2018年3月27日兰德公司报告：中国对海外安全的追求（第一部分） [美国媒体]

Preface

前言

Inrecent years, China’s military has begun to expand its presence abroad. Yet thepace and scope of Chinese international military operations and activitiesremains modest compared with the country’s expanding array of economic andstrategic interests. This report seeks to better understand how China ispursuing security for its overseas interests. It surveys the threats facingChinese interests abroad, the range of forces available to counter thosethreats, and the missions and tasks that are likely to be undertaken bysecurity-related forces. This report also considers some implications ofChina’s approach for the United States.

最近几年，中国军队已经开始将存在扩展到海外。但是相较于国家正在扩张的大量经济与战略利益，中国的国际军队行动和活动的步伐及范围仍保持适度。这篇报告试图更好的理解中国如何确保其海外利益的安全。这篇报告调查了中国海外利益所面临的威胁，可用于应对这些威胁的武装力量的范围，以及这些与安全相关的武装力量可能采取的行动和任务。这篇报告也考虑了一些中国行动对于美国的意义。

Thisresearch was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conductedwithin the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RANDNational Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research anddevelopment center (FFRDC) sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps,the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

这个研究由国防部长办公室赞助，由兰德国防研究所国际安全和防务政策中心执行。该机构由联邦政府资助，并由国防部长办公室，联合参谋部，联合作战司令部，美国海军，海军陆战队，国防部门，以及国防情报机构提供赞助。

Summary

摘要

China’sascent as the world’s second-largest economy has brought the country tremendousprosperity, but integration into the global economy has also exposed growingnumbers of its citizens and their assets to potential harm. According toChinese authorities, 30,000 of the country’s enterprises are located overseas,and more than 100 million Chinese citizens travel abroad annually. Dangers in distantlands menace the markets, resources, and investments upon which China’s economynow depends. In the words of the country’s 2015 Military Strategy White Paper,China has become “more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism,piracy, and serious natural disasters and epidemics.” Chinese leaders haveaccordingly elevated in priority the provision of security for the country’soverseas interests.

中国崛起成为世界第二大经济体给该国带来了极大的繁荣，但是融入全球经济也使得越来越多她的公民以及财产面临潜在的伤害。根据中国官方数据，有30000家企业位于海外，每年有超过100万中国公民出国旅行。在遥远土地上的危险威胁着中国经济现在依赖的市场，资源，以及投资。正如中国2015年军事战略白皮书所说，中国已经变得“更容易受到国际和地区动荡，恐怖主义，海盗，以及严重的自然灾害和流行病的攻击。”因此，中国领导人为其海外利益提高了安全保障。

Thisreport examines the question of how China can provide security for its growingarray of overseas economic and strategic interests. It also seeks to understandhow China’s approach might provide opportunities or raise concerns for theUnited States. The report seeks to answer the following questions:
• Howwill China protect its citizens and their economic assets in distant countries?
• Whatsort of military capabilities or other arrangements might China pursueaccordingly?
• Whatwill China’s approach to security abroad mean for the United States and itsallies and partners?

这篇报告探讨了中国如何为其不断增长的大量的海外经济和战略利益提供安全保障的问题。报告也试图理解中国的做法如何可能为美国提供机会或引起关注。报道争取解答下列问题：
• 中国如何保护在遥远国家的中国公民及他们的经济财产安全？
• 相应的，中国追求什么样的军事能力或其他的军事安排？
• 中国对于海外安全采取的手段对于美国以及其盟友和伙伴意味着什么？

HowChina decides to protect its overseas interests carries important implicationsfor international politics and for the country’s own economic prospects. Thesize and strength of any military forces stationed abroad could affect thecourse of an international crisis or prospects for collaboration with theUnited States on shared concerns. Insight into China’s approach to protectingoverseas interests can also shed light on the economic feasibility of majorBelt and Road Initiative infrastructure investment projects in fragile states.If China lacks a reliable way to protect its interests in unstable countries,ambitious infrastructure and investment projects could suffer heavy losses orremain unrealized.

中国如何决定保护其海外利益会给国际政治以及国家自己的经济前景带来重要影响。任何规模和实力的驻外军事力量都会给国际危机进程或与美国共同关注的合作前景带来影响。深刻理解中国保护其海外利益的方法也可以阐明在脆弱国家主要“一带一路”基础设施投资项目的经济可行性。如果中国没有一个可靠的方法来保护其在不稳定国家的利益，雄心勃勃的基础设施和项目投资将会遭受重大损失或者不能实现。

Historyoffers precedents in which rising nations struggled with the securityimplications of their increasing integration into an international economy.Many of history’s most powerful countries fueled their growth, in part, throughtrade and investment abroad. To secure their overseas interests, these nationsfrequently relied on expeditionary militaries and imperial conquest. Inprevious centuries, European empires and imperial Japan raised large armies andnavies, subjugated other countries, and established colonies in part to ensureaccess to vital resources and markets. The United States established militarybases on some of its imperial conquests, such as the Philippines and Guam.However, after World War II, the United States expanded its internationalpresence through an extensive network of military bases located in alliedcountries. The relevance of these examples for China is unclear. Giveninternational norms proscribing imperialism, China’s own renouncement ofmilitary aggression, a lack of international allies, and the Chinese military’slimited power projection capabilities, Beijing has little incentive to mimicthe examples of either past imperial nations or the United States.

