中国南海基地是毫无意义的吗？ [美国媒体]

China has built some islands in the South China Sea. Can it protect them?

中国在南中国海建造了一些岛屿。它能保护他们吗?

During World War II Japan found that control of islands offered some strategic advantages, but not enough to force the United States to reduce each island individually. Moreover, over time the islands became a strategic liability, as Japan struggled to keep them supplied with food, fuel and equipment. The islands of the SCS are conveniently located for China, but do they really represent an asset to China’s military? The answer is yes, but in an actual conflict the value would dwindle quickly.

二战期间，日本发现，对岛屿的控制提供了一些战略优势，但不足以迫使美国单独攻击每个岛屿。此外，随着时间的推移，这些岛屿成为了一个战略负担，因为日本必须竭力为它们提供粮食、燃料和装备。南中国海的岛屿对中国来说是很便利的，但对中国军方来说，它们真的是一种优势吗？答案是肯定的，但在实际冲突中，价值会迅速下降。

The Installations
China has established numerous military installations in the South China Sea, primarily in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. In the Spratlys, China has built airfields at Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross, along with potential missile, radar and helicopter infrastructure at several smaller formations. In the Paracels, China has established a significant military installation at Woody Island, as well as radar and helicopter facilities in several other areas. China continues construction across the region, meaning that it may expand its military presence in the future. The larger bases (Subi, Mischief, Fiery Cross and Woody Island) have infrastructure necessary for the management of military aircraft, including fighters and large patrol craft. These missiles, radars and aircraft extend the lethal reach of China’s military across the breadth of the South China Sea.

设施：
中国在南中国海建立了许多军事设施，主要是在南沙群岛和西沙群岛。南沙群岛，中国建造了机场，具有潜在的导弹、雷达和直升机基础设施，还有几个较小的编队。在西沙群岛，中国已经在伍迪岛（即永兴岛）建立了重要的军事设施，在其他几个地区建立了雷达和直升机设施。中国继续在整个地区进行建设，这意味着中国可能在未来扩大军事存在。较大的基地拥有军用飞机所需的基础设施，包括战斗机和大型巡逻艇。这些导弹、雷达和飞机把中国军队的致命武器延伸到了南中国海的广袤海域。

Missiles
Several of the islands serve as bases for SAM systems (including the HQ-9, with a range of 125 miles, and perhaps eventually the Russian S-400) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). These missiles serve to make the South China Sea lethal for U.S. ships and aircraft that do not have stealth capabilities, or that do not enjoy a layered air-defense system. The SAM installations, buoyed by networks of radars, can effectively limit the ability of enemy aircraft to enter their lethal zone without significant electronic-warfare assistance. The GLCMs can add another set of launchers to China’s A2/AD network, although not necessarily with any greater effectiveness than missiles launched from subs, ships or aircraft.

导弹：
这些岛屿中有几个是地空导弹系统（SAM）基地(包括射程125英里的HQ-9，也许最终可能是俄罗斯S-400)和从地面发射的巡航导弹(GLCM)。这些导弹使没有隐身能力的美国船只和飞机，或者没有分层防空系统的美国船只和飞机，在南海受到致命威胁。由雷达网络支撑的地空导弹系统（SAM）装置，可以有效地限制敌机进入其致命区域的能力，而不需要大量的电子战武器支援。尽管不一定比从潜艇、舰船或飞机发射的导弹更有效，但GLCM（地射巡航导弹）可以为中国的A2/AD网络增加另一套发射装置。

But it is an open question how survivable the missile installations would be in a conflict. Land-based missiles survive air attack because they can hide among hills, forests and other natural cover. There is no effective natural cover on the islands that China has created, and even man-made defensive installations may not survive concerted attack. Moreover, missile launchers depend upon an at least somewhat robust logistical network for fuel, power and munitions, which China may not be able to reliably provide during a shooting war.

但是，导弹设施在冲突中的生存能力仍是一个悬而未决的问题。陆基导弹也许可以在空袭中幸存下来，因为它们可以隐藏在山丘、森林和其他天然植被中，但中国建造的岛屿上没有有效的自然掩护，即使是人造防御设施也可能无法在协同攻击中生存下来。此外，导弹发射装置依赖于至少在一定程度上稳定的燃料、电力和弹药后勤网络，而在一场直接冲突战争中中国可能无法提供可靠的支持。

Airfields

机场：

The four largest military installations in the SCS have extensive facilities for the operation of military aircraft. This includes advanced fighters, but more importantly patrol, electronic-warfare and advanced early-warning aircraft. The ability to use these airfields effectively extends the reach of China’s A2/AD bubble, enabling the transmission of targeting data to missile launchers at sea and in mainland China. The fighter aircraft themselves serve to make the skies over the SCS even more lethal than they otherwise would be, as well as threaten U.S. ships at a distance with cruise missiles.

