中国的”美国化“的军队 [美国媒体]

China's Americanized Military

中国的”美国化“的军队



The PLA is set to become the largest “American” military force to pose a threat to the U.S.

中国人民解放军将成为最大的“美国”军事力量，对美国构成威胁。

Two Chinese armored brigades clashed in a week-long training exercise at the Zhurihe Training Base in Inner Mongolia in 2015. Both brigades were equipped with identical armored vehicles and weapons. The Blue opposing forces brigade (OPFOR), however, was organized and fought in the fashion of a United States brigade combat team.

2015年，两支中国装甲旅在内蒙古朱日和训练基地进行为期一周的训练。两个旅都装备了相同的装甲车辆和武器。然而，蓝军部队(假想敌部队OPFOR)以美国战斗旅的方式进行战斗。

The Red friendly force was crushed. “Within an hour we were hit with airstrikes, enemy satellite reconnaissance, and cyberattacks … Frankly, I never imagined it would be this hard,” said Wang Ziqiang, the armored brigade commander of the Red force. Wang’s political commissar Liu Haitao was caught on camera sobbing after the defeat. In a documentary aired on state television days before the 19th Party Congress in October, Liu said that his unit was initially very confident of victory over the Blue team, which was formerly a sister unit. “But over the course of seven days, we were beaten … we lost because we didn’t meet realistic combat standards when training our troops,” he said.

红军被碾压。“在一个小时内，我们受到了空袭、敌方卫星侦察和网络攻击。坦率地说，我从来没有想象过会如此艰难，”Wang Ziqiang说，他是红军部队的装甲旅指挥官。王建民的政治委员刘海涛失利后在镜头前抽泣。在10月举行的第19届党代会上，在国家电视台播出的纪录片中，刘表示，他的部队最初非常有信心战胜蓝军，而蓝军以前是一个兄弟单位。“但在过去的7天,我们被打败…当我们用不符合现实的战斗标准培训我们的军队，我们失败了。”他说。

Subpar training tells only part of the story. Between 2014 and 2016, the “American” Blue team scored a total of 32 victories and one defeat against Red forces that comprised some of the best and most well-equipped units in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). On average, Red forces sustained 70 percent simulated casualties after clashing with the Blue team. The PLA’s poor performance against a modern military unit gave President and Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping sufficient reason to seek an overhaul.

低于标准的训练只会告诉我们故事的一部分。从2014年到2016年，"美国化"蓝军总共获得了32场抗红军的胜利，其中一次击败了由中国人民解放军(PLA)中装备最好、装备最精良的部队组成的红军。平均而言，在与蓝军发生冲突后，红军部队的模拟伤亡人数达到了70%。中国人民解放军对现代军事单位的糟糕表现，给了中国充分的理由去寻求彻底改革。

In September 2015, Xi announced sweeping military reforms that included a 300,000 troop cut, the creation of a joint command structure that has drawn comparisons with the United States’s Goldwater-Nichols Act, and a military-civilian integration program that appears to draw inspiration from the American military-industrial complex. During his speech at the 19th Party Congress, Xi set three goals for the PLA: By 2020, achieve basic mechanization, make significant progress in using information technology, and elevate strategic ability; by 2035, become a modernized defense and military force; by 2050, become a world-class military.

2015年9月，中国宣布了全面的军事改革，其中包括30万军队的削减，建立了一个联合指挥机构，并与美国的戈德华特－尼科尔斯国防部重构法案进行了比较，建立了一个军民融合计划，从美国军工复合体中获得灵感。中国在第19届党代会演讲中，为人民解放军设定了三个目标:到2020年实现基本机械化，在信息技术运用方面取得重大进展，提升战略能力;到2035年,成为一个现代化的国防和军事力量;到2050年，成为世界级的军事力量。

If Xi is can fully implement his reforms while successfully fending off military and political opponents, the PLA should most closely resemble the U.S. military in terms of organization and chain of command. The reformed PLA, however, is unlikely to best the U.S. military in a conventional war given its technological gap and lack of warfighting experience. But factor in unconventional warfare tactics and next-generation technology, and the PLA may stand a chance of rivaling the world’s strongest fighting force.

