《国家利益》：耶路撒冷和特朗普拥抱的时事讽刺剧 [美国媒体]

Jerusalem and the Follies of Trump's Embrace

耶路撒冷和特朗普拥抱的时事讽刺剧



Israelis today are feeling the love from Washington and bracing themselves for trouble. As President Donald Trump announces practical steps towards moving the U.S. Embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, he breaks with precedent in overwhelmingly embracing the Israeli government narrative of Jerusalem’s status. Israel’s security establishment is preparing to contain the fallout. Given Palestinian outrage and the Israeli leadership’s predilection for provocation, over reaction, and collective punishment of Palestinians, this could get ugly. As the veteran Israeli commentator Orly Azulai notes in Israel’s leading circulation daily Yediot, “This is not a gift that shows affection for Israel … this is a powder keg being left on our doorstep … we are the ones that will pay the price.” Even if events do not immediately spiral out of control, the president’s announcement will have heightened tensions and sown the seeds for future instability.

今天的以色列人感受到了来自华盛顿的爱，也让自己陷入了麻烦当中。当美国总统唐纳德·特朗普宣布采取将美国驻以色列大使馆从特拉维夫搬到耶路撒冷的实际步骤时，他打破了以往的先例，表态支持以色列政府对耶路撒冷地位的论述。以色列的安全机构正准备遏制这一事件的附带影响。鉴于巴勒斯坦人的愤怒，以及以色列领导层对挑衅、过度反应以及对巴勒斯坦人的集体惩罚的偏好，这种情况可能会变得很糟糕。正如以色列资深评论员Orly Azulai在以色列发行量最大的日报Yediot上所指出的那样，“这不是一份对以色列示爱的礼物。这是一个被扔在我们家门口的火药桶。我们将会为此付出代价。”即使事态不会立即失控，美国总统的声明也会加剧紧张局势，为未来的不稳定局势埋下种子。

That a speech initiated by the White House, not demanded by events, had to include a call for calm itself speaks volumes.

白宫并非在形势所迫之下进行的一次发布会不得不呼吁呼吁保持冷静，这件事本身就说明了问题。

The Jerusalem announcement from Washington needs to be kept in perspective. The proximate cause of insecurity and violations of human rights and international law, the actual problem in other words, is Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians on the ground not the verbal hot air from Washington. But the former is sustained and given protective cover by the latter.

我们需要对华盛顿方面有关耶路撒冷的生命保持客观的态度。造成不安全局面、违反人权和国际法的直接原因——换句话说也就是实际存在的问题——便是以色列对巴勒斯坦人的政策，而不是来自华盛顿的空话。但是前者却是依靠后者赖以存在和提供庇护的。

It is not at all clear that this U.S. initiative has been driven by Israel’s rightist government. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is of course not ideologically opposed to what the president is doing or saying, he will welcome it and declare victory. Trump’s words will also domestically empower Netanyahu at a moment of unprecedented weakness, born of the multiple corruption investigations being conducted against him alongside the heavy handed, legislatively problematic and borderline authoritarian manner of his response. But Trump’s announcement is not risk-free and the celebrations on the Israeli side of Jerusalem may prove to be hollow.

目前还不清楚美国的这一倡议是否是由以色列的右翼政府推动的。内塔尼亚胡总理当然不会在意识形态上反对美国总统所做的或说的，他会欢迎并宣布获得了胜利。特朗普的这番话也将在以色列国内给正处于最衰弱时期的内塔尼亚胡带来强力支持，这一时期他正面临着针对自己的多重腐败行为的调查。但特朗普的声明并非没有风险，以色列方面对耶路撒冷的庆祝可能会被证明是无用的。

To be clear, Trump is not endangering his allies in Israel to the same degree as he is with the South Koreans. A pattern though may be emerging—this president could pose more of a threat to his allies than his adversaries.

需要澄清的是，特朗普并没有像他对韩国人所做的那样，危及他的以色列盟友。尽管这一模式可能是全新的，但总统对盟友的威胁可能比他的对手更大。

This presidential initiative may well be the product of the hawkish, even extremist pro-Israel sympathies of his closest confidantes. It may also be designed to test how much regional leeway (especially regarding Israel) he can now claim given the extent the White House has deepened ties with certain Arab states, and in particular Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In the most farfetched interpretations of this move, it has even been claimed that this lunge towards the Israeli side on Jerusalem can be used to create leverage and be constructively deployed if and when an American peace plan is presented. That is hogwash. If true, it displays a terrifying ignorance of the issues involved, the centrality of Jerusalem and the human dynamics of maintaining confidence and relationships in any mediation and peacemaking effort.

