中国正逐渐成为全球领袖 [美国媒体]

China Edging Closer To Becoming A Global Hegemon

中国正逐渐成为全球领袖



as is being pointed out by a growing number of scholars, analysts and experts amid abundant evidence, it has become a present-day reality that in the near future we are likely to live in a different kind of world, one that is driven and dominated by China.

正如越来越多的学者、分析家和专家指出的那样，有大量证据表明，在不久的将来，我们很可能生活在一个由中国驱动与主导的世界。

While the US has steadily been on the wane, China has risen up to establish itself as a new significant powerhouse on the global stage. There has been “China awareness” worldwide. TV programs and news articles on China have become commonplace.

美国一直在走下坡路，而中国已崛起，并在全球舞台上确立了自己作为一个新的重要强国的地位。世界各地都有“对中国的关注”。 关于中国的电视节目和新闻报道已经变得司空见惯。

Given the strength of its sheer size and enormous population, its dramatic economic growth and overseas direct investment, its influence on and close relationship with several key countries, and its domestic consolidated polity and strong commitment to unity, many even ascertain that China will succeed the US as the global hegemon within the next 10 or 20 years and that its reign will change the world in the most profound ways.

鉴于中国庞大的规模与人口所拥有的力量，它引人注目的经济增长和海外直接投资,它在几个与其关系密切的关键国家的影响力，以及中国国内稳定的政治和对团结的坚定承诺，许多人甚至确信，中国将在未来10到20年内取代美国，成为全球领袖，中国的统治将以最深刻的方式改变世界。

But the question is, how close are we to this becoming reality and, more important, does the arrival of China signal the end of Western universalism?

但问题是，我们离这个即将实现的现实到底有多近，更重要的是，中国登顶是否标志着西方普世价值的终结?

Hegemony defined
In general, hegemony refers to political, economic, military, social or cultural predominance of one state over others. International-relations theory explains that hegemonic status is derived from possession of: (i) great material asymmetry in favor of one state; (ii) enough military power to defeat systematically any potential contester in the system; (iii) access to raw materials, natural resources, capital and markets; (iv) competitive advantages in the production of value-added goods; (v) an accepted ideology reflecting this status quo; and (vi) ability to provide certain public goods such as security, or commercial and financial stability.

霸权的定义
通常来说，霸权是指一国的政治、经济、军事、社会或文化对其他国家的主导地位。国际关系理论解释了霸权地位源于占有:
(i) 有利于一个国家的巨大的物质不对称；
(ii)有足够的军事实力，能够有组织地击败系统中任何潜在的竞争对手；
(iii)能获得原材料、自然资源、资本和市场;
(iv)拥有生产高附加价值商品的竞争优势; 
(v) 反映这种现状的公认的意识形态; 
(vi) 提供安全、商业、金融稳定等公共需求的能力。

Over the last two centuries, the world has seen two global hegemons: Britain (1850-1914) and the US (1945 to the present). Britain’s hegemonic power was expressed in the form of maritime expansion, colonial empires, and the invention of the international gold-standard system.
For the US, it was derived from its airborne and naval superiority, a global network of military bases, its global dominance of the international economic system, and its currency’s dominant position in the international financial system. Possession of the world’s privileged reserve currency in particular means that the US can print money and run enormous trade deficits in a way that other countries cannot. Moreover, American multinational corporations can gain advantage from avoiding the transactional costs of currency exchange in the financing of their trade.

在过去的两个世纪里，世界见证了两个全球霸权:英国(1850-1914)和美国(1945年至今)。英国的霸权力量体现于海上扩张、殖民帝国和发明国际金本位体系。
至于美国的霸权，则体现于其空中和海军优势、全球军事基地网络、其在国际经济体系中的全球主导地位，以及其货币在国际金融体系中的主导地位。
尤其是拥有世界上享有特权的储备货币，意味着美国可以印钞票，以这种其他国家无法做到的方式经营巨额的贸易逆差。此外，美国跨国公司还有一个优势，没有货币兑换的交易成本。

However, in the past two decades, we have apparently witnessed the fading of US hegemony.

然而，在过去的二十年里，我们显然目睹了美国霸权的衰落。

America’s change of course
During the administration of president George W Bush, the US turned away from consensual multilateralism toward unilateralism that played down the need for alliances and placed a priority on military strength.
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 faced widespread criticism, and the subsequent occupation of that country was perceived as a failure and became broadly unpopular. Such military intervention violated international norms and legality, undermining America’s image and credibility abroad sharply.

