日本真的想要核武器吗？ [美国媒体]

Does Japan really want nuclear weapons?

日本真的想要核武器吗？

作者Rrichard A. Bitzinger



Does Trump want a nuclear Japan?” reads the headline on a recent op-ed in The Wall Street Journal. The article, authored by noted academic Walter Russell Mead, argues that an “American retreat from the Pacific” – caused by a vacillating Trump administration with a less-than-sterling security commitment to Asia – could lead Japan to conclude that “going nuclear” might be its best recourse. And in good ol’-fashioned domino fashion, South Korea and Taiwan might follow suit.

“特朗普希望日本拥有核技术吗？”这是华尔街日报最近一篇专题中的题目。由着名学者Walter Russell Mead写的这篇文章认为“美国已从太平洋退出”。由于特朗普政府的犹豫不决以及他低于标准的亚洲安保承诺，可能导致日本得到继续核研究才是最好的自救方式这种结论。在多米诺骨牌效应下，韩国和台湾也可能会效仿。

Mead argues that some in the administration of US President Donald Trump might even welcome the idea of a nuclearized Asia. And indeed, if the United States were to remove Japan from its security guarantee – especially covering it under the US nuclear umbrella – Tokyo might seriously consider becoming a nuclear power.

Mead认为美国总统特朗普的一些政策甚至可能迎合了亚洲核武化的思想。事实上，如果美国将日本从安保条约中移除，尤其是日本处于美国核保护伞下这一点，东京很可能会认真考虑拥有核力量。

Moreover, it is generally conceded that Japan has the technological capacity to build an atomic bomb in a relatively short time – months, perhaps, a few years at the most. The real question, however, is: Does Japan want to be a nuclear power?

而且，普遍认为日本已经有能力在极短的时间内造出原子弹，可能是几个月，最多几年。然而真正的问题是：日本希望拥有核力量吗？

Building the bomb is the easiest part


制造炸弹是最容易的事

In the first place, Japan would likely find that becoming a nuclear-weapons state is a lot harder than it or most others think.

首先，日本可能会发现要成为一个核武器国家，会比它自己以及大多数其他国家想的要困难得多。

It is not simply a matter of building an atomic bomb. Yes, if Japan were to build a nuclear bomb and test it, it would have resonance throughout Asia, and, indeed, the rest of the world. But it would require much, much more for Tokyo to create a credible nuclear deterrent.

它不仅仅是一个造原子弹的问题。当然，如果日本造出了原子弹并成功测试了它，这可能会在亚洲以及世界其他地方产生极大的影响。但是东京需要更大的努力去建立一个核威慑力量。

In the first place, Japan would need to test and re-test its nuclear capabilities. Yes, supercomputers can simulate some of the characteristics of a nuclear explosion, but ultimately Japan would probably have to conduct several tests, over the course of several years, to create a reliable nuclear force.

首先，日本需要不断测试它的核技术。当然，超级计算机可以模拟一场核爆炸的部分特征，但最终，日本不得不需要几年去进行实验，以建立可靠的核力量。

But how would it deploy such a weapon? On aircraft? Japan has no nuclear-capable aircraft, no bombers or specialized strike aircraft. The country’s Air Self Defense Force does operate several US-designed fighter jets, especially as the F-15, which could conceivably be adapted to carry nuclear weapons. But that would require US permission to open up the plane’s “black boxes” – its electronics and sources codes – in order to nuclearize these aircraft; it is hard to see that happening.

但是日本如何部署这种武器呢？在飞机上？日本没有核武飞机，没有轰炸机或是专门的攻击型飞行器。这个国家的航空自卫队的确有几个美国设计的喷气式战斗机可能可以携带核武器，尤其是F-15。但是为了实现这些飞机携带核武器，需要美国同意打开飞机的“黑匣子”-它的电子设备和源代码。这不太可能。

Japan could put its nuclear weapons on missiles. That would require miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to fit on a missile and then developing the missile itself. Japan has a vibrant space-launch industry, but they are the wrong kind of rockets for a nuclear force. A specialized solid-fueled missile would have to be built almost from scratch.

日本可能会在导弹上布置核武器。这就要求小型化核武器以配上导弹并且还要发展导弹技术。日本拥有发达的航天工业，但是这并不适用于核武器。专门的固体燃料导弹不得不从头做起。

Even then, where would Tokyo put these missiles, whether in silos (which would be vulnerable to earthquakes) or on mobile launchers? Japan is a small and populous country; what region of the country  would want to accept these weapons, especially since they would make any such place a high-value target for an enemy first strike? It is likely that many local communities would copy Okinawa in strongly protesting the militarization of their back yards.

