中国在欧洲的战略投资：海港案例 [美国媒体]

China’s Strategic Investments in Europe: The Case of Maritime Ports

中国在欧洲的战略投资: 海港案例

Posted on June 30, 2018 by Yves Smith

2018年6月30日由伊夫史密斯发布

The EU is currently working on a new framework for screening foreign direct investments (FDI). Maritime ports represent the cornerstone of the EU trade infrastructure, as 70% of goods crossing European borders travel by sea. This blog post seeks to inform this debate by looking at recent Chinese involvement in EU ports.

欧盟目前正在制定一个筛选外国直接投资的新框架，海港是欧盟贸易基础设施的基石，因为跨越欧洲边界的货物中有70%是海上运输。这篇博文试图通过观察中国最近在欧盟港口的介入来为这场辩论提供信息。

In September 2017 Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, proposed a new EU framework for screening foreign direct investments (FDI), arguing that ‘if a foreign, state-owned, company wants to purchase a European harbour, part of our energy infrastructure or a defence technology firm, this should only happen in transparency, with scrutiny and debate’.

2017年9月，欧盟委员会主席让-克洛德容克( jean-claude juncker) 提出了一个新的欧盟框架，用于筛选外国直接投资(Fdi)，他辩称，“如果一家外国国有企业想要收购欧洲港口、我们能源基础设施的一部分或一家国防技术公司，这只应在透明的情况下进行，并进行审查和辩论”。

This proposal sparked a large debate in Europe over whether the EU should have the power to vet FDI and how this would work in practice.
Earlier this year, European leaders called on the Council and the European Parliament to make further progress on this topic. The Council accordingly agreed on June 13th 2018 to start negotiations with the European Parliament, in the hope of reaching an agreement before the next elections.

这一提议在欧洲引发了一场大辩论，争论的焦点是欧盟是否应该有权审查外国直接投资，以及这将如何在实践中发挥作用。
今年早些时候，欧洲领导人呼吁欧洲理事会和欧洲议会在这一问题上取得进一步进展，因此，理事会于2018年6月13日商定开始与欧洲议会谈判，希望在下次选举之前达成协议。
鉴于这些事件，我们试图通过查看中国参与欧盟海港的数字来为本次辩论提供参考。

In light of these events, we seek to inform this debate by looking at the figures of China’s involvement in EU maritime ports.
Maritime ports are a vital asset for the competitiveness of the European economy. With over 70% of goods crossing European borders travelling by sea, ports are indeed the gateway to the EU. European ports employ 1.5 million people and currently handle 1,700 billion-worth of goods (Figure 1).
Figure 1 – Top ten European ports by container volume, 2016
Source: Bruegel.

海港是欧洲经济竞争力的重要资本，由于70%以上的货物是通过海上运输的，港口是进入欧盟的门户，欧洲港口雇用150万人，目前处理价值17，000亿欧元货物 (图1)。

 

图1-按集装箱数量分列的欧洲十大港口，2016年
资料来源：Bruegel

EU ports have recently caught the attention of various Chinese corporations, as China undertakes infrastructure projects around the world as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The BRI is an international infrastructure and trade development project led by the Chinese government in an effort to pursue greater cooperation and deeper integration of China into the world economy. It is, in the simplest sense, a vision to carry on the ‘Silk Road spirit’ – “communication and cooperation between the East and the West”.
The “Belt” includes overland transportation routes spanning Eurasia that connect China, Europe, Russia, and the Middle East. The “Road” refers to maritime routes starting in China that go on to Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Middle East, eastern African states and eventually end in the Mediterranean Sea and northern European countries.
In 2016, the China Development Bank provided $12.6 billion in funding to BRI projects. China also set up the Silk Road Fund solely to invest in BRI ventures.
In this context, over the last decade, private and state-owned Chinese firms have acquired stakes in eight maritime ports in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain (Figure 2).
Figure 2 – The Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese stakes in top European ports
Source: Bruegel.

