美国做了什么来阻止中国成为超级大国? [美国媒体]

quora网友:首先,我不太喜欢超级大国这个术语。没有谁是真正的超级大国,谁是超级大国谁又不是的说法是相当主观和随意的。成为一个超级大国无助于解决任何问题,不是超级大国也不会有任何不同。让我们以“全球重要的力量”代替这个术语吧。这要看你问的是谁了。如果你问的是美国人......

What is the U.S.A. doing to prevent China from becoming a superpower?

美国做了什么来阻止中国成为超级大国?




Ben Kelley, Strong interest in geopolitics and defence
Firstly I don’t really like the superpower term. No one is really a superpower, its fairly arbitrary what is a superpower and what is not. Being one doesn’t solve anyone's problems and not being one doesn’t make a lick of difference. Lets just say it means globally significant power.
Depends who you ask. If you ask America, they will say they are doing everything in their power to help China integrate into the international community and help them economically and trying very hard to get along with them. Its true (kind of), the US is China’s biggest trading partner nation (excluding the EU for a second as its not a nation).
If you ask the Chinese they will say on so many issues, South China Sea, trade, military capability, diplomatically the US is trying to subvert China. The US is playing military hardball with China, as its surrounded by US bases and allies and US war machinery. That is true too, from their perspective.
There is actually a big chuck of stuff China and the US are very happy to talk about. Bring up trade and both countries smile, giggle, high five and have a very productive chat followed by a big banquet, both leaders will sing each others praises and part smiling, best friends. That is genuine, both countries come out winners, a bigger global economy is going to facilitate growth in both countries, more jobs, more stuff, more wealth.
Bring up the South China Sea and you end up with two leaders leaving saying they are preparing for war, kicking over podiums and thumping desks (slight exaggeration, but it is heated and there is a passionate response on a human level from both sides). That is real too, it is entirely possible that will escalate into a hot war.
If the US and China only ever talked about trade, Europe, growth, prosperity, peace, UN, then you would think these countries are actually good friends.
When the US and China talk about Australia, South Korea, there are many things both sides can benefit, these countries are kind of useful middle powers who are helpful and useful to both. There are a heck of a lot of things that both China and these other nations agree on. China has been a big boost for them economically. These countries are probably going to help unlock a lot of the world for China, supply China with key things they need and are key US allies that if they can get along with them, then the US is likely not to have major dramas with China. These little countries can be happy little buffer zones where both sides relax and do business.
Japan is more difficult because China really doesn’t like Japan, and Japan really doesn’t like China. They fall along the lines of natural enemies more than natural friends. But even then, its in everyone’s interests if they can get along. There are actually few no go issues with Japan, if everyone keeps away from them, then Japan could be like S.Korea and Australia and be a gateway for them (as it already is) being an important part of the global supply and delivery chain. China no doubt holds the key to unlocking Japans faltering economy and slow growth, and Japan is no doubt is very key to China’s further ascension globally.
Thailand has in recent times turned more to China than to the US, while that possibly annoys the US, its unlikely to cause a big problem and the US can probably live with that depending on how that ends up and if good US relations are kept . There are other countries in that sort of mix, Pakistan is another. However, if China is good and helpful and these countries become prosperous then everyone is a winner. US would certainly welcome a Pakistan that had law and order and peace and is industrialising, it may be China can do that better than the US .
Even North Korea is an area where pretty much China and the US agree. Mostly because South Korea is a sensible country run by sensible people. If the two were to reunite, China isn’t likely to have an issue with that like it did back in the 1950’s.
As China grows, its finding the US is everywhere. However, the US is everywhere anyway and is not really a response to China, the US is like a gas it will just fill a void until evenly distributed.
If the China sees itself unseating the US, then this is a big problem. This is really what the SCS issues are about. The US isn’t giving up its position. While China has grown economically and diplomatically, its military really isn’t a match for the US military. China fighting the US would be bad for both countries, but really bad for China. The US is a military machine, literally, it is powered by its military industrial complex. The US is as far as you can take a democracy down the military path and still be a democracy. The competition against the USSR has warped the US economy in a way that is unlikely to be changed. China could be double the size of the US economically, but would still not be a match for them in a military sense. The US spends many times what China spends on equipment. If China wants to unseat the US as the number one military power (in anyway, including the area around the SCS) then things are going to get very ugly. The US will not budge on that point. Ever. Do not go there.
So that is the friction. The US can’t and is not containing China. China is not the USSR. Can China become an economic Superpower? Sure. We all want to get rich and be happy and there is much agreement about those core things. There are many points where both powers see much positive outcomes for themselves and other nations.
In military terms, there is nothing wrong with China having a large and capable military force that can look after China’s interests. I think a great example of where this can be useful is the Sudan. A country where China just?increased?it UN force by 8,000 and people will see that as a positive move, globally. China is a can do country, that has its own resources, in a world full of countries that struggle to manage themselves.
They don’t have to be enemies. They could be like the US and France. Two different world views, but on the whole able to work together (abit suspeciously).
There are plenty of countries where the US is unlikely ever to help solve completely and would welcome with open arms and a hug any Chinese attempt to improve order. These type of things would be thing China can bring to the table and improve not just China’s relationship with the US but China’s global standing. You can put together a list of a dozen countries the US and China and other can probably work together to improve the quality of life for hundreds of millions of people. The Sudan is one of those and its happening right now.
Just don’t try to fight the USA.

