中国高铁真的很先进吗？（二）外国网友大讨论：未必，那得看跟谁比！ [美国媒体]

Question：How advanced are Chinese high-speed rail trains?

问题：中国高铁有多先进？



Answered by Paco Cabeza-Lopez：（upvote|74）：
Paco Cabeza-Lopez的回答（74赞）：
I have read all the answers so far but I can’t see any of them providing a real answer to the question. Some answers confuse the size of Chinese fleet with technological development. Bigger doesn’t necessarily mean better. We know that well in Europe.

我看完了到目前为止所有对这个问题的回答，但是我还没有发现其中任何回答提供真正的干货。有些答案把中国高铁舰队的规模和中国高铁的技术发展混为一谈。规模更大并不一定意味着技术更好。在欧洲，我们可以很清楚地看到这一点。

Certainly, “how advanced” depends on your own benchmark. For someone in the US, the Chinese High Speed (HS) network will be simply awesome. If your benchmark is France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium or Japan, then I would say it is quite equivalent in most general instances except for one, probably the most important one, SAFETY (I’ll get back to this in a minute).

当然啦，“有多先进”取决于你采用什么样的参照系。比如对于一个身在美国的人来说，中国的高铁网络简直就是牛逼。但是如果你的参照系换成法国、西班牙、意大利、德国、比利时或者日本，那么我会说，在大多数情况下，中国高铁和他们旗鼓相当，除了有一点，或许也是最重要的一点，安全（这一点我待会儿再讲）。

I say quite similarly advanced simply because the Chinese have “borrowed” all technologies to make HS trains from the main European technological contractors. Simply look at the rolling stock running on the Chinese networks. Most of the trains are exact copies of the original Alstom, Siemens, Bombardier (rails division based in Germany, not Canada) Ansaldo and a few Japanese Shinkansen models. (Partially or completely) built in China but exact copies of the European/Japanese marvels.

我说它们几乎是一样的先进，纯粹是因为中国人用来建造高铁的所有技术，都是从几个主要的欧洲技术承包商那里“借来的”。这一点你只需要看一看，目前正运行在中国高铁系统的轨道机车车身就可以知道了。大部分的车身都是原封不动地复制了阿尔斯通、西门子、庞巴迪（它的铁路部门总部在德国，而不是加拿大）、安萨尔多和一部分新干线的原始模型。车身（部分地或者完全的）在中国生产制造，但是完全是欧洲/日本生产商的杰作的翻版。

译注：来源 / 百度百科；
阿尔斯通：法国公司，世界五百强排名448，阿尔斯通是全球交通运输和电力基础设施领域的先驱；
西门子：德国公司，西门子股份公司创立于1847年，是全球电子电气工程领域的领先企业；
庞巴迪：加拿大公司，庞巴迪是一家总部位于加拿大魁北克省蒙特利尔的国际性交通运输设备制造商；
安萨尔多：意大利公司，是一家拥有150多年历史、全能型的工业公司，拥有悠久的重工业研发及制造的历史，目前是全球最优秀的综合机电工程公司之一。

CRH1 train models are Bombardier/Ansaldo Zefiro’s
CRH2 train models are Japanese Shinkansen’s
CRH3 train models are Siemens ICE3 models
CRH5 train models are Alstom Pendolinos
Etc, etc.

CRH1列车模型是庞巴迪/安萨尔多的Zefiro型列车
CRH2列车模型是日本新干线型列车
CRH3列车模型是西门子的ICE3型列车
CRH5列车模型是阿尔斯通的Pendolinos型列车
等等。。。

（译注：CRH 全称为China Railways High-speed，中文字面意为“中国铁路高速”。CRH1即为和谐号CRH1型电力动车组）

It is true that now China is able to make HS trains almost by themselves, but previous agreements with suppliers suggest they still pay royalties for every model they produce (or at least they should). And in no case, the Chinese may claim these trains as “Chinese technology”. Period.

