如何管理社交媒体 [美国媒体]

HOW NOT TO REGULATE SOCIAL MEDIA

如何管理社交媒体

Don’t Undermine Democratic Values in the Name of Democracy

不要以民主的名义破坏民主价值观

【日期】2017年12月12日



We’re in a kind of “hair on fire” moment with respect to the public mood about social media’s effect on democracy. Popular political commentary reflects this pervading negative mood with headlines such as: Do Social Media Threaten Democracy? Can Democracy Survive the Internet? How Twitter Killed the First Amendment. Your Filter Bubble is Destroying Democracy.

社交媒体对民主的影响越来越大，我们必须好好探讨一下公众对此的想法了。一些主流的政治媒体也纷纷出版了相关的文章：社交媒体威胁到民主了？互联网时代还存在真正的民主？推特杀死了修正案；你的过滤器毁了民主（注：过滤器是网络搜索技术，只提供你想看的）

The growing perception is that “the internet” generally, social media specifically, and dominant American platforms like Facebook and Twitter, even more particularly, are eroding the quality of discourse necessary to sustain democracy.

人民普遍认识到因特网会降低人与人交流的深度与广度，而这对有效的维持皿煮是必不可少的。而现在社交媒体，尤其是Facebook和Twitter这样的巨头，充斥着些没什么营养的内容。

Citizens and governments are justifiably alarmed over the perceived deleterious effects of social media across multiple dimensions, ranging from creation of echo-chambers that increase polarized political discourse; to serving as megaphones for populist demagogues, terrorists, and authoritarians; to eroding the business model of traditional journalism, which is supposed to play an important watchdog role in democracy. Perhaps the most terrifying threat comes from the “weaponization of information”—manipulative use of social media by foreign governments reaching across borders to “hack discourse” and affect the outcome of elections.

社交媒体几处明显的弊端，民众和政府部门都需要特别注意。比如标签和团体分化严重加剧了政治对立，限制交流；这些网络媒体常常被用来传播民粹主义，恐怖主义，霸权主义；而且明显的削弱了传统媒体，又不能负起传统媒体作为民主监督者的责任。但是除此之外最可怕的就要属“信息武器”了，国外政府可以轻易操纵社交媒体，进行黑客袭击，引导舆论，最终影响到了选举结果。

This is a dramatic and dire turn of events: We used to assume social media and the general trend toward democratization of the means of distributing content were net positive forces for democracy: that social media disproportionately empowered civil society, expanded citizen access to information, and enhanced civic engagement. Now, we fear that social media is turning free speech against free society and actually undermining the integrity of democratic elections. The sad fact is that malign actors have figured out how to use social media very effectively against democracy, both inside and outside the United States.

社交媒体的性质已经根本性的变了。以前，我们都认定社交媒体总体上还是向着有利于民主一方的，起码信息的传播是如此，因为“文化人”的影响力远远大于普通人。然而现在社交媒体任何人都能大放厥词，真正代表民主的声音就听不到了，选举也不再是真正的民主选举了，当然产生这样的结果也不足为奇了。然而悲剧的是，一些恶意的团体可以非常熟练的利用社交媒体侵害我们国家的民主权益。

But crafting effective interventions is much more difficult than expressing fear and outrage. The most basic point for democratic governments to keep in mind as they develop solutions is to be careful not to undermine democratic values in the name of protecting democracy.

对民主过程进行有效的引导比仅仅在网上发泄要难得多。民主政府要坚守最基本的底线，不能打着民主的旗号反过来又搞损害民主的经济政策。

The political reality is that policy-makers are facing pressure to “DO SOMETHING” about the negative effects of big digital platforms on democracy, without fully understanding all the dynamics at play. Policy-makers don’t have a clear conceptual framing for the various negative effects of social media they seek to reign in, much less a reliable empirical base for assessing those effects. The risk is that well-intentioned governing actors will move to “protect democracy” without thinking through the unintended negative externalities of their proposed solutions.

现如今的政治状况是，政府官员面临大数据下的“民主轰炸”，他们必须干点实事来回应躁动的网络言论，丝毫不考虑前因后果。政府企图控制社交媒体，但又对社交媒体多种多样的负面影响毫无概念，缺乏系统的可靠的评估。这样就会导致出于“保护民主”目的的政府官员，在他实际操作中就会不经意的忽略相关政策通过社交媒体产生的负面效应。

The core challenge we face is to quickly find effective ways to combat real threats, without undermining our own democratic values like freedom of expression and access to information.

我们面临的主要任务是在不损害现有民主价值观的基础上抵制各种各样对民主的威胁。我们必须保护最核心的价值观，即自由的说，自由的听。

As a starting place, before moving down a path to crafting solutions, policy-makers need to differentiate between platforms and functions within the same platform, rather than lump all “digital platforms” into one category. “The internet” is not the same as “social media.” Social media is not equivalent to search engines. Twitter bots are not the same as Facebook personalization algorithms. User-generated content simply posted on Facebook should not be conflated with newsfeed content pushed to the top of the feed by algorithms.

在动手实干之前，首先要确保政府官员能好好区分各式各样的数字平台，以及平台的各种功能，而不是笼统的归类为“数字化”。因特网不等于社交媒体，社交媒体也不等于搜索引擎。Twitter的蠕虫算法和Facebook基于私人的搜索算法有很大的区别。用户私人展示的内容也不要和算法产生的热点推送搞混了。

Second, the various ills in the digital information ecosystem and their deleterious effects on democracy should not all be collapsed into one category. Much of the animating energy driving policy makers to address the “problem of social media” flows from national security concerns about foreign information operations intended to disrupt democratic election outcomes. Foreign disinformation campaigns are not the same as the creation of political filter bubbles or the disruptive effect of social media on the business model of professional journalists in democracy. These distinctly different policy concerns will need different policy solutions.

