well beyond the region. China’s ultimate goal is global preeminence. Beijing is already establishing a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. It is acquiring facilities in the Persian Gulf and in the Mediterranean, and exploring options for a naval presence in East and West Africa.

  中国的近中期战略聚焦于亚洲突出力量，而其长远目标远远超过该地区。中国的终极目标是全球的领先地位。北京已经在印度洋建立了永久的海军存在，正在波斯湾和地中海获取设施，并在东非和西非寻找一个海军存在的选择。

As it builds its military power, China wants to avoid the Soviet mistake of placing an unbearable burden on its economy due to excessive military spending. But as its economy’s size approaches that of the United States’, it likely will also want a comparable military capability and to become a true superpower, with the clout to shape the international order.


  构建其军事力量时，中国想避免前苏联的错误，军费开支过大导致难以承受的经济负担。但随着中国经济规模逐渐接近美国，它可能也会希望获得与其匹配的军事实力，并成为一个真正的超级大国，具有塑造国际次序的影响力。

CHINA’S TRAJECTORY has important implications for the United States. As Graham T. Allison argues in his new book, Destined for War, when rising powers challenge dominant powers, the result is often war. A strong China likely will behave assertively, especially in its territorial ambitions, its claim on Taiwan and its demand for deference from neighboring countries.

  中国的发展轨迹对美国有重要意义。正如格雷厄姆·特·埃里森在他的新书《终有一战》中所说的那样：当崛起的大国挑战统治力量时，结果往往是战争.一个强大的中国可能会独断专行，尤其在领土野心上，对台湾的声索和对周边国家尊重的需求。

Three factors will be particularly important in how Chinese foreign policy unfolds.

  下面三个因素对中国外交政策的展开尤其重要。

First, Beijing’s perception of the relative balance of power with the United States is critical. At present, that balance still favors the United States. China does not want direct conflict with the United States. It understands the implications of America’s military and technological leadership, the value of Chinese investments in the United States, the vital role of its market for Chinese exports and economic growth, and U.S. global influence. China remains conscious of its need to “catch up.”

   第一个因素：北京对与美国力量的相对平衡的看法至关重要。目前平衡仍然倾向于美国。中国不希望和美国正面冲突。了解美国在军事和科技的领导地位，中国在美国的投资价值，美国市场对于中国出口和经济增长的关键角色，以及美国的全球影响力。中国意识清楚的知道仍然需要“追赶”。

At the same time, Chinese leaders see the United States as a country in decline and unable to sustain its global preeminent role over time. This encourages Beijing to pursue its objectives patiently. (There have been exceptions to this patience, however. After the financial crisis a decade ago, perhaps believing that U.S. decline had accelerated, it pursued its regional goals more aggressively.)

  与此同时，中国领导人将美国视为一个衰弱中的国家，随着时间的推移，它无法维持其全球卓越的地位。这将鼓励北京耐心的寻求其目标。(然而，这种耐心也有例外，十年前的金融危机或许让美国的衰退加速了，从而更加积极的追求其区域目标)

Second is in internal instability. A healthy economy has helped China sustain stability, but there are multiple sources of potential instability. The perpetuation of the gap between economic and political progress could produce increased demands for political freedoms, and the government’s refusal to accommodate these demands could produce a dynamic leading to instability. There are also regional and ethnic sources of instability. A serious downturn in the economy could accelerate instability and even lead to conflict and fragmentation—especially if the downturn affected different regions or subsets of the population unequally.

  第二个因素：内部的不稳定。一个健康的经济帮助中国维持稳定，但是也有多个潜在的不稳定因素。经济和政治进步之间的差距持续存在可能会产生增加对政治自由的要求，以及政府拒绝满足这些要求可能会产生一个不稳定的动力。还有特定地区和少数民族的不稳定因素。经济的严重衰退能加速不稳定甚至导致冲突和分裂--特别是经济衰退影响到了不同的区域和人口分布不均的地区。

No matter the cause, significant political instability would alter China’s economic viability and its foreign and national-security policies. Predicting the nature and extent of such an impact is, of course, difficult. The result could be a China that grows more slowly and is more inward looking, but also a China that is externally more aggressive. Such aggressiveness could function as a means of distracting an unruly populace from domestic illegitimacy.

