美国与中国的贸易战——比日本版更强硬 [美国媒体]

A US trade war with China – tougher than the Japanese edition

美国与中国的贸易战——比日本版更强硬

president Trump just fired his first shot in an economic war with the People’s Republic of China, by imposing tariffs on Chinese-made solar panels. One almost feels nostalgic for the 1980s trade battles with the Japanese – who were similarly portrayed as threatening and bent on world domination.

特朗普总统刚刚打响了与中华人民共和国经济战争的第一枪，对中国制造的太阳能电池板征收保护性关税。这使人不禁想起了上世纪80年代美国对日本的贸易战——当时日本人也同样被描绘成威胁并决心统治世界的人。

Such fears proved overblown – as Japan’s ‘bubble’ burst and it settled into a decades-long economic funk. Might things play out similarly with the PRC? Perhaps. But China may be a tougher opponent.

这种担忧被证明是杞人忧天——随着日本经济“泡沫”的破裂，进而导致了长达数十年的经济困境。中国的情况是不是也会类似的结果呢？有可能。但中国可能是一个更强劲的对手。

How so?

那又怎么样呢？

Even at the height of the Japanese economic juggernaut, Japan was self restrained. Tokyo recognized the United States as its only ally – and military protector. This strategic requirement to not make the Americans too angry meant trade concessions – however grudging – would be made.

即使是在日本经济的鼎盛时期，日本也是自我克制的。东京承认美国是其唯一的盟友——而且也是其军事保护者。这种战略需求是为了不让美国人过于愤怒，那么就意味着在贸易上的让步——无论多么不情愿——也都不得不这样做。

Moreover, Japan never intended to supplant US military and political dominance in Asia – or anywhere else.

此外，日本从未打算取代美国在亚洲或其他任何地方的军事和政治主导地位。

The furthest Japan came to asserting itself over the United States was the head of a leading Japanese financial firm suggesting California be declared a Free Trade Zone – in return for which Japan would “solve” the trade deficit. Such was the country’s bubble-era hubris.

日本走得最远的也就是宣称自己超过美国成了主要金融公司的领导，还建议加利福尼亚宣布成为自由贸易区——作为回报，日本将“解决”贸易逆差问题。这就是这个国家泡沫时代的傲慢自大。

China, on the other hand…

中国，另一方……

The PRC seeks to displace the United States in Asia and outdo US influence globally. China regards economic power as being intertwined with military and political power – to be wielded like a club. Beijing concedes nothing easily and is far more willing to engage in tit-for-tat trade battles than Tokyo ever was.

中国寻求取代美国在亚洲的地位，并超越美国建立其在全球的影响力。中国将其经济实力与军事和政治权力交织在一起——就像一个俱乐部一样。尽管北京方面不愿轻易承认，但却比曾经的东京更愿意进行针锋相对的贸易战。

Arguably, Japan was also more frightened of trade pressure than today’s China. While both economies were and are export-driven – and vulnerable to sanctions – in the 1980s few US companies used Japan as a manufacturing base for export back to America.

可以说，比起今天的中国，当年的日本更害怕贸易压力。虽然两国经济都是出口驱动型的，而且很容易受到制裁的影响，但在20世纪80年代，美国很少有企业把日本作为制造业生产基地，再将产品出口到美国。

But the many US companies taking advantage of cheap labor (and the eternal hope of making a bundle in the huge China market) are a hedge against US pressure. Hit Chinese companies and you’re likely to hurt American companies.

