国外论坛讨论：是时候关注中国的海上问题了（一） [美国媒体]

The U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-classguided-missile destroyer USS Porter and the Blue Ridge-class command andcontrol ship USS Mount Whitney sail in formation during the U.S.-Ukrainemultinational maritime exercise Sea Breeze 2018 in the Black Sea July 13, 2

图片：美国海军阿利·伯克级导弹驱逐舰“波特号”和“蓝岭级”指挥和控制舰“惠特尼山”号在美国-乌克兰多国海上演习“海风2018年”在黑海编队航行。
照片拍摄于2018年7月13日。美国海军/大众传播专家贾斯汀·斯坦伯格通过路透社

The time toprevent Beijing's takeover of the South China Sea has passed. What comes next?

阻止北京接管南海的时间已经过去。 接下来是什么？

There was atime, when President Barack Obama was still in the White House, when theU.S.-led coalition in the Asia-Pacific could have responded to, and perhapscountered, the creeping occupation and militarization of the South China Sea.According to many security experts, the window for such action has now closed,and Beijing has successfully created irreversible facts on the ground. If thatis indeed the case, then freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) and othermeasures are too little, too late. China has engineered a new status quo in theSouth China Sea, and efforts to counter its larger ambitions should henceforthfocus elsewhere.

曾经有一段时间，当美国总统巴拉克奥巴马还在白宫时，以美国为首的亚太联盟可能会对南海的逐渐占领和军事化做出回应，也许可能会遭到反击。 许多安全专家认为，这种行动的窗口已经关闭，北京已成功地在当地制造了不可逆转的事实。 如果确实如此，那么“自由航行”（译者注：Freedom of Navigation” operations，英文缩写为FONOPS）和其他措施太少，太迟了。 中国已经在南中国海创造了一个新的现状，因此，应对其更大的野心的遏制应该集中在其他地方。

What isperhaps most surprising about what has occurred in the South China Sea in thepast decade isn’t so much that China has succeeded in building a series ofartificial islands and militarizing what it regards as its “lake,” but ratherthat the international community would be caught unawares by the current stateof affairs. From the outset, Beijing telegraphed its intentions in the SouthChina Sea, and if it has become a no-go zone for others in the region, and forthe United States, it is largely the result of our inattention and our failureto read the tea leaves.

过去十年在南中国海发生的事情，或许最令人惊讶的，并不是中国成功建造了一系列人工岛，并将其视为“湖”的海域军事化，而是国际社会将被目前的状况措手不及。从一开始，北京就传达了它在南中国海的意图，如果它已经成为该地区其他国家和美国的禁飞区，这在很大程度上是由于我们漫不经心的疏忽和未能察觉其蛛丝马迹。

Democraticstates in the region, along with their longstanding security guarantor back inWashington, now face a new dilemma. And this time it should be clear to allthat inaction or inattention will only mean more trouble down the line. Awarethat China’s activities in the South China Sea are directly related to itslarger ambitions in the West Pacific and Indo-Pacific (among them displacingthe United States), it is now incumbent upon allied states in the region togive serious thought to whether even more Chinese expansionism is somethingthey can live with.

该地区的民主国家以及长期担任安全保障的华盛顿政府，现在面临着新的两难境地。 而这一次，所有人都应该清楚，不采取行动或疏忽只会意味着更多麻烦。意识到中国在南中国海的活动直接关系到其在西太平洋和印太地区的更大野心（其中包括取代美国），该地区的盟国现在有责任认真考虑更多的中国扩张主义是否是他们可以忍受的东西。

The first areawhere this question needs to be asked is in the East China Sea, where China hasalso increased its military and maritime militia activities—primarily near thedisputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islets claimed by Tokyo, Beijing and Taipei. There, asin the South China Sea, Beijing’s strategy has been one of “salamislicing”—small, gradual gains that, over time, fundamentally shift the balancein Beijing’s favor. As I argued in an earlierpiece for the National Interest, Beijing has created anenvironment of “permanent conflict” in the East and South China Sea whereby italternating escalation between the two areas, shifting out when its actionsdrew too much attention, only to return months later to build upon previousgains.