南中国海四个最大军事基地都有广泛的军用飞机包括先进的战斗机的操作设施，但更重要的是巡逻、电子战和先进的预警飞机。利用这些机场的能力，可以有效地扩大了中国A2/AD网络的覆盖范围，使目标数据能够在海上和中国大陆的导弹发射装置之间传输。预警飞机本身就能使中国在南中海上空的杀伤力更强，并以巡航导弹威胁距离较远的美国船只。

But in conflict, the durability of an airfield depends on the availability of materials and equipment to execute repairs after an attack. It is not obvious that the islands China has created in the South China Sea will be robust enough to continue in operation after U.S. missile and bomb attacks. Although the larger islands have aircraft shelters, it is an open question whether these shelters could long survive a concerted U.S. attack.

但在实际冲突中，机场的耐久性取决于攻击后是否有可用的材料和设备进行维修。目前还不清楚中国在南中国海建造的岛屿是否强大到足以在美国导弹和炸弹袭击后继续运作。虽然一些较大的岛屿有飞机掩体，但这些掩体能否在美国的协同攻击下长时间存活仍是个未知数。

Radars

雷达：

SAMs, GLCMs and combat aircraft depend on accurate targeting data for effectiveness. The most important contribution that the SCS islands may offer to the Chinese military is through the radar installations that China has established on many of the islands. These installations, while individually vulnerable, help to provide a much fuller picture of the battle space than China would otherwise enjoy. Together, they significantly enhance the lethality of China’s defensive networks.

地空导弹系统（SAMS）、地射巡航导弹（GLCMs）和作战飞机依赖于精确的目标数据来获得有效性。南中国海岛屿对中国军方的最大贡献是中国在许多岛屿上建立的雷达设施。这些设施虽然个别极易遭受攻击，但却能提供比中国其他地区更全面的作战空间。这些因素一起，极大地增强了中国防御网络的杀伤力。

That said, the radars themselves are vulnerable to a wide array of U.S. attacks. These include kinetic methods such as missiles (launched from submarines, stealth aircraft or other platforms), electronic warfare, cyberattacks and even special-forces raids. In a conflict, China could quickly lose access to the radar network that it has established. Still, the network offers a relatively low-cost way of complicating the job that the U.S. military faces in penetrating the SCS.

也就是说，雷达本身就容易受到美国的广泛攻击。这些方法包括动能攻击，如导弹(从潜艇、隐形飞机或其他平台发射)、或电子战、网络攻击等，甚至特种部队突袭。在一场冲突中，中国可能很快就会失去其建立的雷达网。不过，该网络提供了一种相对较低成本的方式，使美国军方在渗透南中国海过程中所面临的任务变得更加复杂化。

Logistics

后勤：

All the military capabilities of China’s SCS islands depend upon secure communications with mainland China. Most of the islands constructed by China cannot support extensive logistics stockpiles, or keep those stockpiles safe from attack. In a shooting war, the need to keep the islands supplied with fuel, equipment and munitions would quickly become a liability for presumably hard-stretched Chinese transport assets. Assuming that the PLAN and PLAAF would have little interest in pursuing risky, expensive efforts at resupplying islands under fire, the military value of the islands of the SCS would be a wasting asset during a conflict. Unfortunately for China, the very nature of island warfare, and the nature of the specific formations that China has determined to support, make it difficult to keep installations in service in anything but the very short term.

