从地缘政治看中印边境纠纷 [美国媒体]

China and India's Border Disputes

从地缘政治看中印边境纠纷

wiwalker于11天前投稿
Hey all. I've been studying the habits of China politically and economically for some time now, but what I haven't been able to pin down is...what is the significance of the land they have disputes with in regards to Bhutan and India?
For some context, I understand that China often has the attitude that losing any land considered "greater China" is often considered a humiliation to its leadership, which sparks some chest beating on their southern border. But what is the geopolitical or economic significance of these borders, if any? Is it purely just a conflict of different interpretations of past treaties with British India?
some resources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Indian_border_dispute
http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Richards%20final%20IPSD%20paper.pdf

大家好，我已经学习中国的政治经济模式有一段时间了。但是有一件事情我还不能确定，中国和不丹以及印度纠缠不清的那块土地的重要性在哪里？
在某种意义上来讲，我明白中国存在某种情绪认为大中国失去任何一块领土都是一种对领导能力的羞辱，这导致他们对西南边疆发生的事群情激奋。但是，这些边疆地区的地缘政治以及经济意义到底是什么？还是仅仅是对过去和英属印度签订的条约的不同解释造成的矛盾。





sparky_sparky_boom 64分 11天前 
The latest dispute has to do with part of the Doklam Plateau that's at the south end of the Chumbi Valley. The Chumbi Valley is narrow and overlooked in the West by Sikkim and East by Bhutan. It is of little strategic worth since Indian forces in Sikkim can bombard Chinese positions in the narrow strip or trap Chinese forces inside by cutting off the mouth of the valley. Since the Chumbi's mouth is on the north side of the Himalayas, Indian forces can't hold ground in the valley for long before Chinese tanks roll in. But the valley is also boxed in on all sides by mountains and useless to Chinese forces.
Useless unless the Chumbi valley is linked with the Doklam Plateau at the end. It's the last piece of high ground along the Chumbi Valley before it leads through Bhutan into the south side of the Himalayas, and is a flat plateau perfect for stationing artillery and soldiers. Indian forces there can block any Chinese incursion south through the valley. Chinese forces there can shell supply lines to Sikkim from high ground during a conflict while shielding forces moving south on the east side of the plateau. Chinese control of Doklam suddenly turns the Chumbi valley into a strategic asset. I definitely recommend checking out the geography with 3D view on Google Earth if you can.
As for why Chumbi is important, China and India have two major bits of land under dispute. Aksai Chin is under Chinese control since it's on their side of the Himalayas. But Arunachal Pradesh is on the Indian side of the Himalayas and hard to hold against Indian resupply without cutting the Indian Northeast off from the rest of the country, which is why despite securing Arunachal Pradesh in 1962 Chinese forces decided to retreat. In any future war over Arunachal Pradesh, an improved Chinese position around Sikkim makes it significantly easier to isolate the Northeast and force its separation from India.
So the significance of the disputed land is because it's high ground. As for why the issue popped up now, instead of earlier or later, that's probably much more complicated.

最新的争端与地处春丕河谷南端的洞朗高原的一部分有关。春丕河谷非常狭窄，西邻锡金东靠不丹。这地方没什么战略价值，因为印度在锡金的军队可以在狭窄地带轰炸中国据点，也可以通过切断谷口在内部牵制。由于春丕河谷的谷口在喜马拉雅山北部，印度军队在中国坦克滚滚而下之后就很难占据此地了。但是山谷被环山包围，对中国军队来讲也没什么用处。 
春丕河谷本身是没什么战略价值的，除非最终与洞朗高原相连。它是通过不丹进入喜马拉雅山南部之前沿春丕河谷的最后一块高地，是一个平坦的高原，非常适合驻扎固定火炮和士兵。印度在那里的军队可以阻止任何中国向南通过河谷的入侵。而中国在那里的军队在冲突期间可以从高地打击通往锡金的补给线，同时掩护部队从高原东部向南移动。中国对洞朗高原的控制突然将春丕河谷变成了战略资产。如果可以，我强烈推荐你在Google地球上用3D视图看该地区地理。 
至于为什么春丕河谷很重要，中国和印度有两大块争议领土。阿克沙钦被中国控制，因为这在喜马拉雅山的他们一边。但是，阿鲁纳恰尔邦在喜马拉雅山的印度一边，除非将印度的东北部与其他地区切断，否则很难阻止印度持续的补给，这就是为什么尽管1962年中国军队拿下阿鲁纳恰尔邦却还是最终撤退了。在任何未来的关于阿鲁纳恰尔邦战争中，中国围绕锡金的地理位置改善会使得切断印度东北部并将它从印度分离出来容易的多。 
所以争议领土的重要性在于它是高地。至于为什么这个问题现在出现，而不是更早或更晚，这可能要复杂得多。