需要提出这个问题的第一个海域是东海，中国增加了军事和海上民兵活动 ，主要是在东京，北京和中国台湾省声称的钓鱼岛/尖阁列岛附近。 就像在南中国海一样，北京的战略一直是“切香肠式”，随着时间的推移逐渐取得的一些晓得、渐进的收益，从根本上改变了平衡。正如我早些时候在国家利益有关的文章中所说的那样，北京在东海和南海创造了一种“永久性冲突”的环境，在这两个地区之间交替升级，当它的行动引起过多关注时适时转移，几个月后回来建立以前的收益。

For variousreasons, the might of the Japanese self-defense forces and Tokyo’s securitytreaty with the United States chief among them, China’s gains in the East ChinaSea have been more limited than in the South China Sea. Still, the frequency ofintrusions by Coast Guard and fishing vessels into Japanese territorial watersor near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets, and of transits by the People’sLiberation Army Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) through the Strait ofMiyako, between Taiwan and Japan, into the West Pacific, has reached alarminglevels in recent years.

由于日本自卫队与美国的《日美安保条约》，中国在东海的收益比南海更为有限。海岸警卫队和渔船入侵日本领海或有争议的尖阁列岛/钓鱼岛附近海域的频率，以及人民解放军海军（PLAN）和解放军空军（PLAAF）通过中国台湾省和日本之间的宫古海峡抵达西太平洋的频率，近年来已达到惊人的水平。

If, as I wouldargue, there is no going back in the South China Sea and we must resignourselves to ceding that maritime territory to China, then the next step is todecide what to do next. More inaction would likely embolden Beijing to seek toaccomplish in the East China Sea what it has already achieved in the SouthChina Sea. Another option, if the fledgling democratic alliance is ready totake concrete countervailing action against China, would be to turn the entireEast China Sea into a “choke point” for China: denied area whereby the PLAN andPLAAF would no longer be able to use the nine existing channels it currentlyuses to transit from within the first island chain into the West Pacific.Between them, Japan, the United States and Taiwan undoubtedly have the means toclose off this area to the Chinese military by fielding various naval,ground-based and airborne defense systems as well as by reinforcing YonaguniIsland, which lies just 108 kilometers (67 miles) from the east coast ofTaiwan. (I would also argue that every effort should be made to ensure that Palau, a tiny speck in the Pacific butstrategically located, retains its official diplomatic ties with Taiwan.)

如果像我所说的那样，南中国海没有退路，我们必须放弃这片海域给中国，那么下一步就是决定下一步该做什么。更多的不作为可能会鼓励北京寻求在东海实现它在南中国海已经取得的成就。另一个选择，如果刚刚起步的民主联盟准备采取针对中国的具体反介入行动，将把整个东海变成中国的“瓶颈”，封锁中国海军和中国空军目前用于从第一岛链进入西太平洋的九个现有渠道。其中，日本、美国和中国台湾无疑有办法通过部署各种海陆空防御系统，以及加强距离（距离台湾东海岸）仅108公里的与那国岛（67英里）来封锁中国军队。（我认为，应该尽一切力量努力确保帕劳，一个太平洋上的小斑点，但身居战略位置，其与与中国台湾省保持着官方外交关系。）

Without doubt,such a move would be escalatory. Nevertheless, the case could be made thatChina has already flouted international law by refusing to recognize thelegitimacy of the July 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling against it, not to mention theunprecedented occupation and militarization of an expanse of internationalwaters. Such actions could legitimize a counteractive move by an Asian alliancewhich would in effect punish Beijing for its failure to behave as a responsiblestakeholder. The objective of such enforcement action, which no doubt wouldnecessitate coordination between Japan, Taiwan and the United States., andpossibly with other allies, would be to deny China the East China Sea as atransit corridor into the West Pacific and limit it to the Bashi Channelbetween Taiwan and the Philippines. In other words, it would yield to China’sgains, but prevent further ones, especially as gains in the East China Seawould pose a direct threat to Japanese trade routes, the U.S. military presencein the Pacific and expose the continental United States to missile attack byChinese submarines.