中国南海诸岛的所有军事能力都依赖于与中国大陆的安全通信。中国建造的大部分岛屿无法支持大规模的后勤储备，也无法保证这些储备免受攻击。在一场正面冲突中，需要保持岛屿的燃料、设备和弹药供应，这很快就会成为中国后勤运输的负担。假设解放军海军和解放军空军没有兴趣继续进行高风险、昂贵的努力来补给遭受攻击的岛屿，那么南海岛屿的军事价值在冲突期间将是一笔严重的浪费。不幸的是，对于中国来说，由于岛屿战争的性质，以及中国决心支持的特定编队的性质，使得在短期内维持任何设施的服务都很困难。

Ships vs. Forts

舰船 vs 堡垒：

As Lord Horatio Nelson may have quipped, “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” But there are situations in which ships have a major advantage over forts. China’s islands in the SCS are not mobile, and are not large enough to hide much in the way of military equipment and material. The United States will be able to meticulously map the military installations on each of the islands in the SCS, and will probably be able to track shipments of military equipment to the islands. This will make the islands extremely vulnerable to attack from ships, subs and aircraft, as missiles will not require real-time targeting data.

正如霍雷肖·纳尔逊勋爵打趣的那样，“一艘船与一座堡垒去作战是愚蠢 ”，但在某些情况下，船只比堡垒有着很大的优势。中国在南中国海的岛屿并不是移动的，也不足以隐藏军事装备和物资。美国将能够仔细绘制南中国海各岛屿上的军事设施地图，并可能追踪向这些岛屿运送军事装备的情况，这将使这些岛屿极易受到来自船只、潜艇和飞机的攻击，因为导弹不需要实时的目标数据。

（译注：霍雷肖 · 纳尔逊（Horatio Nelson，1758－1805 ），“英国皇家海军之魂”，地中海舰队总司令 ，英国着名海军将领）
 
One positive step for the United States would be to reverse the decision to “retire in place” the Advanced Gun System on the Zumwalt-class destroyer. Making available a munition for this gun would enable the Zumwalts to strike Chinese island installations at range, potentially causing serious, practically irreparable damage at a relatively low cost. Otherwise, the islands will suck up cruise missiles that might effectively be used on more juicy targets.

对美国来说，一个积极的步骤是逆转朱姆沃尔特级驱逐舰上先进火炮系统“退役”的决定，为这种火炮系统提供弹药将使朱姆沃尔特级驱逐舰能够在射程内攻击中国的岛屿设施，可能以相对较低的成本造成严重的、几乎无法弥补的破坏。否则，这些岛屿将耗费本应用于攻击更有价值目标的巡航导弹。

The islands of the SCS have some military relevance, but are more important as a political claim to waterways and undersea resources. Militarily, they represent a thin crust on China’s A2/AD system. Under certain conditions this crust could disrupt U.S. freedom of action, but it won’t be hard for the United States’ Air Force and Navy to punch through.

这些南中国海的岛屿在军事上有一定的意义，但更重要的作用是作为对航道和海底资源的政治主张的支持。在军事上，它们只是中国A2/AD系统的一层薄弱外壳，在某些情况下，这层外壳可能会破坏美国的行动自由，但美国空军和海军要想突破这一外壳并不困难。



Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book. He serves as a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. His work includes military doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns and Money and and The Diplomat.
Image: Reuters

作者简介：罗伯特·法利(RobertFarley)是TNI的撰稿人，着有《战舰》一书，是肯塔基大学帕特森外交和国际商务学院的高级讲师。他的着作包括军事理论、国家安全和海事事务等方面，他在 “Lawyers, Guns and Money”和“Information Dissemination ”等网站，以及《外交官》杂志上发表文章。
图片来源：路透社


Dave Ng：
US has military installations on Pacfic islands such as Guam, Wake, Midway...In Chinese chess game, the first line of chess entities facing opponents are called soldiers which are expendables. American Think Tank strategists visualize future conflicts in line with past American encounters where adversaries just dug in waiting for US Marine onslaught. American writers conveniently not to consider tic for tac tactics with peer adversary. Would the same scenario which Mr.Farley described equally apply to US Pacific possessions?
These artificial islands create an extra layer of expendables in a progressive war of retaliating exchanges before reaching continental mainland of both side, giving an extra day before nuclear button is pushed. Conflict between major nuclear powers has to be viewed as peer war where every move can anticipate equal counter.
Now, die hards & trolls, ur turn to hit me with rhetorics,.. kitchen sink.