第二，数字化生态圈本身的不完善，和对皿煮的危害也是有所区别的。很多政府官员竭力要处理“社交媒体问题”，基本是出于国家安全的考虑，防止国外的信息操作有意的破坏民主选举结果。但是国外传来的误导性的信息和过滤技术不同，也和社交媒体冒充职业记者所产生的毁灭性的结果不同。针对不同的政治考虑应该执行不同的政策。

Furthermore, much of the commentary seems to merge effects driven by inherent features of the technology with effects caused by malign uses of the technology by bad actors who manipulate platform tools for nefarious purposes.

甚至有很多的专业评论似乎都没能区分到底是技术性的原因，还是人为的利用技术缺陷和数字工具搞的阴谋。

For example, a core critique of Facebook has been that personalization algorithms and micro-targeting capacities shape access to information, create echo chambers and reinforce tribal mentalities, all of which intensify polarization and animosity in society.  (Apparently, the underlying empirical evidence with respect to Facebook’s polarizing effects is still being sorted out by independent researchers.)  BUT, even assuming the polarization effect of Facebook is substantial, the echo-chamber problem is distinctly different from the intentional manipulation of social media by foreign actors seeking to affect election outcomes. Delineating between inherent features and malign uses will help us define platform responsibilities and yield better solutions.

例如，Facebook最令人诟病的是基于私人的算法以及各种各样的分类标签。这些都限制了特定人群接受的信息，形成封闭的团体。这无疑加剧了社会团体之间的分化和仇视（然而，这种巨大的社会分化效应还仅仅被当做是无关紧要的研究项目）。尽管这样的分化效应广泛存在，这也和外国信息操作行为有本质的不同。把平台特点和恶意操作区分开来，这样才能划清责任，找到解决办法。

This is a pivotal moment for democratic governance in the digital realm.
To say that digital technology has disrupted society is a cliché. Yet, we are only just starting to grasp the radical break we are facing with respect to our legal institutions and norms, now that digital tools pervade our social relations and information flows. Policymakers are struggling to deal with this transformed information ecosystem, where existing doctrine and regulatory approaches don’t work. The speed, scale, and extraterritorial reach of “bad” online speech makes it qualitatively different from dangerous speech in the non-digitized realm, so we need new tools and rules to counter it. In American parlance, to say that we need “more speech to counter bad speech” just won’t cut it.

现在已经到了民主政府数字保卫战的关键时刻。那些说数字技术破坏社会和谐的简直就是扯淡。数字工具使社会形成了一个整体，促进我们对现行机构和规则进行一场根本性的变革。政治家需要做的是努力处理好信息生态圈的转换，废弃掉陈旧的教条。信息传播的速度和尺度，尤其是“坏”消息传播的的速度都和非数字化传播不可比的，我们需要制定一整套的新规则。用典型的美国式说法：我们的速度必须超越不利信息的速度。

But there is an additional wrinkle on this already complex challenge: characterizing the nature of speech in the digital realm and whether it can be legitimately restricted in democracy is itself a very slippery subject matter. We are dealing with a kind of shape-shifting phenomenon where hate speech can look like core political speech that must be protected in democracy, when in fact that speech might be part of a foreign disinformation campaign intended to polarize American political discourse.

还有一点不得不提，在数字领域如何给公开发言定义和做出法律限制，也是一个很模棱两可的事。现在有一种扭曲的现象，一些带着批评性的言论看起来像是正儿八经的政治演说。然而这也可能是外国故意搞的阴谋，目的无非就是破坏美国的政治，激发人民矛盾。

We see a bizarre interplay between domestic fringe hate groups and foreign anti-democratic actors, troll farms, and bot armies—mixing political themes with hate speech to sow seeds of discontent, mistrust, and polarization across borders. The hard part is that polarizing speech sometimes looks like it should be protected political speech in a democracy when it’s actually part of a sophisticated information operation we need to protect against.  This has created category confusion for us all.

我们可以看到一场奇怪的演出，一些本地人变成反边缘化群体，移民又在搞反皿煮活动，还有一堆叫嚣的农民，各个团体主张群体融合同时又到处散发不满情绪，不信任，搞极端化。一些极端化的演讲，有的基于皿煮考虑，我们还得保护，毕竟有些揭示了复杂的社会矛盾。这就很难把握度了。

Here’s the dilemma for democratic governments and policymakers:
Protection of free expression is now coming into tension with protection of democratic processes.  Protection against the pernicious effects of free speech and access to information have become top national security and cybersecurity concerns.

民主政府现在陷入两难的境地，保护人民表达权利反过来又威胁了民主。如何防止自由发言和自由接受造成的恶果是我们急需关注的问题。

While we sort through this category confusion and develop new doctrine for a dramatically different information ecosystem, we must NOT give up on core democratic values. Our challenge is to stop malign actors while protecting free expression. To do this we need to internalize a “do no harm” mentality and think through the negative externalities of any interventions, especially when those policies might be replicated and go global.

就算要解决这所有的问题，甚至搞另一套信息系统，也不要忘记我们的核心民主价值观。我们要让人们自觉，不干坏事，好好考虑任何干涉可能产生的后果。要警惕最近新上任和出过国的政治官员。

During this period of tumult, democratic governments must not fall into the lazy and cynical view that they can no longer afford to protect free expression because of the dangers of social media. If they do, they will become unwitting participants in the erosion of democracy and help finish the work that foreign information operations started.

在这关键时期，民主政府不能放任不管，只会抱怨，不能因为社交媒体的危害放弃对自由言论的保护。倘若放弃抵抗，那无疑加速了民主的毁灭，那就真的中了国外信息操纵的下怀。