首先,我不太喜欢超级大国这个术语。没有谁是真正的超级大国,谁是超级大国谁又不是的说法是相当主观和随意的。成为一个超级大国无助于解决任何问题,不是超级大国也不会有任何不同。让我们以“全球重要的力量”代替这个术语吧。
这要看你问的是谁了。如果你问的是美国人,他们会说他们正在尽全力帮助中国融入国际社会,并在经济上帮助他们,努力与他们相处。这种说法没错(某种程度上),美国是中国最大的贸易伙伴国(暂时不包括欧盟,因为它不是一个国家)。
如果你问的是中国人,他们会例举很多问题,比如在南海、贸易、军事能力以及外交上美国都正试图颠覆中国。美国对中国采取军事强硬态度,因为它被美国的基地和盟友以及美国的战争机器包围。从中国人的角度来看,这也是事实。

事实上,中国和美国都很乐意进行大量的交流。
提起贸易,两国都相谈甚欢,然后举行了一场盛大的宴会,双方领导人微笑着互相赞颂,仿佛最好的朋友。这是真的,两国都是赢家,一个更大的全球经济将促进两国的增长,带来更多的就业机会、更多的商品、更多的财富。
提起南中国海,你会发现两位领导人都在踢着椅子和敲着桌子说他们在准备战争(虽然有点夸张,但双方的情绪确实很激烈)。这也是真的,完全有可能升级为一场热战。

如果美中两国之间只谈贸易、欧洲、增长、繁荣、和平、联合国,那么你会认为这两个国家实际上是好朋友。中美两国在谈到澳大利亚、韩国时,双方都可以从中受益,这些国家都是有用的中间大国,对双方都有帮助和用处。中国和其他国家实际上有很多事情是相似的。中国在经济上对他们起到了很大的推动作用。这些国家可能会帮助中国打开世界的大门,向中国和美国关键的盟友提供他们需要的关键的东西,如果他们之间能够相处的好的话,那么,美国很可能不会与中国上演重大闹剧。那些小国家可以高兴地成为两国放松并且做生意的小缓冲区。

这对日本来说有点难,因为中国真的不喜欢日本,日本也真的不喜欢中国。他们俩相比于天生的朋友更倾向于是天生的敌人。但即便如此,如果他们能好好相处,也符合每个人的利益。其实日本没有什么问题,如果大家(中美)都离他们远一点的话,那么日本就可以像韩国和澳大利亚一样成为他们的门户(已经是这样了),成为全球供应和交货链的重要组成部分。中国无疑是打开日本经济低迷和增长放缓的钥匙,日本也无疑是中国进一步崛起的关键。
泰国最近更多地转向中国而不是美国,虽然这可能会惹恼美国,但不太可能造成大问题,美国可能会接受这一点,这取决于结果如何,以及能否和美国保持良好的关系。还有其他国家也有点像这样,巴基斯坦是另一个这样的国家。然而,如果中国是好的、有帮助的,能使得这些国家变得繁荣,那么每个人都是赢家。美国肯定会欢迎一个拥有法律、秩序与和平、正在工业化的巴基斯坦,也许中国能比美国做得更好。
就连朝鲜也是中美两国都能做出协议的一个领域。主要是因为韩国是一个明智的国家,由明智的人管理。如果两国重聚,中国不太可能像上世纪50年代那样对此产生异议。