欧洲港口最近吸引了多家中国企业的注意，作为其“一带一路”计划的一部分，中国在世界各地开展基础设施项目。
“一带一路”一个由中国政府牵头的国际基础设施和贸易发展项目，旨在促进中国与世界经济的更大合作和更深层次的融合，从最简单的意义上说，这是贯彻“丝绸之路精神”——“东西方之间的交流与合作”的愿景。

“一带”包括横跨欧亚大陆的陆路运输路线，连接中国、欧洲、俄罗斯和中东。“一路”是指从中国到斯里兰卡、巴基斯坦、中东、东非国家，最终到达地中海和北欧国家的海上航线。
2016年，中国国家开发银行为“一带一路”项目提供了126亿美元的资金，中国还设立了丝绸之路基金，专门用于投资“一带一路”企业。
在这种背景下，在过去十年中，中国的私营和国有企业在比利时、法国、希腊、意大利、荷兰和西班牙的八个海港获得了股份(图2)。



图2-一带一路倡议和中国占股的欧洲顶级港口
资料来源：Bruegel

As the only multi-billion dollar port investment in the EU, the acquisition of a 35-year lease of Greece’s Piraeus Port by the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), certainly represents China’s flagship project in this field.
In 2008, COSCO signed a deal with the Piraeus Port Authority to operate two of the port’s three terminals. In subsequent deals COSCO has since become a majority stakeholder in the Piraeus Port Authority, which operates the port’s third terminal.
Since its acquisition by COSCO, the port has experienced unprecedented growth due to new technology and infrastructure upgrades. In six years, port traffic grew by over 300%. Under new management and with millions of euros spent to expand port capacity, COSCO aims to have Piraeus rank as one of the busiest ports in Europe.
This major investment reflects the fact that China considers the southern and eastern European regions as strategic. The Piraeus investment indeed extends beyond the maritime port itself, as China also plans to build the Land-Sea Express Route – a network of railroad connections from the port to the western Balkans and northern Europe.

作为欧盟唯一价值数十亿美元的港口投资，中国远洋运输公司(COSCO)以35年租约收购希腊比雷埃夫斯港的，无疑是中国在这一领域的旗舰项目。
2008年，中远集团与比雷埃夫斯港务局签署了一项协议，将运营该港口三个码头中的两个，在随后的交易中，中远集团已成为比雷埃夫斯港务局的主要利益攸关方，比雷埃夫斯港务局经营着该港的第三个码头。

自中远收购以来，由于新技术和基础设施的升级，港口经历了前所未有的增长，这六年中，港口交通增长了300%以上，在新管理层的领导下，中远斥资数百万欧元扩大港口产能，目标是让比雷埃夫斯港成为欧洲最繁忙的港口之一。
这一重大投资反映了中国认为南欧和东欧地区具有战略意义这一事实。
比雷埃夫斯的投资确实超出了海港本身的范围，因为中国还计划建设陆海快速通道——从港口到西巴尔干半岛和北欧的铁路连接网络。

In 2013 the Piraeus port was connected to the Greek railway system, but the current railway connections in the region have fewer tracts, low travel speeds, and cannot accommodate larger trains. China’s project to establish new railway lines connecting the Piraeus with the western Balkans and northern Europe could revolutionise EU trade routes. Compared to existing shipping routes, which go around the Strait of Gibraltar, the Land-Sea Express Route could indeed decrease shipping time between China and the EU by 8-12 days.
These plans to increase rail connectivity have already attracted large companies to the Piraeus. Hewlett Packard (HP), Hyundai, and Sony have all decided to open logistics centres in the Piraeus and use the port as their primary distribution centre for shipments to eastern and central Europe, as well as to northern Africa.
HP’s decision to shift operations from the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands to the Piraeus indicates that, with expanded rail and freight connections, Piraeus could represent a cheaper and more viable option compared to northern European ports.
Though the port of Rotterdam will likely maintain its primacy as the busiest port in Europe, the Piraeus port is set to continue to see an uptick in business upon the completion of more BRI projects.
Though the port of Rotterdam will likely maintain its primacy as the busiest port in Europe, the Piraeus port is set to continue to see an uptick in business upon the completion of more BRI projects.
Hungary, Serbia, and China already signed a trilateral plan to build a new railway line between Budapest and Belgrade, financed with loans from the Export-Import Bank of China. Construction has already begun in Serbia but remains stalled in Hungary due to an investigation by the European Commission, since Hungary did not open the project up to public tender until recently.

