希腊的债权人是该国解决其灾难的主要障碍（完） [美国媒体]

Greece’s creditors are now the mainimpediment to solving the country’s woes

希腊的债权人是该国解决其灾难的主要障碍



The biggest difference is now between theIMF and the Europeans

现在最大的意见分歧来自世界货币基金组织与这群欧洲人之间

If HISTORY repeats itself first as tragedyand then as farce, it continues thereafter as endless iterations of Greek debtdramas.

如果历史首先以悲剧继而以闹剧的方式重复自己，那么此后它会以这种无休止的希腊债务剧的循环方式持续下去。

The script is wearyingly familiar.

脚本已让人熟悉到腻味。

Greece’s European creditors are trying toclose the second review of its third bail-out, which was signed in August 2015.

希腊的欧洲债权人们正试图关闭对其第三次要钱渡过困境的第二轮复审，而这第三次是早在2015年八月便签署的。

That would enable them to lend Greece thefunds it needs to meet 6.3bn ($6.7bn) of bond repayments due in July.

那份签署的文件本来是要让它们借给希腊助其偿还七月份到期的债务所需的63亿欧元（67亿美元）的。

But talks have run aground ahead of ameeting of euro-zone finance ministers in Brussels on February 20th.

但是会谈却在二月20日的欧盟地区布鲁塞尔财长会议前夕搁浅。

Bond yields have spiked, German ministersare issuing barbed comments, and dust is being blown off the Grexit files.

债务的利息小幅上扬，德国的部长们发表了尖锐的评论，而蒙在希腊退出欧元区的那些文件上的灰尘也正在被吹开。

The review covers everything from healthcare to military wages.

这次复审覆盖了从医疗保健到军人工资等各个方面。

But thanks to pressure from the IMF – whichhas not yet joined the bail-out, as it did the previous two – Greece faces morepressing demands: to pass tax and pension reforms worth 2.5% of GDP, to kick inafter the bail-out expires.

但是鉴于来自国际货币基金组织的压力（实际上该组织从未加入过支援希腊钱的队伍，前两次也没有），希腊面临更具压力的要求：1）通过占其国民生产总值2.5%的税务及养老金改革，2）在支援的钱到期之后便要开始还钱。

Alexis Tsipras’s hard-left Syriza government will struggle to get these measuresthrough parliament, but the alternative is to call elections that Syriza wouldprobably lose to New Democracy, a centre-right party.

亚历克西斯·茨皮拉斯的极左翼联盟政府将会在国会拼命以通过上述措施，不过也不是没有其它选择，只是重新进行国会选举的话，极左翼联盟有可能输给中右翼政党新民主党。

Thousands of farmers wielding their producetook to the streets in Athens in outrage at more austerity (see picture).Unions are pondering further protests.

数千名农民带着他们的农产品在雅典大街上游行，他们表达着愤怒但更多的是为了表达他们的生活是多么不容易（见图片）。工会正在衡量是否要进行更多的抗议。

Greece has become a bystander to its owntragedy.

希腊正变成它自身悲剧的旁观者。

The conditions attached to the bail-outsdrastically reduce the government’s control over economic policy.

数次借钱附带的条件大大地降低了政府控制其经济政策的能力。

For many Greeks, this makes politics itselfpointless: 17% do not know a party they support (or will not say), while 15%will not vote at all. What sets today’s drama apart is the dispute among Greece’screditors.

这让许多希腊人认为政治毫无意义：17%的民众不了解他们支持的政党（或是知道了也不愿意说），而15%的民众完全不投票。整个事件闹到今天这个万众瞩目的地步实际上源自希腊各个债权人之间的争吵。

These date back to the complex architectureof euro-zone bail-outs, jerry-built in haste in 2010. But today the debate ismore public, and potentially more serious.

日期则要追溯到2010年，当时欧元区借债这座复杂的建筑物在仓促间以偷工减料的方式完成了。但是到了今天争论变得更公开，潜在来说也更严重。

The biggest difference is between the IMFand the Europeans. Burned by experience, the fund is jealously guarding its credibility.

最大的意见分歧来自国际货币基金组织和这群欧洲人之间。该基金组织一朝被蛇咬，致使它极度猜疑地保卫着它的信任感。

Having seen Greece consistently fail tomeet previous bail-out targets (see chart), it thinks the European Commission’sforecasts are too rosy, and that, without relief, Greece’s debt will balloon after2030, as cheap euro-zone loans are replaced by private finance.