  无论何种原因，重大的政治动荡将改变中国的经济活力以及其外交和国家安全政策,预测这种事情的类型和冲击的严重程度当然是困难的。结果可能是中国增长的更慢，政策更加的内向，同时中国会变的对外格外侵略性，这种攻击性是为了分散国内人民注意力的一种手段，以达到控制国内难以驾驭的民众。

Third are regional developments and Chinese responses. Many Asian countries are alarmed by the surge of Chinese power and Beijing’s push for hegemony under Xi Jinping. Some convey their concerns openly. But others, including some U.S. allies, exercise restraint because they do not want to jeopardize economic ties. Japan, Vietnam and India are among those expressing the most alarm. Moscow seems more ambivalent, opting to cooperate with China to avoid isolation in the face of its deteriorating relations with the West. Russia is also concerned, however, that the balance of power is shifting significantly in favor of Beijing. Indeed, the two countries are competitors in Central Asia.

  第三个因素：区域发展和中国的对策。许多亚洲国家对中国力量的汹涌而来和来自北京的霸权压力感到恐慌，一些人公开的表达了关切，但其他人，包括一些美国盟友，采取了克制态度，因为他们不想危及其于中国的经济关系。他们当中日本、越南和印度是最为恐慌的国家。莫斯科似乎更为两面，选择和中国合作，以避免在与西方关系恶化的同时变得孤立。俄罗斯也是担心的，然而，权力的天平正在向北京偏移，事实上，这两个国家在中亚是竞争对手。

Regional concerns about China’s aggressive policies can produce responses that ought to constrain Beijing. Already, neighboring powers are aligning with the United States to balance against China. It is not outside the realm of possibility that China could miscalculate and become involved in a protracted and costly regional conflict.

区域国家担心中国的侵略政策会产生不良反应，认为应该约束北京。周边大国已经在和美国达成一致来制衡中国。中国可能判断错误，卷入长期和代价高昂的地区冲突，这些并非不可能的事情。

A STRATEGY review is one thing. Developing a long-term strategy that protects and enhances U.S. interests is another entirely. Like China watchers and strategists outside of government, those within the Trump administration may be divided. Some may believe in enhanced engagement—expanding economic and political consultations with China, with the aim of achieving a lasting partnership and mutual accommodation. Others may argue for a blend of prevention and containment.

战略回顾是一回事，制定一项保护和增强美国利益的长期战略完全是另外一回事。政府之外的中国观察家和战略家和特鲁普政府内部的人可能有分歧。一部分人可能信奉制衡--增强和中国在经济上和政治上的磋商，以实现一个持久的伙伴关系和相互妥协的目的；而另外的人使用阻止和牵制的组合拳。

While each of these approaches has merit, they both suffer from serious limitations. Engagement could secure Chinese cooperation on current issues of importance, such as North Korea and access to the Chinese markets for American goods and services. It banks on the belief that continued Chinese economic development, combined with U.S.-China cooperation on issues of mutual interest, has the potential to transform China into a more democratic nation. Advocates of engagement might argue that, with increased Chinese participation in the international system, Beijing could gradually come to the conclusion that the system and its norms serve its interests. Some recent statements by President Xi, such as in the 2017 meeting of the World Economic Forum and his May 2017 New Silk Road speech in support of globalization, can be interpreted as a positive indicator.
Engagement advocates inside the Trump administration might argue that, by the time China becomes strong enough to challenge the international order, it could already have become coopted by it.

虽然这些方法各有优点，但它们都有严重的局限性。参与可以确保中国在当前重要问题上的合作，例如朝鲜问题和美国商品和服务进入中国。随着中国经济不断发展会累积信任，辅以美中共同利益的合作，有潜在的可能将中国转变为一个更加民主的国家。
参与主义者可能会争辩说，随着北京参与国际体系的增多，中国可以逐渐得出结论，该制度及其规范符合其利益。中国最近的一些发言，如2017世界经济论坛会议和2017年5月《新丝绸之路》支持全球化的讲话，可以被视为一个积极的信号。特朗普政府内部的参与倡导者可能会说，当中国变得强大到足以挑战国际秩序时，它可能已被收编了。

But relying on engagement alone is risky. Expanded U.S. engagement would further help China develop economically and, thus, militarily—enabling it to catch up and even surpass the United States sooner than would otherwise have been the case, and raising the risk of war.

但仅仅依靠参与是有风险的。美国进一步扩大的参与将帮助中国发展经济和军事力量，因此，中国能够比预计更快赶上甚至超过美国，这提高了战争的风险。

The prevention-plus-containment avenue faces similar limitations. The goal of this approach would be to stymie China’s power relative to America’s. In this view, the United States would not just strengthen its own overall economic and military power, but also seek to contain and weaken China’s. It would also demonstrate resolve by opposing hostile Chinese policies. The United States would bolster existing alliances, focus them on counterbalancing China, and forge new alliances and partnerships. Washington would oppose China’s OBOR policies and start limiting U.S. and allied markets to Chinese exports, so as to slow Beijing’s economic growth. It might also explore ways to more effectively support those Chinese who seek political reform, greater local autonomy and human rights. Washington would also redouble efforts to thwart Chinese theft of U.S. technological secrets.