但许多美国公司愿意利用中国的廉价劳动力（并且希望永远和巨大的中国市场捆绑在一起）是对来自美国的压力的一种对冲。如果打击中国公司，那么你可能就会伤害到美国公司。



David Knee (center), chairman of the American Conservative Union, and his supporters, destroy a Toshiba radio with sledgehammers on the Capitol Hill lawn, in Washington DC, on July 1, 1987. The US Senate had just voted to ban Toshiba from selling products in the US after it was accused of selling secret submarine technology to the Soviet Union. Photo: AFP / Renato Rotolo

1987年7月1日，美国保守派联盟主席大卫·尼（中）和他的支持者们在华盛顿特区国会山的草坪上用大锤砸毁一台东芝收音机。当时美国参议院刚刚投票决定禁止东芝在美国销售产品，此前该公司被指控向苏联出售秘密潜艇技术。照片：法新社/ Renato Rotolo。

Also, Japan’s economic threat was mostly concentrated on three major US industries – automobiles, electronics, and steel. Japan took advantage of its technological and manufacturing prowess – and sometimes unfair trade practices. A chaotic US economy, obstinate labor unions, and addled management, heightened the sense of vulnerability.

此外，日本的经济威胁主要集中在美国三大产业——汽车、电子产品和钢铁，日本利用其技术和制造业的实力——有时甚至是不公平的贸易做法。而美国经济的混乱、顽固的工会以及糟糕的管理，都加剧了这种脆弱的感觉。

China, however, matches up competitively – now or in the future – with nearly every American-made product. Go to Wal-Mart and take a look. And it’s not just Christmas ornament manufacturers who’ve been harmed: high-end products and industries long dominated by the US  are being challenged.

然而，中国几乎是与每一个美国制造的产品都都展开全面竞争——无论是现在还是将来。去沃尔玛超市走一走看一看，就知道不仅仅是圣诞饰品制造商受到了伤害，长期被美国主导的高端产品和行业也正受到挑战。

Theres another big difference. In response to US political pressure – some unfair – Japan bit its tongue and moved Toyota, Nissan, and Honda to America, effectively granting Detroit a reprieve.

还有一个很大的区别，就是作为对美国政治压力的回应——尽管有些不公平——日本咬牙忍痛默默地将丰田、日产和本田的工厂转移到了美国，这实际上给了底特律一个喘息的机会。

The PRC is more likely to offer to buy a weakened GM and Ford – and when turned down, complain of discrimination and look for opportunities to exact revenge.

而中国却更有可能是收购实力较弱的通用汽车和福特汽车公司——当他们被拒绝时，还抱怨受到歧视，并寻找机会进行报复。

Worldwide influence

世界范围内的影响

Although Japanese industry and government operated worldwide, the country had nowhere near the influence China has accumulated in recent years. The PRC has used its money well.

尽管日本的工业界和政府在全世界范围内进行运作，但其影响力水平远未达到中国近年来所积累的影响力程度。中国已充分利用其资金实力。

China may ‘over-lend’ on onerous terms and then put the squeeze on. And the Belt and Road may have questionable long-term prospects – but it is creating a real presence and influence in far-flung parts of the world, unlike anything Japan had going.

中国可能会在苛刻的条件下“过度放贷”，随后又施加压力。尽管“一带一路”倡议长期前景存忧，但这向世界的偏远角落地区都展现了中国真切的存在和影响，而不像日本过去的那些做法。

Tellingly, fear of Chinese economic retaliation is making many countries reluctant to side with the US in a trade war – even if America is an ally or security guarantor. In the 1980s, everyone went after Japan with abandon.

很明显，由于担忧中国可能施加的经济报复，使得许多国家在贸易战争中不愿支持美国——即使美国是其盟友或安全担保人。在20世纪80年代，人人都放纵地追随日本。

Disregard for the rules

漠视规则

Despite contentious US-Japan trade negotiations, Tokyo understood international rules and mostly lived up to its promises.

尽管美日贸易谈判存在争议，但东京方面理解国际规则，而且大部分情况下也都遵守承诺。

Meanwhile, China considers trade agreements as largely voluntary and discriminates against foreign companies, while intellectual property theft and industrial espionage seem like a moral imperative.

与此同时，中国认为贸易协定基本上是自愿的，并且歧视外国公司，而在侵犯知识产权和工业间谍活动方面，似乎又仅仅视作是道德义务。

Its hard to negotiate with this sort of adversary.