如果中国能够在成功地击败军事和政治对手的同时，充分实施他的改革，那么中国人民解放军就应该像美国军队一样，在组织和指挥体系方面与美国类似。然而，由于技术上的差距和缺乏战争经验，改革后的解放军不太可能在常规战争中打败美国军队。但在非常规战争战术和下一代技术方面，解放军可能有机会与世界上最强大的作战力量相匹敌。

Reasons for Reform

改革的原因

Xi’s military reforms appear to be driven by two factors: China’s need as an aspiring world power for a modern military that can fight and win wars, and Xi’s need to consolidate power in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

中国的军事改革似乎受到两个因素的驱动:中国需要成为一个有抱负的世界大国，一个可以打仗和赢得战争的现代化军队，另外，中国需要巩固中国(CCP)的权力。

The former factor is the more obvious of the two. While previous CCP leaders had carried out some military reform and updated the military’s weaponry, the PLA had long remained organized along the Soviet model. Combat tactics and doctrine didn’t differ much from the low-tech, ground forces-heavy style utilized during the 1950 Korean War. While militaries around the world had been moving toward joint service operations since the 1980s, the army was still the most prominent service branch in the PLA. The navy and air force played an auxiliary role.

前者是两者中最明显的一个。虽然以前的中国领导人进行了一些军事改革，并更新了军队的武器装备，但长期以来，解放军一直是按照苏联模式组织的。战斗战术和作战理论与1950年朝鲜战争时期使用的低技术、地面部队风格没有太大区别。尽管自上世纪80年代以来，世界各地的军队一直在向联合作战行动，但陆军仍是解放军中最重要的部门，海军和空军起辅助作用。

From a national defense and overseas security standpoint, the relative backwardness of the PLA is a pressing concern for the Xi administration. China has pledged hundreds of billions of dollars for its Belt and Road Initiative, a major transnational development strategy to promote trade between China and Eurasian countries through an overland route and a maritime route. The PLA also periodically faces border issues with India and Vietnam, and maritime run-ins with neighboring countries in the South China Sea. And in the east, China has to contend with a nuclear-capable North Korea whose leadership is aligned with Xi’s political rivals.

从国防和海外安全的角度来看，中国人民解放军的相对落后是中国的一个紧迫问题。中国已承诺为“一带一路倡议”提供数百亿美元资金，这是一项重要的跨国发展战略，旨在通过陆路和海上通道促进中国与欧亚国家之间的贸易。解放军还时不时地与印度和越南产生边境摩擦，以及与中国南海周边国家发生海上冲突。而在东方，中国必须与一个拥有核能力的朝鲜进行斗争，后者的领导层与中国的政治对手是一致的。

The need for modern tactics and joint operations was firmly impressed upon the commanders who participated in or observed the training exercises in Zhurihe. Previously, training exercises were formulaic affairs that usually ended up with friendly Red teams defeating Blue teams made up of rotated units. Xi, however, required a professional OPFOR to test the combat effectiveness of PLA units more rigorously. So the 195th mechanized infantry brigade under commander Xia Minglong underwent reorganization between 2013 and April 2014 to serve as a dedicated Blue team. State media hinted that the “foreign combat doctrine” embraced by the Blue team was similar to that of the U.S. military, and its organization should more closely resemble a U.S. combat brigade.

参加或观察在朱日和的训练演习的指挥官们对现代战术和联合作战的必要性印象深刻。之前的训练是公式化的，通常是由友好的红军击败由轮换的部队组成的蓝军。然而，中国需要一个专业的假想敌部队（OPFOR）来更严格地测试解放军的作战效能。因此，在2013年至2014年4月期间，Xia Minglong领导的195机械化步兵旅进行了重组，作为一个专门的蓝军部队。官方媒体暗示，蓝军部队所奉行的“外国作战原则”与美国军方类似，它的组织应该更像美国的战斗部队。

A typical training exercise at Zhurihe would see the Blue team launch nuclear strikes, carpet bombing runs, and electronic attacks against the attacking Red force, as well as conduct nightly raids. Special forces tactics were also utilized — Blue team troops impersonating local government representatives delivering goodwill provisions to a Red team force successfully met with and captured their commander. While the Blue team was equipped with outdated Type 59 main battle tanks and Type 63 armored troop carriers, it is likely that they were simulated as M1 Abrams and Bradley Fighting Vehicles using multiple integrated laser engagement systems. Lastly, the Blue team usually emerged overwhelmingly victorious as both a defender or aggressor force.