毫无疑问，行动将会升级。然而，可以说，中国已经藐视了国际法，拒绝承认2016年7月常设仲裁法院对其作出的裁决的合法性，更不用说前所未有的国际水域被占领和军事化。这些行动可能会使亚洲联盟的反行动合法化，这实际上将惩罚中国政府未能作为负责任的利益相关者行事。这种执法行动的目的无疑是需要日本、中国台湾省和美国之间的协调，并可能与其他盟国协调，目的是拒绝中国将东海作为通往西太平洋的过境走廊，并将其限制在台湾和菲律宾之间的巴什海峡。换句话说，它将屈服于中国的利益，但阻止进一步的进展，特别是在东海的收获将对日本的贸易路线、美国在太平洋的军事存在构成直接威胁，并使美国大陆暴露于中国潜艇的导弹攻击之下。

With its manysuccesses in the South China Sea, Beijing has effectively created a “chokepoint” for its competitors; in the complex game of go that has emerged in theIndo-Pacific, the democratic alliance’s next move should be to create a “chokepoint” of its own. Otherwise, there is no reason why China, having consolidatedits successes in the South China Sea, should not try to repeat this featfurther north.

由于在南中国海取得了许多成功，北京实际上为其竞争对手制造了一个“瓶颈”；在印度太平洋地区出现的复杂博弈中，民主联盟的下一步应该是创造自己的“瓶颈”。否则，中国既然巩固了在南中国海的成功，就没有理由不试图在更远的北方重复这一壮举。

Moreover, forJapan, such a strategy would imply strengthening its security relationship withTaiwan while adding urgency to the maintenance of the “status quo” in theTaiwan Strait. The continued existence of Taiwan as a sovereign entity is a keycomponent of this strategy; annexation by China would neutralize what isarguably the single most important barrier to Beijing’s goals in the West andIndo-Pacific.

此外，对日本来说，这一战略将意味着加强与台湾的安全关系，同时增加维持台湾海峡“现状”的紧迫性。台湾作为主权实体的继续存在是这一战略的关键组成部分；中国对台湾的吞并将抵消北京在西太平洋和印度太平洋地区实现目标的唯一最重要障碍。

Withoutconcrete action, rhetoric about “pivots” and “rebalancing” will remain emptyslogans. There are risks in escalation, but at the same time continuedinaction, or even more of the ad hoc same, is a recipe for the creation of afuture that very well could be untenable to the alliance a few years hence.

如果不采取具体行动，有关“转向”和“再平衡”的言论仍将是空洞的口号。升级有风险，但与此同时，继续不采取行动，甚至更多的临时行动，是造成一个非常可能在几年后联盟无法维持的未来的恶方。

The urgency oftaking countervailing action has also become more evident following the recentannouncement by Beijing in early July that control of China’s Coast Guard hasbeen shifted from civiliancommand to direct control by theCentral Military Commission (CMC), which is supervised by President Xi Jinping.Most experts are of the opinion that this move occurred by design rather thanas the result of concessions to hawkish elements by an embattled Xi. Whateverthe reason, we can now expect the Coast Guard to act as proxy to the PLAN, afact that creates a variety of uncertainties as to rules of engagement andwhich undoubtedly is intended to test the alliance’s resolve. Here again, absenceof an appropriate response to this “salami slicing” strategy would create newfacts at sea and could, furthermore, prove destabilizing to the entire legalsystem should other countries decide to emulate Beijing and militarize theirown civilian maritime agencies. If indeed putting the Coast Guard under CMCcommand was by design, then we can expect the Coast Guard to become moreassertive in “defending” China’s territorial claims in both the East and SouthChina Sea, often with Coast Guard vessels that are better equipped and have alarger displacement than their competitors.

