核武器黑市交易者卡迪尔汗的核活动大事记 [美国媒体]

A. Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology

卡迪尔.汗的核活动年鉴



The complete extent of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s decades-long involvement in the illegal transfer of nuclear materials and technologies is not known. The details are submerged in Khan’s work over the past thirty years, which has included both the development of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment capabilities and a complex international network of experts, suppliers, and front companies that have aided Iran, Libya, North Korea, and potentially others. Since we do not know exactly what Khan did, we cannot know when he did it. As more information is released from those who have questioned Khan and his network partners, a more complete image of the nuclear black market will emerge. This chronology summarizes what we now know.

巴基斯坦科学家阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗(Abdul Qadeer Khan)几十年来一直参与非法运输核材料和转让核技术的工作，具体细节目前尚不清楚。这些细节都隐藏在卡迪尔汗过去三十年的工作中，包括发展巴基斯坦的铀浓缩能力，以及一个复杂的由专家、供应商和代理公司的组成的网络，这些公司帮助了伊朗、利比亚、朝鲜以及其他潜在的国家。因为我们不知道卡迪尔汗到底做了什么，不知道他什么时候做的。随着那些质疑卡迪尔汗和他的网络伙伴的人透露更多的消息，一个更完整的关于核黑市的情况慢慢浮现。这个年表总结了我们目前所知道的信息。

Khan Builds His Base in Pakistan
Pre-1985: Khan’s early exposure to European technology and supply chains allow him to establish and develop uranium enrichment technologies in Pakistan. Knowledge of the technologies, and more importantly, the companies from which to obtain the necessary components set the foundation for how the future proliferation network would operate.

卡迪尔汗在巴基斯坦建立大本营
1985年前：卡迪尔汗早期接触欧洲的技术和供应链使他能够在巴基斯坦建立和发展铀浓缩技术。对技术的了解，更重要的是，这些公司能够获得必要的材料，为未来的运营网络的运作奠定了基础。

1936
• Khan is born in Bhopal, which is part of British India. Khan will immigrate with his family to Pakistan in 1952, several years after India and Pakistan are partitioned.

1936
卡迪尔汗出生在博帕尔，是英属印度的一部分。在印度和巴基斯坦被分割后的几年里，他将于1952年随家人移民到巴基斯坦。

1961
• Khan moves to Europe to complete his studies, first in West Berlin and later at the Technical University in Delft, Holland, where he receives a degree in metallurgical engineering in 1967.

1961
卡迪尔汗前往欧洲完成学业，先是在西柏林，后来在荷兰代尔夫特的技术大学，1967年他在那里获得冶金工程学位

1972
• Khan receives Ph.D. in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium.
• May – Khan begins work at Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory (FDO), a subcontractor of Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (UCN). UCN is the Dutch partner in the Urenco uranium enrichment consortium.
• 8 May - Within one week of starting work at FDO, Khan visits the advanced UCN enrichment facility in Almelo, Netherlands to become familiar with Urenco centrifuge operations and the aspects relevant to his own work to strengthen the metal centrifuge components. Khan is not officially cleared to visit the facility, but does so many times with the consent of his employers.

1972年
•卡迪尔汗获得比利时鲁汶天主教大学冶金工程博士学位。
•五月 - 卡迪尔汗开始在物理动力研究实验室(FDO)工作，该实验室是超离心机Nederland (UCN)的分包商。UCN是铀浓缩协会的荷兰合作伙伴。
•8月8日-在FDO开始工作的一个星期内，Khan访问了荷兰Almelo的先进的UCN浓缩设施，熟悉了Urenco离心机的操作，以及强化金属离心组件，这跟他的本专业比较相关。卡迪尔汗并没有被正式允许参观该设施，但是在他的雇主的同意下，他参观了很多次。

Early 1970s
• Dutch intelligence begins to monitor Khan soon after he begins work at FDO, concerned by a series of inquiries about technical information not related to Khan’s own projects.

1970年代早期
•荷兰情报部门在他开始在FDO工作后不久就开始监控他，一系列与他自己的项目无关的技术信息的询问，使得卡迪尔汗开始有些担心。

1974
• 18 May – India conducts its first nuclear test, a “peaceful nuclear explosion.
• September – Khan writes to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to offer his services and expertise to Pakistan.
• Late – Khan is tasked by UCN at Almelo with translations of the more advanced German-designed G-1 and G-2 centrifuges from German to Dutch, to which he has unsupervised access for 16 days.

1974年
5月18日-印度进行第一次核试验，“和平核爆炸”。
•9月-卡迪尔汗给总理佐勒菲卡尔·布托写信，表示愿意向巴基斯坦提供他的服务和专业知识。
•年末-卡迪尔汗的任务是在Almelo的UCN工作，将更先进的德国设计的G-1和G-2离心机从德语翻译成荷兰语，在这16天里，他在无人监管的情况下进行了参观。

Late 1970s and Early 1980s
• American intelligence officials convince Dutch authorities on two occasions not to arrest Khan for the purposes of monitoring his activities further.