确实，如今中国已经能够完全靠自己的能力来建造高铁了，但是根据此前与供应商达成的协议推断，他们仍然要为自己制造的每一辆车身支付专利使用费（或者至少是他们应该支付）。所以无论是在哪一种情况下，中国人都没有资格宣称他们的高铁是“中国技术”。这部分说完了。

Now, let’s go to the safety part.

现在，让我们回到关于安全的部分。

Any country may have the fastest, superfanciest trains they can, but you need a signaling management system that goes with it and that guarantees no accidents while optimizing headways (ie, to get your return on investment operators place trains as fast as possible and as close to each other as possible in total SAFETY): in Europe, with ERTMS, we can place trains at 350 km/h every 3 minutes in a way that if one needs to stop to halt, the next one will do so without crashing into the previous one, in total safety. Of course this is not easy and needs its own planning, development and investment.

每个国家都可以建造他们认为的最快速、最豪华的列车，但是你必须有一个信号管理系统来相配套，这样才可以保证在不出事故的前提下优化列车行驶速度（例如，为了回收投资，在总体安全的情况下，经营者会将列车设置在尽可能快的速度下行驶，并且设置前一趟列车和后一趟列车的间距尽可能的短一些）：在欧洲，通过ERTMS，我们能够把列车速度设置成每隔3分钟切换至350 km/h一次，通过这种方式，一旦前一趟列车需要紧急制动，那么后一趟列车将会采取同样的方式来避免撞上前一趟列车，这样就可以保证总体安全。当然要做到这一点不是那么容易的，这需要相关人员计划，发展和投资。

ERTMS stands for European Rail Traffic Management System. Basically, to make the long story short, the Chinese have adapted (or taken) ERTMS and called it CTCS, which stands for, you guessed it, Chinese Train Control System. ERTMS comes in 3 levels, 1 being the least advanced and 3 being a pure moving block system (trains talk to each other permanently and report their position in real time, no signals needed). CTCS also comes in 3 levels, with CTCS2 somehow equivalent to ERTMS1, CTCS3 equivalent to ERTMS2 and, CTCS1 equivalent to, mmhhmm, “non-safe” Automatic Train Protection System (ATP). Let’s try to elaborate a bit further:

ERTMS 代表“欧洲铁路运输管理系统”。长话短说，总体上，中国人已经改编（或者说 “采取”）了ERTMS，然后改了个名字叫做CTCS，意思是“中国列车运行控制系统”。 ERTMS分3个等级，其中1级是最落后的，3级是指“纯移动闭塞系统”（列车之间互相保持持续稳定的信息传输，并且实时报告各自的位置，不需要信号控制）。CTCS同样分3个等级，但是不知怎么搞地，CTCS2等同于ERTMS1，CTCS3等同于ERTMS2，CTCS1等同于，额额额。。。，“非安全”的列车自动防护系统（ATP）。我再努力说得详细一点：

CTCS 1 is a non-safe ATP system improved by some trackside data reading from a Eurobalise via packet 44. CTCS1 is not used for HS trains because it is designed for maximum speeds of up to 160 km/h. You may find this outside the HS network.
CTCS 2 makes use of ERTMS type data packets but – big difference – the system does not read a Movement Authority (MA) from the Eurobalise as we do in Europe. Instead, the MA is computed by the on-board unit combining trackside data from the Eurobalise with a track circuit code indicating the number of blocks ahead free. Putting your safety in a track circuit may not be the wisest of the ideas, as the Wenzhou train collision on 23 July 2011 proved, with 40 people killed after a heavy storm with lightning hit the area of the accident and made the track circuit fail.
CTCS 3 is the highest end Chinese ATP system capable of dealing with speeds up to 380 km/h with a similar ERTMS 2 type architecture and comprises Radio Block Centers (RBC) and a GSM-R radio communications infrastructure and on-board data radios.