随着中国的发展,它会发现到处都是美国的身影。然而,就算到处都是美国的影子,这实际上也不是真正的针对中国,美国就像一个气体,它只会填满每一个空洞,直到均匀分布。
如果中国认为自己已经将美国赶下了台,那么这会是一个大问题。这才是南海问题的所在。美国不会放弃自己的立场。尽管中国在经济和外交上都取得了发展,但中国的军事实力与美国的军事实力并不匹配。中国对抗美国对两国都不利,但实际上对中国最不利。美国是一个军事机器,从字面上讲,它是由其军事工业综合体提供动力的。美国是你能把民主带到军事道路上的最大限度,但仍然是民主国家的国家。与苏联的竞争在某种程度上扭曲了美国的经济,而这种情况不太可能改变。中国的经济规模可能会达到美国的两倍,但在军事意义上仍无法与美国匹敌。如果中国想取代美国成为头号军事强国(在任何意义上,包括南海附近区域),那么事情会变得非常糟糕。在这一点上,美国不会让步。永远不会。不要触碰这一点。
所以就产生了摩擦。美国无法、也没有在遏制中国。中国不是苏联。中国能成为一个经济超级大国吗?当然。我们都想变得富有和快乐,并且在这些核心问题上有很多共识。在许多方面,这两个大国都看到了自己和其他国家的积极成果。

在军事方面,中国拥有一支能够照顾中国利益的强大和有能力的军事力量,这是没有问题的。我认为苏丹就是一个很好的例子。中国刚刚又为联合国增加了8000的兵力,在全球范围内人们会认为这是一个积极的举动。中国可以做一个在一个充满自我管理的国家的世界里拥有自己的资源的国家。
他们不必成为(美国的)敌人。他们可以和美国形成美国和法国那样的关系。虽然有着两种不同的世界观,但总的来说还是可以一起工作(存在一点疑虑)。
有很多国家,美国不能协助他们完全解决他们的问题,但美国会张开双臂,拥抱任何中国改善秩序的尝试。这类事情将是中国可以带来的不仅可以改善中国与美国的关系,还可以改善中国的全球地位的东西。你可以列出一打国家的名单,这些国家的数亿人口可以在中美两国的合作下提高他们的生活水平。苏丹就是其中之一,它现在正在发生。
只是不要尝试和美国对抗。