在朱日和的一场典型的训练演习中，蓝军将发动核打击、地毯式轰炸，对攻击的红军部队发起电子攻击，以及进行夜间突袭。特种部队的战术也被利用上了——蓝军小队的士兵扮演当地政府代表，向一支红军部队提供善意的帮助，并成功地俘获了他们的指挥官。虽然蓝军装备了过时的59型主战坦克和63装甲运兵车，但很可能他们被模拟为M1-艾布拉姆斯主战坦克和布莱德利战车，使用多重集成激光作战系统。最后，不管是作为防守还是进攻的力量，蓝军通常取得压倒性的胜利。


The sobering performance of the various PLA units at Zhurihe seemed to be sufficient for Xi to convince the top PLA brass to adopt deep reforms for the military to stay relevant. The reforms that have been rolled out thus far appear to largely take reference from the United States:

从朱日和看，中国人民解放军各部队的表现令人警醒，足以让中国主席说服中国人民解放军高层，对军队进行深入的改革，以保持军事实力。到目前为止，已经推出的改革似乎很大程度上借鉴了美国：

The Central Military Commission (CMC) was reorganized to accommodate a permanent joint command and control structure. This is reflected in the abolishing of the four General Departments and the creation of 15 new departments, as well as inclusion of top naval and air force generals in the CMC of the 19th Central Committee.

中央军事委员会(CMC) 被重组以适应长期的联合指挥和控制机构。这反映在废除四个一般部门和设立15个新的部门，以及在第十九届中央委员会，中央军事委员会加入了海军和空军的高级将领。

The chain of command was separated into an operational chain and an administrative chain. For instance, the new military theaters oversee combat preparations, while the service branch headquarters see that the various units are organized, trained, and equipped for missions.

命令链被分成了一个操作链和一个管理链。例如，新的军事战区负责监督作战准备工作，而总部则负责组织、训练和装备等各种任务。

The PLA is now organized around brigade combat teams as opposed to divisions.

中国人民解放军现在是由旅级战斗队组成。

China’s new civilian-military integration program is geared toward the development of a military-industrial complex like the United States’

中国的新民用军事一体化计划旨在发展像美国这样的军事工业联合体。

On November 10, the CMC announced regulations governing the creation of a new civilian service.

11月10日，中央军委宣布了一项新的民用服务的管理条例。

On November 24, state media announced the piloting of a military professional education program.

11月24日，国家媒体宣布了一项军事专业教育计划的试点。

Operationally, the PLA may more closely resemble the U.S. military after reform, albeit with a Leninist dual command structure that allows the CCP to retain full control over the troops.

从操作上讲，中国人民解放军在改革后可能更像美国军队，尽管它采用了列宁主义的双重指挥结构，使中国能够完全控制军队。

China vs. The United States: The Gap
中国vs美国:差距

The PLA should become a modernized fighting force if Xi is successful in implementing his reforms, but it will unlikely surpass the U.S. military in a conventional skirmish.

如果中国能够成功实施他的改革，那么中国人民解放军应该成为一个现代化的战斗力量，但它不太可能在一场常规的战斗中超越美国军队。

Every year, America spends 3.3 percent of its GDP (about $611 billion in 2016) to develop and maintain a military force that is widely regarded as the strongest in the world. In terms of equipment, the U.S. military has 10 aircraft carriers, combat-proven vehicles like the M1 Abrams tank and the Apache helicopter, next-generation fighter jets like the F-35, advanced military communications satellites, and about 6,800 nuclear warheads. There are about 1.3 million active-duty personnel, of which under 200,000 are deployed overseas. Training standards and professionalism are high, and U.S. troops have participated in conflicts around the world since World War II.

每年，美国花费其GDP的3.3%(2016年大约为6110亿美元)来发展和维持一个被广泛认为是世界上最强大的军事力量。在装备方面，美国军方有10艘航空母舰，有实战经验的车辆，如M1艾布拉姆坦克和阿帕奇直升机，下一代战斗机，如F - 35，先进军事通信卫星，约6800枚核弹头。有大约130万现役人员，其中20 000人部署在海外。训练标准和专业水平很高，美国军队自二战以来就参与了世界各地的冲突

In contrast, China spends just 1.9 percent of its GDP (about $216 billion in 2016) on its military. China’s defense ministry acknowledges a “definite gap” between the PLA’s military technology and that of other developed countries. For instance, China’s maiden aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, is a refurbished Soviet-era steam turbine vessel, while the PLA’s next-generation fighter jet, the J-31, lacks an advanced engine to fly at the supersonic speeds of an F-35. The Type 99 is a modern main battle tank, but it hasn’t been combat-tested. And except for a handful of senior commanders who fought in China’s disastrous war against Vietnam in 1979, most of the PLA’s 2 million-strong military is lacking in combat experience. Worse, the PLA has to overcome a severe professionalism problem: Under Jiang Zemin’s era of dominance (1997-2012), senior military officials had to bribe their way up the ranks, training exercises were routine and conducted for show and profit, and the military had a problem with binge drinking.

