【GPF】：在中国，一个由软弱而生的战略 [美国媒体]

GPF：geopolitical futures

一个地缘政治杂志网

China’s actions so far in the ongoing North Korean affair have been ambiguous. In order to try to understand China’s strategy toward North Korea, it is necessary to understand China’s strategy in general. To do that, it is important to recognize the imperatives and constraints that drive the country.

迄今为止，中国在朝鲜问题的行动上一直模棱两可。为了了解中国对朝鲜的战略，那就有必要了解一下中国的总体战略。要做到这一点，重要的是要认识到，是什么驱动和限制这个国家。

First, we need to outline China’s basic geographical parts. The country has four buffer regions that are under its control. Tibet in the southwest has seen some instability and is vulnerable to outside influences. Xinjiang in the northwest is predominantly Muslim, with a significant insurgency but not one that threatens Chinese control. Inner Mongolia in the north is stable. Manchuria in the northeast is also stable and of all four buffers is the most integrated with the Chinese core. These last two regions are now dominated by the Han Chinese, China’s main ethnic group, but they are still distinct. When you look at a map of China, you will see that a good part of what we think of China is not ethnically Chinese.

首先，我们要概括基本的中国地理部分。这个国家在其控制之下有四个缓冲区。西藏在西南地区有一些不稳定因素，容易受到外界的影响。西北地区的新疆以穆斯林为主，有明显的叛乱，但并没有威胁到中国的控制。北部的内蒙古是稳定的。东北的满洲也很稳定，这四个缓冲区都是中国的核心。其中两个地区现在由中国的主要民族汉族统治，但他们仍然是不同的。当你看一幅中国地图时，你会发现，中国的大部分区域并不是中国人。

Within Han China, there are also divisions. The population is concentrated in the east because western China has limited rainfall and can’t sustain very large populations. In this sense, China is actually a relatively narrow country, with an extremely dense population. The interests within Han China are also diverse, and this has frequently led to fragmentation and civil war.

在中国内部，也存在着分歧。人口集中在东部，因为中国西部的降雨量很有限，人口无法维持。从这个意义上讲，中国实际上是一个相对狭窄的国家，人口密度极高。中国的利益也是多变的，这经常会导致分裂和内战。

The most important distinction is the one between coastal China and interior China. Coastal China, when left to its own devices, is involved in regional and global maritime trade, while the interior has fewer commercial opportunities. Coastal China’s priority is reaching its customers, whereas the interior wants Beijing to transfer the wealth from the coast to help support the poor interior. Many other regional disagreements exist of course, but this is the source of discord between the two regions.

最重要的区别是中国沿海和内地之间的区别。中国的沿海地区，在其自身的条件上，可以参与区域和全球的海上贸易，而内陆地区则拥有比较少的商业机会。中国沿海地区的首要任务是向客户提供服务来赚钱，而内地则希望北京方面将财富从沿海地区转移到内陆地区，以帮助贫困的内陆地区。当然，这两个地区的其它分歧也有，但上句所说的矛盾是这两个地区之间不和的根源。

It is not a new problem, and left to fester, it can result in internal conflict, with coastal interests frequently seeking intervention by their customers. This was the case from the British intervention in the mid-19th century until 1947. During this time, there was endless internal conflict in China and constant foreign involvement. Mao Zedong tried to solve the problem by closing China to trade (at least somewhat), crushing the coastal elite and imposing a dictatorship. Like emperors before him, he imposed a powerful state on a unified but nonetheless very poor country.

这会导致内部冲突，但它不是一个新问题，沿海利益往往会寻求客户的干预。这就是19世纪中期到1947年英国会干预的原因。在这段时间里，中国内部发生了无休止的冲突，外国的介入也持续不断。毛试图通过关闭中国贸易来解决这个问题(至少在一定程度上)，这也摧毁了沿海的精英阶层，并强加了一个威权政府。就像在以前的皇帝一样，他在一个统一但仍然非常贫穷的国家之上，强加了一个强大国家的思想。

After Mao died, China embarked on a traditional Chinese strategy: It tried to build its economy by selling low-priced manufactured goods to the world without allowing divisions to arise – in other words, it wanted to have its cake and eat it too. This worked for a generation; once the state stopped undermining economic development, China surged. By 2006, exports, particularly to the U.S. and Europe, accounted for 37 percent of China’s gross domestic product. The coastal region became relatively prosperous, while the rest of China and the buffer regions lagged far behind, as they always have. But the surging economy helped raise living standards, even if it also created inequality.