Robert Garmong, I've lived here for 7 years, speak decent Chinese, and read incessantly about it
The question is a rather oversimplified one, because neither the US nor China thinks of itself in those purely competitive terms.
First of all, the phrase "as powerful as..." is extremely vague. "Powerful" can refer to military power, or economic prowess, or cultural influence over average people around the world, or diplomatic influence, and probably lots of other elements. Nor is it a simple equation in any one of those spheres: the US may have more military power overall than Vietnam, but who won the war there?
Secondly, the US and China are not enemies. We are adversaries, but that's not the same thing. During the Cold War, it was very important for the US and the USSR to compete with each other directly for power in every possible sphere. But the US and China are not existential threats to each other, and so they do not have to think of each other in those terms.
There is something common to both the US and China — a mixture of na?veté and maturity — that makes this kind of "who is more powerful" comparison rather alien to both national characters.
Both the US and China see themselves in rather insular terms. China is "The Middle Kingdom." The US is "A City on a Hill" and "The Land of the Free." Each is self-absorbed. Each tends to ignore the perspectives of the rest of the world. Each thinks its own position is self-evidently correct, and wonders why anyone could possibly disagree. This is their naiveté.
Note that this is very different from the way many other countries see themselves. Other countries may fight passionately, and sometimes militarily, but they don't see themselves as bathed in righteousness the way Americans and Chinese do. If you put one of their statesmen under some sort of truth serum and asked him, "If you were suddenly wearing the uniform of the other side, what would you do," they would tell you "I would fight just as vehemently for them." If you asked the same question of an American or a Chinese leader, they would literally be unable to answer the question. They cannot see that there is another side to any issue, even when there is.
Both the US and China primarily care about whatever it is that they see as being in their interest. They don't fundamentally care who is more "powerful." They care about getting their own way, about pursuing their own interests around the world, but that's different.
And here's where their naiveté becomes maturity: neither one of them is particularly absorbed in that schoolyard bullying about who could beat up whom. Unlike some other countries (Russia?), neither America nor China sees "power" as an end in itself. They're focused on their interests, and of course one has to have the means to pursue one's interests. But if America's interests — or what it?believes?are its interests — are not threatened by China, America doesn't care who is "more powerful." It's mostly the same for the Chinese.
(Caveat: the Chinese are somewhat more focused on "power," because of their cultural emphasis on "face" — and because of the past century and a half of humiliating powerlessness. But still, the Chinese are far more focused on achieving their specific interests, than on having more "power" than any particular country.)
The question of "power" really only arises because of the often very deep disagreements about what is in our interests. China is a dictatorship, while the US still (mostly) believes in basic rights. China believes its territorial claims are automatically valid, while the US has doubts. China is afraid that America's allies will form a kind of sea wall around it, cutting off maritime routes. China is a mercantilist country that seeks to protect domestic enterprises from overseas competition, while the US is still (mostly) committed to (mostly-)free trade. These disagreements give rise to conflicts.
Of course, there are elements within each country that are indeed focused on the one-on-one comparison. There are the nationalist citizens who seek to gain reflected glory from their country's power. And of course there are national-security professionals whose job it is to prepare for worst-case conflicts. The latter class in each country should, as the saying goes, "hope for the best, but prepare for the worst."
But in terms of the average person?or?the government in America — which is what this question asked about — they don't fundamentally care if China is "more powerful" than the United States.
Nor, fundamentally, do the Chinese. They want to ensure that their lives are improving, first and foremost. They want to ensure that they never again endure the kind of national humiliation that they've endured in the past. But do they fundamentally care if America is "more powerful" than China? As long as America keeps its nose out of what they see as their own business, they really don't.

这个问题过于简单化了,因为无论是美国还是中国,都不以纯粹的竞争这个术语来看待自己。
首先,“像...一样强大”这个短语非常模糊。“强大”指的是军事力量、经济实力、对世界各地普通民众的文化影响力、外交影响力,以及许多其他因素。在上述的任何一个领域,这也不是一个简单的等式:美国的军事实力比越南更强大,但在那里谁赢得了战争?

第二,美国和中国不是敌人。我们是对手,但和敌人不是同一回事。冷战期间,美国和苏联在各个可能的领域直接竞争该领域的领导权是非常重要的。但美国和中国之间互不不存在对对方的威胁,因此他们不必用这些术语来考虑彼此。

中美两国都有共同之处--即既天真又成熟--这使得这种“谁更强大”的比较,与这两个民族的性格大相径庭。
中美两国都习惯用相当孤立的术语来描述自己。中国称自己为“中央王国”。美国则自称是“一座孤峰上的城市”和“自由之地”。双方都是自恋的。双方都倾向于忽视世界其他地方的观点。双方都认为自己的立场是不言而喻的正确的,并疑惑为什么任何其他人可能会不同意他的观点。这就是他们的天真。

请注意,这与其他许多国家对自己的看法大相径庭。其他国家之间可能会激烈地战斗,有时甚至是军事上的斗争,但是,他们并不会像美国人和中国人那样,把自己看成是沐浴在正义中的人。如果你给他们的一位政治家打一种能使人吐露实情的麻醉药,然后问他:“如果你突然穿了另一边(竞争对手)的制服,你会怎么做?”他们会对你说:“我会为他们拼命战斗。”如果你以同一问题问美国或者中国领导人,他们根本无法回答这个问题。他们看不到任何问题都存在另一面,即使这一面真实存在。

