公共外交是一种感知。就在一年前,这还是不可想象的事情,但是如今看来中国正成为世界上最受欢迎的超级强国。
Public diplomacy is perception. Remarkably—and, unthinkably, as recently as one year ago—today China seems to be the world’s most likeable superpower.
公共外交是一种感知。就在一年前,这还是不可想象的事情,但是如今看来中国正成为世界上最受欢迎的超级强国。
Compare Donald Trump’s recent visit to Europe with that of Premier Li Keqiang, China’s second-in-command. Li, who landed in Berlin on Wednesday, hoped to use his three-day trip, with stops in Germany and Belgium, to “voice support for an open economy, free trade and investment [and] global regional peace and stability,” according to China’s state news wire Xinhua. Trump, on the other hand, failed to support NATO, decried Germany as “very bad” for its trade policies, and even seemingly pushed aside Montenegro’s prime minister to barrel his way to the front of a group photo. On Thursday, Li reaffirmed China’s support for the Paris Agreement, stating that there is an “international responsibility” to fight climate change. Later on Thursday, Trump announced the United States would exit the landmark climate-change treaty. In that speech, Trump reaffirmed his commitment to his “America First,” policy, while Li, in his meetings and speeches in Europe, successfully painted China as a liberal, responsible, globalist power.
对比川普最近的欧洲访问,中国总理李克强上周三抵达柏林开始了他的德国和比利时的三天访问行程。“以开放的姿态支持自由贸易和投资以维护全球地区的和平与稳定”中国国家媒体新华社说。而川普却并不支持北约,并且谴责德国的贸易政策“非常糟糕”,甚至推开了挡道的黑山总理。上周四,李克强重申了对巴黎气候协议的支持,声称应有“国际责任”应对气候变化。而上周四晚些时候,川普宣布退出具有里程碑意义的巴黎气候协议。在演讲中,川普重申了他的承诺——“美国第一”政策,而李克强在欧洲的演讲成功得把中国展示成了一个自由的、负责任的全球化力量。
Yet in this case, perception is not reality. China is an illiberal, authoritarian nation, run by the Communist Party for the last 68 years. The United States, for all its faults, is a far more natural partner for most of the world’s countries. It’s a stable, multiparty democracy with a healthy, developed system of alliances, decades of experience in global intervention, and a proud tradition of defending both human rights (in words, if not always in action) and free trade. China is none of these things. But because of Trump’s shambolic presidency, a series of disastrous foreign-policy decisions, and Beijing’s concerted push to peel away U.S. allies, it currently seems to be winning the global battle for hearts and minds.
然后在这种情况下,感知并非现实。中国是一个由共产党统治了68年的狭隘的、专制的国家。美国尽管拥有很多缺点,却在世界拥有很多天然的合作伙伴。这是一个稳定的、多党制的民主国家,拥有健康、发达的联盟体系,数十年的全球干预经验,以及捍卫人权(口头上的,如果不行动)和自由贸易的骄傲传统。中国并没有这些优势。但由于川普的混乱领导,一系列灾难性的外交政策,北京目前已经离间了美国和他的盟友,北京目前似乎赢得了全球的人心。
China, over the last decade or so, has been prioritizing bilateral and multilateral relations, rather than alliances. Until the Trump presidency came along, that seemed like an obtuse strategy (though better than its decades-long isolationist foreign policy). Why would countries favor a subordinate relationship with Beijing when Washington granted them group security, international recognition, and favorable trade policies? In other words, how could countries like South Korea or Australia—or even, if current trends continue, Germany or France—possibly imagine that their relationships with Beijing, and not Washington, better served their interests?
中国过去十多年发展了很多双边和多边关系,而不是联盟。直到川普上任,这似乎是一个迟钝的政策(对他的几十年的孤立主义外交政策而言)。为什么美国的盟友会在华盛顿给予他们集体安全、国际认可和有利的贸易政策时,却依然要顺从北京?换句话说,为什么像韩国和澳大利亚这样的国家——甚至发展到德国和法国——为什么会觉得在北京、而不是华盛顿那能获得更好的利益?
Since last November, however, America and China’s respective strategies and realities have shifted. Some of Trump’s statements, like his inauguration address (“from this moment on, it’s going to be America first”) and actions have alienated American allies. And his four months of bungling foreign policy—from his rude and disastrous late-January call with Australia’s prime minister to his contentious Europe trip, to his abdication of global responsibility in exiting from the Paris Accords—have worried them.