历史为崛起大国与不断融入国际经济带来的安全隐患作斗争提供了先例。许多历史上最强大的国家，在某种程度上，通过海外贸易和投资来推动经济增长。为了保障海外利益，这些国家经常依靠远征部队和帝国征服来实现。在之前几个世纪中，欧洲帝国和日本帝国建立了庞大的军队及海军，征服其他国家并建立部分殖民地来确保获得重要的资源及市场。美国在部分其征服的帝国上建立了军事基地，比如菲律宾和关岛。但是，在二战后，美国通过在盟友国家建立的广阔的军事基地网络来扩张其国际存在。对中国多来说这些例子是否中肯仍不清楚。鉴于国际准则禁止帝国主义，中国放弃军事侵略行为，缺少国际盟友，以及中国有限的军事投射能力，北京都几乎没有动机去模仿过去的帝国主义国家或者美国。

Drawingfrom analysis of publicly available databases and academic studies, as well as Chineselanguage official documents and scholarly writings, this paper argues thatChina is likely to pursue an approach distinctly different from that taken bypast imperial countries and the United States. China’s approach will becharacterized by an overlapping mixture of People’s Liberation Army troops,paramilitary forces, civilian contractors, and local security forces provided bynations hosting major Chinese assets. State-owned companies will likely alsoplay an important role in providing needed ports and bases, as well aslogistics and maintenance support. Many of these forces are likely to becharged with narrowly defined tasks and may cooperate with one another only sporadically,if at all.

根据公开的数据库和学术研究分析，以及汉语官方文件和学术着作，这篇文章争论中国可能会追求一条与过去帝国主义国家和美国明显不同的方法。中国的方法具有这样的特点，它是各种手段的相互交织，包含人民解放军部队，预备部队，民间承包商，以及中国主要资产所在国家提供的地方安全力量。国有公司也可能在提供需要的港口和基地，以及后勤和维护支持上扮演重要角色。如果需要的话，很多这些力量都可能会承担狭义上的任务，也有可能偶尔会与其他力量相互合作。

In someways, China’s likely approach to overseas security operations and activitiesreplicates in exaggerated form trends already apparent in western countries.Declining defense budgets, low public tolerance for costly overseasentanglements, and the persistence and seeming insolubility of security threatsin diverse parts of the world have led the United States and Europe to involvemore defense contractors in their overseas operations, press partner countries tostep up contributions on security affairs, and narrow the focus of their combatoperations to address only the most pressing threats, while leaving broadersecurity problems unresolved. China shares some of these concerns andassessments, and its own limitations and inclinations provide strong incentivesfor it to borrow many of these practices even as it develops its own path.

在某种程度上，中国在海外安全行动和活动可能的方式在西方国家已经呈现出夸张的趋势。国防预算的下降，公众对于昂贵的海外纠纷的低容忍度，以及在世界不同地方的持续的，看起来无法解决的安全威胁都使得美国和欧洲让更多国防承包商参与进他们的海外行动中，迫使伙伴国家提升在安全事务中的贡献，并且缩小战斗行动的焦点以应对最紧迫的威胁，而留下了广大的无法解决的安全问题。中国有一些相同的关切和评估，加上中国自身的局限以及倾向会给中国强大的激励来借鉴许多这些做法，即使是在她发展自己的道路的时候。

China’sapproach suggests both opportunities and limits to the prospects of cooperationwith the United States in the international arena. Paradoxically, the prospectsfor cooperation may be highest in domains suited to military operations,especially such nonwar missions as disaster relief and countering maritimepiracy, because of U.S. strengths in these domains and clearer shared interestsbetween the two countries. However, areas featuring a Chinese reliance onparamilitary and Chinese-backed host-nation security forces may offer morelimited areas of cooperation. Paramilitary forces are more likely to operateunder the authority of laws or frameworks influenced by Chinese politicalvalues that may be at odds with those of the United States. Differinginterpretations of terrorism, for example, could continue to impaircollaboration between the two countries in countering some threats, forexample. In some cases, China’s pursuit of security abroad could encroach onU.S. interests. In particular, Chinese efforts to arm and equip friendlyhost-nation–provided security forces in areas of South Asia, the Middle East,or Africa could complicate U.S. efforts to promote its security and those ofits allies and partners in the same areas. China’s desire to cultivate tieswith Iran—a key energy supplier—could lead Beijing to provide advanced weaponsthat Tehran could employ against countries allied with the United States, oragainst U.S. forces themselves. Similarly, Beijing may step up arms sales tohelp equip the governments of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and othersto suppress domestic insurgencies that threaten Chinese investments. Growingdependence on China for security could expose those same countries to pressurefrom Beijing.

中国的方法在国际舞台上与美国合作的前景既有机会也有限制。矛盾的是，军事行动方面的合作前景可能是最高的，特别是一些诸如灾难援助和反海盗等非战争行动，因为美国在这方面是强项，并且双方在这方面有着明显的共同利益。但是，在一些领域包含中国依靠的准军事部队以及中国支持的东道国安全部队方面，合作会有限制。准军事部队可能是在中国当局政治价值观影响的法律或框架下行动，而这些价值观可能与美国不和。比如，对恐怖主义的不同诠释可能会持续影响双方在应对一些威胁时的合作。例如，有时候，中国追求的海外安全可能会蚕食美国的利益。特别是，中国努力在南亚，中东，或非洲武装和装备对华友好国家的安全部队，会使得美国及其盟友和伙伴在相同区域促进安全的行动复杂化。中国渴望培养与伊朗的关系—一个关键的能源供应商—会使得北京提供先进的武器给伊朗，从而德黑兰能够部署这些武器来对抗美国盟友，或直接对抗美国军队。类似的，北京可能增加武器销售来帮助武装菲律宾政府，泰国，印度尼西亚，以及其他的一些国家来镇压威胁中国投资的国内叛乱。对中国安保方面的需要会使得这些国家受到来自北京的压力。