美国和中国都主要只关心他们认为符合自己利益的事情。他们根本不在乎谁更“强大”。他们关心的是自己的道路以及在世界各地追求自己的利益,但两者是不同的。

而这就是他们从天真变为成熟的地方:他们中的任何一个都没有特别专注于在校园欺凌中谁可以打败谁。不像其他一些国家(俄罗斯?),无论是美国还是中国,都不认为“强权”本身就是目的。他们专注于自己的利益,当然,一个人必须拥有追求自己利益的手段。但是,如果美国的利益--或者它认为是它的利益--没有受到中国的威胁,那么美国不在乎谁“更强大”。对中国人来说也是一样的。

(注意:中国人相比美国更关注“权力”,因为他们的文化侧重于“面子” - 也因为过去一个半世纪的耻辱和无能为力。但是,中国人更注重实现他们的特定利益,而不是比任何特定国家拥有更多的“权力”。)
“权力”的问题之所以真正产生,是因为人们对什么是符合我们利益的问题常常存在着非常深的分歧。中国是一个毒菜国家,而美国(大部分)仍然相信基本权利。中国认为自己的领土主张自动有效的,而美国则持怀疑态度。中国担心美国的盟友会在其周围形成一堵海堤,切断中国海上的航线。中国是一个重商主义国家,寻求保护国内企业不受海外竞争的影响,而美国仍(主要)致力于(主要是)自由贸易。这些分歧引发了冲突。

当然,每个国家内部确实都有一些因素把注意力集中在两国各个领域一对一的比较上。有些民族主义公民试图从国家的权力中获得反映出来的荣耀。当然,也有一些国家安全专业人士的工作是为最坏的冲突做准备。正如俗话说的那样,每个国家的后一类人都应该“抱着最好的希望,但要做好最坏的打算。”

但就美国的普通民众或政府而言--这正是这个问题所问的--他们根本不在乎中国是否比美国“更强大”。
从根本上说,中国人也是如此。他们首先要确保他们的生活得到改善。他们希望确保再也不需要忍受像过去所遭受的那种国家耻辱。但他们是否根本关心美国是否比中国“更强大”?只要美国不插手他们认为是自己的事情,他们就真的不在乎。