总统的这一倡议很可能是鹰派——甚至是他最亲密的亲信中最为极端的亲以色列的同情者的强硬态度的产物。考虑到白宫加深了与某些阿拉伯国家——尤其是沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国——的关系，这也可能被设计用来测试他现在可以拥有多大的区域回旋余地(尤其是在以色列这一问题上)。在对这一行动的最牵强的解读中，甚至有人宣称，如果美国和平计划得以实施，那么在耶路撒冷向以色列一方的这一举动就能被用于为美国创造影响力，并会进行建设性的部署。这是一派胡言。如果这是真的，它只会显示出对所涉及到的问题、耶路撒冷的中心地位，以及在任何调解和调停过程中维持信任和关系的人类动力的无知。

To understand the ‘why’ and the ‘why now’ of this move, one is probably better advised to visit the Breitbart website, which is proudly proclaiming ‘hallelujah’ in a banner homepage headline. Not unusually for American engagement on this issue, this is probably more about the mid-West than the mid-East. Trump’s overall political strategy has been all about keeping the Republican Party and Congress on board by solidifying support within his own domestic political base. This move will play well, very well, with a large swathe of the dispensationalist Evangelical Christian community as well as with the very small cohort of conservative American Jewish support he carries, especially the subset of that cohort known as Sheldon Adelson.

为了理解这一举动的“原因”，人们最好可以去浏览一下Breitbart这个网站，这是在首页横幅上高呼“哈利路亚”的网站。美国涉入这一问题并不是罕见的事情，这可能更多的是关于美国中西部而不是中东地区的政治。特朗普的总体政治策略是通过巩固其国内政治基础的支持力量，将共和党和国会拉上船。这一举措将会很好地发挥作用，因为有大批的福音派基督教社区和一小批保守的美国犹太人支持他，特别是那些被称为Sheldon Adelson的群体。

The question many experts have been pondering is how these considerations have trumped the traditional American national security interest argument whereby the price America pays for its indulgence of Israeli occupation practices, and its perpetuation of a grievance felt by Muslims and Arabs regarding Palestine, needs to be managed, not exacerbated. American policy on Israel/Palestine is a gift to radicalisation, and is consistently part of the extremist recruitment narrative from Bin Laden down.

很多专家一直在思考的问题是：这些因素是如何胜过传统的美国国家安全利益观点的？通过这种方式，美国为它纵容以色列的占领行为以及穆斯林和阿拉伯国家在巴勒斯坦问题上持续不断的不满情绪所付出的代价需要得到处理，而不是任其恶化。美国对以色列和巴勒斯坦的政策推动了激进化，而且一直以来都是自本·拉登以来极端主义势力招募人员的论述的一部分。

CENTCOM chiefs have frequently and openly testified to how the handling of this issue can undermine American forces and security in the region and beyond. That entire trend is intensified when the focus becomes more narrowly that of Jerusalem.

美国中央司令部的长官们经常公开地证实这个问题会如何削弱美国在该地区及其他地区的军事力量和安全。当焦点更加地集中在耶路撒冷的时候，整个趋势就会趋于恶化。

However, for those arguments to have carried the day, one has to assume that this White House agrees with the premise that U.S. interests are best served by seeking to heal and improve relations with the Muslim world. But if your own political project and the project for America is to polarize, to deepen divisions, and especially to demonize Muslims and perhaps even use that clash to achieve other domestic political transformations then you might have an interest in fomenting trouble, in generating demonstrations where for instance American flags may be burned.

然而，对于那些获得胜利的观点来说，我们必须假定白宫同意这样的一个前提——即美国的利益最好是通过寻求修复和改善与穆斯林世界的关系而得以实现的。但是如果你自己的政治计划与美国的计划是使分歧变得两极化、加深，特别是导致对穆斯林的妖魔化，甚至是利用这一冲突来实现国内的其他政治转型，那么你可能会有兴趣煽动骚乱和大规模的抗议示威活动，比如在活动中可以烧毁美国国旗。

Undoubtedly this is a defeat for the Palestinians in the short term, but more precisely, this is a defeat for what was anyway a failed Palestinian approach, one in desperate need of change. The clarity which the Trump administration is offering the Palestinians with regards to how counterproductive it is to continue pursuing an American-led peace process, to continue neglecting the accumulation of Palestinian leverage, that clarity may end up being more of a cause of concern for Israel.

毫无疑问，对巴勒斯坦人来说，这是短时期内的失败，但更准确地说，这是已经失败的巴勒斯坦人所必然会招致的一场失败，他们于绝望中急需改变。特朗普政府向巴勒斯坦人阐明的一点是：继续追求以美国为主导的和平进程，继续忽视巴勒斯坦影响力的积累，将会是多么的适得其反，而这种阐释最终将不止是引发以色列方面的关注。

To understand why this might be the case, it is worth remembering why this conversation is taking place at all right now. The necessity for the U.S. President to address the issue of the embassy and Jerusalem every six months is not a Trump invention. It is a consequence of the Jerusalem Embassy Act passed by Congress in October of 1995 by an overwhelming 93-5 majority in the Senate and 374-37 in the House, calling on the embassy to move to Jerusalem unless the president uses a waiver for national security reasons. The push for that legislation in the early 1990s came not from the Israeli leadership of the time, but from the way this issue plays out in American domestic politics and the biases of the key lobbying groups, notably AIPAC. It was an initiative at the time which cornered and undermined the peace efforts of the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (who privately opposed the move).