2013年，比雷埃夫斯港与希腊铁路系统连接，但该区域目前的铁路连接较少，运行速度低，不能容纳较大的列车。
中国建立连接比雷埃夫斯与西巴尔干半岛和北欧的新铁路线的项目，可能会对欧盟的贸易路线产生革命性的影响。
与现有的环绕直布罗陀海峡的航线相比，陆海快速航线确实可以将中国与欧盟之间的航运时间缩短8-12天。

这些增加铁路连接的计划已经吸引了很多大公司来到比雷埃夫斯。
惠普、现代和索尼都决定在比雷埃夫斯开设物流中心，并将皮雷埃夫斯港作为向东欧、中欧以及北非发货的主要配送中心。
惠普将业务从荷兰鹿特丹港转移到比雷埃夫斯港的决定表明，随着铁路和货运连接的扩大，比雷埃夫斯港可能是比北欧港口更便宜、更可行的选择。
虽然鹿特丹港很可能保持其作为欧洲最繁忙港口的首要地位，但雷埃夫斯港在完成更多的“一带一路”项目后，业务将继续增长。
匈牙利、塞尔维亚和中国已经签署了修建布达佩斯和贝尔格莱德之间新铁路线的三边计划，资金来自中国进出口银行的贷款，塞尔维亚已经开始施工，但由于欧盟委员会的调查，匈牙利仍处于停滞状态，因为匈牙利直到最近才公开招标。

New cargo routes will require new storage and shipment centres and will bring more business to south-eastern Europe. The Land-Sea Express Route, in conjunction with other BRI projects, is thus set to enhance the role of southern and eastern European countries in the continental trade routes.
Notwithstanding these major developments, the EU remains divided over its response to the BRI. To date, only 11 EU Member States have officially joined the BRI project. Though most recognise the increasingly important political and economic relationship between the EU and China, there are still reservations over China’s motives behind the BRI and the impact it would have on domestic markets.
For instance, despite stating his support for increased EU-China cooperation, France’s president Emmanuel Macron expressed his hesitations by stating that the new “roads cannot be those of a new hegemony” and “cannot be one-way”. Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel has taken a similar stance, pushing for reciprocity and stating her worry that economic relations will be linked with political questions.
Unlike France and Germany, Greece has warmly welcomed Chinese investment, with its prime minister Alexis Tsipras affirming Greece’s desire to “serve as China’s gateway into Europe.” In 2017 Greece blocked an EU statement on Chinese human-rights violations, further feeding into the fear that the BRI could be used by China to exercise political leverage over involved countries.

新的货运路线将需要新的储存和运输中心，并将为东南欧带来更多的业务。
因此，陆海快速通道与其他“一带一路”项目一道，将加强南欧和东欧国家在大陆贸易线路中的作用。

尽管取得了这些重大进展，但欧盟在对“一带一路”的回应问题上仍存在分歧。
迄今为止，只有11个欧盟成员国正式加入了“一带一路”倡议项目，尽管多数人认识到欧盟与中国之间日益重要的政治和经济关系，但对于中国支持“一带一路”的动机及其对国内市场的影响仍持保留态度。
例如，尽管法国总统伊曼纽尔·拉加德·马克龙表示支持加强欧盟与中国的合作，“新丝路不能是新的霸权”，“ 不能是单向的”，他对此表现出犹豫不决。

德国总理安格拉·默克尔也采取了类似的立场，主张推动互惠，并表示她担心经济关系将与政治问题联系在一起。
与法国和德国不同，希腊热烈欢迎中国投资，希腊总理亚历克西斯·齐普拉斯肯定了希腊“充当中国进入欧洲大门”的愿望。2017年，希腊否决了欧盟关于中国侵犯人权行为的声明，进一步加剧了中国可能利用“一带一路”对相关国家施加政治影响力的担忧。

China maintains close ties in its 16+1 framework of cooperation with 16 central and eastern European countries, all of which are either EU Member States or official EU candidate countries. The 16+1 setup has been perceived by several EU leaders as a Chinese effort to undermine EU unity.
Maritime activities are already an important component of China’s economy, and the country seeks to expand its international naval presence and operations by creating partnerships with ports in which it has stakes. China also aims to ensure access to critical infrastructure and resources it will need to drive economic growth.
Given their strategic relevance, we consider that the Council and the European Parliament cannot avoid taking maritime activities into consideration during their discussions on the EU framework for screening foreign direct investments.