美国理所当然的变化

在美国总统乔治布什政府期间，美国放弃了协商一致的多边主义，转向单边主义。单边主义淡化了结盟的必要性，并将军事力量放在优先地位。
2003对伊拉克的入侵受到了广泛的批评，随后对伊拉克的占领被认为是失败的，且普遍地不得人心。这种军事干预破坏了国际规则和合法性，严重损害了美国在国外的形象和信誉。

Then, American superpower status was shaken again by the financial crisis in 2007. The crisis emanated from flawed regulation, perverse incentives for banks to sell mortgages to poor Americans with no ability to repay, and gigantic leverage in the financial system, bringing the whole financial sector to its knees and sending shockwaves throughout the global economy.

然后，2007年的金融危机再次动摇了美国的超级大国地位。这场危机源于有缺陷的监管、银行向无力偿还贷款的美国穷人出售抵押贷款的反常动机，以及金融体系中巨大的杠杆作用，最终使整个金融业陷入瘫痪，并在全球经济中引发了海啸。

Later, thanks to China, the crisis was mitigated by Beijing’s purchase of US Treasury bonds. As a consequence, the financial meltdown set the scene for gravitational shift in economic power, from the West to East Asia and from the US to China.
Since 2000, annual growth of China’s gross domestic product has fluctuated between 6.7% and 14.2%, while that of the US peaked at 3.8% in 2004 and plunged to negative-2.8% in 2009 because of the 2007 financial crisis. (However, China’s GDP per capita is still clearly lagging behind the US because of its huge population.)

后来，多亏了中国，由中国政府购买美国国债才缓解了这场危机。其结果是，这场金融危机使得全球经济实力的重心从西方转向东亚，从美国转向中国。
自2000年以来，中国国内生产总值的年增长率在6.7%和14.2%之间波动，而美国在2004年达到3.8%的峰值，2009年因2007年金融危机而暴跌至2.8%。(然而，由于人口众多，中国的人均GDP仍明显落后于美国。)

Moreover, the Chinese government was successful in poverty reduction, as it lifted 800 million people out of poverty between 1978 and 2014, more than any other country. Now its large middle class and its government are prosperous and have massive spending power, becoming an increasingly important market for every country.

此外，中国政府在扶贫方面取得了成功，在1978年至2014年期间，它使8亿人脱离贫困，比其他任何国家都多。现在，中国庞大的中产阶级和政府繁荣起来，拥有巨大的购买力，成为每个国家日益重要的市场。

As of 2016, China was the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer of merchandise goods. It also had the world’s largest foreign-exchange reserves, totaling US$3.52 trillion.

截至2016年，中国是世界上最大的商品出口国和第二大商品进口国。中国还拥有世界上最大的外汇储备，总计3.52万亿美元。

Interestingly, according to the annual ranking of the world’s largest banks by assets released by S&P Global Intelligence, four of the five largest banks are Chinese.
Apart from being the world’s No 1 recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), China is also among the world’s largest providers in terms of overseas investment and financial assistance, of which a big part comes in the form of development finance.

有趣的是，根据标准普尔全球情报公司公布的全球最大银行资产年度排名，全球五大银行中有四家是中国银行。
中国不仅是世界第一大外商直接投资接受国，而且在海外投资和金融援助方面也是世界上最大的提供国，其中很大一部分来自发展融资。

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has been spreading its wings globally, intending to foster closer ties with developing countries and meanwhile seeking a reliable supply of the raw materials and natural resources required for fueling its economic growth.

自二十一世纪开始，中国已经在全球范围内展开翅膀，意在与发展中国家建立更紧密的联系，同时寻求可靠的原材料和自然资源的供应，以促进其经济增长。

In 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to provide a $2 billion fund for investing in and assisting developing countries, which would increase to $12 billion over the next 15 years.
China’s most emphasized areas of strategic engagement are perhaps Africa and Latin America. In Africa, a continent that has been relatively neglected by the US and European countries, the evidence of growing Chinese presence is everywhere. Trade between China and Africa as well as China’s investment in the region has increased dramatically across the continent.

2015年，中国承诺提供20亿美元的资金用于投资和援助发展中国家，未来15年将增加到120亿美元。
中国最重视的战略地区或许是非洲和拉丁美洲。在美国和欧洲国家相对忽视的非洲大陆，越来越多的中国存在的迹象随处可见。中国与非洲之间的贸易以及中国对该地区的投资都有显着增长。

As for Latin America, the United States’ geo-strategic back yard, China is now the largest trading partner of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. This is especially so with Brazil, where China has a close diplomatic and political relationship through their membership of the BRICS grouping.