与这样的对手谈判真的是很难。

The US is better positioned than in the 1980s

美国现在的处境比上世纪80年代要好

Ironically, though, the US is better equipped to handle Chinese economic competition than it was to deal with Japans.

但具有讽刺意味的是，美国在处理与中国经济竞争方面的能力比与日本的要好。

The American economy is stronger these days compared to its battered state in the late 1970s and early 1980s. And more of the US business community supports economic pressure on the PRC – having finally realized the China market is a rigged casino.

与上世纪70年代末和80年代初遭受重创的美国相比，如今的美国经济更加强劲。而且美国商界更支持对中国施加经济压力——终于意识到中国市场是一个被操纵的赌场。

Also, nothing made in China cant be made elsewhere. Global supply chains are always shifting. Its perhaps inconvenient and costlier, but they were not chiseled in stone on Mt. Sinai.

同样，没有什么中国制造的东西是其他地方生产不出来的，而且全球供应链也一直在变化，尽管这可能很不方便成本也会比较高，但他们也并没有在西奈山上凿穿石头。

China does hold a lot of US debt, as did Japan. But thats less of an advantage than it seems – provided the US government someday soon gets its financial house in order.

中国确实持有大量美国国债，日本也是如此。但这并不如表面上所看到那样是一种优势——只要美国政府能很快整顿好自己的金融体系。

Lobbying power

游说力量

When a US administration starts to apply economic pressure, the target countrys lobbyists try to stop it. Chinese lobbying interests are probably awash.

当美国政府开始施加经济压力时，目标国的游说力量就会进行阻止。中国的游说利益很可能是泛滥的。

During Japans heyday, Americans lined up to take Japanese cash – just as they do today where Chinese money is concerned.

在日本的全盛时期，美国人排着队接受日本的现金——就像他们今天关心着来自中国的钱一样。

But the PRC is increasingly seen as an existential threat to US global power in a way Japan was not. Thats a hard thing for lobbyists to overcome.

但中国越来越被视为对美国全球实力的威胁，而日本却并非如此。这对游说者来说是很难克服的。

Finally, the PRC is vulnerable in unique ways. Its banking system, with its immense bad-loan burden, is shakier than Japanese banks were. And not even the Chinese Communist Party itself believes the country’s 6.5% growth figures.

最后，中国独特的模式很脆弱。其银行体系存在着巨大的坏账风险，比日本的银行更不稳定。甚至连中国共产党本身也不相信中国6.5%的经济增长率。

There are also daunting and costly social issues of poverty, an aging society, environmental problems, lack of an honest legal system and secure property rights – and corruption that would embarrass Chiang Kai Shek’s KMT. Moreover, just about every person who can tries to move their money out of China.

中国还存在着一大堆艰巨而代价高昂的社会问题，如贫困、社会老龄化、环境问题、缺乏诚实的法律制度、产权保障，以及腐败等，曾经令蒋介石的国民党感到难堪。而且，几乎每个人都想把自己的资金从中国转移出去。

The PRC also has a penchant for cutting off its nose to spite its face – out of resentment or to teach someone a lesson – over Taiwan, say, or a South China Sea oil rig.

中国还有一种嗜好，就是砍掉鼻子也不要面子——为了泄愤或是教训别人——比如，在台湾问题上，或在南海石油钻井平台问题上。

And Chinese economic rapacity invariably provokes a negative reaction – in both first- and third-world countries. The Japanese were not shy about going after market share – but generally knew when to say ‘when.’

而中国的经济掠夺行为总是会引起负面反应——包括第一和第三世界国家。日本人并不羞于追求市场份额——但他们通常知道什么时候该说“什么话”。

Ultimately, the Trump Administration is right to take on the PRC on the trade front. But this will be much harder than it was with Japan. And for that, America has itself to blame.

最后，特朗普政府在贸易方面对中国采取行动是对的，但这将比对付日本要难得多。而对于造成这种局面，美国也难辞其咎。