[–]insipid-fauna 35分 11天前 
As for why the issue popped up now, instead of earlier or later, that's probably much more complicated.
Some speculation if I may:
Bhutan and China are close to establishing diplomatic ties, which would resolve a lengthy border dispute between the two countries. Under the deal Sinchulumpa and Gieu would have been ceded to Bhutan while the Doklam Plateau would have been ceded to China.
Since negotiations have been dragging on for years, the road building in the plateau would put pressure on the Bhutanese government to settle the issue more quickly lest China secures de facto control over the area without ceding the other two territories. However India, given its suzerainty over Bhutan intervened for the strategic reasons /u/sparky_sparky_boom suggests.
As for the timing, OBOR is ramping up, and the 19th National People's Congress is this September. China has been seeking greater relations with its neighbors (Nepal, Philippines, Myanmar, etc.) in the past year, and Bhutan is likely just one element of this plan. Bhutanese elections are also coming up next year, but it remains to be seen whether this drags on until then.

以下是我的推测：
不丹和中国即将建立外交关系，这将解决两国之间长期的边界争端。根据协定，沈久弄布和基伍将被移交不丹，而洞朗高原将被转交给中国。 
由于谈判拖延多年，高原道路建设给不丹政府带来了很大压力，所以他们想要更快地解决这个问题，以免中国在不丧失另外两块领土的情况下，对该地区进行实质控制。不过，由于印度对不丹的宗主地位，其因为自身战略因素对此进行干预。
至于时机，一带一路正在展开，十九届全国人大是今年九月。中国过去以来一直在寻求与邻国（尼泊尔，菲律宾，缅甸等）和平共处，不丹也许只是这个计划的一个部分。不丹选举在明年也将上演，但是到目前为止还有待观察。

sparky_sparky_boom 12分 11天前 
Bhutan is on the Indian side if the Himalayas, so India can easily punish Bhutan by blockading the country or just straight up annexing it. If China wanted to turn Bhutan to their side, they could have given Bhutan a backup plan in case of Indian pressure. Maybe building a rail line up to the border and offering to resupply or defend Bhutan in return for diplomatic relations. Doesn't seem like China actually wants relations with Bhutan that badly if they're willing to let Bhutan shoulder all the potential fallout.

不丹在喜马拉雅的印度一方，所以印度可以通过封锁国家或直接吞并它来轻易地惩罚不丹。如果中国想把不丹争取到他们一边的话，那就给不丹一个备份计划以防止印度的压力。也许建立一条铁路线到边界，并提供补给或捍卫不丹以换取外交关系。似乎中国实际上不想与不丹建立联系，如果他们想让不丹承受所有潜在的后果的话。

insipid-fauna 20分 11天前 
China's already begun to build a rail link from Lanzhou to link up with Kathmandu, extending the railway which runs from Lanzhou to Xigaze. They could easily do the same and extend the railway to Bhutan whose border is just over 100 km away from Xigaze, so the infrastructure is in place for an extension. Given China's rather shrewd "carrot-and-stick" approach with other countries, I would guess that China has already offered a rail link to Bhutan along with settling the boundary dispute and establishing official political relations.
If reports that Bhutan did not ask India to occupy Doklam, and that China notified both Bhutan and India that they were improving the road well in advance (and was provided no objection) are true, this action by India would just compel Bhutan to establish relations with China sooner. But Bhutan may be waiting to see how Sino-Nepal relations progress before committing ties with China, lest it be subjected to the withdrawal of subsidies or a closing of the Bhutan-Indian border as you suggest (also this has happened before) and become economically isolated. I think the problem with Bhutan however that unlike Nepal, 42% of exports consist of energy sales to India, while Nepal's economy is far more diversified and would be able to pivot between the two countries easily. If anything, China would also need to link up its power network with Bhutan's, but I suppose we'll have to see how this plays out.

