安全研究机构指出：中国正在非洲展示其军事实力 [美国媒体]

ISS: China tests its military muscle in Africa

安全研究机构指出：中国正在非洲展示其军事实力


  
Is the hugely successful film Wolf Warrior 2 a metaphor for China’s growing presence in Africa – and perhaps beyond? It’s an action thriller featuring a Rambo-like Chinese hero called Leng Feng. He takes on the bad guys, first at home and then in Africa, where he foils Somali pirates, rebels and mercenaries trying to overthrow a government. In passing he tackles a deadly (fictitious) infectious disease called Lamanla.

《战狼2》这样一部非常成功的电影是否隐喻了中国在非洲日益增长的影响力——也许还不止于此？这是一部惊险的动作片，讲述了一个兰博式的中国英雄，他名叫冷锋。他先是在国内，然后是在非洲对付各种坏人，在那里，他要对付索马里海盗、反政府武装和试图推翻政府的雇佣军。在这一过程中，他感染上了一种致命的(虚构的)传染病——拉曼拉病毒。

Like his American inspiration, Feng is something of a maverick who has been discharged from the Chinese army and who pushes official limits. Nonetheless he is ultimately a great patriot (otherwise, presumably, the Chinese embassy in Pretoria wouldn’t be hosting the South African premiere next week).

就像他从中获得灵感的那位美国英雄一样，冷锋也是一个特立独行的人，他曾被中国军队解职，并遭到了官方的限制。尽管如此，他最终还是一个伟大的爱国者（否则，可以推测，中国驻比勒陀利亚大使馆就不会在第二周举行这部电影的南非首映礼了）。

Wolf Warrior 2 is being seen as a symbol of China’s growing security presence in Africa where, like Feng, it is also fighting Somali pirates, rebels, terrorists and other enemies of the established order – not to mention Ebola. The film is being interpreted by some as a cinematic expression of China’s growing assertiveness on the world stage under President Xi Jinping.

《战狼2》被认为是中国在非洲日益增强的安保力量的象征，就像冷锋一样，他们也在与索马里海盗、叛乱分子、恐怖分子和其他现存秩序的敌人作战——更不用说埃博拉病毒了。这部电影被一些人解读为是对中国在***领导下在世界舞台上日益自信表现的电影化表达。

He told the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Congress last month, for example, that it was time for his nation to become ‘a mighty force’ that took a greater lead on the world stage on political, economic, military and environmental issues.

比如，他在上个月的中共**大会议期间指出，是时候让这个国家成为一个在世界舞台上获得政治、经济、军事和环境等方面更大领导权的“强大的力量”。

Africa, some Chinese scholars believe, is being used by Beijing as a zone of experimentation for this more assertive global role. This is in contrast to China’s traditional principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries, as Sinologist Chris Alden noted at the launch of his book China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

一些中国学者认为，非洲正被北京视为其扮演更自信的全球角色的试验区。这与中国传统的不干涉他国内政原则形成了鲜明的对比，正如汉学家克里斯·奥尔登在南非国际事务研究所(SAIIA)为其新书《中国与非洲: 在这片大陆上建立和平与安全合作》举行的发布会上所指出的那样。

In the book, Alden – a senior research fellow at SAIIA and professor in international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science – and his fellow authors describe how China’s security presence in Africa has been growing. This shift from its erstwhile hands-off attitude has brought Beijing closer to the approach of Western powers which have been involved far longer in African security. But it also caused some disquiet and suspicion among those Western powers about China’s designs on the continent, Alden said.

在这本书中，南非国际问题研究所的高级研究员和伦敦经济与政治科学学院的国际关系教授奥尔登与他的合着者们共同描绘了中国在非洲的安保力量是如何增长的。从过去的不干涉态度到现在的这种转变使北京更接近西方大国的做法，而后者介入非洲安全问题的时间更长。奥尔登说道，这也引起了西方国家对中国在非洲大陆的图谋的不安和怀疑。

Nevertheless, China and Western powers are also learning to cohabit in the security domain, most notably in Djibouti where China, the US, Japan and European militaries are living cheek by jowl in a very small space. This could also be a pilot study for security cooperation elsewhere.