Robert Maxwell
Nothing. China is doing it all by her lonesome.
China’s line appears to be that the United States is maintaining power by poisoning everyone against China with insidious propaganda, bribes, and military threats. The United States, so they say, has turned everyone against China. That might satisfy Chinese who have difficulty figuring out why China’s economic power hasn’t translated into political influence and dominance, but it doesn’t ring true in the real world. Not to put too fine a point on it, but “they don’t like me because you poisoned their minds!” reads more like an irresponsible high school girl that can’t own up to her failures more than it does a responsible member of the international community.
Contrary to popular belief, sheer power - economic or military - does not a superpower make. Prospective superpowers?also?require a friendly international support system and allies who are willing to assist or at least countenance its rise. They require the means to develop and exert their influence at an international level, a fact which requires some reservoir of good will from the nations most impacted by the rise - or at least some need.
China has failed to develop that. East Asian nations - who stand to be affected most by China’s rise - have learned that. In 2015, the?Pew Research Center reported?that 61% of South Koreans, 54% of Filipinos, 19% of Vietnamese, and only 9% of Japanese view China favorably.?According to the same report, 78% of South Koreans, 91% of Filipinos, and 83% of Vietnamese and Chinese polled viewed territorial disputes with China as worthy of concern. Keep in mind that these findings were reported before South Korea asked the U.S. to deploy THAAD (and China’s subsequent protests), and before UNCLOS’s findings with regard to the Scarborough Shoal (which China unilaterally dismissed), as well as any number of other incidents.
The reply to that might be that China is in the right in all of those things. That’s fine - but it’s not my point. China might well be right, but in so aggressively pursuing those claims China is alienating its neighbors. China is geographically isolated and potential, essential allies along the Pacific Rim, allies which China seems unwilling to cultivate, are the very same nations that China is picking fights with. In order to challenge the status quo and replace a regional (or even global) hegemon, you have to convince the nations that would be most affected by your rise that your leadership will be better for them than the status quo. As much as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam might criticize American hegemony in the region, China’s behavior offers little evidence that their leadership will benefit them more. China appears to have little to offer those nations aside from trade - something they already enjoy under an American aegis, along with autonomy and a general respect for democratic institutions that nations such as Japan, Korea, and the Philippines appreciate. What reason is there to think that a Chinese dominion will be more benign or more politically palatable?
None of this is helped by the confusion many Chinese face as to why their economic growth hasn’t automatically translated into political power. See, for instance, the number of questions in Quora asking why Australia remains an American ally even though her largest trading partner, by far, is China.
But China doesn’t seem to care. Its rhetoric is built around China regaining hegemonic power as a historic right that has been temporarily deferred by a shameful period of weakness. China was such in the past and will be in the future, the line goes. Opposition and disagreement with China’s positions elicit a storm of shrill criticism - and even threats - from the Chinese government. It’s a narrative designed to appeal to the domestic line of palingenetic ultranationalism that preaches a rebirth of Chinese glory and strength in opposition against those who would keep it weak - against internal traitors and external enemies who cannot countenance China taking what’s theirs. But this sort of revanchist, revisionist rhetoric is something that most of the world learned to be suspicious of in the first half of the 20th century, and it’s part of the reason why China is being looked at with suspicion.
Contrary to popular opinion, the vast majority of the institutional bases of American international influence and power originate with the consent and even active invitation of other nations. NATO was not founded by the United States, but by European nations that sought to?keep?the U.S. involved in Europe - in the words of Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first General Secretary, NATO’s purpose was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The Bretton Woods system that gave birth to the World Bank and the IMF - now characterized as an arm of American power - was developed by a conference including all 44 Allied nations. These institutions and others became the bedrock of American soft power, but they were originally created as part of an international system developed with the consent of other nations.
China has either no ability nor interest to do such a thing. For China to become a superpower, it would have to present an attractive, alternate international system that other nations would prefer to be a part of. The closest thing is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but that’s far from a new global order and is centered on a tenuous quasi-alliance between Russia and China whose main mutual attraction is opposition to the United States.
If China is to become a superpower, she’d have to begin immediately repairing relationships with neighboring states - including, if necessary, dropping territorial claims - and convincing neighboring countries that Chinese hegemony will be more benign, beneficial, and just than an American hegemony. She’d have to put forward an alternative international system centered on China and organized such that potential members will gain significant benefits - politically, economically, and in terms of security - over being members of America’s order. But she’s more concerned with playing to nationalist domestic opinion and, in doing so, is driving more nations into the U.S.’s arms and making her own rise more difficult.

美国什么也没做。但中国正在通过孤立自己来达到这一目的。
中国的路线似乎是:美国正在通过阴险的宣传贿赂和军事威胁来毒害所有人,让他们来反对中国,以此保持自己在全球的权力。因此他们说,美国已经使每个人都来反对中国。这可能会让中国人感到满意,因为他们很难弄清楚为什么中国的经济实力没有转化为政治影响力和统治地位,但在现实世界中真相却不是这样。说的可能不太贴切,但“他们不喜欢我,都是因为你洗了他们的脑!”读起来更像是一个不能承认自己的失败的不负责任的高中女生,而不是国际社会中一个负责任的成员。

与大众的看法相反,纯粹的经济或军事力量并不会造就一个超级大国。未来超级大国还需要一个友好的国际支持体系和愿意协助或至少支持其崛起的盟友。他们需要在国际层面上发展和发挥其影响力的手段,这一事实需要来自受崛起影响最大的国家的善意表达 - 或者至少有一些需求。

中国未能发展这一目标。东亚国家--它们将受到中国崛起的最大影响--已经知道了这一点。2015年,皮尤研究中心报告说,只有61%的韩国人,54%的菲律宾人,19%的越南人,9%的日本人对中国持好感。根据同一份报告,78%的韩国人,91%的菲律宾人,83%的越南人和中国人的被调查者认为与中国的领土争端值得关注。请记住,这些调查是在韩国要求美国部署萨德(以及中国随后的抗议活动)之前,以及在“海洋法公约”对斯卡伯勒浅滩(黄岩岛)(中国单方面予以驳回)的调查结果,以及任何其他事件发生之前发布的(言下之意是在这些事件之后这些数据会更低)。