自从去年十一月以来,美国和中国各自的战略现实已经改变。川普的一些声明,比如他的就职演说(“从这一刻起,美国第一将是首要任务”)和他的行动疏远了美国的盟友。他四个月的拙劣外交政策——自从他在一月下旬灾难性得、粗暴得对待加拿大总理而开始的欧洲行程,以及退出巴黎协议而造成的国际责任的丧失——使盟友们感到了担心。
The result, intentional or otherwise, is that allies and friendly nations have begun to at least think about the alternatives. Consider German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s response to Trump’s Europe trip. The continent should “take our fate into our own hands,” she said on Sunday, adding, “the times in which we could completely depend on others are on the way out.” After emphasizing that China “has become a a more important and strategic partner” in a meeting with Li on Thursday, she said “we are living in times of global uncertainty and see our responsibility to expand our partnership in all the different areas and to push for a world order based on law.” Merkel’s remarks not only indirectly rebuked Trump, but expressed a hope that China would shoulder some of the international responsibility America now seems to be yielding. Consider also the new president of South Korea’s surprisingly lukewarm messages towards Trump, and the debate in Australia about moving away from the United States. “Self-reliance and helping ourselves should be the keynote of our foreign policy,” Australia’s former Prime Minister Paul Keating said in April.
结果就是友好的盟友们开始寻找替代(美国的)方案。德国总理梅克尔上周末以“欧洲大陆应该把命运掌握在自己的手中”来回应川普的欧洲之行,并且说“我们依赖他人的时代已经离去了”,并且在上周四与李克强会面后强调“中国已经成为一个越加重要的战略伙伴”。她说“我们生活在一个不确定性影响全球的时代,我们有责任扩大在不同领域的合作并推动建立起基于规则的全球秩序。”梅克尔不仅间接地指责了川普,而且寄希望中国能够承担起美国所放弃的国际责任。同时韩国新的总统对川普出人意料的冷淡,以及澳大利亚对美国正渐行渐远——澳大利亚前总理在四月时曾表示“自力更生是我们外交政策的基调”。
Beijing is providing frameworks for all these nations to plug into a Chinese world order. The most prominent is “One Belt, One Road,” Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature trade initiative, which seeks to recreate the old Silk Road trading routes, with China once again at the center of the world’s economy. A May forum in Beijing on the initiative gathered Russian President Vladimir Putin, among other leaders, and officials from over three dozen countries, including the United States. China is also increasing its influence over existing frameworks like the United Nations, where it is now the second-largest contributor to the body’s peacekeeping budget, and even via the privately held World Economic Forum annual conference in Davos, Switzerland, this January, where Xi portrayed himself as the patron saint of globalization.
北京正为这些国家提供一个由中国构建的国际秩序。最突出的是一带一路——中国国家主席习近平提出了这一贸易倡议,旨在重现古代具有经济优势的丝绸之路的贸易线路,使中国再次成为世界的经济中心。在北京五月份举办的一带一路论坛上,聚集了俄罗斯总统普京、许多第三世界国家以及美国的官方代表。中国还在现有的国际秩序框架下——比如联合国——增加了自己的影响,中国现在是联合国维和预算的第二大贡献者。甚至在今年一月的瑞士达沃斯世界经济论坛年度会议上,习把自己描绘成了全球化的守护神。
In some prominent cases, the choice by allied or friendly nations to distance themselves from the United States does not necessarily mean they are moving closer to China. Some, including Japan, India, and Germany, are also seeking to diversify their foreign policies. For example, in an endurance test of high-level diplomacy, Merkel managed to host Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi between Trump and Li’s visits. And yet, this trend still benefits China, where many leading strategic thinkers fear that America’s alliances seek to contain China, similar to the U.S. Cold-War strategy towards the Soviet Union.
在一些特定情况下,美国的盟友们选择疏远美国并不代表着他们一定会靠近中国。比如日本、印度和德国,都在寻求多样化的外交政策。例如在高层外交方面,梅克尔在川普和李克强会面时成功得与印度总理穆迪实现了会面。然而,这一趋势依然会使中国受益,许多领先的战略思想家担心美国会利用盟友们来遏制中国,就像美国在冷战期间对苏联的政策一样。
Beijing is not only accepting warmer greetings from nations that feel spurned by the United States; it is actively trying to coerce America’s allies to distance themselves from China to assert its power. The prime example is South Korea: After Seoul decided earlier this year to deploy the THAAD anti-missile system, which Beijing fears could shoot down Chinese missiles, but which primarily serve to curtail North Korean aggression, Beijing retaliated economically. It reduced tourism between the two nations, and some South Korean businesses have faced boycotts in China.