尽管如此，中国和西方大国也在学习如何展开安全领域的合作，尤其是在吉布提，中国、美国、日本和欧洲的军队都驻扎在了一个非常小的空间内。这也可能成为其他地方的安全合作的一种试点研究。

Alden explained how China’s rapidly expanding economic involvement in Africa over the past two decades had exposed it to the vagaries of African politics, forcing it to step up its meagre security presence to protect its businesses and its citizens. China began increasing its military footprint on African soil in 1998, with a growing endorsement of and presence in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

奥尔登解释了在过去的20年里，中国在非洲快速扩张的经济影响力如何使其暴露在非洲政治变幻莫测的局势中，迫使它加强薄弱的安保力量来保护其企业和公民。中国从1998年开始增加在非洲土地上的军事存在，并且越来越多地支持和参与联合国的维和行动。

The book observes how Chinese investment has been drawn to war-torn, unstable or fragile states like Sudan, which Western companies have mostly shunned; or to countries like Angola which have rejected Western donor conditionalities. But this has often confronted China with unusual risks.

该书指出了中国的投资是如何被吸引到像苏丹这样饱受战争摧残、不稳定或脆弱的国家中去的，西方企业大多都对这些国家避之不及；或者被吸引到像安哥拉这样拒绝接受西方捐赠条件的国家。但这种做法往往会让中国面临不同寻常的风险。

Sudan and Darfur, where China has considerable oil investments, became a turning point in China’s security approach in the early 2000s, Alden said. It took an increasingly activist position there, initiating discussion at the UN Security Council and even allowing the cases of Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir and others to go to the International Criminal Court. It was also motivated by concern about its international reputation, especially in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, that its involvement in Sudan could hurt its international reputation.

奥尔登说：苏丹和达尔富尔——中国在此地拥有大量的石油投资——在21世纪初成为中国安全措施发展的一个转折点。中国在这一地区采取了越来越积极的立场，开始在联合国安理会讨论与之相关的问题，甚至允许苏丹总统奥马尔·巴希尔和其他一些人的案件为国际刑事法庭受理。这种行为也受到了对其国际声誉担忧的驱动，特别是在2008年北京奥运会前夕，他们担心卷入苏丹事务将会损及其国际声誉。

As South Sudan gained independence in 2011, fell out with Khartoum over oil deliveries and later imploded, Beijing played an active mediation role. China then contributed combat soldiers to the UN peacekeeping mission in the newborn country.

随着南苏丹在2011年获得独立，然后与喀土穆方面（苏丹政府）就石油运输问题闹翻，随后又爆发了冲突，北京方面在这一进程发挥了积极的斡旋作用。随后，中国为联合国在这一新生国家的维和任务提供了作战人员。

And just as Darfur had pushed China into areas it hadn’t really expected to enter, so the 2011 crisis in Libya – where China also had considerable oil interests – pushed it even further along the road of engagement in peace and security matters, Alden said.

奥尔登说，就像达尔富尔把中国推入到了它原本不希望进入的区域，2011年的利比亚危机——中国在这一地区也有着相当大的石油利益——推动者中国沿着参与和平和安全事务的道路进一步向前发展。

China also entered the private security domain, rehatting People’s Liberation Army soldiers as private security guards to protect some of its larger commercial interests. It also increased its support to African Union peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. It put combat boots on the ground in Mali. And it became involved in the post-civil war peacebuilding efforts in Liberia, partly as a result of that country shifting diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to mainland China.

中国也进入了私人安保领域，它派遣人民解放军的士兵作为私人保镖保护一些重大的商业利益。它还增加了对非盟维和与和平建设工作的支持。它踏足到了马里地区。它还参与了利比里亚内战后的和平建设工作，这在一定程度上是由于这个国家与台湾断交，并且转而承认了中国。

China also stepped up its bilateral military support in Africa, with training – but also more controversially becoming the third-largest provider of small arms to Africa. Alden said, though, that Western non-governmental organisations were pressuring Beijing to reduce those sales as they were fuelling conflict.

中国还加强了在非洲的双边军事支持行动，不仅是通过培训——更有争议的是，中国成为非洲第三大的小型武器供应国。不过，奥尔登指出：西方的非政府组织正在向北京施压，要求他们减少这些武器的销售，因为这么做正在加剧冲突的爆发。

Alden noted that China’s involvement in African maritime security had been growing too, starting with the Chinese navy’s participation in the international naval patrols against Somali pirates in 2008. In 2015 it went further by establishing the naval base in Djibouti and then expanding its presence there.