中国在16+1合作框架内与16个中欧和东欧国家保持着密切联系，这些国家都是欧盟成员国或欧盟的正式候选国。
一些欧盟领导人认为，16+1体制是中国破坏欧盟团结的一种企图。
海上经贸活动已经是中国经济的一个重要组成部分，中国寻求通过与其拥有股份的港口的国家建立伙伴关系，扩大其国际海军存在和行动。
中国还致力于确保能够获得推动经济增长所需的关键基础设施和资源。
鉴于其战略意义，我们认为，在讨论欧盟审查外国直接投资框架的过程中，欧洲理事会和欧洲议会必须将海上经贸活动纳入考虑范围。

gnat
business is always any nation’s or alliance’s achilles heel. blind with greed, with few or no other concerns than amassing and acquiring, businesses sell out every time. china is making itself indispensable on one continent after another.
the well deserved irony here is that greece, kicked to the curb by the EU, its supposedly natural allies, has every reason to regain some financial health by these deals, and little reason to care what the rest of the “union” thinks, fears or wants.

商业永远是任何国家或联盟的致命弱点。贪婪蒙蔽了双眼，企业很少或没有其他的担忧，而不是积累和获取，企业每次都会卖光自己，中国正使自己在一个又一个大陆上成为不可或缺的国家。
具有讽刺意味的是，希腊被理应是天然的盟友欧盟——踢到了一边，完全有理由通过这些交易重新获得一些财富，并改善自己的财务健康状况，它也没有理由去关心其“盟友”的想法、它们恐惧或想要什么。

Roger Boyd
June 30, 2018 at 1:02 pm
Varoufakis, the ex-Greek finance minister states in his book that China was warned off from making investments during the Greek debt crisis that could have helped support the Greek government against the Troika. The Greeks have no reason to see the EU as their “friends”.

希腊前财长瓦鲁法基斯在他的书中指出，在希腊债务危机期间，中国被警告不要进行有助于支持希腊政府对抗“三驾马车”的投资，希腊人没有理由将欧盟视为他们的“朋友”。

Louis Fyne
June 30, 2018 at 8:00 am
the 5-10,000 mile supply chain, whether in goods or LNG, whether EU-East Asia, EU-US, US-East Asia, etc. is going to make slowing greenhouse emissions impossible for the near term. barring the regulatory hammer coming down on freight emissions,or Star Trek levels of tech breakthrough.
where’s Michael Moore or Al Gore on this? guess it’s easier to rouse up the people on something about Trump.

这条长达5-10，000英里的供应链，无论是在货物方面还是在液化天然气领域，无论是欧盟-东亚、欧盟-美国、美国-东亚等，都将使温室气体排放在短期内无法放缓，除非是对货运排放进行监管，或者是有《星际迷航》那样的技术突破。
迈克尔·摩尔( 译注：Michael Moore ，不知道是谁) 或阿尔·戈尔( 译注：Al Gore，环境学家，政治学家) 在这件事上的立场如何？
我想，特朗普相关的一些事情可能会更容易引起关注。

Jeremy Grimm
June 30, 2018 at 6:10 pm
These long supply lines are definitely a concern for efforts to reduce greenhouse emissions but the problem is the long delay before experiencing their impacts. I believe the long supply lines build a dangerous fragility into our economies. I fear what could happen when Saudi oil starts to run out. The long supply lines reflect the fragmentation and geographic spread of production. Most products represent a complex assembly of parts and processes spread around the globe. In many cases the want of a single part can shut down production — and inventories are kept ‘lean’ and ‘agile’ and so could run out quickly. Similarly the warehouses of goods, some of them needs not wants are remote from their points of consumption where again the inventories are kept ‘lean’ and ‘agile’. I think the major cities would be most vulnerable and most dangerous as jobs leave and food runs out.
A hypothetical I’ve been mulling — suppose the long supply lines for goods and services in the U.S. shut down. Would the U.S. be able to reassemble the many industries that have been fragmented? If transportation costs went up significantly how might that affect the location of various industries? I suspect economies of scale would scale very differently.