至于拉丁美洲，美国的地缘战略后院，中国现在是阿根廷、巴西、智利和秘鲁的最大贸易伙伴。这一点在巴西尤其如此，中国通过金砖国家集团身份，与巴西有着密切的外交和政治关系。

China’s presence in developing countries means much more than mutual economic benefit to both parties. First, China’s arrival signals an alternative source of assistance as they are no longer reliant on the West, or on multilateral lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. While Western aid is often patronizing and has strings attached concerning political conditions such as democracy and human rights, Chinese aid has far fewer, based on the notion that it is wrong to impose political and economic conditionality in exchange for assistance.

中国在发展中国家的存在，对双方来说都是经济互利的。首先，中国的到来标志着另一种援助来源，因为它们可以不再依赖西方，也不再依赖国际货币基金组织和世界银行等多边贷款机构。而西方的援助往往自命为恩人，而且有一连串的附加条件如民主和人权等，中国的援助条件却少得多，它基于这样一种观念，即把政治和经济条件强加于人以换取援助是错误的。

Former Chinese president Hu Jintao said, “China steadfastly supports the wish of the African countries to safeguard their independence and sovereignty and choose their road of development according to their national conditions.”
Second, a contrasting approach toward developing countries paves the way for projecting a new distinctive model of global development to the world. It is characterized by state-led investment focusing on infrastructure and support services that are less tied to the donor’s economic interests, less ideological, but more pragmatic and experimental.

前中国主席说:“中国坚定支持非洲国家维护国家独立自主、根据国情选择发展道路的愿望。”
首先，对发展中国家采取截然不同的做法，向世界展示了一种新的独特的全球发展模式。它的特点是由国家主导的投资集中在基础设施和后勤保障上，而这些服务与捐助国的经济利益无关，意识形态更少，但更务实和更具实验性。

Also, China’s impressive economic growth and poverty reduction have attracted a lot of attention and can be a model for other nations to consider and learn from.
Third, for developing countries, China’s unconditional economic assistance is considered more favorable, friendly and businesslike. This has been the most instrumental in enhancing the prospects of building long-term alliances, support and credibility at the international level.

其次，中国令人印象深刻的经济增长和减贫也吸引了许多国家的注意，并可以成为其他国家思考和学习的榜样。
第三，对发展中国家而言，中国无附加条件的经济援助对于发展中国家更有利、友好且有效率。这对加强在国际层面中建立长期联盟、支持和信誉的前景是最有帮助的。

These factors perhaps can explain why there has been a significant shift of sentiment among developing countries away from the US and toward China.
Leaving aside economic and military concerns, one thing that makes US hegemony increasingly unpopular in the world is its notion of soft power that puts too much emphasis on the importance of democracy within nation-states without realizing that all countries are not the same, all government systems function differently, all cultures cannot be blanketed with the same designated set of standards and protocols.

这些因素或许可以解释为什么发展中国家的态度发生了重大转变，开始远离美国亲近中国。
撇开经济和军事方面的担忧不谈，美国霸权在世界上越来越不受欢迎的一个原因是，它的软实力概念过分强调了国家内部民主的重要性，而没有意识到所有国家都不一样，所有政府体系运作不同，所有文化都不可能被同一套由别人指定的标准和协议所覆盖。

China seems to have realized this and seeks to offer a development package that emphasizes no-strings-attached aid and infrastructural assistance, respect for sovereignty, importance of a strong state, opposition to superpower domination, and support for a level playing field.
In this connection, if China succeeds in becoming a global hegemon, these emphases together with ethical elements rooted in Confucianism, a philosophy embraced by the Communist Party of China and currently being promoted worldwide as the ideology and culture of today’s China, are likely to be featured in the new order.

中国似乎已经意识到这一点，它所提供的发展方案，强调不附带任何条件的援助、基础设施帮助、强政府的重要性、尊重主权、反对超级大国的统治，以及支持公平的竞争环境。
在这方面，如果中国成功地成为一个全球领袖, 这些根植于儒家思想中的强调以及道德因素，作为当今中国的思想文化、一种被中国TG接受并正在全球推广的哲学思想，很可能会出现在新秩序中。

Another important determinant of becoming a global hegemon is political leadership. Since Donald Trump assumed the US presidency in January 2017, there has been a lot of discussion questioning his leadership and often drawing comparisons with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Trump’s presidency has been widely criticized and is unpopular overseas, deteriorating the global image and credibility of the US. A survey by Pew Research Center conducted in 37 countries showed US favorability ratings in the rest of the world dropping to 49% from 64% at the end of Barack Obama’s administration; in many countries the figure was lower than for either Russian President Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, and even below that of George W Bush in 2004 after the Iraq invasion.