中国已经开始建立起从兰州到加德满都的铁路线，把从兰州到日喀则的铁路进行延伸。他们也可以很容易地将铁路延伸到距离日喀则仅有100多公里的不丹，所以基础设施已经到位了。鉴于中国对其他国家相当精明的“胡萝卜和大棒”的方针，我猜想中国在尝试解决边界争端和建立官方政治关系的同时，已经提供了不丹铁路连线的计划。
如果不丹没有要求印度占领洞朗高原，而且中国提前知会不丹和印度，他们要改善道路（没有提出异议）的报道是真实的，印度的这一行动只会迫使不丹提早建立与中国的关系。但不丹在此之前可能会先观望中国-尼泊尔关系将会怎么发展，以免像你所说的被印度撤销补贴或关闭不丹-印度边界（曾经发生过），导致经济上的孤立。不过，我认为不丹的问题与尼泊尔不同，不但42％的出口包括能源销售都是对印度，尼泊尔的经济要多样化不少，因此能够轻松地在两个大国之间周旋。至于还有什么可以做的，中国可以其电力网络与不丹联系起来，但我想我们要看这将如何发展。

CopperknickersII 3分 9天前 
Bhutan has always been aligned with India because India leaves them alone, whereas if they fell under Chinese influence they'd end up like Tibet, a colonial settlement of China. India's interest in Bhutan is as a buffer state between China and the Siliguri Gap, one of India's main strategic weaknesses.

不丹一直与印度保持一致，因为印度给他们自由，而如果他们受到中国的影响，他们最终会像西藏一样，是中国的殖民地聚居点。印度对不丹的兴趣在于它是中国与西里古里走廊之间的缓冲，印度主要战略弱点之一。

sparky_sparky_boom 12分 9天前 
You might want to do a bit more reading on that. There's plenty of evidence that India messes in the affairs of Nepal and Bhutan, and none that China would annex Bhutan like Tibet.

你可能需要读更多关于这方面的东西。有很多证据表明印度干预尼泊尔和不丹的事务，而且中国也不会像西藏一样吞并不丹。

loveindiahateindians 1分 7天前 
Didn't china mess with Vietnam. Bhutan and Nepal are India's neighborhood same as Vietnam for china. There will always be issues between neighbouring countries.

中国没有干预越南吗？不丹和尼泊尔是印度的邻居就像越南是中国的邻居。邻国之间总会有这样那样的问题。

wiwalker[S] 2分 11天前 
So I understand it tactically now, but strategically, its mainly to cut off India from its eastern provinces? That seems very ambitious but I wouldn't put it past China.

所以现在我在战术上明白了，但战略上呢，主要是把印度东北部分离出去吗？这似乎非常有抱负，但我不相信中国会这么做。

sparky_sparky_boom 21分 11天前 
If you don't buy the whole "claim Arunachal Pradesh because it was always part of China" the best explanation is that China wants the Buddhist Monastery in Tawang to eliminate something that could be considered a capital for an alternative government of Tibet. However, India isn't willing to hand over Tawang on a plate, and China can't annex Tawang and hold it against Indian forces as long as they can roll tanks into the Northeast. Cutting the Northeast off from India would be the only way China can gain long-term control of Tawang and put Tibetan independence in the ground for good. The rest of Arunachal Pradesh and the Northeast isn't nearly as valuable, being on the other side of the Himalayas and hard to connect to. China would probably support a separatist movement or let Myanmar annex it or something.

如果你不买“阿鲁纳恰尔邦自古就是中国的一部分”的帐，最好的解释就是中国希望得到在塔旺的佛教寺院以消除可以被认为是西藏替代政府的首都。不过，印度不愿意交出塔旺，只要印度能把坦克运到东北部，中国就不能吞并塔旺。分离印度东北部将是中国可以长期控制塔旺，把西藏独立置于死地的唯一途径。阿鲁纳恰尔邦和东北部的其他地区并不是那么有价值，因为在喜马拉雅山的另一边，所以很难连接。中国可能会支持分裂主义运动，也可能支持缅甸将其吞并。

GroovyBabua 2分 7天前 
The Tibet issue is a weird one betweent he two countries. India accepts that the Tibet region is part of China. So there doesnt seem to be any will to push China on that front. Atleast not yet. The "capital" of the Tibetan government in exile is in Dharamshala, near the other end of the border between India and China. So Tawang is not important because of that reason.