中国政府最近在7月初宣布，中国海岸警卫队的控制权已从民间文职指挥转变为由“锦屏同志”监督的中央军委(CMC)直接控制，因此采取反介入行动的紧迫性也变得更加明显。大多数专家认为，这一举动是故意的，而不是由于四面楚歌的“锦屏同志”对鹰派分子让步的结果。不管是什么原因，我们现在可以期待海岸警卫队作为该计划的代理人，这一事实在交战规则方面造成了各种不确定性，这无疑是为了考验该联盟的决心。在这方面，如果不对这一“切香肠”战略作出适当反应，就会在海上造成新的事实，而且，如果其他国家决定效仿北京并使本国的民用海事机构军事化，则可能会破坏整个法律体系的稳定。如果真的将海岸警卫队置于中央军委CMC的指挥之下，那么我们可以预期，海岸警卫队在“捍卫”中国在东中国海和南中国海的领土主张时，会变得更加自信，通常是用装备更精良、排水量比竞争对手更大的海岸警卫队船只来“捍卫”中国的领土主张。

The impact ofChina’s growing ambitions within and beyond the first island chain, and bydefault over the East and South China Seas, affect not only the ability of theU.S. military to retain its role in the Asia Pacific, but increasinglyundermine Taiwan’s—and Japan’s—sense of security. At some point, the allianceof democracies will need to make a choice between greater accommodation ofChinese expansionism and strategic retaliation. Having already “lost” the SouthChina Sea, it is incumbent upon the alliance to enter the game and todemonstrate that it, too, means business. To do so, it will have to be willingto escalate, well beyond the occasional FONOPS and annual U.S. Navy transits inthe Taiwan Strait. The East China Sea is undoubtedly the place to start, giventhat it is of immediate concern to all three key partners in NortheastAsia—Japan, Taiwan and the United States—and that it constitutes the lastremaining “choke point” within the first island chain. Until China candemonstrate its willingness to abide by international law and to respect the territorialintegrity of other regional powers, the East China Sea corridor should bedenied it as a transit point into the West Pacific.

中国在第一个岛链内外、以及在东海和南海的野心不断增强，不仅影响了美国军方在亚太地区保持其地位的能力，而且还日益削弱了台湾和日本的安全感。在某种程度上，民主联盟需要在更大程度上适应中国扩张主义和战略报复之间做出选择。由于已经“输掉”了南中国海，联盟有责任加入这场游戏，并证明它也是一场生意。要做到这一点，它必须愿意升级，远远超过偶尔的航行自由行动和美国海军在台湾海峡的年度过境。东海无疑是起点，因为它是东北亚所有三个主要伙伴日本、中国TW省和美国的直接关切，也是第一岛链内最后一个剩余的“瓶颈”。除非中国能够表现出遵守国际法和尊重其他地区大国领土完整的意愿，否则东海走廊就不应该成为进入西太平洋的中转站。

译者注：迈克尔·科尔(J.Michael Cole)是一名驻台北记者，诺丁汉中国政策学院(China Policy Institute Of Nottingham)高级研究员，加拿大皇家军事学院(Royal Miles College Of Canada)战争研究专业毕业生，曾任加拿大安全情报局(Canada Security Intelligence Service)分析师。他的新书“台湾海峡的融合或冲突”于2016年由Routledge出版。

·  hiyosilver
For Japan to re-arm enough to be of any use requires a treaty revision atthe least. It was a 6 or 7 party treaty and includes Russia so would gettricky. Russia also inhabits 2-3% of Japan and is desirous of building a navalbase on one of the former Japanese islands.

对于日本来说，要想重新武装到能够发挥任何作用，至少需要对条约进行一次修订。这是一个6或7个缔约国的条约，包括俄罗斯，因此将变得棘手。俄罗斯拥有日本国土面积2-3%，并希望在前日本岛屿之一建立一个海军基地。

Realist
Throughout history, dominant economic powers have seized control of largeswaths of territory. We give China our markets and our jobs and our technology,then wonder why they behave like a super power??

纵观历史，占主导地位的经济大国一直控制着大片领土。我们给中国我们的市场，我们的工作和我们的技术，然后奇怪他们为什么表现得像一个超级大国？

Skyler
This is a lot like the 1930s when Germany and Japan were building up tremendous military forces and the US, Britain andFrance wondered why.

这就像上世纪30年代德国和日本建立了巨大的军事力量，而美国、英国和法国则想知道为什么。

RickH
Another option would be creating our own artificial islands in the area.They would probably get the hint.

另一种选择是在该地区建立我们自己的人工岛。他们可能会得到暗示。

Kevin
China wouldn’t have so much power if they didn’t have so manymanufacturing jobs given to them by American business

如果中国没有那么多美国企业提供的制造业工作，中国就不会有这么大的权力。