中国成为全球领袖的另一个重要决定因素是政治领导能力。自唐纳德特朗普在2017年1月就任美国总统以来，有很多人在质疑他的领导能力，并经常拿他与中国主席进行比较。
特朗普的管理受到了广泛批评，在海外不受欢迎，恶化了美国的全球形象和信誉。皮尤研究中心在37个国家开展的一项调查显示，美国在世界范围的支持率为49%，而奥巴马政府任期结束时为64%;在许多国家，这一数字低于俄罗斯总统普京或中国主席，甚至低于2004年伊拉克入侵后的乔治布什。

Aside from Trump’s unfavorable character, many of his key policies under the “America First” slogan have been broadly controversial and opposed, such as building a wall between the US and Mexico, withdrawing the US from major trade and climate-change partnerships, banning people from some Muslim-majority countries entering the US, weakening health care, the “shithole” remark, the planned shift of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the more recent proposal of 25% tariffs on some Chinese imports. These acts of protectionism and isolationism are signs of abdication of its global leadership role to China.

除了特朗普那令人不快的性格, 他在“美国优先”口号下的许多关键政策都引起广泛争议和反对, 比如在美国和墨西哥之间建墙, 从主要的贸易、气候变化伙伴协议中撤出，禁止一些穆斯林占多数的国家的人民进入美国，削减医疗保险，“屎坑”言论，美国驻耶路撒冷大使馆搬迁计划，以及最近对部分中国进口商品征收25%关税的提议。
这些保护主义和孤立主义行为标志着它将全球领导地位让给中国。

When speaking about hegemony, it should not be considered solely in economic terms but in terms of politics and culture too. In economic terms, considering the heavy military burden borne by the US, its colossal amount of debt based on an addiction to spending and imports, and its dependence on China to finance its budget deficits, this underlines the fragility of American prosperity, and the speculation that China will overtake the US to undertake a position of global hegemony in the near future seems to be a sure thing.

在谈到霸权时，不应只考虑经济方面，还应考虑政治和文化。在经济方面，考虑到美国承受沉重的军事负担、其基于消费和进口的巨大债务、以及依赖中国为其预算赤字提供资金，这些都突显了美国繁荣的脆弱性, 中国在不久的将来取代美国成为全球领袖似乎是一件必然的事情。

But for a country to be accepted or welcomed, hegemony requires something more. American political scientist Joseph Nye once stated that China was far from America’s equal in soft power because of its lack of cultural industries or non-governmental organizations such as those in the US. However, China is now working hard to promote its culture and increase its own soft power around the world, for example establishing government-funded Confucius Institutes worldwide and sponsoring Lunar New Year celebrations around the world.

但是，对于一个被接受或受欢迎的国家来说，霸权需要更多的东西。美国政治学家约瑟夫•奈曾经说过，由于缺乏文化产业和类似美国的非政府组织，中国在软实力方面远远落后于美国。
然而，中国现在正在努力促进其文化的发展，并在世界范围内增加自己的软实力，例如在全世界建立政府资助的孔子学院，并在世界各地资助农历新年的庆祝活动。

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for the most part seen as a strategy to engineer China’s economic expansion and diplomatic influence overseas, will also serve well as a platform backing this.

“一带一路”倡议，在很大程度上被视为中国经济扩张和增强海外外交影响力的战略，也将成为支持其软实力发展的平台。

Within the next decade, China order will begin to take shape and, as Martin Jacques wrote in his renowned book When China Rules the World, it is likely to exercise power in new and distinctive ways that are congruent with its history and culture. It will reconfigure the world on its terms far more fundamentally than any other past hegemon.

在接下来的十年里，中国的秩序将开始成形，正如马丁•雅克在他的着名着作《当中国统治世界》【When China Rules the World】中所写的那样，它很可能以新的、独特的方式行使权力，这与中国的历史和文化是一致的。相比于过去的其他霸权，中国将更加根本的改变世界。

Sit back, relax and be prepared for the change.

坐下来，放松，为变革做好准备。

Dr Pattharapong Rattanasevee is a lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science and Law, Burapha University, Thailand. His academic interests focus on international relations, regionalism and Southeast Asia.

本文作者是泰国东方大学政治科学与法律学院的讲师。他的学术兴趣集中在国际关系、地区主义和东南亚。

Guobaorou楼主
SS: In the last few years, the public has started to wake up to the power that China has obtained through its continued economic rise. As their voters have become aware alongside / because of mainstream media, governments are now starting to address what many are seeing as China's replacing of the US hegemony. Nations and commentators are divided as to the effects this will have on the global order, and Western founded and backed international organisations and agreements. This article talks in turn about China's efforts to establish themselves in various areas around the world, and focuses a fair bit on Xi and his darling Belt and Road Initiative, contrasting it to Trump's actions, seen by many as isolating the US.