西藏问题是两国之间的一个奇怪的问题。印度接受西藏地区是中国的一部分。所以中国似乎没有任何必要去做什么。至少现在还没有。西藏流亡政府的“首都”在达兰萨拉，靠近印度和中国边界的另一端。因此，塔旺是不重要的。

greenpearlin 17分 11天前 
I follow some geopolitics blogs on wechat from Chinese perspectives. The way these writers see it that both China and India have been constructing roads to secure their de facto borders, but the Chinese were just doing it quicker and it came to a head here in Doklam.
Strategically, I think it's a good leverage to their position in the Indian Ocean, where their $trades with Africa go through.
They are also standing firm on their demand to deal with the issue with just Bhutan, challenging the client state relationship between India and Bhutan.

从中国的角度来看，我在微信上关注了一些地缘政治博客。这些作家看到，中国和印度一直在建设道路，以确保他们的事实上的边界，但中国人做得更快，来到了洞朗这里。 
在战略上，我觉得这对他们在印度洋的地位很有好处，他们与非洲的交易通过此处。 
他们也坚决要求处理与不丹的单边问题，挑战印度与不丹之间的附庸国家关系。

sparky_sparky_boom 8分 10天前 
There's also another scenario where a Chinese attack through the Chumbi valley is useless for cutting off the Indian northeast. If India can secure transit through Bangladesh, through treaty or force, then Chinese forces would have to cut off a much wider strip across Bangladesh, impossible with only Chinese infantry facing Indian tanks on flat ground.
Considering Bangladesh is smaller and weaker than India, they probably could force passage if necessary. I'm of the opinion that cutting off and holding the Northeast is more likely than not to fail. The recent dispute over Doklam probably isn't part of some larger plan. More likely some poor Chinese schmucks got sent up to pave a road they completely thought was in their country and accidentally sparked a standoff.

另外还有一种情况是中国人通过春丕河谷的袭击对于切断印度东北地区是无用的。如果印度可以通过条约或武力保证运输可以通过孟加拉国，那么中国军队就不得不切断孟加拉国更广阔的地带，这对中国步兵来说是不可能的，考虑到到平原面对印度装甲部队。
考虑到孟加拉国比印度更小，更弱，如果有必要，他们可能会强行通过。我认为切断和掌握东北方的可能性并不大。最近对洞朗的争议可能不是一些更大的计划的一部分。更可能的情况是，一些可怜的中国笨蛋被送上去铺路，完全认为这是在他们的国家，结果不小心引发了对峙。

insipid-fauna 8分 10天前 
Problem is going through Bangaldesh to NE India means going across the Jamuna river, and the nearest bridge crossing is ~250 km south of the trijunction area. India would need to secure safe passage through Bangladesh by political means, forcing through Bangladesh a la Blitzkreig style would destroy any goodwill India has with the US (unless China launched an unwarranted offensive). The Siliguri Corridor appears to be a natural chokepoint, otherwise I'm not sure why India is getting so worked up over Doklam.
The recent dispute over Doklam probably isn't part of some larger plan.
The Chinese rarely do anything in international affairs unless they have some greater plan. This would be a rare exception rather than the rule.

问题是通过班加尔德到印度东北部意味着穿过贾姆古河，最近的桥梁交叉点在三联区以南约250公里处。印度需要通过政治手段确保安全通过孟加拉国，强制通过孟加拉国，打闪电战将破坏印度和美国的友好关系（除非中国发动无端的攻势）。 西里古里走廊似乎是一个自然的咽喉，否则我不知道为什么印度在洞朗如此大动干戈。
除非有更大的计划，中国人很少在国际事务中做任何事情。这将是一个罕见的例外，而不是惯例。

sparky_sparky_boom 8分 10天前 
If China were to use the Doklam plateau high ground, it would be during an attack. So I doubt any Indian violation of Bangladesh's border would be looked upon that badly. India's not going to randomly cross Bangladesh in peacetime. The fact that Chinese forces on Doklam might force India to cross Bangladesh explains why India wants to keep Chinese forces off, but I have doubts now about the value of Doklam for China or an invasion plan for the Northeast if the Siligiri corridor could be easily bypassed.
I'm not convinced the PRC is always capable of operating with all its parts in concert without ever making a mistake. That's on the level of accussing the CIA being behind every negative event to happen to the US's rivals. No point attributing events to malice when it can also be attributed to error.