即使东京做出这些导弹了，那是在固定发射装置（可能容易受到地震影响）还是在移动发射装置上呢？日本是一个小的而且人口众多的国家，它的国土上哪片区域能接受成为敌人第一打击的高价值目标从而接受这些武器呢？很可能大多数的当地组织都会效仿冲绳强烈的抗议将他们的后院军事化。

Japan could deploy these missiles on submarines, which would require a specialized submarine-launched missile, encapsulated for underwater launch. The country would also have to develop a whole new ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN), most likely nuclear-powered, meaning another technological hurdle (small, extremely safe nuclear reactors) that needs to be overcome.

日本也可能会将这些导弹部署到潜艇上，这就需要专门的潜艇导弹以及密闭的水下发射装置。这同样不得不研发一种全新的弹道导弹潜艇（SSBN），很可能是核动力潜艇，这就意味着许多其他的技术难题（小型的、极其安全的核反应堆）需要解决。

All this would not be cheap. It cost Britain ￡15 billion (more than US$19 billion) to create a four-boat fleet of Vanguard-class SSBNs – and London simply bought submarine-launched Trident II missiles off the shelf from the United States (something Washington would likely not do for Tokyo).

以上所有的事情都不会便宜。英国花费了150亿英镑打造了一只有四艘先锋级弹道导弹核潜艇的舰队。而英国仅仅只是从美国买了现成的鱼叉II水下导弹（华盛顿可能不会对东京做同样的事情）。

More than missiles

除了导弹

At the same time, Japan would have to build up a whole supporting infrastructure for its nuclear weapons. Specialized, extremely secure storage facilities would have to be built at airbases and naval stations to secure them. Nuclear engineers would have to be trained to maintain and handle these bombs and warheads.

同时，日本必须为其核武器建立一个完整的配套基础设施。空军基地需要建立一套专业的、极其安全的存放设施，还要海军保护他们。核工程师们需要训练去维护以及操纵这些炸弹或是弹头。

Japan would have to come up with a specialized command and control to safeguard the use of nuclear forces. Security devices called permissive action links would have to be fitted to each weapon to prevent the unauthorized arming or detonation of a nuclear device. Such PALs would have to be highly encrypted to prevent their being hacked.

日本必须有专门的指挥和控制，以保障核力量的使用。为了防止核武器的未经授权的武装或引爆，每种武器都必须安装一种叫做“许可行动链接”的安全装置。这也需要有高度加密以防止被黑客攻击。

Tokyo would then have to devise protocols for arming and using its nuclear forces. Most likely the prime minister would control the “nuclear football” containing the launch codes, and he or she would be the final authority for the actual release of nuclear weapons. But what about submarine-launched nuclear forces? Even with the “two-man rule”, submarine commanders on SSBNs theoretically have considerable autonomy to launch on their own authority. Such details would have to be worked out.

之后，东京还需要制定它的核力量使用和武装的协定。最有可能的是，首相将控制包含发射代码的“核橄榄球”，成为真正释放核武器的最终权威。但是潜艇发射的核武器呢？即使有“双人管理制”，但理论上来说，潜艇指挥官在自己权限范围内会有相当大的自主权进行发射。这些细节都需要被考虑到。

You’re on your own, Japan

你要靠你自己，日本

Above all, Tokyo would need to tackle all of these technological and infrastructure issues on its own. The United States certainly is not going to help. It would cost billions, perhaps trillions, of yen to build a credible nuclear force, and take decades to put it into place.

综上所述，东京需要靠他们自己解决所有这些技术以及基建上的难题。美国不会给予帮助。建造一支可信的核力量需要数十亿美元，甚至上万亿日元，而且需要几十年时间才能到位。

In the meantime … what? Will the Japanese public go along with a massive and expensive nuclear-weapons program? One might expect Japan’s political far right to love the idea. The nationalists have long yearned for the day of reclaiming the country’s imperial heritage, of possessing a massive military force, including nuclear weapons, capable to defending the country independently.

在此期间，日本民众会赞成一个工程量和费用都巨大的核武器工程？有些人可能会期望日本右翼会喜欢上这个点子。这些民族主义分子长期渴望恢复帝国传承拥有强大军事力量（包括核武器）的那一天，有能力独立的保卫国家。

But what about the vast majority of Japan’s population that is still squeamish about the idea of going nuclear? Japan’s citizens have had anti-militarist, anti-war, and anti-nuclear beliefs drummed into them over the past 70 years.