在过去的几年里，公众已经开始意识到中国通过持续的经济增长所获得的力量。因为主流媒体的报道，随着他们的选民意识到这一点，政府现在开始着手解决许多人眼中的中国取代美国霸权的问题。这对全球秩序、以及西方建立和支持的国际组织和协定会产生什么影响，各国和评论员意见不一。
这篇文章谈到了中国在世界各地的努力，并将重点放在中国主席和他的“一带一路”倡议上，将其与特朗普的行动进行对比，许多人认为特朗普是在孤立美国。

mt55645 
how does one become a global hegemon without military bases all over the globe? 

没有全球的军事基地，一个国家如何成为全球霸权？

astuteobservor
and usa is still here with it's huge military.
people are really over blowing this.
if the chinese economic transition succeeds, it will be a peer with the usa, but no way it will ever become a hegemon to replace usa.

美国仍然拥有庞大的军队。中国的军事实力被人们吹过头了。如果中国经济转型成功，它可以跟美国并列，但绝不可能取代美国成为霸权。

DaBIGmeow888
【and usa is still here with it's huge military. 】
The Sun will never set on the British empire... until it did.
Excessive indebtedness, unmanageable overseas commitments, and financial crisis is what doomed British empire, and America has exhibited these characteristics recently

不列颠帝国的太阳永不下落……直到太阳真的落了。
过度的负债、难以管理的海外承诺、以及金融危机让不列颠帝国灭亡，而美国最近也表现出了这些特征。

TypingMonkey59 
【and usa is still here with it's huge military. 】
And the USSR was still there with its huge military back in 1990.

苏联在1990年也拥有庞大的军队。

astuteobservor
ussr had no money, literally bankrupt. usa is still here with 20 trillion gdp. #1 in gdp, #2 in ppp, one of the highest per capita ppp or gdp.
china will not become a hegemon, it will become a peer of usa. unless usa goes full retard. usa absolute power will not go down unless it goes full gorbachev or yeltsin.

苏联没有钱，是真的破产了。美国仍然有20万亿的GDP。GDP排第一，PPP排第二，是人均GDP和PPP最高的国家之一。
中国不会成为霸主，它可以跟美国并列，除非美国全面衰落。美国的绝对实力不会下降，除非都是被戈尔巴乔夫或叶利钦这样的人统治。

Nefelia 
The USD losing global reserve currency status would go a long way towards reducing the US' global footprint. Given the US' domestic political climate, I can't help but think the US going full retard and facilitating such a loss in financial status as inevitable.

如果美元失去全球储备货币地位，会大大减少美国的全球实力，考虑到美国的国内政治气候，让我不禁认为美国会完全衰落、在财政状况上产生这样的损失是不可避免的。

Nefelia 
Depends entirely on when/if and to what extent the US dollar falls out of favour. The impact could be anything from a minor recession to a more serious and long-lasting downturn that leads to major economic decline.
I would be hesitant to rely on long term predictions, as they are based on static trends and expectations. Very few people in the early 1920s envisioned the Great Depression of the 1930s. And very few people today can know for sure is disaster will strike the economy of the US, or of China, or India, or any other country.

这完全取决于美元是否会、何时会以及失宠到什么程度。这种影响的范围可能从轻微衰退到更严重、更持久的经济衰退进而导致经济大幅崩盘。
我不愿相信长期的预测，因为它们是基于静态的趋势。20年代早期，几乎没人能预见到30年代的大萧条。如今也一样，几乎没人能确切的知道是否会有突然的灾难袭击到美国、中国、印度还有其他国家的经济。

Baconlightning
The USSR broke apart and lost half it's population. Do you think the USA will break apart?

苏联解体后失去了一半的人口。你认为美国会解体吗?

shadows888 
My thinking is, turning into Brazil slowly is a more realistic scenario over the next few decades.

我的想法是，在未来的几十年里慢慢的变得类似巴西，这样比较现实。

bobmarles3 
The US is among the richest and most technologically advanced countries in the world. It is not just going to disappear. China, for all the talk of them succeeding the US, remains far poorer and technologically behind.

美国仍然是世界上最富有、技术最先进的国家，不可能会灭亡。对于那些谈论中国正在取代美国的人应该要知道，中国仍然远比美国贫穷，技术上也远远落后。

Guobaorou
Well that would be more in line with the definition of hegemony as it pertains to the US. Hegemony can be argued as also being defined by, say, infrastructure and trade-based bilateral agreements, which China is accumulating, particularly in developing nations; East-coast Africa and Central-Asia are excellent examples of this.

好吧，拥有全球军事基地更符合霸权的定义，因为美国就是这样的。霸权也可以被认为是基础设施和以贸易为基础的双边协议，而这是中国正在积累的，特别是在发展中国家;东非和中亚地区就是很好的例子。

kolvindr 
While you are right, his point remains to be true. Without the military power to project your will worldwide at any time, you're not a global hegemon, as your competitors (namely the US) can easily use it's military to cut off and blockade your trade and support routes.