如果中国要使用洞朗高原的高地，那将会是在进攻中。所以我认为到时任何印度对孟加拉国边界的违法行为都会被谅解。印度在和平时期不会随机穿过孟加拉国的。事实上，中国在洞朗的军队可能迫使印度越过孟加拉国正说明了印度为什么要中国撤离。但是现在我对洞朗对于中国的价值或印度东北的入侵计划很困惑，如果西里古里走廊可以很容易地被绕过的话。
我不相信中华人民共和国总是能够在不犯错误的情况下与其所有部分合作。这就像指责中情局在每一个负面事件中落后于美国竞争对手一样。把它归因于错误不一定是恶意的。

insipid-fauna 5分 10天前 
If China were to use the Doklam plateau high ground, it would be during an attack. So I doubt any Indian violation of Bangladesh's border would be looked upon that badly. India's not going to randomly cross Bangladesh in peacetime. The fact that Chinese forces on Doklam might force India to cross Bangladesh explains why India wants to keep Chinese forces off, but I have doubts now about the value of Doklam for China if the Siligiri corridor could be easily bypassed.
Agreed. I have my doubts as well.
That's on the level of accussing the CIA being behind every negative event to happen to the US's rivals.
False equivalence. The CIA doesn't have authority over the behavior of its US rivals, while the CPC/PLA has authority over its own soldiers. I have extraordinary doubts the expansion of a road in contested territory, and with China reportedly providing a statement to Bhutan and India prior to road construction that they would proceed to build the road, was done by some rogue company of engineers. You don't have to look deeply that China is making deals with its other neighboring countries either.

同意，我也有自己的困惑。
错误的类比，中央情报局对美国对手的行为没有权力，而中共中央军委对自己的士兵有权利。我感觉在争议领土扩建道路是非常可疑的，据中国报道，中国在道路建设之前已经向不丹和印度知会了他们将修路，这是由一些流氓工程公司完成的。你也不必对于中国与其邻国进行交易想得太多。

sparky_sparky_boom 3分 10天前* 
If your source is correct and that China asked for permission before starting construction, and only started after receiving no objection, then it seems like they weren't expecting Indian opposition and were blindsided by it. Not really behavior planned to raise tensions at this particular point in time. More likely that they were expecting routine maintenance after notifying neighbors.
Of course, we're running off of rumors at this point. I'm still inclined to believe that large organizations are difficult to control due to many moving parts, personnel interactions, and inner political struggles. Even something that looks as united as the CPC from the outside isn't infallible and probably makes errors even a quarter of the time.

如果你的资料是正确的，中国在开始施工之前要求许可，只有在没有人反对的情况下才开始施工，那么似乎他们没有料到印度的反对，被蒙蔽了。他们没有计划在这个特定的时间点提高紧张局势。更像是在通知邻居之后的常规维护。
当然，在这一点上，我们已经说了很多了。我仍然倾向于认为，由于许多移动部件，人员交往和内部政治斗争，大型组织是很难以控制的。即使是外界认为非常统一的中共也不是绝对的，甚至也会经常出错。

loscrimmage 18分 11天前 
That seems to be India propaganda. While it is a remote possibility, I can't see any interests from the Chinese side for actually implementing it. In short, India is not that important.

这似乎是印度的宣传。虽然这是一个遥远的可能性，但我看不到中方实施它会有任何的好处。总之，印度并不重要。

devils_advocate8 0分 11天前 
In short, India is not that important.
Really? This is your conclusion? The only peer in Asia that can rival China both economically and militarily, one which shares a border where they’ve already had a war and has $60B worth of trade imports from China isn’t important for China? You’re either seriously misinformed or downright delusional.
That seems to be India propaganda. While it is a remote possibility, I can’t see any interests from the Chinese side for actually implementing it.
Would you care elaborating why this might be Indian propaganda? It’s well documented that this region is strategically important for both India and China. Just because you can’t see why it’s important for the Chinese, doesn’t mean it’s propaganda.