奥尔登指出：从2008年中国海军参与打击索马里海盗的国际海军巡逻开始，中国对非洲海上安保行动的参与程度也在逐步加深。在2015年，它更进一步地在吉布提建立了海军基地，扩大了自己在这一地区的军事存在。

Cobus van Staden of the Wits University media studies department told the SAIIA seminar that China’s involvement in Africa was increasingly mirroring the robust debate in Western societies about exposing soldiers to danger in far-off places. After two of its peacekeepers were killed in South Sudan and one in Mali last year, there had been an outpouring of debate on Chinese social media. Some questioned why Chinese soldiers were in those countries at all, while others called for an even more aggressive response.

金山大学传媒系的Cobus van Staden在南非国际问题研究所研讨会中说道：中国介入非洲的行动正越来越多地反映了西方社会关于在遥远的地方将士兵暴露在危险之中的激烈辩论。去年，当驻扎于南苏丹和马里的两名维和人员被杀后，中国社交媒体上出现了大量的争论。一些人质疑中国士兵为何要出现在这些国家，而另一些人则呼吁采取更为积极的应对措施。

Van Staden felt the demands by many Chinese citizens for revenge in South Sudan and Mali, coming at just the time Wolf Warrior 2 became the biggest blockbuster in Chinese movie history, expressed the way China was seeing its role in the world. That is, as a transnational actor, as opposed to the non-interventionist policy of the past, he said.

Van Staden认为许多中国公民所提出的在南苏丹和马里复仇的要求——时值《战狼2》成为中国电影史上最卖座的电影——反映了中国是如何看待它自己在全球所扮演的角色的。他说，它现在自视为作为一个跨国活动的参与者，而不再秉持过去的不干涉政策。

Alden suggested that the lessons China was learning in Africa could be applied to Xi’s hugely ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, or Silk Road – a development and transport corridor linking Beijing with the West. Alden said, as in Africa, China’s economic interests in the Silk Road were exposing it to political contests and probably the need to provide security protection.

奥尔登表示，中国在非洲吸取到的教训可以应用于中国领导人雄心勃勃的“一带一路”计划，即丝绸之路——一条将北京与西方连接在一起的发展和交通走廊。奥尔登说：就像在非洲一样，中国在丝绸之路的经济利益使其面临政治竞争，因此可能就有了提供安全保护的必要。

If China’s growing security involvement in Africa was changing its fundamental policy of non-interventionism, would its growing involvement in supporting African elections likewise herald a greater embrace of democracy more generally, asked John Stremlau of the Wits International Relations Department. He was surprised at China’s open support for post-conflict elections in Guinea and Madagascar, for instance.

金山大学国际关系系的John Stremlau提出疑问：如果中国正在介入非洲的越来越强大的安保力量正在改变其不干涉主义的基本政策，那么它是否会介入支持非洲的选举，并且也预示着它更广泛地接受民主制度？比如他便对中国公然支持几内亚和马达加斯加冲突之后的选举感到惊讶。

Alden thought not, saying China still preferred the developmental post-conflict peacebuilding model. This put the stress on socio-economic reconstruction and development over the Western liberal peacebuilding model, which emphasised democracy as the foundation for societal recovery, he said.

对此，奥尔登认为答案是否定的，中国仍然更倾向于接受冲突之后的发展式的和平建设模式。他说这给立足于西方自由主义和平重建模式基础之上的社会经济的重建和发展施加了压力，因为西方的这一模式强调了民主制度是社会复苏的基础。

Nonetheless one can imagine that China’s contribution to post-conflict elections in Africa might at least begin to introduce some constructive ideological tension with its own authoritarianism at home. And incidentally, the growing security footprint in Africa of its unquestionable friend in Beijing seems to have silenced many African critics of Western ‘imperialism’ on the continent.

尽管如此，人们仍然可以想象，中国对非洲冲突后选举的贡献，至少可能会在其国内导致某种与本国威权主义相冲突的结构性意识形态的紧张。顺便说一下，，中国在非洲那些它的确定无疑的友国中越来越强大的安保力量存在似乎已经减弱了许多非洲人对西方在非洲的“帝国主义”的批评。

Rambo and Feng, arm in arm, stride off into the African sunset?

兰博和冷锋会手挽着手一同步入非洲的日落之中吗？