相比之下，中国军费开支仅占GDP的1.9%(2016年约为2160亿美元)。中国国防部承认，解放军的军事技术与其他发达国家之间存在“明显的差距”。举例来说，中国的首艘航空母舰辽宁号是一艘翻新的苏联时代的蒸汽涡轮船，而中国人民解放军的下一代战斗机歼-31却缺乏先进的发动机以超音速的速度飞行。99型是一款现代化的主战坦克，但它还没有经过实战考验。在1979年中国对越南的灾难性战争中，除了少数几位高级指挥官外，中国人民解放军两百多万军队中的大多数都缺乏作战经验。更糟糕的是，中国人民解放军必须克服一个严重的专业性问题：在******时期(1997 - 2012)，高级军官必须通过贿禄来提高军衔，训练演习是例行公事，而且是为了表演和获利，而军队也有酗酒的问题。

Bypassing the Gap

绕过差距

To match or even surpass the United States, the modernized PLA will resort to the unconventional means that it has already been experimenting with in recent years.

为了达到甚至超过美国，现代化的中国人民解放军将采取非传统的方式，这意味着它已经在最近几年进行了试验。

In his bestselling book The Hundred-Year Marathon, Pentagon consultant Michael Pillsbury described simulated war games between the American military and the PLA where the Chinese side “was the victor” whenever it “employed Assassin’s Mace methods.” Assassin’s Mace, or shashoujian, are weaponry that the PLA has developed to cripple or bypass technologically superior militaries. Such weaponry includes anti-satellite and anti-aircraft carrier missiles, high-powered microwave and electromagnetic pulse weapons, and radar jammers. Because Assassin’s Mace weapons are far cheaper than carriers or next-generation fighter jets, they are a cost-effective way for the PLA to gain an advantage over more powerful militaries that rely on satellites, networks, and the internet for communications.

五角大楼顾问迈克尔·皮尔斯伯里在他的畅销书《百年马拉松》中，描述了美国军队和解放军之间的模拟战争游戏，每当“使用刺客手段”时，中国“是胜利者”。“刺客手段“或者说”“杀手锏”是中国人民解放军为削弱或绕过技术上的先进军队而研制的武器。这类武器包括反卫星和防空导弹、高能微波和电磁脉冲武器和雷达干扰器。因为杀手锏武器比航空母舰或下一代战斗机便宜得多，所以它们是PLA的一种划算的方式，可以在与依靠卫星、网络和互联网进行通信的更强大的军队对抗中获得优势。

Getting China-manufactured components into the high-tech military hardware of other countries is another way that the PLA can gain an edge. Microchips made in China are known to be counterfeit in some cases or actual spyware in others. In 2010, the U.S. Navy found that it had bought 59,000 fake computer microchips from China. These chips were meant for use in missiles, fighter planes, warships, and other equipment. Reuters reported in 2014 that the Pentagon had approved the use of Chinese magnets in the construction of the F-35’s sensitive hardware. In the best case scenario, the made-in-China parts work as advertised and no harm is done. In the worst case scenario, the Chinese parts could cause catastrophic system failure or serve as surveillance devices for the PLA.

将中国制造的零部件投入到其他国家的高科技军事装备，是解放军获得优势的另一种方式。在中国制造的微晶片在某些情况下被认为是伪造的，或者在其他的情况下是真正的间谍软件。2010年，美国海军发现，它从中国购买了59,000个假电脑芯片。这些芯片用于导弹、战斗机、军舰和其他设备。路透社(Reuters)在2014年报道称，五角大楼已批准在F - 35的敏感硬件建设中使用中国磁铁。在最好的情况下，中国制造的部件就像宣传的那样，没有危害。在最坏的情况下，中国部件可能会导致灾难性的系统故障，或者成为解放军的监视设备。

Perhaps more disturbing is what the PLA could potentially develop. Stuart Russell, an artificial intelligence scientist at the University of California in Berkeley, released a short film on November 13 which highlighted the devastating capabilities of fictional autonomous “slaughter bots” — using tiny weaponized AI drones, malicious figures eliminate politicians and activists in broad daylight. Russell’s vision of the future is stark, but China could make it a reality. Presently, China is at the forefront of drone manufacturing and has a sizable slice of the civilian drone market (Dajiang Innovation alone has 70 percent of the global market share). Meanwhile, Beijing plans to spend $100 billion to grow its semiconductor industry under a Made in China 2025 program. It is not inconceivable that the PLA could eventually develop advanced AI-powered drones and put them to use, even if their ethical use becomes a concern. The CCP has proven that it has no scruples about crushing “anti-revolutionaries” (political opponents, students at Tiananmen, ethnic minorities, and religious groups), and its military will likewise pursue asymmetrical hybrid warfare tactics to achieve its ends against external foes.