真的吗？这就是你的结论？亚洲唯一能够在经济和军事上与中国竞争的对手，领土接壤并打过战争，每年从中国进口600亿美元的国家对中国而言并不重要？你不是被严重误导就是一个彻底的妄想症。
你会关心为什么这可能是印度的宣传？文件表明这个地区对印度和中国都具有战略意义。只因为看不出它对于中国的重要性，并不意味着它是政治宣传。

id815 17分 10天前* 
The only peer in Asia that can rival China both economically
India has a lower GDP than France
and militarily
India still relies on Russian tech which is already starting to fall behind China's indigenous tech in several areas.
Russia and Japan are the only 2 countries in Asia that can arguably be considered "peers" of China (not even really) and India isn't even in THAT league.
The only comparable thing India has to China is its population.

印度GDP比法国还低。
印度仍然依赖俄罗斯的技术，在很多领域已经开始落后于中国的国产技术了。俄罗斯和日本是亚洲唯一可以被勉强视为中国“对手”的两个国家（甚至不是真的），印度甚至不在其中。印度和中国唯一可比的事情就是人口。

Ali_Safdari 3分 10天前 
Lower nominal GDP than France. By PPP terms, India is the third largest, at around 9.5 trillion dollars; which, however, is still less than half of that of China.
And yes, India does rely primarily on Russian tech, only military. Apart from Russian nuclear reactors, not much of Russian tech and products are used in India. Also, what point are you trying to make?

名义GDP比法国低。按PPP计算，印度是世界第三大，约9.5万亿美元; 然而，这仍然不到中国的一半。
是的，印度确实主要依靠俄罗斯科技，但只有军事。除俄罗斯核反应堆外，俄罗斯的技术和产品在印度也不多。此外，你想说明什么？

id815 10分 10天前* 
Seems like people like to pick measures to paint a picture they want to tell. Why use PPP over nominal when comparing the spending power between 2 economies? Using PPP is especially absurd when discussing GDP and military together, seeing as a large proportion of Indian money would be spent on Russian military equipment bought on an open market. I'll paste my other reply in this thread below.
PPP GDP isn't a good measure of economic power that a nation can leverage on the world stage compared to Nominal GDP. Nominal GDP shows the total productive output of a country indexed to USD which provides a better base for comparison than PPP, which adjusts for the cost of living in different countries. While adjusting for the cost of living matters when looking at individual well-being in these countries, in the context of the world stage where many different countries trade on an open market, Nominal GDP is a better measure at how much "ammunition" / spending power each economy has.
I didn't really have a point. I was just refuting OP's point about India being the only "peer" / "rival" that can challenge China, and we had a little debate over what "challenge" actually meant.

似乎像人们总喜欢挑选对他们有利的事实。为什么比较两个经济体之间的消费能力时，用PPP而不是名义GDP？在讨论国内生产总值和军事力量时，使用PPP尤其荒谬，因为印度的大部分资金用于在公开市场上购买的俄罗斯军事装备。我将在下面的回帖中粘贴我的其他回复。
与名义GDP相比，购买力平价GDP不是衡量一个国家在世界舞台上的经济实力的一个很好标准。名义GDP显示了一个为美元为单位的国家的总产出，它提供了一个比购买力平价GDP更好的比较基础，购买力平价GDP根据不同国家的生活成本进行了调整。在考虑到这些国家的个人福祉时，根据生活费用调整很重要。但在许多不同国家在公开市场上进行贸易的世界舞台上，名义GDP是衡量每个经济体有多少“弹药”/消费能力的更好指标。
我不想表达什么，只是反对你印度是唯一可以挑战中国的对手的观点，我们对“挑战”实际上意味着什么有个小争论。

Ali_Safdari 2分 9天前 
I agree on both your points. India isn't a peer of China, and it'll need atleast 2 decades of the current growth rate to reach China's current nGDP. In the distant future, perhaps both the countries will be on an equal footing, now they definately aren't peers.

我同意你的观点。印度不是中国的对手，目前的增长速度至少需要20年才能达到中国目前的名义GDP。在遥远的未来，也许两国将处于平等的位置，现在他们绝对不是对手。