要理解为什么会出现这种情况，就需要记住为什么会存在现在所有的这些对话。美国总统每六个月就必须面对大使馆迁址和耶路撒冷问题并不是特朗普的发明。这是1995年10月由国会通过的耶路撒冷大使馆法案所导致的结果，该法案当时在参议院以93票对3票的多数通过，众议院以374票对37票的多数通过，它要求美国大使馆迁往耶路撒冷，除非总统出于国家安全考虑使用豁免条款。上世纪90年代初，这项立法的推动力并非是以色列当时的领导人，而是美国国内政治所存在的问题，以及主要游说团体——尤其是美以公共事务委员会——的偏见。这一项倡议导致当时的以色列总理拉宾(他私下反对此举)的和平努力被逼入绝境并受到破坏。

The circumstances today are different. The current Israeli Prime Minister, Netanyahu, is seeking to close the door on any realistic peace deal and to gain acceptance and cover for the permanent disenfranchisement and bantustanization of the Palestinians.

今天的情况是不同的。现任以色列总理内塔尼亚胡正在寻求关闭任何现实的和平协议的大门，并试图为其永久剥夺巴勒斯坦人的身份及其组织的行为获得国际社会的认为和提供掩护。

Still, the story of the Jerusalem Embassy Act is instructive. It speaks to the American inability to be an effective, let alone honest, broker on this issue, as being a permanent structural feature rather than an ephemeral Trumpian blip.

尽管如此，耶路撒冷大使馆法的故事还是很有启发性的。它表明，美国不能在这个问题上成为一个有效的、更遑论诚实的调解人，因为它具有一种永久性的结构性特征，而不是昙花一现的特朗普现象。

Trump suggested that his move was a departure from the failed policies of the past, in reality he is putting that same policy on steroids, a policy of putting America’s thumb down on the scales in favour of the stronger party, Israel.

特朗普表示，他的这一举动与过去的失败政策不同，实际上，他只是在更加激进地使用同样的政策，这是一种将美国的拇指放更强大的以色列一方的天平上的政策。

Trump’s moves are further cornering the Palestinian leadership and generating a demand among the public for a game-changing shift in strategy away from the current comfort zone of an American-Israeli defined peace process. That includes the need to sufficiently overcome debilitating internal Palestinian divisions.

特朗普的举动进一步疏离了巴勒斯坦的领导层，并在公众中引发了一场将战略从目前的美国-以色列定义的和平进程的舒适地带中转移出去的需求。这其中包括了足以克服使巴勒斯坦 削弱下去的内部分歧的必要性。

Trump is doing the Palestinians a favour by making the centrepiece of this Jerusalem—the issue which resonates most broadly in Arab communities, and also amongst Muslims and Christians (as well as with Jews of course), and the issue around which people are more likely to be mobilized. The new Saudi leadership, given its particular closeness to the Trump administration and given its custodianship of the two holy mosques, is especially exposed and vulnerable should it appear to be complicit in selling out al-Aqsa and al-Quds. Trump’s mention in his speech of the Summit in Riyadh earlier this year will fuel speculation of Saudi culpability.

特朗普正在做已建有利于巴勒斯坦人的事情，他又重新提出了耶路撒冷问题——这个问题在阿拉伯社会引起了广泛的共鸣，在穆斯林和基督徒(当然还有犹太人)中引发了广泛的共鸣——也会导致人们更有可能被动员起来。鉴于它与特朗普政府的密切关系，以及它对两家圣地清真寺的托管，新的沙特阿拉伯领导层现在尤其受到曝光，而且很容易受到攻击，因为它似乎与出卖阿克萨清真寺和耶路撒冷的行为中与外人沆瀣一气。特朗普在今年早些时候在利雅得举行的峰会上的讲话将会给沙特是否有罪的猜测火上浇油。

Over the summer when Israel tried to unilaterally change arrangements at the al-Aqsa mosque compound, there was perhaps an unprecedented large-scale mobilization of Palestinian Jerusalemites, Palestinian citizens of Israel and West Bankers which, with Jordanian and international support, ultimately led to an Israeli capitulation.

今年夏天，以色列试图单方面改变在阿克萨清真寺的相关安排，这一行动导致了住在耶路撒冷的巴勒斯坦人、以色列的巴勒斯坦公民和约旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦人的史无前例的大规模抗议，并得到了约旦和国际社会的支持，从而最终导致了以色列的妥协。

That was a timely reminder that Palestinians do have agency, that mobilization on the local and regional level matters, and that what is said in the Briefing Room in Washington ultimately counts for less than what is done on the ground in the Holy Land.

这是一个及时的提醒，巴勒斯坦人确实有在地方和地区层面上的进行动员的机构存在，这一点在华盛顿的简报室里已经被提及了，但它最终对美国在这片圣地上的所作所为影响甚微。