70年代末和80年代初。
•美国情报官员曾两次说服荷兰当局不要逮捕卡迪尔汗，目的是进一步监视他的活动。

1975
• August – Pakistan begins buying components for its domestic uranium enrichment program from European Urenco suppliers. S.A. Butt, a physicist in the Pakistani embassy in Belgium, contacts a Dutch company to obtain high frequency inverters, which are used to control centrifuge motors. Purchases accelerate in the following years and many components are secured from companies in the Netherlands that Khan is familiar with.
• October – Khan is transferred away from enrichment work with FDO as Dutch authorities become increasingly concerned over his activities. He is reportedly observed asking “suspicious questions” at a nuclear trade show in Switzerland.
• 15 December – Khan suddenly leaves FDO for Pakistan with copied blueprints for centrifuges and other components and contact information for nearly 100 companies that supply centrifuge components and materials.

1975年
•8月-巴基斯坦开始从欧洲Urenco供应商购买其国内铀浓缩项目的零部件。美国驻比利时大使馆的物理学家S.A.对接了一家荷兰公司，以获取高频逆变器，用于控制离心机。在接下来的几年里，购买加速，许多零部件都是从荷兰的公司那里获得的。
•10月，随着荷兰当局对他的活动越来越关注，卡迪尔汗被调离核心工作岗位。据报道，他在瑞士的一场核贸易展览会上提出了“可疑的问题”。
•12月15日- 卡迪尔汗突然离开FDO，前往巴基斯坦，带走了离心机和其他部件的蓝图，以及将近100家提供离心机组件和材料的公司的联系信息。

1976
• Khan begins centrifuge work with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), headed by Munir Ahmad Khan.
• July – After conflicts at the PAEC, Prime Minister Bhutto gives Khan autonomous control over Pakistani uranium enrichment programs. Khan founds Engineering Research Laboratory (ERL) on July 31, which focuses exclusively on developing an indigenous uranium enrichment capability.
• The PAEC continues nuclear research and experiments in both weapons and power programs in competition with A.Q. Khan and will later develop Pakistan’s first generation of nuclear weapons.

1976年
•汗开始与巴基斯坦原子能委员会(PAEC)合作，该委员会由Munir Ahmad Khan领导。
•7月——在与PAEC发生冲突后，总理布托让卡迪尔汗单独负责巴基斯坦的铀浓缩项目。卡迪尔汗的工程研究实验室(ERL)于7月31日建立，专门研究开发一种本土的铀浓缩能力。
•PAEC继续进行核实验和研究，并且在武器和能源项目上继续和卡迪尔汗竞争，并且之后研发了巴基斯坦的第一代核武器。

1978
• ERL develops working prototypes of P-1 centrifuges, adapted from the German G-1 design Khan worked with at Urenco. Pakistan enriches uranium for the first time on April 4 at Khan’s enrichment facility at Kahuta.

1978年
•ERL研发了P-1离心分离机的工作原型，这是根据德国公司的G1离心机改变的。4月4日，巴基斯坦在卡胡塔汗的铀浓缩设施首次进行铀浓缩活动。

1979
• April - Pakistan is cut off from economic and military assistance by the United States after U.S. intelligence learns of the recently commissioned enrichment facility at Kahuta. However, the strategic importance of Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ensures that no meaningful sanctions will be imposed. This policy is consolidated following the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

1979年
•4月——美国情报机构获悉最近在卡胡塔汗进行的铀浓缩设施后，美国切断了巴基斯坦的经济和军事援助。然而，在苏联入侵阿富汗之后，巴基斯坦的战略性位置，确保了美国不会对其实施有意义的制裁。这一政策在1980年罗纳德·里根(Ronald Reagan)当选后得到了加强。

Early 1980s
• Khan acquires blueprints for the Chinese bomb that was tested in China’s fourth nuclear explosion in 1966.
• Khan is, reportedly, approached by an unknown Arab country (possibly Saudi Arabia or Syria) requesting nuclear assistance.

1980年代早期
•卡迪尔汗获得了中国核弹的图纸，这是1966年中国第四次核爆炸试验的样图。
.据报道，可汗是接到了一个神秘的阿拉伯国家(可能是沙特阿拉伯或叙利亚)的核援助请求。

1981
• 1 May – ERL is renamed A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by President Zia ul-Haq in recognition of Khan’s contributions to the operational enrichment facility at Kahuta.

1981年
•5月1日，齐亚·乌尔-哈奇总统将ERL更名为卡迪尔汗研究实验室(KRL)，以表彰卡迪尔汗对卡胡塔汗的铀浓缩设施建设的贡献。

1983
• Khan is convicted, in absentia, in Dutch court for conducting nuclear espionage and sentenced to four years in prison.