这些漫长的供应线无疑是试图减少温室气体排放的人的一个关切点，但问题更在于在受到影响之前的长时间拖延。
我认为，漫长的供给线给我们的经济带来了危险的脆弱性，我有点担心当沙特石油开始枯竭时会发生什么。
漫长的供应线反映了生产的支离破碎和地理分布的放大，大多数产品代表着遍布全球的复杂零件和工艺组合。
在许多情况下，单一零件的缺乏会导致生产停产，库存也会保持“精益”和“灵活”，因此可能很快就会耗尽。
类似地，一些不需要的货物仓库与它们的消费点相距甚远，我认为，随着工作岗位流失和食品短缺，大城市将是最脆弱和最危险的。
我一直在考虑这样一个假设：假设美国的长期商品和服务供应线关闭了，美国能重新整合那些已经支离破碎的产业吗？如果运输成本大幅上升，这将如何影响各个行业？我怀疑规模经济的“规模 ”届时会大不相同。

Steve H.
June 30, 2018 at 10:26 am
Thank you, informative article.
Noting the difference with ‘only 11′ v ’16+1’, China only needs to increase European membership in the BRI by about a third to avoid losing a qualified majority vote in the EU.

感谢，信息量很丰富的一篇文章。
我留意到“ 11”与“16+1”的区别，中国只需将欧洲在“一带一路”项目的成员增加约三分之一，就能避免失去在欧盟的合格多数选票。

MyLessThanPrimeBeef
June 30, 2018 at 2:53 pm
China only needs to increase European membership (16 currently?) in the BRI by about a third (5 or 6 more?) to avoid losing (losing? Does China have a quality majority now and what does it mean to say China has a qualified majority vote in the EU) a qualified majority vote in the EU?
What is European membership? Is that different from EU membership?

中国只需将欧洲在BRI的成员(目前为16个)增加约三分之一(5个或6个以上)，以避免失去。。？？( 失去？中国现在是否拥有绝对多数？你说中国在欧盟有合格多数票是神马意思？
什么是欧洲成员国？这和加入欧盟有什么不同吗？

Lambert Strether
June 30, 2018 at 1:31 pm
> China considers the southern and eastern European regions as strategic…. China also plans to build the Land-Sea Express Route – a network of railroad connections from the port to the western Balkans and northern Europe.
“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the world.” –Halford Mackinder
Now, I’m not sure I believe this; it certainly didn’t work out that way for the USSR. And it’s not working out for NATO, now. But Xi and company might believe it.

“  中国认为南欧和东欧地区具有战略意义。。中国还计划修建陆海快线——从港口到西巴尔干半岛和北欧的铁路连接网络。。”
——“谁统治东欧，谁就能统治欧洲心脏地带；谁统治欧洲心脏地带，谁就能统治世界岛（译注：即欧亚非大陆）；谁统治世界岛，谁就能控制世界。”——哈福德·麦金德（译注：着名地缘政治学家）
现在，我不确定我是否相信这一点，反正对于苏联来说，这是不可能的，而现在，对北约来说也还不够。
但XXX和他的公司可能会相信这一点。

MyLessThanPrimeBeef
June 30, 2018 at 3:02 pm
Recalling the claim by the South China Morning Post a few months that the trade war between China and America was over a while back, and the US lost, reading this post, it seems like Europeans are acting as if they are at (trade) war with China. 
Perhaps they don”t want to be like America and only find out (from SCMP) after they have been defeated.

回顾几个月前“南华早报”一篇报道，并称中美之间的贸易战已经结束了，根据这篇文章，似乎美国输了，看起来欧洲人的行为就好像是在和中国打( 贸易战 )
也许他们（欧洲）不想像美国一样，只有在被击败后才会发现( 引自南华早报 ) 。

Unna
June 30, 2018 at 6:58 pm
If I’m reading my map correctly, the Chinese have to go through Greece, then Macedonia, then Serbia, then Hungary to get to the German speaking lands and Western Europe. So does Russian gas via Turkey. Think how vital Macedonia is then in the West’s efforts to block the Chinese and their very best friends, the Russians. America had already put the thumb on Bulgaria as far as a Black Sea gas pipeline goes, but they now seem to be trying to squirm out of that. It’s important for the ”West” to block pretty much all infrastructure projects in Eurasia: German Russian gas pipelines, Iranian Indian pipelines, trans Eurasian railroads, seaports etc. Watch what happens when the Russians propose building pipelines from Russia into N Korea then S Korea and then under the ocean to Japan. Hell hath no fury then an aging Hegemon scorned, or something like that. Sort of echos the so called pre WW1 Berlin to Baghdad-Basra Railway project generally opposed by the British: as per Wikipedia in a “light” article: “…the existence of the railway would have created a threat to British dominance over German trade, as it would have given German industry access to oil, and a port in the Persian Gulf.” All as per the Mackinder and now Brzezinski theory. When was the last time America proposed a grand infrastructure project tying in a north to south South American transportation project along with a trillion dollar high speed rail project in North America? Maritime powers try to prevent Continental powers from developing and connecting – at least according to some theories. I remember reading that in the last 12 years, China built 16,000 km of high speed rail. Why can’t Trump and Trudeau get together and build just one? Instead, they squabble about cheese – and not very good cheese at that.