对于这些事件的答复是,就算中国在所有这些事情上都是对的一方。那也毫无关系——这不是我的重点。中国很可能是对的,但在如此积极地追求这些主张的过程中,中国正在疏远其邻国。中国在地理上是孤立的,而中国似乎不愿培养在太平洋沿岸潜在的、重要的盟友,而是选择与之斗争。为了挑战现状,取代一个地区(甚至全球)霸主,你必须让那些受你的崛起影响最大的国家相信,你的领导能力会更好。而不是像现状一样。尽管日本、韩国、菲律宾和越南可能会批评美国在该地区的霸权,但中国的行为并没有提供证据表明,他们的领导地位会给他们带来更多好处。除了贸易之外,中国似乎没有什么可以为这些国家提供的--在美国的支持下,这些国家已经享受到了这种待遇,以及对日本、韩国和菲律宾等国所赞赏的民主制度的普遍尊重。有什么理由认为中国的统治将会是更良性的或者是在政治上更受欢迎的?

以上这些都有助于解决许多中国人都在问的为什么他们的经济增长没有自动转化为政治权力的疑惑。例如,在Quora中,有很多问题问澳大利亚为什么仍然是美国的盟友,尽管澳大利亚最大的贸易伙伴是中国。

但中国似乎并不在意。它的言论是围绕着中国应该重新获得霸权主义作为一项历史权利而建立的,而这一历史权利已经被一段可耻的软弱时期暂时推迟了。中国过去是这样,将来也是这样。反对和反对中国的立场引发了来自中国政府的尖锐批评--甚至威胁。这是一种旨在吸引国内极端民族主义的叙事,宣扬中国的荣耀和力量的复兴,反对那些会让中国变得软弱的人--即反对那些不能支持中国的内奸和外部敌人。但是,这种复仇主义的、修正主义的言论在第二十世纪上半叶就被世界上大多数人所怀疑,这也是人们对中国持怀疑态度的部分原因。

与大众的观点相反,美国国际影响力和权力的绝大多数制度基础都是在其他国家的同意甚至积极邀请下产生的。北约不是美国建立的,但是那些试图让美国继续参与欧洲事务的欧洲国家——用北约第一任秘书长黑斯廷斯·伊斯梅的话来说,北约的目的是“把俄国人拒之门外,把美国人邀请进来,把德国人的权重降低。”布雷顿森林体系诞生了世界银行和国际货币基金组织--现在被认为是美国权力的一个分支--是由一次包括所有44个盟国的会议发展起来的。这些机构和其他机构成为美国软实力的基石,但它们最初是作为在其他国家同意下发展起来的国际体系的一部分而创建的。

中国没有能力也没有兴趣去做这样的事。中国要想成为超级大国,就必须建立一个其他国家更愿意参与的具有吸引力的、可供选择的国际体系。最接近的是上海合作组织,但这远不是一个新的全球秩序,而是以俄罗斯和中国之间脆弱的准联盟为中心,而中俄之间的主要相互吸引力是反对美国。

如果中国要成为超级大国,她就必须立即开始修复与邻国的关系--如有必要,包括放弃领土主张--并说服邻国。认为中国霸权的国家将比美国霸权更良性、更有利、更简单。她将不得不提出一个以中国为中心的替代国际体系,并将其组织起来,使潜在成员能够获得重大的政治、经济和社会利益。结束成为美国秩序的一员。但她更关心的是玩弄民族主义的国内舆论,这样做会把更多的国家推向美国的怀抱,使她自己的崛起更加困难。

Tom Rutigliano
US policy has been to welcome the growth of China, but encourage it to join in international norms. The worry is not that China gets more powerful, but that it gets more powerful and doesn’t play nice with other countries.
Most of the conflicts that emerge between the U.S. and China come out along those lines. It doesn’t help that China internally often presents their policies as just taking back what’s “traditionally” theirs. 