1983年
•可汗因从事核间谍活动在荷兰法庭被判有罪，并被判处四年监禁。

1985
• Khan’s conviction is overturned based on an appeal that he had not received a proper summons. The Dutch prosecution does not renew charges because of the impossibility of serving Khan a summons given Pakistan security and the inability to obtain any of the documents that Khan had taken to Pakistan.

1985年
•卡迪尔汗的定罪被推翻，因为他没有收到正式的传票。荷兰检察机关没有再次提出指控，因为鉴于巴基斯坦的安保措施不可能送达卡迪尔汗的传票，并且无法获得卡迪尔汗向巴基斯坦提交的任何文件。

The Network Flows Both Ways

交易网络通过两方面进行

Mid-1980s to mid-1990s: Khan’s early successes with the Pakistani uranium enrichment program are followed by the more advanced design and technologies of the P-2 centrifuge, an adapted version of the German G-2 that can spin twice as fast as the previous P-1 design. Khan is left with an excess inventory of P-1 components and begins to purchase additional P-2 components that he will export through many of the same channels he had used to import centrifuge components. Khan makes nuclear sales in this period to Iran and offers technologies to Iraq and possibly others.

上世纪80年代中期至90年代中期:卡迪尔汗在巴基斯坦铀浓缩项目上取得早期成功，紧接着更先进的P-2离心机的研发，这是德国G-2的一种改进型，其转速可以比之前的P-1快两倍。卡迪尔汗P-1离心机组件的库存过多，并开始购买额外的P-2组件，他将通过与进口离心机部件相同的渠道来出口P-1组件。卡迪尔汗在此期间向伊朗进行核销售，并向伊拉克和其他国家提供核技术。

Mid 1980s
• Pakistan produces enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon. KRL continues work on enrichment and is tasked with research and development of missile delivery systems.
• Khan, reportedly, begins to develop his export network and orders twice the number of components necessary for the indigenous Pakistani program. This transition from importer to exporter of centrifuge components is, apparently, completely missed by western intelligence services who believe Khan is only working on Pakistan’s domestic nuclear weapons program.

1980年代中期
•巴基斯坦生产足够的高浓缩铀(HEU)用于制造核武器。KRL继续进行铀浓缩工作，并负责导弹运载系统的研究和开发。
•据报道，卡迪尔汗开始发展他的出口网络，并订购了两倍于巴基斯坦本土项目所需的部件数量。显然，从进口国到离心机部件出口国的转变，完全被西方情报机构忽视了，他们认为，卡迪尔汗只是在研究巴基斯坦国内的核武器项目。

1986 to 1987
• Pakistan and Iran are suspected of signing a secret agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. Allegedly, the deal includes a provision for at least six Iranians to be trained in Pakistan at the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology in Islamabad and the Nuclear Studies Institute. Iranian scientists might also receive centrifuge training at KRL.
• Khan is suspected of visiting the Iranian reactor at Bushehr in February 1986 and again in January 1987. These early interactions may have led directly to Khan’s assistance to Iran, but the content of the visits is unknown.

1986年到1987年
有人怀疑，巴基斯坦和伊朗签署了和平核合作的秘密协议。据称，该协议包括至少6名伊朗人在伊斯兰堡核科学技术研究所和核研究所接受培训。伊朗科学家也可能接受了KRL的离心机研培训。
•据推测卡迪尔汗在1986年2月和1987年1月访问伊朗布什尔的核反应堆。这些早期的互动可能直接导致了卡迪尔汗对伊朗的援助，但访问的内容还不得而知。

Late 1980s
• Khan and his network of international suppliers are reported to begin nuclear transfers to Iran. The period of cooperation is thought to continue through 1995 when P-2 centrifuge components are transferred. The Pakistani government claims no transfers occurred after the shipments of P-1 components and sub-assemblies from 1989 to 1991.
• German intelligence investigates potential Pakistani assistance to Iraq, and possibly Iran and North Korea, with processes related to melting uranium.

1980年代末
据报道，汗和他的国际供应商网络开始与伊朗进行核交易。转移P-2离心机组件的时候，人们认为持续了1995年一整年。巴基斯坦政府声称，在出售P-1离心机零部件核组件之后，1989-1991年间没有发生过核材料转移。
•德国情报机构调查了巴基斯坦对伊拉克的可能援助，可能还包括伊朗和朝鲜，这些援助的过程与铀的熔化有关。

1987
• Khan is suspected of having made an offer to Iran to provide a package of nuclear technologies, including assistance for the difficult process of casting uranium metal. The price for the package is reported to be from the tens of millions to the hundreds of millions.
• Khan is believed to make a centrifuge deal with Iran to help build a cascade of 50,000 P-1 centrifuges. In addition, Iran may have received centrifuge drawings through an unknown foreign intermediary around this time.
• KRL begins to publish publicly available technical papers that outline some of the more advanced design features Khan has developed. The papers include information that would normally be classified in the U.S. and Europe and show that KRL is competent in many aspects of centrifuge design and operation. The papers also include specifications for centrifuges with maraging steel that can spin faster than earlier aluminum designs. Later, in 1991, KRL publishes details on how to etch grooves around the bottom bearing to incorporate lubricants. These technical developments are important for Khan’s P-2 centrifuges.