毛死后，中国开始了一项传统的中国战略:它试图通过向世界出售廉价的制成品以建设经济，而不允许出现分裂——换句话说，它也要有自己的利益蛋糕，并吃掉它。这对一代人来说是有效的;一旦国家停止破坏经济发展，中国就会迅速发展。到2006年，出口，特别是对美国和欧洲的出口占中国国内生产总值的37%。沿海地区变得相对繁荣，而中国其他地区和缓冲地区却一如既往的远远落后。经济的飞速发展提高了人们的生活水平，但这也造成了不平等。

2008 was a turning point. China’s major customers, Europe and the United States, went into recession, and their appetite for Chinese goods declined. Economic growth slowed dramatically, and by 2016, exports only contributed 19 percent of GDP. Although internal consumption increased, the coastal region was focused on markets in advanced industrial countries, which the interior couldn’t replace.

2008年是一个转折点。中国的主要客户欧洲和美国陷入衰退，他们对中国商品的需求下降。经济增长大幅放缓，到2016年，出口仅占GDP的19%。虽然国内消费有所增加，但沿海地区的市场主要集中在发达工业国家，内陆地区依然无法取代其市场。

And in the process of maintaining weakening businesses, saving jobs and increasing domestic demand, the cost of production rose. China faced competition from other countries for markets, and the pressure on its internal system intensified.

在维持疲软的企业、保住工作岗位和增加国内需求，生产成本也开始上升。中国面临着来自其他国家的市场竞争，其内部体系的压力也在加剧。

Coastal and regional interests diverged again, and each advocated different policies in response to the crisis. The Chinese government tried to accommodate all but accommodated none. In 2012, President Xi Jinping took office and sought to put the genie back in the bottle.His anti-corruption campaign was intended to take control of the economy and to convince the interior that he was not a pawn of the coastal region. Xi sought to maintain exports as much as possible and to re-establish centralized control with minimal effect on the economy.

沿海地区和地区利益再次分化，各自主张不同的政策以应对危机。中国政府试图适应所有政策，但一个也适应不了。2012年，新一届政府上台，试图将妖怪放回瓶子里。反腐运动旨在控制经济，并让内地相信他不是沿海地区的一个小兵。政府力图尽可能保持出口，同时在对经济最小的影响下，重新建立集中控制。

He also had to deal with the United States. The United States’ consumption of exports was a major engine of China’s economy. At the same time, the crackdown on government and business officials – an essentially political act – would affect American investments and other interests in China. China had to take greater control of the economy without losing U.S. investment or imports.

中国还必须与美国打交道。美国的出口消费是中国经济的主要引擎。与此同时，对政府和商业官员的打压——实质上是一种政治行为——将影响美国在中国的投资和其他利益。中国必须在不失去美国投资或进口的情况下，更好地控制经济。

But in case the worst happened, China developed a fallback strategy. It began producing a new class of high-tech products. It also had to find new markets outside the U.S. The economic solution posed a military problem.

但万一发生最坏的情况，中国制定了一个后备战略。它开始生产新的高科技产品。它还必须在美国以外寻找新的市场。但经济解决方案构造成了军事问题。

In the event there was an economic falling out with the U.S., China had to consider the possibility of a military confrontation. But the key issue was the ability to guarantee China’s access to sea lanes. In this, China had a major geographic problem. The South and East China seas are ringed with small islands, spaced in such a way that passage between them can be blocked with relative ease. The U.S. Navy is far superior to the Chinese navy, and the Chinese were concerned that in some unforeseen crisis the U.S. would block access to their much needed sea lanes. Those small islands were now at the center of Chinese national interest. The Chinese could claim the entire region, but they were not in a position to seize it.

在这一过程中，美国出现了经济衰退。中国必须考虑军事对抗的可能性。但关键问题是在于能否能保证中国的海上通道畅通。在这方面，中国有一个主要的地理问题。中国的南海和东海被小岛环绕，被这样的方式隔开，它们之间的通道可以相对容易地被封锁。美国海军远比中国海军优越，而中国人担心，在一些不可预见的危机中，美国将封锁他们急需的海上通道。所以这些小岛现在变成是中国国家利益的中心。中国可以宣称拥有整个地区，但他们现在还没有一个好机会来抓住。



At the same time, the Chinese devised a political solution to their strategic problem. If a country like Indonesia or the Philippines aligned with China instead of with the United States, access to the global sea lanes would be assured without having to confront the United States. The problem here is that the two strategies undermined each other. Aggressive assertion of Chinese power in the regional waters and finding accommodation with regional powers were inconsistent approaches. What’s more, they could only work if the United States was not present. And, of course, it was.