但是那些对发展核技术想法仍旧敏感的绝大多数日本民众怎么办？在过去70年里，日本公民被灌输反军国主义、反战争、反核信念。

These convictions are enshrined in Article 9 of its constitution, which renounces war as a tool of international disputes. Yes, this article has been constantly reinterpreted over the decades to permit the re-arming of Japan, sending Japanese forces overseas, and engaging in collective security with the United States. Nevertheless, Article 9 is still construed as prohibiting offensive weapons, particularly nuclear forces.

宪法的第九条体现了这些信念，即放弃将战争作为一个解决国际争端的工具。当然，这条在几十年的日本自我武装，日本海外部队，以及配合美国加入集体安全行动中不断被重新解释。然而第9条依旧被解释为禁止攻击性武器，尤其是核武器。

Moreover, when it comes to nuclear weapons, Japan is a special singular victim, the only country ever to have been attacked with atomic bombs. These are difficult sentiments to overcome on the road to “going nuclear”.

此外，当谈论到核武器时，日本却是一个特殊的、奇怪的受害者。它是唯一一个受到原子弹攻击的国家。在发展核技术的道路上有大量负面情绪需要克服。

A nuclear Japan is not unimaginable. At the same time, it is not a thing that could be done on the cheap, in a hurry, or without provoking a massive political tempest.

一个拥有核武的日本是难以想象的。同时，这也不是一个低廉的、很快的且不会引起巨大的政治风暴的就可以完成的事。

The opinions expressed here are the author’s own.

这是作者自己的观点。



Joe Wong
Japanese is an unrepentant war criminal and the American is the Empire of Chaos, both of them will cut off the nose to spite the face. As the Kamikaze operation in WWII shows Japanese will commit suicide willingly for their national cult and glory. 

日本是一个顽固不化的战犯，而美国是一个混乱的帝国。他俩都会因为泄愤而害了自己。二战中神风敢死队会为了国家崇拜和荣耀而自杀。

There are profits, a very large one, to make by helping the Japanese and SK to arm nuclear weapon infrastructure while creating more chaos in Asia that makes China, Japan and S Korea less energy to threaten American hegemony somewhere else, it is very profitable business when your don't have the capability to maintain your hegemony in Western Pacific. Besides if the American will not help a lot of other people will, British, French and Jew are the few pop up in my mind right away. 

当你没法在西太平洋中维持你的霸权，在亚洲制造混乱使中国、日本、韩国几乎没法威胁美国的时候，通过帮助日本和韩国建立核武器基础设施，是有很大的商业利益可图的。此外，如果美国不提供帮助，其他许多国家也会提供，我脑子里立马就出现了英国、法国还有犹太人。 
It's not a matter does Japan really want nuclear weapons, but it's a matter of when.
这不是日本是否真的希望要核武器的问题，这只是时间的问题。

Alex Fowler · Kelley School of Business
Kim Jong Un's most likely end goal is to acquire a large and reliable enough nuclear/missile arsenal to be able to credibly threaten the US mainland (enough to overwhelm any missile defense system, likely at least several dozen bombs and the accompanying missiles) so that he can hold US cities hostage and blackmail the US into standing on the sidelines while he invades the south. Given that, I think Japan and especially South Korea have to be thinking about an independent deterrent. Both countries could certainly do so internally but another option would be for the US to give China a deadline of 6 months or a year to solve the North Korea issue and if they fail, we give nukes and delivery systems to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Proliferation certainly isn't ideal but when North Korea and Pakistan have nukes and Iran will shortly the cat is already out of the bag.

金正恩的最终目的很可能是获得一个巨大的可靠的核武器库，以便能够威胁美国本土（足以压倒任何导弹防御系统，可能至少有几十枚炸弹和导弹）。这样他在入侵韩国的时候可以以美国城市作为要挟，让美国站在一边。考虑到这些，我认为日本，尤其是韩国必须靠率独立防御。这两个国家在国内都能做到这一点。但另一个选择就是美国给中国为期6个月或者一年的时间去解决朝鲜问题，如果他们失败了，我们就把核武器和运载系统交给日本、韩国还有台湾。当然扩散开并不是理想的，但是当朝鲜和巴基斯坦拥有核武器时，伊朗就会立刻露出马脚。