在见证希腊一直没能达到先前借债的目标之后（见图表），该组织认为欧盟的预测太乐观。而且该组织还认为如果希腊的债务不减少的话，希腊的负债会在2030年之后因便宜的欧元区贷款被私人金融机构取代而膨胀。

It has two conditions for joining thebail-out: stricter (and pre-legislated) reforms from Greece, and a crediblepromise from euro-zone governments to relieve Greece’s debt burden when thebail-out expires, via guarantees of long-term cheap finance.

要它加入借钱给希腊的队伍，它还开出了两个条件：1）要求希腊执行更加严格（并且也是先于立法的）改革，2）要求欧元区各政府立下不会反悔的承诺，即当债务到期的时候减少希腊的债务负担，方法则是通过保证长期提供便宜的金融来实现。

European governments do not believe thatGreece needs debt relief. But they insist on IMF participation in the bail-outbecause they do not trust the commission to oversee the Greeks.

欧洲各政府不相信希腊需要减少债务。但是因为它们不相信欧盟委员会对希腊的监督，所以它们坚持要世界货币基金组织参与到此次借钱中来。

The Germans and Dutch will not approvefurther disbursements without the fund. That gives the IMF an effective veto.

没有该基金组织德国人和荷兰人将不会批准发放更多的钱。这样实际上给了国际货币基金组织有效的否决权。

For many Greeks, this makes politics itselfpointless: 17% do not know a party they support (or will not say), while 15%will not vote at all. What sets today’s drama apart is the dispute among Greece’screditors.

这让许多希腊人认为政治毫无意义：17%的民众不了解他们支持的政党（或是知道了也不愿意说），而15%的民众完全不投票。整个事件闹到今天这个万众瞩目的地步实际上源自希腊各个债券人之间的争吵。

These date back to the complex architectureof euro-zone bail-outs, jerry-built in haste in 2010. But today the debate ismore public, and potentially more serious.

日期则要追溯到2010年，当时欧元区借债这座复杂的建筑物在仓促间以偷工减料的方式完成了。但是到了今天争论变得更公开，潜在来说也更严重。

The biggest difference is between the IMFand the Europeans. Burned by experience, the fund is jealously guarding its credibility.

最大的意见分歧来自国际货币基金组织和这群欧洲人之间。该基金组织一朝被蛇咬，致使它极度猜疑地保卫着它的信任感。

Having seen Greece consistently fail tomeet previous bail-out targets (see chart), it thinks the European Commission’sforecasts are too rosy, and that, without relief, Greece’s debt will balloonafter 2030, as cheap euro-zone loans are replaced by private finance.

在见证希腊一直没能达到先前借债的目标之后（见图表），该组织认为欧盟的预测太乐观。而且该组织还认为如果希腊的债务不减少的话，希腊的负债会在2030年之后因便宜的欧元区贷款被私人金融机构取代而膨胀。

It has two conditions for joining thebail-out: stricter (and pre-legislated) reforms from Greece, and a crediblepromise from euro-zone governments to relieve Greece’s debt burden when thebail-out expires, via guarantees of long-term cheap finance.

要它加入借钱给希腊的队伍，它还开出了两个条件：1）要求希腊执行更加严格（并且也是先于立法的）改革，2）要求欧元区各政府立下不会反悔的承诺，即当债务到期的时候减少希腊的债务负担，方法则是通过保证长期提供便宜的金融来实现。

European governments do not believe thatGreece needs debt relief. But they insist on IMF participation in the bail-outbecause they do not trust the commission to oversee the Greeks.

欧洲各政府不相信希腊需要债务。但是因为它们不相信欧盟委员会对希腊的监督，所以它们坚持要世界货币基金组织参与到此次借钱中来。

The Germans and Dutch will not approvefurther disbursements without the fund. That gives the IMF an effective veto.

没有该基金组织德国人和荷兰人将不会批准发放更多的钱。这样实际上给了国际货币基金组织有效的否决权。

But it has its own problems. Its board,which must approve participation, is split; shareholders from non-Europeancountries do not see why they should stump up again.

但是该组织自己也存在问题，因为它那必须赞同参与借钱给希腊的董事会分裂了；从非欧洲国家来的股东们不明白为什么他们又要再掏一次腰包。

Most IMF staff are sick of Greece. “If thefund agrees to something on the basis of a hazy promise of future debt relief …then all this fancy talk about standing up to the Germans at the board wouldonce again be an empty show,” says Ashoka Mody, a former IMF official now atPrinceton University.