CTCS 1是指非安全的“列车自动防护系统”，它是从“欧洲标准查询应答器”通过packet 44读取的轨道数据改进而来的。CTCS1不是用于高铁系统的，因为它是为最大速度不超过160 km/h的列车设计的。你在高铁网络系统之外的铁路系统中也可以发现它。
CTCS 2使用ERTMS类型数据包，但是，有很大的不同，CTCS 2无法像我们欧洲这样读取来自欧洲标准查询应答器的“行车许可模块”数据。取而代之的是，中国的“行车许可模块”数据是由车载单元综合两方面的数据计算而来的，一方面是来自欧洲标准查询应答器收集的轨道数据，另一方面是来自轨道电路编码指示的前方道路是否通畅的数据。将你的人身安全置于一个轨道电路之上，可能不是所有的方案中最明智的那一种，正如发生在2011年7月23日的温州火车相撞事故证明的那样，那次事故导致40人死亡，起因就是事发区域出现雷暴天气，导致轨道电路发生故障。
CTCS 3是中国最高等级的“列车自动防护系统”，能够应对最高速度达380 km/h的列车，采用和ERTMS 2等级类似的架构，包含“无线闭塞中心”（RBC），GSM-R无线通信设施和车载数据无线电通信。

In other words, and in response to the question asked, Chinese HS rolling stock (trains) are as good as European and Japanese counterparts but I would only trust a Chinese HS ride on a CTCS3 equipped network (and would try to skip CTCS2). Would never ride on a CTCS1 line (this one not supporting HS traffic). Today, only the CTCS3 signaling system in China is up to the European and Japanese standards.

换一句话说，可以这样回答上面提出的这个问题，中国高铁系统的轨道机车车身，和欧洲或日本的同行一样好，但是我只会信任运行在装备了CTCS3标准网络上的高铁（或许会尝试一下CTCS2），但是绝对不会乘坐一条CTCS1线路列车（CTCS1根本就支撑不起高铁交通运输）。当今，在中国只有CTCS3信号系统才可以比肩欧洲和日本的标准。


Rick Wang：
LOL, I love how this person just low key skips the indigenously developed CRH6s and the CRH380s. Copied the Japanese and European models? China signed contracts and collabrated with those companies to design its first few models together. By your logic the Fiat 124 Spider is a copy of the Mazda Miata? Oh and China only has 3 CTCS levels? Forgot about the CTCS 0 and 4 I see? Do you want to do some more research?

真搞笑，我奇怪你这个人是怎么跳过了关键性的中国自主研发的CRH6s和CRH380s型列车的？复制日本和欧洲的模型？中国和这些公司签订了合同，一起来合作研发设计最初的车型。按照你的逻辑，菲亚特124Spider汽车是马自达MX-5 Miata汽车的复制品了？哦？中国只有3个CTCS等级？我看你是忘了还有CTCS 0的CTCS 4了？你难道不想回去做点功课再来谈这个问题吗？

Paco Cabeza-Lopez（答主）：（2赞）Rick, Ill be happy to read your answer if you can provide one to Quora. Sometimes, being a bit of a fanatic makes you believe things are not exactly like you think they are. I can see that in many of your Chinese-related answers.
Rick，我很高兴在这个网站上看到你的回复。有时候，你的某种狂热情绪，让你笃信了一些事情，但是事情并非你认为的那样。我可以从你回答的与中国相关的问题的许多答案上看出这一点。

Anyhow, not mentioning the CTCS0 or CTCS4, or even ERTMS3 doesn’t mean I am not aware of them. They were not relevant for THIS answer. I just didn’t want to get too technical. but if you wish, I can tell you in this direct reply to you that CTCS0 is not signaling system, just a compliance level, and that CTCS4 only exists on paper, just like ERTMS3. Some suppliers claim having ERTMS3 solutions (moving block principle, like CBTC), but this is not completely true. They only have ERTMS3-like systems