虽然你说得对，但他的观点仍然没问题，如果你没有军事实力来随时投射你的意志，你就不是一个全球霸权，因为你的竞争对手（也就是美国）可以轻易的用它的军事力量切断和封锁你的贸易线路和支持线路。

DaBIGmeow888
did USSR have bases all over the world? Yet USSR was considered a Superpower despite being mostly a continental land empire with 1 single aircraft carrier.
The threshold of being a superpower isn't that high to be honest.

苏联在世界各地都有基地吗? 然而苏联还是被认为是一个超级大国，哪怕它只是大陆性的陆地帝国，只有一艘航母。
老实说，成为超级大国的门槛并不是那么高。

jsfly
【how does one become a global hegemon without military bases all over the globe? 】
I'd argue military might is vastly overrated now that we're in the nuclear age where conventional warfare between superpowers is no longer a viable option with nukes in play. Thus, the frontiers of 21st century warfare will be focused on digital threats, technology, the space race, political/social media influence, economic sabotage, trade and technology and actual conflicts will only occur as proxy wars in minor developing countries.
China recognizes this and as such is much more interested in establishing global trade partners than military partners.

我认为现在的军事力量被大大高估了，因为我们处在核时代，超级大国之间的常规战争不再是一个可行的选择，因为核武器正在发挥作用。
因此，21世纪战争的前沿将集中于数字威胁、技术、太空竞赛、政治/社交媒体影响力、经济破坏、贸易，实际上冲突只会发生在较小的发展中国家，以代理人战争的形式。
中国认识到了这一点，因此对建立全球贸易伙伴的兴趣比对建立军事合作伙伴的兴趣更大。

deadjawa 
These are highly debatable points. First off, in order to be a world leader you must first and foremost carry a “big stick.” China understands this, and is throwing massive amounts of resources at developing weapons that can defeat US threats. The idea that China is approaching the idea of “hegemony” ( which I fundamentally disagree that’s what they are angling for) without projecting military might is just plain wrong. That’s why they are building military bases in the middle of the South China Sea. They are slowly trying to expand their military footprint as their technology enables them to do.
And I also disagree that the idea that peer competitors can no longer fight each other because of nuclear weapons is just plain wrong. In fact, given that warfare is becoming less about sending human beings in to conquer territory, and more about degrading your opponent’s systems of systems, peer warfare is now becoming more and more likely over time. Peer warfare will not look like carpet bombing of industrial infrastructure or nuclear warfare in the near future. This means casualty counts will remain low, and civilians won’t feel as threatened and nations won’t be as compelled to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent. And, delivery of those nuclear weapons is going to becoming increasingly unreliable anyway as more and better intercepting methods become available and R&D of countries nuclear arsenals plays second fiddle to defending the system of systems.
So I think you’re vastly overstating the idea that conventional arms will be irrelevant in the futute. I see quite the opposite trend. Big systems of systems (eg Navy AEGIS) will continue to become more capable, more unmanned, and more expensive - making them more important and more enticing targets. Conventional war is not going away. It’s just going to change.

你说的观点是有很大争议的。首先，为了成为一个世界领袖，最重要的是你必须要拥有“大棒”。 中国明白这一点，并且正在投入大量资源开发能够击败美国威胁的武器。认为中国正在成为霸权而不需要投射军事力量的想法是完全错误的（我也完全不相信这是中国在谋求的东西）。

这就是他们在南中国海的中部建造军事基地的原因。他们正慢慢地扩大他们的军事范围，因为他们现在的技术让他们能够做到这一点。
你的另一个观点我也不同意，就因为有了核武器两个竞争对手就不再打仗的想法是完全错误的。事实上，考虑到战争越来越少地把人类送去征服领土，更多的是削弱对手的体系，随着时间的推移，同级战争的可能性越来越大。

以后的同级战争不太可能是地毯式轰炸工业基础设施或核战争。这意味着伤亡人数将维持在低水平，平民不会感到威胁，国家也不会被迫使用核武器作为威慑。而且，无论如何，这些核武器的投送都会变得越来越不可靠，因为越来越多的拦截手段得到了发展，各个国家的核武库的研发也成为了保卫体系的次要手段。

所以我认为你过分夸大了常规战争在未来会变得无关紧要的观点。我看到了相反的趋势。大型体系(如海军宙斯盾)会变得更强大，更无人化，更昂贵，使它们成为更重要和更诱人的目标。常规战争不会消失，只是改变了形式。

Dilbertreloaded
I don’t understand this idea. Nuclear armed countries like Pakistan , India are not considered close to USA or even China in military might. Going to nuclear option is a red line compared to conventional warfare. Conventional warfare is also important when interfering in allied or non-home countries.
In war, using nukes can only mean one thing, assured mutual destruction.
Will a large country with a stable government immediately resort to nukes when conventional weapons are used by a hostile force to claim superiority in their periphery or neighboring state?