北京不仅正在从担心被美国冷落的国家那获得温暖的问候,他正积极得通过强迫美国的盟友远离美国来主张他的权力。最好的例子是韩国:在首尔今年早些时候绝对部署萨德系统后,北京则减少了两国间的旅游和贸易,韩国的一些企业则在中国受到了抵制。
In Asia, “we’re seeing a region that’s equally afraid of being subject to Chinese retaliation as a region fleeing from Donald Trump,” Ely Ratner, a former deputy national security advisor to Joe Biden who’s now at the Council on Foreign Relations, told me. “I wouldn’t underestimate the former.”
在亚洲,“我们看到了一个地区,因为怕受到中国的报复而逃离川普”,目前就职于外交关系委员会的前副国家安全顾问Joe Biden说,“我不会低估中国”。
Beijing wants South Korea to remove THAAD. But it doesn’t want Seoul as an ally. Why? Because the world’s second-largest economy, and a nation that may dominate the 21st century, has no allies. Chinese diplomats and scholars don’t even regard North Korea and Pakistan, two neighboring nations with which it has maintained historically warm relations, as allies. Part of this has to do with timing. “By the time China became a more prominent diplomatic player in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the countries who most desired it were a pretty unsavory bunch: Venezuela, Iran, Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan,” Ratner said. That’s not to say China today is diplomatically isolated—far from it. Today, China has mostly shaken its reputation as a coddler of pariah states: Throughout the global financial crisis, Beijing seemed to realize it had more to gain by further integrating itself with the international order, leading to its expanding global influence.
北京希望韩国移除萨德,但不希望韩国变成盟友。为什么?因为这个世界第二大经济体、可能成为二十一世纪主宰的国家没有盟友。中国外交官和学者甚至不把历史上一直拥有有好关系的北韩和巴基斯坦视为盟友。这与时间有一定的关系。“当中国在上世纪末和本世纪初成为一个日益关键的外交角色时,只有一些令人讨厌的国家支持他:委内瑞拉、伊朗、缅甸、津巴布韦、苏丹。”Ratner说。这并不是说中国在今天是被孤立的——完全不是。今天,中国已经改变了他的不好的形象——在全球经融危机期间,北京开始意识到他有更进一步融入国际秩序的机会,并且持续不断得扩大他的全球影响力。
Yes, several eventualities could reverse this trend. Trump’s presidency, like the lives of prehistoric men, could be nasty, brutish, but also short. A more engaged America could soothe the damage Trump wrought to American alliances. Xi could decide China needs to manage its domestic issues first, and retreat diplomatically. Or perhaps he could overextend, and alienate friendly countries with unreasonable demands. Beijing could face an economic crisis, or, scarier to the Communist Party, a political one, potentially relieving it of control of China, or forcing it to share power—all possibilities that would distract from the extension of China’s power.
是的,有几个可能性能反转这一趋势。川普的总统任期,可能会像史前人类一样肮脏、野蛮,但也可能非常短暂。一个对盟友更加亲密的美国可以缓解川普对美国盟友造成的损害。习需要优先管理他的外交问题,并且在外交上趋于守势。或许他将会因为过度的扩张和不合理的要求而与友好的国家疏远。北京或许将面临经济危机,或许共产党将面临被迫分权的恐惧——这些可能性都将使中国分心。
In a June 2012 conversation, a high-ranking Chinese diplomat told me Beijing doesn’t believe in alliances. Rather, it sees relationships, including with the United States, in bilateral terms. The diplomat said two countries are like neighbors. As Beijing’s plants keeps growing—China now has legitimate political and economic interests and entanglements in almost every country in the world—Washington should recognize that new reality and gracefully yield, the diplomat told me.
在2012年7月的一次会谈中,中国的一位高级外交官告诉我北京不相信联盟关系。他们宁可与包括美国在内的国家进行双边或多边的谈判。这位外交官说中美两国就像邻居。随着中国势力的发展,中国的政治、经济和关切对世界上的每个国家都产生了影响——华盛顿应该认清这个现实并且优雅得接受。
Five years on, Trump is yielding—neither gracefully, nor altogether intentionally.
五年过去了,川普既不优雅也不在意。
我们致力于传递世界各地老百姓最真实、最直接、最详尽的对中国的看法
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