美国在太平洋的关岛、维克、中途岛等拥有军事设施。在中国的象棋中, 面向对手的第一个棋子被称为“士兵”（卒子），它是“可消耗的”。 美国智囊团的战略家们将未来的冲突想象成与美国过去遭遇的冲突一样，以为对手只是在等待美国海军陆战队的进攻。 美国的作者们很轻易的就不去考虑同等对手的战术问题。 请问，罗伯特·法利先生（本文作者），你所描述的情况是否也同样适用于美国在太平洋地区的基地和设施？

在一场双方都会进行报复的渐进战争中，在战事蔓延至大陆之前， 这些人工岛屿创造了一个额外的消耗性空间，并在核按钮被按下之前多争取了额外的一天时间， 主要核大国之间的冲突必须被视为对等战争, 在这样的战争中，每一步行动都会有可预见的，相似的反击。

好了，死硬派&巨魔，现在轮到你了，放手来打我脸吧，煞笔智囊。

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Ronnery Amon：
The US islands in the middle of the Pacific act as an invention force between the US and her adversary like how Hawaii acted as one between Japan and the US. The Chinese islands are completely in the opposite direction of her more powerful and potential adversaries so they offer virtually zero strategic advantage outside of southeast Asia. They serve more as glorified fishing docks against her southeast Asian neighbors. The islands are not too far away from the mainland and there is little reason why any military deployment if any can't occur from nearby Hainan island.

太平洋中部的美国岛屿，是美国和她的对手之间的一股缓冲力量，就像夏威夷在日本和美国之间扮演的角色一样。中国的岛屿完全与她更强大和潜在的对手截然相反，因此它们在东南亚以外的地区几乎没有战略优势。它们更像是一个对抗她东南亚邻国的荣耀渔港，这些岛屿离大陆并不太远，如果附近的海南岛不能进行任何军事部署，为什么还要在别的地方进行军事部署？没理由的。

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Dave Ng：
I am not surprised if currently SCS seabed has been laid with suspending sonars. I question ability of USN in sneaking close to Hainan to launch time critical SLBM attack. PLAAF interceptors & assets on those artificial islands can quarantine Taiwan Strait & SCS allowing PLAN SSNs to sneak out to open sea & deny P8 intrusion. Do not fantasize having so called Allies such as Japan or Aussi to fight along side, just sound bite to pump up adrenaline in Die Hards to support GOP aisle of Congress. Guam, Wake..just quid pro quo in escalated missile exchange.

如果有人告诉我目前的南中海海底已铺设了悬吊声纳，我一点也不会惊讶。我严重怀疑美国海军（USN ）在靠近海南的情况下有发射潜射弹道导弹的机会。中国人民解放军空军（PLAAF ）在这些人工岛屿上的拦截机和武器可以有效隔离台湾海峡和南中国海，使解放军海军的潜艇能够偷偷潜入开放海域，并隔绝P8反潜机的探测。不要幻想日本，澳大利益这样所谓的盟友会跟你一起战斗，那仅仅是死硬派为支持国会的大佬党（GOP，大老党，美国共和党的别称）打的一针肾上腺激素。醒醒吧，关岛什么的。。只不过是升级的导弹战中用来牺牲的消耗品。

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Ronnery Amon：
You make the assumption that USN would want to target Hainan which just like the man-made islands in the SCS is still in the opposite direction of the Chinese mainland. Even a Beijing scholar has pointed out that the islands in the SCS are simply glorified shipping docks used to babysit their fleet of fishing boats. So unless Chinese submarines leave the port of Hainan to meet the USN out in open sea in the Pacific where the action is, PLAN sailors are going be sitting in Hainan twiddling their thumbs.

你在假设美国海军会把海南岛作为攻击目标，但就像南中国海的人造岛屿一样，仍然在与中国大陆相反的方向。就连北京的一位学者也指出，这些南中国海的岛屿不过是用来照看他们的渔船的船坞而已。所以，除非中国潜艇离开海南港，与美国海军在太平洋公海上作战，否则解放军的水手们只能无所事事地将坐在海南，摆弄他们的大拇指。

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Dave Ng：
China has only 2 SSN base, other is in NE where water is much shallow & under constant watch by SK & Japan. Subs probably wander under SCS with occasional trips out to open ocean south of the Philippines. SCS has strategic value in keeping 2nd strike capability and US wants to deny that. Bombing the sub underwater pen south of Hainan even with conventional munitions would trigger nuclear retaliation regardless what China said just yesterday on no 1st use of nuke. I am surpriseTaiwan troll takes Bejing scholars word literally.