大部分国际货币基金组织的工作人员讨厌希腊。现身在普林斯顿大学的该组织前官员阿沙克·莫迪说：“如果该组织根据一个模糊的减少未来债务的承诺而同意了一些事情……那么   想要在董事会中谈论对抗德国人就将再次变成一场空洞的表演。”

Greece’s fiscal path is a particular pointof contention.

希腊的财政之路是一场竞争的特别连接点。

The IMF believes that the country cannotsustain the primary-surplus (ie, before interest) target of 3.5% of GDPdemanded in the bail-out by 2018, and that the austerity such goals imply willdelay the recovery.

国际货币基金组织相信希腊无法支撑到2018年达到息前国民生产总值3.5%的初级盈余目标，而这又是对它进行财政援助所必须的条件，而且为了达到这些目标就意味着必须执行的经济紧缩政策又会推迟经济复苏。

The Europeans insist Greece is on track:last year’s surplus target of 0.5% will be exceeded, and the commissionforecasts growth of 2.7% this year.

欧洲人坚持认为希腊走在正轨上：去年0.5%的盈余目标被突破了，而欧盟委员会预测今年的增长会达到2.7%。

Relations have become poisonous; oneEuropean official says the IMF is deploying “Trump University statistics”.

火热的关系已然变成了毒药；一个欧洲官员说国际货币基金组织正在利用“特朗普大学的统计法”。

Some formula will probably be found toallow to Greece to avoid default, though not in time for Monday’s meeting.

虽然赶不上周一的会议，但是人们还是可能会去找一些公式允许希腊避免拖欠。

But that will do little to alleviate Greece’smisery. GDP has shrunk by over one quarter since 2008, and the recovery hasbeen dismal by historical standards.

不过这对减轻希腊的痛苦无济于事。自从2008年以来，国民生产总值已经萎缩超过四分之一，而依照历史标准来看复苏的前景很惨淡。

Nearly a quarter of the workforce isjobless, and over a third of children are poor or nearly poor. Young, ambitiousGreeks have been forced abroad. Banks are clogged with non-performing loans,and tax-collection rates have actually fallen. Like its predecessors, Syrizahas learned the art of complying with bail-out targets without owning them. Thecurrent delays will hurt the economy and make it harder for Greece to return tothe markets next summer. A fourth bail-out looms.

接近四分之一的劳动人口失业，超过三分之一的儿童陷入或几乎陷入贫困。年轻而有雄心的希腊人被迫到国外去。银行困在无法偿还的贷款中，而缴税的比率在下滑。和它的前任们一样，极左翼联盟政府学会了服从却不承认的艺术——他们向紧急借贷开出的条件低头却又不承认这些条件。目前的拖延将伤害到经济，并会让希腊于明年夏天返回欧洲市场的目标更加艰难。

Locked inside the euro, unable to due,and confronted with German fears over a “transfer union”, Greece has beenforced down the road of internal duation and austerity.

因为被困在欧元中，不能进行货币贬值，还要面对德国不想变成“汇钱工具”这一事实，希腊被迫在贬值国内货币和经济紧缩的政策上越滑越远。

The government has met current expenditures(bar interest payments on debt) from revenues since 2014; today’s arguments arelargely about shuffling money from one public creditor to another.

自从2014年以来，希腊现政府的财政收入是可以满足当前的开支的（当然，这个是要撇开为借债支付的利息的）。今天的争论大部分是关于将钱从一个债主政府转移到另一个债主政府。

Even if the July deadline is met, furthercliff-edges lie ahead, meaning more summitry and more market jitters.

即使七月这个最后期限得到满足，还是有更多的难于跨越的横沟躺在前方，也就是说还有更多的高级会议要召开，而市场也会变得更加神经过敏。

Northern Europeans will grow more, notless, hostile to debt forgiveness, even if it comes in disguise. The deadlockthis time may not be as serious as in 2015, when Greece came close to ejectionfrom the euro. Yet it shows the problem of a bail-out architecture that isunfit for purpose but from which neither creditors nor Greeks can work out howto extricate themselves.

即使免除债务的方式经过伪装很隐蔽，越来越多而非越来越少的北欧人还是讨厌债务免除。这次的僵局可能不及2015年那次那样严重，当年希腊几乎就要被欧元区抛弃了。不过这次僵局还是显示出借债这座建筑物与建造它的目的有出入， 这样带来的一系列问题让债权人和希腊人都无法通过它找到使他们自己摆脱困境的方法。