不管怎么样，不用说CTCS0或者CTCS4，哪怕是ERTMS3，我也不是非常了解它们。这些跟这个问题无关。我不想谈太多的技术问题。但是如果你非要追根问底，我可以直接跟你说，CTCS0不是信号系统，还尚处于编译级别。而CTCS4还只存在纸面上，就像ERTMS3一样。一些供应商声称已经开发出ERTMS3解决方案（移动闭塞原理，就像CBTC），但是也不完全正确。他们目前只达到了“类ERTMS3”级别。

Re. vehicles (rolling stock), youre perfectly endorsing my answer, and I thank you for that. What you call “design its first models together” is what I call “copies of exactly the same model made in China with mainly Chinese labor”. We are on the same page here.

回应你关于车身的问题，你点赞了我的答案，我很感谢这一点。你所说的“一起来合作研发设计最初的车型”，就是我所说的“在中国制造，主要使用中国工人，原封不动的模型翻版”，这里我们说的是一个意思。

Last but not least. I need do no “research”. Its part of my own knowledge and experience. Thank you.

最后但是同样重要的一点是，我不需要做任何“功课”。这是我的知识和经验的一部分。谢谢。

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Yi Lu：
Thanks for an answer with hardcore details! I love such answers.

谢谢你的干货答案！我喜欢这个答案。

I checked on Chinese internet and it is said that D trains use CTCS2 systems and their speed is 200km/h, while G trains use CTCS3 systems and their speed is 300km/h.

我在中国相关网站上查了一下，网上说D字打头的火车使用CTCS2系统，速度是200km/h；G字打头的火车使用CTCS3系统，速度是300km/h。

So D trains are not safe? or safe at 200km/h?

所以D字打头的火车是不安全的吗？或者说只要在200km/h下行使才安全？

Paco Cabeza-Lopez（答主）：
D trains are rather safe, otherwise we would have accidents every week or month. My point is that theyre not as safe as the equivalent European system for the reasons I explained around the Wenzhou accident. Never fully trust a track circuit. Theyre quite easy to fail, especially in bad weather conditions.

D字打头的火车也是相当安全的，否则我们每个月或每周都要发生交通事故了。我的重点是，他们只是没有像同等级的欧洲系统那样安全而已，原因我已经在温州事故那个问题上解释了。不要过分相信轨道电路。他们很容易出故障，尤其是在恶劣天气状况下。

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Kåre Skak Pedersen：
I’m trying to imagine myself at the ticket office:

我脑补一下我自己在车站买票的场景：

“I would like a ticket back home to Beijing. Please make sure it’s a HS ride on a CTCS3 equipped network.”

“你好，我要买一张回北京的票。请确保我买的这张票的高铁是运行在配备了CTCS3网络系统上。”

Besides I wouldn’t know how to express it in Chinese, I have a feeling that they wouldn’t have a clue what I’m talking about.

除了我不知道应该怎样用中文表达这个意思之外，就算我会用中文说，我估计售票员也对于我所说的一头雾水。

But I still get the point: Chinese trains are cheap copy-crap and only the HS ride on a CTCS3 equipped network is worth risking your life on.

但是我还是抓住了你的要点：中国的火车都是便宜的仿制品，除了运行在CTCS3配置的线路上的高铁值得一试。

Paco Cabeza-Lopez（答主）：
I tried to provide an answer with limited technical details to the question. Of course, the situation you mention is rather unrealistic but, as just replied above to Yi Lu, traffic on CTCS2 systems are rather safe, otherwise we would have accidents every week or month. Fortunately this is not the case.

我是在尽量用不涉及技术细节的语言来回答这个问题的。当然，你提到的场景肯定是不现实的，但是正如我上面回复Yi Lu所说那样，D字打头的火车也是相当安全的，否则我们每个月或每周都要发生交通事故了。幸运的是，事情并没有像这样发生。

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Vincent Poon：
Interesting but your answer seems lacking. Out of curiosity, I've decided to search the web for the “worst high speed rail accidents” and here's the top 3 results.