我不明白这个想法。像巴基斯坦这样的核武装国家，在军事上并不会被认为能接近美国或中国的水平。与常规战争相比，核武器是一条红线。常规战争在干预盟国或非其他国家时也很重要。
在战争中，使用核武器只意味着一件事，同归于尽。
当敌方势力使用常规武器在一个国家的边缘或它们的邻国取得优势时，拥有稳定政府的大国会立即动用核武器吗？

jsfly
【Will a large country with a stable government immediately resort to nukes when conventional weapons are used by a hostile force to claim superiority in their periphery or neighboring state? 】
No. That's called a proxy war and I've already addressed the issue in my comment.
One thing I'm missing the comment though is that China knows there's a very slim chance it can win a proxy war with conventional weapons against the United States at present and in the near future. Thus, their only viable option if a battle happens to be important enough is to threaten possible nuclear escalation.

不会，那只是代理人战争，我已经在我的评论中提到了这个问题。
有件事我在评论里漏掉了，那就是中国知道，在目前和不久的将来，想要用常规武器对抗美国赢得一场代理人战争，它只有非常渺茫的机会。因此，他们唯一可行的选择是，如果一场战斗非常重要，那就威胁美国要升级到核战争。

Guobaorou
I agree with this comment. In terms of military, China is mostly focusing on domestic reform and development. Purely military external partners are much fewer than trade partners, with most agreements for, say, ports being only partly related, and even then only apparently for protecting trade routes and access to resources. The maritime component of the BRI/OBOR allows China to develop an extended "string of pearls" of trade/naval port agreements, without necessitating the investment into dedicated military bases, though these are often controversial. Playing this focus on global trade in the media also allows China to be seen as a supporter and maybe even protector of free trade and globalisation.
China is also focusing heavily on developing its own technological capability, and is being pushed by the recent decision against ZTE. State media has been talking a lot about this in the last few days. This isn't being related so much to the military by the media at the moment, at least outwardly. But securing access to tech, preferably through domestic production, all ties in to Xi's Made in China 2025 policy.

我同意这一评论。中国主要关注国内改革和发展。他们关注纯粹的军事合作伙伴比贸易伙伴要少得多，大多数的港口协议只是部分与军事相关，甚至只是为了保护贸易通道和获取资源。一带一路的海上组成部分允许中国发展 “珍珠链”贸易/海军港口协议，而无需投资于专用的军事基地，尽管这些通常是有争议的。中国这些专注于全球贸易的行为，能让媒体把中国视为自由贸易和全球化的支持者，甚至是保护者。

中国也在大力发展自己的技术能力，由最近正在被针对的中兴等公司推动。媒体在过去几天里一直在谈论这些问题。这些与军事的关系不大，至少表面上如此。但通过国内生产，确保获得技术，所有这些都与中国制造2025的政策有关。

Sacrebuse
Manufacturing dependency. Reverse opium wars. If everything you need (including infrastructures) is made in China or by Chinese companies, there's little anybody else can offer you to side with them in case of conflict and your politicians are probably bought.

依靠制造业，放弃鸦片战争。如果你所需要的一切（包括基础设施）都是由中国制造或由中国的公司制造的，那么在发生冲突时，几乎没有人会站在你的一边，而且你的政客可能会被收买。

mt55645
scare mongering. china or any other country for that matter will never achieve that kind of dominance in manufacturing.

危言耸听。中国或其他国家都不可能在制造业中占据主导地位。

Sacrebuse
For some African countries, they're already there.
I fail to see how that's scaremongering. That's the deal most African countries have known for close to a century. They used to be consumer markets for their former colonial masters, selling them washing machines or cars in exchange for resources but the biggest shift in the last 10 years is China taking that place, they're cheaper, they have a lot more stuff to sell than former colonial powers and they offer loans through Chinese banks that are essentially painless for the current governments.