美国的政策是欢迎中国的增长,并且鼓励中国加入国际秩序。人们担心的不是中国变得更强大,而是中国变得更强大,而且与其他国家的关系也不太好。
美国和中国之间出现的大多数的冲突都是沿着这些线。无济于事的是,中国内部经常提出他们的政策只是收回他们“传统”的东西。

Jinglei Wu, studied at British Literature
Just like Florian Huthmann said, China used to be a world powerful in the history. Why can't China take it back?
Every country has the right and freedom to develop, why do America wanna prevent the development of China?
If not the modernization of humiliation beginning with the opium in 1840 and the wrong route, principles and policies, e.g. the movement "great quantum leap " and the culture revolution, I believe China will be more powerful than today.
And like Joseph Boyle said, america has been doing everything to aim at China, but China still do not stop it's progress and are describing its new development blueprint today.
Although there are still many problems in China due to the economical development. Some of the problems were unavoidable, given the current stage of development, some resulted from a faulty understanding of development. But most of the problems happened in most of developed countries. China is still in the exploration stage of its development. Giving China an opportunity, tolerating the plight of China in today, China will be better tomorrow!

正如弗罗里安·胡思曼所说,中国历史上曾是一个强大的国家。中国为什么不能把曾经属于自己的东西拿回来?
每个国家都有发展的权利和自由,为什么美国要阻止中国的发展?
如果不是从1840年鸦片开始的耻辱和错误的路线,原则和政策,例如“大跃进”运动和文化革命,我相信中国将比今天更强大。

正如约瑟夫·博伊尔所说,美国一直在尽一切努力瞄准中国,但中国仍然没有停止它的进步以及描绘它的新的发展蓝图。
虽然由于经济的发展,中国仍然存在许多问题。鉴于目前的发展阶段,其中一些问题是不可避免的,有些问题是由于对发展的认识错误造成的。但是,大多数发达国家都存在着这样的问题。中国仍处于发展的探索阶段。给中国一个机会,容忍中国今天的困境,中国明天会更好!

Steve Staniek, Lifelong advocate for peace through non-violence.
Why should the US prevent China from becoming a superpower?
History shows that the world absolutely needs a balance of power. Look what happened when the USSR was deconstructed. As soon as the USSR broke down, the USA came out of the closet, and stepped up its aggressive war agenda as though all the rules of good conduct were gone. US corporate agents, Bush and Co., attacked innocent: Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan, overtly, and many other nations have been attacked covertly as the US uses corporate terrorism to advance its greedy control over Muslim people, lands, and resources.
Actually, a world survey shows that the rest of the unaligned world thinks the US is the biggest terrorist threat to world peace. Americans never get to see what the rest of the world thinks of them, because the American Patriot Press protects Americans against real news from the outside world that might conflict with the bogus official narrative used to keep Americans on a constant war footing. American war crimes have been sold to the American population as “rescue missions”, and Americans never get to see the results of the wars they pay TRILLIONS, to make against largely innocent families around the world. 

美国为什么要阻止中国成为超级大国?
历史表明,世界绝对需要权力的平衡。看看苏联解体后发生了什么。苏联一解体,美国就出柜了,加紧了其侵略性的战争议程,好像所有的良好行为准则都消失了一样。美国企业代理人布什公司攻击无辜:巴拿马,伊拉克和阿富汗,在美国利用公司恐怖主义推进对穆斯林人民、土地和资源的贪婪控制时,许多国家也遭到了美国公开的攻击。

事实上,一项世界调查显示,其他不结盟国家认为美国是对世界和平的最大恐怖和威胁。美国人永远不会看到世界上其他人对他们的看法,因为美国爱国者出版社保护美国人免受来自外部世界的真实新闻的影响,这可能与用来使美国人处于不断战争状态的虚假官方说法相冲突。美国的战争罪行被以“拯救使命”的名义卖给了美国人民,美国人永远也不会看到他们付出了数万亿美元的战争的结果,那就是在世界各地对大部分无辜的家庭进行攻击。

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