你的答案很有趣，但是有缺陷。出于好奇心，我决定在网上搜索一下“最糟糕的高铁交通事故”，然后发现以下排在前三位的结果。

Eschede derailment occurred on 3 June 1998, deaths 101, injuries 88
Santiago de Compostela derailment occurred on 24 July 2013, deaths 80, injuries 140
Wenzhou train collision on 23 July 2011, deaths 40, injuries 200+ (based in the wiki article, this is China's first fetal highspeed rail accident)

艾须得镇（德国）列车脱轨，发生在1998年6月3日，101人死亡，88人受伤；
圣地亚哥-德孔波斯特拉（西班牙城市）列车脱轨，发生在2013年7月24日，80人死亡，140人受伤；
温州火车相撞事故，发生在2011年7月23日，40人死亡，200多人受伤（根据维基百科词条查询的结果，这是中国第一起致命的高铁交通事故）

In comparison, let's take a look at this list of non highspeed rail accidents by death toll.

相比之下，让我们再来看一看非高铁交通事故导致的死亡人数：（维基百科链接。。。）

Paco Cabeza-Lopez（答主）：
Thank you so much for this question, Vincent. I was really expecting it so that I could elaborate a bit more. Wonder why my answer is “lacking” but anyhow. Ill be short for this is just an answer to a direct question. Ill start in reverse order:

谢谢你的回复，Vincent。我非常期待你们对我的答案感兴趣，所以我可以说得详细一点。但是我很奇怪你为什么说我的答案是有缺陷的，不管怎么样，我长话短说，直接回答你的问题吧。我将采取倒序的方式：

Wenzhou, 2011: I already provided details, no questions here.

温州，2011：我已经提供了事发细节了，这一点应该没问题了。

Spain (Santiago de Compostela) 2013: The accident was a political disaster: The line had to be opened prior to some kind or regional elections and long story short, the last 6.5km were not equipped with ERTMS, only the ASFA national system. The accident ocurred during the transition from ERTMS to ASFA, on the ASFA section. ASFA was not able to stop the train. It warned the driver but he was busy (apparently) on the phone and did not brake in time (he forgot he had to take over the train on the non-ERTMS section). Therefore, ERTMS is not to be blamed here. On the country, it wouldve stopped the train if implemented. But it wasnt.

西班牙（圣地亚哥-德孔波斯特拉）2013：这起事故是一个政治灾难的后果：长话短说，这条线路由于不得不优先向某些地方选举开放，最后的6.5km路线没有配置ERTMS，只是配置了ASFA国家系统。事故发生在ERTMS向ASFA过渡的地方，列车处于ASFA区域。ASFA没有能力紧急停止火车。警告送达火车司机，但是司机显然在忙与打电话，没有及时刹住火车（他忘了在非ERTMS区域应该手动操作车辆）。因此，这起事故不能归咎于ERTMS。相反，如果部署了ERTMS，列车就可以停住，但是很遗憾没有部署。

Last but not least, Enschede, Belgium (1998): the easy outcome of this accident was/is that the whole country is currently being re-signaled into ERTMS (in order to avoid accidents like Enschede), just like Denmark or Switzerland.. Netherlands is also thinking about it. At that time we had no ERTMS in place, it was being developed. The Belgian system was completely outdated in most parts of the country.

最后但是同样重要的一点是，艾须得镇，比利时（1998）：这起事故最简单的结论就是，当时整个国家正在重新调试信号以便改成ERTMS（目的是为了避免像艾须得镇那样的事故），当时丹麦、瑞士和荷兰等等国家也在考虑做同样的事，那个时候ERTMS还没有完全部署，而是正在发展当中。比利时系统在这个国家的很多方面已经完全过时了。