对一些非洲国家来说，中国已经占据主导地位了。
我看不出怎么危言耸听了。这是大多数非洲国家近一个世纪以来的共识。以前非洲作为消费市场为他们的前殖民统治者销售洗衣机或汽车,以换取资源, 但在过去的10年里最大的转变是中国在那里占据了主导。它们比以前的殖民列强卖得更便宜，而且它们通过中国的银行提供贷款，对当前政府来说基本上是满意的。

ZeroMikeEchoNovember
Unfortunately, the concept of hegemony is as dated as the world that existed before globalization.
China is the first of the 'multipolars,' a definite great power in Asia. India will follow shortly, and perhaps we may see a regional wildcard in Nigeria (or its rival AU), Indonesia, or a unified EU state. Either way, IMF projections have India, China, and the US as the three biggest economies post-2050, in that order. The US will have a clear and uncontested sphere of influence in the America's. The relative share of influence in Eurasia will be complex, and probably depend on India's efforts in the Quad and if China's BRI is a flop (which is looking more and more likely).
But if we want to make a judgment on hierarchy in global power politics.
Two of the biggest powers will be multi-ethnic, multi-cultural democracies with an existing global network of institutions and alliances (and developing for the other). It's hard to see China becoming anything more than a regional great power with the EU to its west, India to its southwest, and the US to its east.

不幸的是，霸权的概念跟以前的全球化一样过时了。
中国是亚洲第一个“多极化”的大国。印度将紧随其后，或许我们会看到尼日利亚(或其竞争对手澳大利亚)、印度尼西亚或统一的欧盟。无论是哪种情况，IMF的预测都将印度、中国和美国作为2050年后的三个最大经济体。美国将在美洲拥有明确且毫无争议的势力范围。在欧亚大陆，影响力的相对份额很复杂，这可能要取决于印度在四方会谈中的努力，以及中国的一带一路是否会失败(看起来越来越有可能)。

但如果我们想要对全球大国政治中的层次作出判断。其中两个最大的国家是多民族、多文化的民主国家，拥有全球机构和联盟网络。很难看出中国的实力能够超过地区大国的等级，因为它的西边是欧盟，西南是印度，东边是美国。

Moronica
As others have put forward in this thread, I have my doubts that China will become a global hegemony. It can definitely become a regional power, but there are some factors outside its control that stymie its ascension to a global one.
Principally is the demographics factor. Xi has already set extremely ambitious milestones (moderate prosperity by 2020, modernised socialism by 2035, modernised socialist power by 2050), which I find hard to reconcile with the hard facts of China's demographics. By way of comparison, China's working age population hit its peak in 2010, it will become an aging society by 2025, and it will hit its overall population peak in 2030. Even assuming that abolishing the one child policy will induce a population boom, the effects will only start to be felt two decades down the road and China must still undergo a period of contraction. I'm not optimistic enough to think that mechanisation will solve the productivity issue, or that China has sufficient resources to care for its increasing elderly.
Secondly, China is fundamentally constrained by surrounding middle powers. It only has one coastline, which is effectively blockaded by archipelagic nations as outlined in the island chains doctrine. It also explains why China is so desperate to secure the South China Sea, as it provides manoeuvring space within the confines of the first island chain. Taiwan is key to breaking the blockade of the first island chain (never mind the second or third), hence the insistence on Chinese reunification.
Part of the OBOR initiative is to forge an alternative route to westward markets via overland routes. The point of the maritime route is not to secure the Straits of Malacca for Chinese trade, but to bypass it altogether via infrastructure routes from the landlocked western provinces to coastal ports in friendly countries. The Kra canal is also an overlooked but crucial element of the initiative.

正如其他人在这篇帖子中说的，我对中国能否成为全球领袖抱怀疑态度。它肯定会成为一个地区强国，但在它的控制之外，还有一些因素阻碍了它成为全球霸权。

主要是人口因素。中国主席已经设定了极其宏伟的里程碑(到2020年实现小康，到2035年实现社会主义现代化，到2050年实现社会主义现代化的强国)，我发现这个目标很难与中国艰难的人口事实相一致。相比之下，中国在2010年达到劳动人口顶峰，到2025年将成为老龄化社会，到2030年将达到总人口顶峰。

即使假设取消独生子女政策可以让人口激增，但这种影响只有到20年后才会开始显现，而中国还必须经历一段时间的人口减少。我并不会乐观地认为机械化能够解决生产力问题，或者中国有足够的资源来照顾日益增长的老年人。

其次，中国受到周边国家的制约。它只有一条海岸线，实际上被群岛国家封锁，正如岛链学说所概述的那样。这也解释了为什么中国如此迫切地想要保护南中国海，因为它在第一岛链的范围内拥有迂回空间。台湾是打破第一岛链封锁的关键（更不用说第二岛链和第三岛链了）因此中国极力坚持要统一。

一带一路计划的一部分是通过陆路开辟另一条通往西方市场的路线。海上航线的目的不是为保护马六甲海峡，而是通过从内陆西部省份到友好国家沿海港口的基础设施路线，完全绕过马六甲海峡。克拉运河也是该倡议的一个被忽视但至关重要的因素。