中国只有2个攻击型核潜艇基地，另一个位于东北亚，那里的水很浅，并在韩国和日本的持续监视下。这些潜艇可能会在南海下游荡，偶尔会到菲律宾南部的开阔海域。南中国海的基地在保持第二次打击能力方面具有战略价值，而美国则否认这一点。即使是使用常规弹药轰炸海南岛以南的潜艇基地，也会引发核报复，即使中国有不首先使用核武器承诺，我很惊讶，台湾佬竟然把北京学者的话当真了。

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Ronnery Amon：
No. I don't think the value of Hainan and the islands in the SCS is for second strike capability as you believe. They are still much too far from any USN assets or even the the US mainland to be effective second strike resources. Sure, PLAN subs can go out under the Philippines but what makes you think the USN doesn't monitor this corridor into the Pacific? Guam and Australia are nearby at this corridor. In order for PLAN to have 2nd strike capability, they should have subs already out in the middle of the Pacific and not still be twiddling their thumbs inside the SCS.

不，我不认为海南岛和南海的人造岛屿的价值在你所谓的二次打击能力。它们距离任何美国基地，甚至美国本土都太远了，无法成为有效的二次打击资源。没错，解放军海军的潜艇可以在菲律宾的水下航行，但你凭什么认为美国海军没有监视这条通往太平洋的走廊？关岛和澳大利亚就在这条走廊附近，为了使解放军拥有二次打击能力，他们应该在太平洋中部部署潜艇，而不是在南海无所事事。

USN using conventional munitions would cause PLAN to escalate to nuclear? That sounds like logical response. Perhaps you are making another assumption that the USN would not match with nuclear as well?
Perhaps you are one of those flat Earth folks, eh? You need to take a look at a globe and familiarize yourself with geography.

美国使用常规弹药会导致解放军升级为使用核弹吗？听起来还真是合乎逻辑的反应。也许你是在做另一个假设，即美国海军不会用相应的核武器进行反击？
也许你是那种相信地球是平的人，是吧？你需要看看地球仪，熟悉一下地理。

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Redmond：
The two opposing forces have different combat doctrines. One relies on full spectrum dominance and the other relies on creeping defense. The article is accurate. This is going to be a missile war from day one so there's the importance of surrounding the area with SAM batteries. The war won't start by a large scale extensive eviction of the Chinese from the Spratlys or a naval barricade, that will only expose too much personnel and equipment to long range munitions coming from the mainland. The island bases will only serve as bait to maximize the fatality of the PLA's mobile S2S launchers. Im afraid that if war is inevitable, it has to start by bypassing the islands and attacking the mainland first.

这两种对立的力量有着不同的作战理念。一个依靠全天候的作战优势，另一个依靠潜行的防御。这篇文章是准确的。战争从一开始就是一场导弹战，所以用地对空导弹覆盖这个地区是很重要的。这场战争不会以大规模的从南沙群岛或海军壁垒中大规模驱逐中国人开始，这样只会让大量人员和装备暴露于来自大陆的远程打击之下。岛上的基地只会成为最大限度地提高解放军的移动地对地导弹发射装置的致命性的诱饵。恐怕如果战争是不可避免，美军必须首先绕过这些岛屿，首先攻击大陆。

The only way out of this, and postpone direct confrontation between two superpowers was to to instigate a cold-war style proxy war between Philippines and Malaysia. Sadly, the Lahad-Datu incident was too badly cooked that both presidents from respective countries smelled it. Now, too bad this opportunity has long passed. Time to build some bomb shelters folks.

解决这一问题的唯一办法是，避免两个超级大国之间的直接对抗，在菲律宾和马来西亚之间挑起一场冷战式的代理人战争。可悲的是，拉哈德-达乌事件干的太糟了，两国的总统都闻到了它味，可惜的是，这个机会早就过去了，是时候建造一些防空洞了。

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AbleArcher：
As a very knowledgeable commenter explained to myself and others on a different thread not long ago, the SCS artificial islands being built are really misunderstood.
1. The SLOCs supplying Guam, Japan and probably Korea can simply be moved out to, or beyond, the “second island chain”. The PLAN can perhaps threaten the SLOCs there, but nowhere near as effectively. Certainly these islands will play no part.
2. These islands are what you build when you can’t build a decent carrier. The islands are also bad publicity in the meantime and certainly haven’t enhanced any territorial claims. Just a poor man’s carrier.
3. These aren’t the days of D-Day and Iwo Jima. These islands can be wiped out by guided missile subs, like the four Ohio class that were converted and used against Libya in Operation Odyssey Dawn, without the sub even surfacing. Also, the USN has its own supersonic anti ship missile, the multi-purpose SM-6, and its newer LRASM, the old Harpoon etc etc.