与此同时，中国为他们的战略问题制定了政治解决方案。如果像印度尼西亚或菲律宾这样的国家与中国结盟而不是与美国结盟，那么就可以在不与美国对抗的情况下保证进入全球海上通道。这里的问题是这两种策略的相互影响。中国在区域水域的强势主张和与此区域国家的和解是不一致的。更重要的是，他们只有在美国不在场的情况下才能工作。当然，它也做的了。

China had one other option for getting around potential U.S. actions: creating an alternative export route through Asia to Europe. This was the One Belt, One Road concept. But it, too, was flawed. First, the cost of building the requisite infrastructure was staggering. Second, it would run through countries that were unstable and, for the Chinese, unimportant customers. 


中国有另一个选择，可以绕过美国的潜在行动:开辟一条经由亚洲到欧洲的替代出口路线。这是一个“一带一路”的概念。但它也有缺陷。首先，必要的基础设施建设成本是惊人的。其次，它将贯穿那些不稳定的国家，以及那些不重要的中国客户。

China, therefore, is caught in a set of interlocking problems. Its economic miracle has matured into more normal growth rates. It has a vast population that lacks the ability to consume all that it produces. It has to contend with global stagnation and competition from other producers – and competing with high-tech producers is no small task. It is therefore afraid of internal instability and has imposed a dictatorship designed to maintain a vibrant economy without social costs. To do that, it must increase exports and control access to China’s economy, a move designed to alienate a large and dangerous power, the United States. But it can’t afford to confront the U.S., whose navy it can’t defeat.

因此，中国陷入了一系列连锁问题之中。它从经济奇迹已经变成为更正常的增长率。它拥有庞大的人口，缺乏消费它产生的一切的能力。它必须应对全球经济停滞和来自其他生产商的竞争——与高科技生产商竞争并非易事。因此，它害怕内部的不稳定，并强加了威权形式，以维持一个没有社会成本又充满活力的经济。要做到这一点，中国必须增加对中国经济的出口和控制进口，此举旨在疏远一个庞大而危险的大国——美国。但它承担不起与美国对抗的代价。它的海军不能失败。

The Chinese are caught between the need to placate the United States and to distract it with as many problems as possible. North Korea is a perfect diversion, but siding with Pyongyang is not an option. China can appear to be helping the United States while keeping the U.S. focused on Pyongyang.

中国人被夹在需要安抚美国和尽可能分散美国注意力之间。朝鲜是一个完美的转移，但与平壤站在一边不是一个好的选择。中国似乎表示可以帮助美国，又同时需要保持美国对平壤的关注。

This is a strategy that emerges not from a position of strength but from one of fundamental weakness. China’s internal contradiction is that prosperity creates instability, and stability is incompatible with prosperity. There are complexities and nuances of course, but this is the root of China’s problem. China is therefore trying to maintain what prosperity it can without destabilizing the system. In doing this, it is jeopardizing its overseas markets, particularly the United States, creating the opportunity for a conflict it can’t win and opening the door to regionalism and warlordism.

这是一种战略，不是从实力地位，而源于其根本的弱点。中国的内部矛盾是繁荣造成不稳定，稳定与繁荣的不相容。当然，这也有复杂和微妙之处，但这是中国问题的根源。因此，中国正在努力保持它能在不破坏体系稳定的情况下实现繁荣。在这样做的过程中，它正在危及其海外市场，尤其是美国，这将会导致一场无法赢得的冲突，以及为地区主义和军阀主义打开大门。

Unlike Japan, which moved from being a high-growth country to a low-growth country without social upheaval, China may not be so lucky. Japan had a homogeneous, socially integrated society. China is not homogenous, and it has irreconcilable social differences. Its global strategy reflects these contradictions and ultimately poses a greater risk to China itself than to others. And in such a situation, the key is to look confident and try to keep others off balance. But this can only work for so long.

与日本不同，中国从一个高增长国家变成了一个没有社会动荡的低增长国家，中国可能没有那么幸运。日本有一个同质的、社会一体化的社会。中国是不同质的，它有不可调和的社会差异。它的全球战略反映了这些矛盾，最终给中国自身带来了比其他国家更大的风险。在这种情况下，关键是要显得自信，并努力让别国保持平衡。但这需要这样做很久。