预防和围堵政策同样面临局限性。这种方法的目的是阻止中国的力量超过美国。在这个视角下，美国不仅会加强自己的经济和军事力量，而且还寻求遏制和削弱中国。这也将用充满敌意的中国政策显示政策的决心。美国将加强现有的联盟，专注于制衡中国，并建立新的联盟和伙伴关系。华盛顿将反对中国的一路一带的政策以及限制中国产品出口到美国及其盟国的市场，以减缓北京的经济增长。还将探索如何更有效的支持中国内部的政治改革者，更大的地方自治声索者和人权人士，华盛顿还将加倍努力，阻止中国窃取美国的技术秘密。

The weakness of this approach lies in its assumption that China is inevitably on course to become a hostile global rival—a self-fulfilling prophecy. This vision also imperils potential Chinese cooperation, which could benefit the United States in dealing with North Korea, for instance. And it jeopardizes the considerable economic benefits the United States could derive from engagement.

这种方法的缺点是它基于一种假设，假设中国不可避免的成为一个充满敌意的全球竞争对手--这是一个会自我实现的预言。这种视角下也会危及和中国的潜在合作，比如，那本来有利于美国解决朝核问题的中国合作。而且也会损害美国已经参与的相当可观的经济投资。

In addition, it would be a difficult sell domestically. It would require mobilizing national energy on the basis of predictions that are pessimistic and uncertain. A policy of prevention plus containment would, moreover, require cooperation from regional allies and from most of the world’s other advanced industrial countries.

此外，这个政策在美国国内也很难推销出去，因为这需要基于一个悲观和不确定的预言来动员国家力量，再者，预防和遏制政策还需要动员区域盟友和其他先进工业国家的合作。

For all these reasons, the Trump administration needs a different strategy, one that could accomplish three things: preserve the hope inherent in engagement; preclude Chinese domination of Asia, limiting the relative growth of Chinese power along the way; and hedge against a strong China challenging U.S. interests. I propose a strategy of “congagement”—a mix of containment and engagement.

基于以上原因，特鲁普政府需要不同的策略。一个一石三鸟的办法：合作和参与中保持固有希望；通过阻止中国统治亚洲来限制中国力量的相对增长；防止一个强大的中国挑战美国利益。我提出了一个制衡中国的方案 --围交 ，它是遏制和接触的混合。

The Trump administration should embrace this new tack, tilting toward containment without abandoning engagement. The goal would be to plausibly convince the Chinese that while the United States is open to cooperation and mutual accommodation, American actions and messaging should aim at convincing the Chinese leaders that a push for hegemony would be resisted by the United States and its allies and partners, including other major regional powers.

特鲁普政府应该接受这个新的方针，在不放弃参与的情况下向遏制倾斜。目标是振振有词的说服中国，而美国是开放合作和相互妥协，美国用行动和信息说服中国领导人，推动霸权将会受到美国及其盟国和伙伴的抵制，包括其他地区大国。

Under congagement, the United States would adopt the following twelve tenets:

在围交中，美国将采取以下十二个原则：

1) Strengthen America’s overall economic and military power to maintain a favorable global position;
2) Maintain America’s technological lead and discourage friends and allies from contributing to the growth of Chinese military capabilities by strengthening existing export controls that restrict access to Western technology;
3) Pursue a balance-of-power strategy in Asia, by encouraging U.S. allies and partners to build up their military capabilities and to cooperate among themselves to prevent Chinese regional hegemony;

1）增强美国的整体经济实力和军事实力来保持良好的国际地位；
2）通过加强现有的限制西方技术准入的出口管制，保持美国的技术领先地位，阻止朋友和盟国为中国军事实力的增长作出贡献；
3）通过鼓励美国盟国和伙伴建立军事能力，相互合作，防止亚洲地区霸权，谋求中国大国战略的平衡；

4) Seek to strengthen its own relative capabilities in Asia so it can play the role of balancer and avoid facing a fait accompli when a critical U.S. interest is threatened—for example, by forcing the United States to risk major escalation and high casualties to reinstate the status quo;
5) Dissuade Taiwan from reuniting with the mainland;
6) Use access to American markets and those of regional allies—on which Chinese prosperity depends—as leverage to condition China’s behavior;