正如一位非常有见地的评论者不久前向我和其他人解释的那样，正在建造的南海人造岛被很多人误解了。
1、供应关岛、日本甚至韩国的海上交通线会被转移到“第二岛链”或更远的地方。解放军可能会威胁到那里的海上交通线，但是没有那么有效，当然，这些岛屿不会起任何作用。

2、当你无法建造一艘像样的航母时，就只能建造一些这样的岛屿。这些岛屿的宣传也很糟糕，而且肯定没有加强任何领土主张，只是一个穷人的“航母”。

3、今天早已不是诺曼底登陆和硫磺岛战役那个时代了，这些岛屿可以用导弹、潜艇轻松摧毁，比如在攻打利比亚的“奥德赛黎明”行动，四艘俄亥俄级潜艇甚至都没有浮出水面。同时，美国海军拥有超音速反舰导弹，多功能SM-6（标准6反舰导弹），最新的远程反舰导弹（ LRASM），以及旧的“捕鲸叉”反舰导弹等等，等等。

So far I haven’t seen any evidence that these islands are significant at all except to make Vietnam angry, and to be used by the Pentagon as a justification to less knowledgeable people, including in Congress, to request more and more money.

到目前为止，我还没有看到任何证据表明这些岛屿意义重大，只是成为激怒越南，并被五角大楼用作包括国会在内的那些无知的人当成不停要钱的理由。

TPAJAX：
China, the worlds largest exporter, is gonna use its fake islands to disrupt shipping? Seems unlikely. And that can start a war if they do actually impinge on freedom of navigation like that. They aren’t going to risk anything. US carriers and everyone else’s ships are going to keep sailing through just as they were yesterday and last week and last decade. It’s up to the Chinese to start shooting and actually start WWIII.

中国，世界上最大的出口国，会利用它的假岛屿来扰乱航运吗？似乎不太可能。如果他们真的侵犯了这样的航行自由，那就会引发战争。他们不会冒这种风险，美国航母和其他所有人的船只都将继续航行，就像昨天、上周和过去10年一样。这取决于中国人是否会开第一枪，如果真那样就意味着第三次世界大战。

Lookbeyondtheobvious：
China's trade with Americas, Japan, Russia and Central Asia will not be dirupted by whatever happens in SCS. In a few years' time, China will have a number of bypasses and its trade will be unaffected by chokepoints in SCS. Oil and gas pipelines from Russia, Kazhakstan and Iran will be complete too. The same can not be said about others!

中国与美国、日本、俄罗斯和中亚的贸易不会受到南中国海局势的影响。再过几年，中国就会有很多旁路，中国的贸易也不会受到南海瓶颈的影响。来自俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦和伊朗的油气管道也将完好无损，对其他人来说，可就不见得如此了！


Nexusfast123：
Don't think that will be the case as very large volumes of trade will still go by sea. It's not practical to move it all by land routes.

别这么假设，因为大量的贸易仍将通过海路实现，把所有的贸易都搬到陆地上是不现实的。

Lookbeyondtheobvious：
Still China has more pipelines and land routes for trade. Compare that to Japan, SK, Taiwan, ASEAN. Which countries will be more desperate to open the SCS if conflict ensues as they have no land routes whatsoever?

中国还有很多管道和陆路可供贸易，相比之下日本，韩国，台湾，东盟有什么？如果没有陆路而引发冲突，哪些国家会更迫切地开放南海？

Schlesinger's Zenith ElPrimero：
Nice little prompt for Australian nuclear weapons too - and you know what Aussies are like, they'll tell the chicoms to get f&cked!

让澳大利亚拥核也许是个不错的主意---你知道澳洲人是什么样子的，他们会干上中国佬的！

PappyStu：
History has proved no fixed position is impregnable, but their creation was for more political than military purposes...

历史已经证明，没有任何地方是坚不可摧的，但他们的创建是更多的是为了政治目的，而不是军事目的...

Popskief
In a shooting war in the pacific, those fake islands will be obliterated in 24 hours.
Pity to those stationed to defend the indefensible. Death guaranteed.

在一场太平洋地区的热战中，这些假岛屿将在24小时内被消灭。
可怜那些驻守的人，必死无疑。