1987年
•卡迪尔汗被怀疑向伊朗提出了提供一揽子核技术的提议，其中包括对铀金属制造的援助。据报道，这一揽子协议的价格从数千万到几亿不等。
•卡迪尔汗被认为与伊朗达成了一项离心机协议，以帮助建造多达5万台P-1离心机。此外，伊朗可能在这段时间内通过一个不知名的外国中间人接收了离心机图纸。
•KRL开始发布公开可用的技术论文，概述卡迪尔汗开发的一些更高级的设计特性。这些文件包括通常在美国和欧洲属于机密的信息，显示出KRL在离心机设计和操作诸多方面都很有实力。这些文件还包括了用旋转速度比铝更快的马氏体钢的离心机规范。后来，在1991年，KRL发表了关于如何在底部轴承上蚀刻凹槽以加入润滑剂的细节。这些技术发展对卡迪尔汗的P-2离心机很重要。

1988
• Iranian scientists are suspected of having received nuclear training in Pakistan.

1988年
•伊朗科学家被怀疑在巴基斯坦接受过核培训。

1989
• Iran is suspected of receiving its first centrifuge assemblies and components around this time. The shipped components are likely older P-1 centrifuge components that Khan no longer has use for in Pakistan. Through 1995, Khan is reported to have shipped over 2000 components and sub-assemblies for P-1, and later P-2, centrifuges to Iran.

1989年
•伊朗被怀疑在这段时间内收到第一批离心机组件和部件。已装运的组件可能是旧的P-1离心机组件，在巴基斯坦已经不再使用了。据报道，到1995年，卡迪尔汗已经为P-1，以及后来的P-2，向伊朗运送了超过2000个部件和子组件。

1990
• An Iraqi memo, found during inspections in 1995, indicates that Khan may have offered significant nuclear assistance to Iraq in late 1990. He offered to sell Iraq a nuclear bomb design and guarantee material support from Western Europe for a uranium enrichment program. Khan stated that any materials needed from Europe could be routed through a company he owned in Dubai and that a meeting with a friendly intermediary could take place in Greece. However, Iraq is believed to have turned down the offer, suspecting it to be a sting and no known follow-ups were made after the 1991 Gulf War. The investigation in the 1990s was inconclusive in its efforts to determine the authenticity of the memo.

1990年
•1995年检查时发现的伊拉克的一份备忘录表明，卡迪尔汗可能在1990年后期向伊拉克提供了大量的核援助。他提出向伊拉克出售核弹设计，并保证从西欧获得物质支持，以进行铀浓缩计划。卡迪尔汗说，任何需要从欧洲进口材料，都可以通过他在迪拜拥有的一家公司进行转运，并且可以在希腊与中间人会面。然而，伊拉克拒绝了这一提议，并怀疑这是一种刺激，而且在1991年海湾战争之后，没有采取任何的后续行动。在20世纪90年代的调查中，无法确定该备忘录的真实性。

1992
• Pakistan begins missile cooperation with North Korea. Within Pakistan, KRL is one of the laboratories responsible for missile research and will develop the Ghauri missile with North Korean assistance. This cooperation probably establishes the connections that Khan could have used to transfer nuclear technologies. However, very little is known about when any nuclear transfers began, what nuclear components might have been obtained by North Korea, and whether or not the Pakistani government was privy to Khan’s activities.

1992年
•巴基斯坦开始与朝鲜进行导弹合作。在巴基斯坦境内，KRL是负责导弹研究的实验室之一，并将在朝鲜的协助下开发Ghauri导弹。这种合作可能建立了卡迪尔汗以后用来转让核技术的联系。然而，很少有人知道何时开始进行核转移，北朝鲜可能获得了哪些核部件，以及巴基斯坦政府是否对卡迪尔汗的活动知情。

1994 or 1995
• More advanced components for P-2 centrifuges are suspected to have arrived in Iran. B.S.A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan business man and Khan’s chief lieutenant, told Malaysian police that Iran paid approximately $3 million for these parts.

1994年或1995年
更先进的P-2离心机的组件被怀疑已经抵达伊朗。塔希尔(B.S.A. Tahir)是斯里兰卡的商人，也是卡迪尔汗的副手，他对马来西亚警方说，伊朗为这些零件支付了大约300万美元。