如果我没有看错地图，中国人必须先经过希腊，然后是马其顿，然后是塞尔维亚，然后是匈牙利，才能到达讲德语的国家和西欧，俄罗斯天然气通过土耳其也是如此。
想想看，在西方阻止中国和他们最好的朋友俄罗斯人的努力中，马其顿是多么重要，美国已经在黑海天然气管道上向保加利亚伸出了手，但他们现在似乎正试图摆脱这一局面。
对于“西方”来说，阻断欧亚大陆几乎所有的基础设施项目是很重要的：德国俄罗斯天然气管道、伊朗印度管道、跨欧亚铁路、海港等，看看当俄国人提议修建从俄罗斯到朝鲜，再到韩国，再从海底到日本的管道时，会发生什么。
该死，没必要愤怒，也不需要抱有一个老去的霸主被蔑视，或这种类似的情绪，这有点呼应了第一次世界大战前柏林到巴格达-巴士拉铁路项目遭英国人的普遍反对：根据维基百科在一篇文章：“。。这条铁路的存在将会对英国在德国贸易方面的主导地位构成威胁，因为这将使德国工业获得石油，以及波斯湾的一个港口。“
这一切都符合麦克金德和布热津斯基的理论。
美国上一次提出一个庞大的基础设施项目是什么时候，北美与南美的运输项目以及北美的一万亿美元高速铁路项目？“ 海洋强国会试图阻止大陆势力的发展和联系”——至少根据一些理论是这样的。
我记得在过去的12年里，中国修建了16000公里的高速铁路，为什么特朗普和特鲁多（译注：这里是指加拿大总理贾斯廷 · 特鲁多）不能聚在一起，哪怕建上一个这样的项目啊？相反，他们为奶酪争论不休——而且还不是什么好奶酪。。（译注：川普对加征收钢铁铝加征关税，墨西哥、加拿大反击，对美国扁钢、奶酪加征，但好像墨、加两国还没有付诸实际。）

Chauncey Gardiner
June 30, 2018 at 7:56 pm
Direct investment in EU maritime ports discussed here is one aspect of China’s trade with the EU, but direct investment in and shipments by rail are also growing rapidly. A Reuters article this week discussed the logistics bottlenecks of rail shipments of goods from China into Northern Europe via Belarus and Poland due to the rapid growth in trade volumes.

这里讨论的欧盟海港的直接投资是中国与欧盟贸易的一个方面，但对铁路的直接投资和铁路运输也在迅速增长。
本周路透社的一篇文章讨论了由于贸易量的快速增长，从中国通过白俄罗斯和波兰向北欧运送货物的物流瓶颈问题。

mauisurfer
June 30, 2018 at 10:45 pm
Please correct me if I am wrong.
I recall that Greece was forced to sell the port (or a large part of it) at Piraeus because the EU (i.e. German and French bankers) required austerity rather than some form of debt haircut.
And China was there as purchaser.
So the irony is that German/French bankers forced the sale of port to China by Greece. And now they realize that it will cost German/French shipping in the long run, probably a lot more money than debt haircut would have cost.
And of course, Greece lost its valuable asset.

如果我错了，请纠正我。
我记得，希腊被迫在比雷埃夫斯出售港口(或大部分港口)，是因为欧盟( 即德国和法国银行家 ) 要求的是紧缩政策，而不是某种形式的债务削减。
当时中国成为了收购者。
因此，具有讽刺意味的是，正是德国/法国银行家迫使希腊向中国出售港口，现在他们意识到，从长远来看，这将变相增加德国/法国的船运成本，可能比削减债务所需的成本要高得多。
当然，希腊失去了宝贵的资产。