4）寻求加强亚洲自身的相对能力从而发挥平衡器的作用，避免面对既成事实的时候，美国的一个关键利益受到威胁，例如，通过迫使美国风险的重大升级和高伤亡恢复现状；
5）阻止台湾与大陆的统一；
6）中国的繁荣取决于美国和区域盟友的市场，利用这些市场撬动和影响中国的行为；

7) Rebalance trade to reduce the huge trade deficit;
8) To preserve its technological advantage and preclude new or increased vulnerabilities, review existing agreements with allies and partners, to update and add necessary steps to protect the stealing of technology by the Chinese and avoid the transfer of sensitive technology;
9) At a minimum maintain, but preferably expand, political interaction, military-to-military relations and cultural ties with China;

7）平衡贸易，减少巨额贸易逆差；
8）保持其技术优势，排除新的或增加的漏洞，审查盟国和伙伴的现有协定，更新和增加必要步骤，以阻止中国人窃取技术，避免敏感技术的转让；
9）至少维持，但最好扩大，与中国的政治互动、军事关系和文化关系；

10) Adjust economic relations by insisting on reciprocity, such as rebalanced trade relations that reduce the huge balance-of-trade deficit;
11) Enhance cooperation on regional issues, including North Korea and terrorism;
12) To increase regional cooperation, crisis prevention and crisis management, encourage an OSCE-type organization in the Asian region with Chinese and U.S. participation. The East Asia Summit might be the best candidate to evolve into such a role, because it has the right membership, but it will need to be properly institutionalized and provided with the right mandate.

10）坚持互惠调整经济关系，如平衡的贸易关系，减少巨大的贸易逆差；
11）加强在包括朝鲜和恐怖主义在内的区域问题上的合作；
12）加强区域合作、危机预防和危机管理，鼓励亚洲和美国参与的亚太地区欧安组织型组织。东亚首脑会议可能是发展这一作用的最佳人选，因为它有适当的成员资格，但需要适当制度化，并提供适当的授权。

This congagement strategy would clarify to Beijing that it is best served by pursuing its interests without undermining the international system. It would communicate to China the potential costs of turning hostile by demonstrating that the United States is prepared to protect its interests. It also would highlight that the United States will reciprocate positive Chinese actions.A congagement strategy would provide the flexibility to adjust the balance between engagement and containment, depending on the state of Chinese capabilities, objectives, policies and actions. Chinese cooperation on security and economic issues would invite more engagement. Conversely, inadequate cooperation on, say, North Korea, aggressiveness in the South China Sea and bellicosity on Taiwan would trigger a tilt toward containment.

这个围交遏制战略将让北京保持头脑清醒，在国际系统下追求自身利益是最优选择而不是破坏国际体系。这个战略向中国表明转向敌意的潜在成本，美国通过保护其利益的来展示。战略还将强调美国将回报中国的积极行动。一个围交战略将调整接触与遏制之间的平衡点来提供其灵活性，取决于中国的能力，国家的目标、政策和行动。中国在安全和经济问题上的合作将引起更多的参与。相反，缺乏协作，比如说，朝鲜，南海和对台湾的好战将触发向遏制的倾斜。

A combination of containment and engagement promises a superior approach to protecting American interests.

遏制与参与相结合是保护美国利益的最佳途径。

Zalmay Khalilzad is a counselor at CSIS. A former director of policy planning at the Pentagon, he served as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the UN. He is the author of The Envoy: From Kabul to the White House: My Journey through a Turbulent World. He would like to thank Jacqueline Newmyer Deal, Marin Strmecki and Ashley Tellis for their assistance. An earlier version of this essay was published in the American Conservative. Khalilzad originally proposed “Congagement” in 1999 as an analyst at the RAND Corporation.

哈利勒扎德在国际战略研究中心担任顾问。曾任五角大楼政策规划主任，曾任美国驻阿富汗大使、伊拉克大使和联合国大使。他是这些书的作者：<<从喀布尔到白宫>>：<<我走过的动荡世界>>。他要感谢亲爱的杰奎琳.纽麦尔，马林·斯特默基和阿什利 特莉丝的帮助。这篇文章的早期版本发表在《美国的保守党》。哈利勒扎德最初提出的“围交”是1999在兰德公司的分析师。

This essay was published in the July/August 2017 print magazine under the headline “The Case for Congagement.”

这篇文章发表在2017年7/8月出版的杂志标题“制衡的方案”