也许更令人不安的是中国人民解放军的发展潜力。加州大学伯克利分校的人工智能科学家斯图尔特拉塞尔在11月13日发布了一段短片，强调了虚构的自动“屠杀机器人”的毁灭性能力——使用小型武器的人工智能无人机，恶意人物在光天化日之下消灭了政客和活动人士。拉塞尔对未来的展望是严峻的，但中国可以让它成为现实。目前，中国处于无人机制造的最前沿，拥有相当大的民用无人机市场份额(仅大疆就占全球市场份额的70%)。与此同时，中国政府计划斥资1000亿美元，在“中国制造2025”的基础上发展半导体产业。中国人民解放军最终能够研制出先进的人工智能无人机并加以利用，这并不令人难以置信，即使他们的伦理使用成为了一种担忧。中国已经证明，它对镇压“反革命”(政治对手、天X门事件、少数民族和宗教团体)毫无顾忌，其军队也将采取不对称的混合作战策略，以达到对抗外部敌人的目的。

Finally, the PLA is a legitimate cybersecurity threat. In recent years, PLA cyber units have successfully breached the networks of U.S. businesses, infrastructure companies, and the government. In May 2014, the U.S. Justice Department announced indictments against five members of the former General Staff Department’s Unit 61398 for hacking Westinghouse Electric, the United States Steel Corporation, and other companies. Chinese hackers backed by the state also allegedly breached the computer system of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, compromising the private data of its 4 million current and former government employees. Militaries that rely on cyber networks for communications may find their operations severely hampered in a conflict with the PLA.

最后，解放军是一个合法的网络安全威胁。近年来，中国人民解放军网络部队成功地突破了美国企业、基础设施公司和政府的网络。2014年5月，美国司法部(U.S. Justice Department)宣布起诉前总参谋部(General Staff)61398号部门的5名成员，指控他们侵入西屋电气(Westinghouse Electric)、美国钢铁公司(United States Steel Corporation)和其他公司。被政府支持的中国黑客据称还侵入了美国人事管理办公室的计算机系统，泄露了400万现任和前政府雇员的私人数据。依靠网络进行通信的军队可能会发现他们的行动在与解放军的冲突中受到严重阻碍。

This year, four U.S. Navy vessels were involved in collisions in the East China Sea. Internal investigations indicated that crew negligence was to blame. But the particularly severe collisions of destroyers USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain with commercial ships, as well as the frequency and close timing of the accidents, have led government investigators and technology experts to consider the possibility of the warships being targeted by cyber attacks. If cyber sabotage is indeed a reason for the collisions, then the PLA is suspect.

今年，四艘美国海军舰艇涉及了中国东海的撞击事件。内部调查显示，船员疏忽是罪魁祸首。但是，美国菲茨杰拉德公司(USS Fitzgerald)和约翰·s·麦凯恩号(USS John s. McCain)号驱逐舰与商业船只发生的特别严重的碰撞，以及事故发生的频率和时间，已经让政府调查人员和技术专家考虑到军舰可能遭到网络攻击的可能性。如果网络破坏确实是碰撞的原因，那么中国人民解放军是非常可疑的。

Conclusion

结论

Xi Jinping’s military reforms appear to draw inspiration from the U.S. military, and serve the dual purpose of modernizing the PLA and consolidating his control over the CCP. A modernized PLA will unlikely surpass the United States in a conventional engagement, but the outcome will scale toward the PLA if it uses unconventional tactics and weapons. In this scenario, the PLA is set to become the largest “American” military force to pose a threat to the U.S.

中国的军事改革似乎从美国军队中汲取了灵感，实现了中国人民解放军现代化，巩固了他对中国控制的双重目标。一个现代化的解放军不可能在常规交战中超过美国，但如果使用非常规战术和武器，其结果将会出人意料。在这种情况下，中国人民解放军将成为最大的“美国化”军事力量，对美国构成威胁。