中国“一带一路倡议”显露出隐秘的战略动机 [印度媒体]

China's 'BeltRoad Initiative' exposes its ulterior strategic motives
中国“一带一路倡议”显露出隐秘的战略动机

【日期】2018年4月23日



WASHINGTON:The official narrative in China and the highlighting of the country's"core interests" in terms of fostering and promoting economicdevelopment in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region through the ambitiouslyconceived "Belt Road Initiative" (BRI) may not be entirely true.

华盛顿：中国官方的说法以及着重强调的国家“核心利益”，即通过雄心勃勃的“一带一路倡议”来促进欧洲和印度太平洋地区经济发展，可能并不完全真实。

According to a report prepared by the Center forAdvanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), a Washington D.C.-based non-profitorganisation dedicated to data-driven analysis and evidence-based reporting ofglobal conflict and security issues, Beijing so-called dynamic infrastructureand investment-dominant BRI initiative most definitely has a strategiccomponent to it that a wary international community is aware and concernedabout.

根据总部位于华盛顿特区的非营利性组织“先进防御研究中心”编写的一份报告，北京所谓的“动态基础设施和投资主导的一带一路倡议“无疑具有战略要素，这是一个谨慎的国际社会所意识到和关注的。该中心致力于全球冲突和安全问题的数据驱动分析和基于证据的基于证据的全球冲突和安全问题报告报告。

The report says, "... investments may not beprincipally driven by the concept of win-win development. Maritimeinfrastructure investment is inherently dual-use and is capable of furtheringboth legitimate business activities and military operations. The strategiccharacteristics of six analytical dimensions that are exhibited across China'sIndo-Pacific investments--having strategic location, a dual-use developmentmodel, notable Communist Party presence, significant financial control, limitedtransparency and unequal benefits..." These"several marked examples of unprofitability suggest that Beijing isactively seeking to leverage the geopolitical capacity of its port projects, asdiscussed by Chinese analysts. 



报告说：“投资可能不是主要由双赢发展的概念驱动的。海事基础设施投资本质上是双重用途，能够促进合法的商业活动和军事行动。投资具有六个分析层面的战略特征——战略位置、双重用途发展模式、显着的共产党存在、重要的财务控制、有限的透明度和不平等的利益…”，“几个明显的无法盈利的例子表明，正如中国分析人士所讨论的那样，中国政府正积极寻求利用其港口项目的地缘政治能力。”

The C4ADS report is also of the view thatport-linked investments by China will eventually deliver to it strategicadvantages and are indicative of that country's long acknowledged and acceptedpolicy of centralized control of schemes that it conceives from time to time,whether at home or abroad. Thereport does not hesitate to flag China's ulterior motives through its analysis,maintaining that its BRI-related investments "are both serving China'snational security interests and altering the strategic operating environment ofthe United States and its allies." 

该报告还声称，中国对港口的投资最终将提供战略优势，同时也说明该国长期接受并认可的政策，集中控制其不时设想的计划，无论是在国内还是在国外。该报告通过分析毫不犹豫地指出中国别有用心，认为中国的相关投资“既符合中国的国家安全利益，也改变了美国及其盟国的战略运作环境”。

According to the report, port projects in theIndo-Pacific region fall along just a few of the BRI's nine economic pathways,and if looked at from the economic perspective, the Chinese government andthrough it Chinese firms are creating new markets for the exploitation of cheaplabour as costs rise at home.
It is feltthat Beijing's manufacturing facilities place significant emphasis onagricultural output, "which addresses China's food insecurity."

根据这份报告，印度洋-太平洋地区的港口项目只沿着一带一路的九条经济道路其中的几条分布，如果从经济角度看，中国政府和中国企业正在开拓新的市场，以便在国内成本上升的情况下利用廉价劳动力。人们认为，中国的制造业设施非常重视农业产出，“这解决了中国的粮食不安全问题。”

The reportquotes Geoff Wade of the Australian National University as alleging thatmilitarily, Cambodia's three ports on Koh Kong, which receives ships fromSingapore, Malaysia and Thailand, "will be large enough to potentiallyhost China's frigates and destroyers, though there is no concrete indicationthat China plans to establish a base there or use the proposed port as a placeof forward deployment."

报告援引澳大利亚国立大学的杰夫·韦德的话称，从军事角度来看，柬埔寨在戈公地区的用于停靠来自来自新加坡、马来西亚和泰国船只的三个港口“规模将足以容纳中国的护卫舰和驱逐舰，尽管没有具体迹象表明中国计划在那里建立一个基地，或将港口用作前沿部署地点。”

It must be kept in mind that planned hospitals andrecreational areas in this port area "could theoretically host People'sLiberation Army Navy crews on patrol in the Gulf of Thailand or on the easternside of the Malacca Strait. Its proposed future industrial capacity could alsotheoretically provide logistical support to Chinese warships in line withstrategies proposed by China's analysts."

必须记住，这个港口地区规划的医院和娱乐区“理论上可以容纳人民解放军海军在泰国湾巡逻，也可以在马六甲海峡东侧巡逻，按照中国分析人士提出的战略，其所提供的未来工业能力理论上也可以为中国军舰提供后勤支持。”

Creating port related pilot zone, for instance inCambodia, could potentially allow China to use a proposed "ThaiCanal" to "circumvent China's Malacca Dilemma and cut approximatelythree days from the time required to ship through the Malacca Strait. Inaddition to facilitating exports and imports between the Indian Ocean and SouthEast Asia, the Koh Kong Port could provide PLAN ships swifter access to theIndian Ocean and allow Beijing's navy to monitor these new sea lanes. Notably,the Chinese ambassador to Thailand (has) reportedly asserted that the ThaiCanal is part of China's vision for the BRI."
Officiallythough what has been projected is that the Pilot Zone's master plan imaginesbuilding a nearly complete economy, with medical treatment centers,condominiums, resorts and hotels, manufacturing facilities, a deep-water port,and an international airport.

建立与港口有关的试点区，例如在柬埔寨，可能会允许中国使用计划中的“泰国运河”来“绕过中国的马六甲困境”，并把运输时间缩短大约三天。除了便利印度洋和东南亚之间的进出口外，戈公的港口还可以使计划中的船只更快地进入印度洋，并使中国海军得以监控这一新航线。据报道，中国驻泰国大使声称，泰国运河是中国一带一路愿景的一部分。
尽管按照（中国）官方的说法，试点区的总体规划设想是建设一个近乎完整的经济体，包括医疗中心、共管公寓、度假村和酒店、制造业设施、深水港口和国际机场。

China's gradualcontrol over Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port is another example of a country notbeing able to pay of its debts and opting to cede lease-based control toanother country to arrive at some sort of one-sidedconcessional arrangement.

中国对斯里兰卡汉班托塔港口的逐渐控制是另一个例子，表明一个国家无力偿还债务，并选择将基于租赁的控制权让给另一个国家，以达成某种单边让步协定。

According to the C4ADS report, "Sri Lankaagreed to the aforementioned deal with China Merchants Holding and ChinaCommunication Construction Company for berth operating rights at Hambantota.Local media alleged that since negotiations for the deal had continued untilthe day before the agreement was signed, it was impossible that the Sri LankanCabinet had properly vetted the agreement prior to signing. Instead, localmedia contend that the contract was a backroom deal between (then PresidentMahinda) Rajapaksa and Beijing, in which Sri Lanka conceded the berths inexchange for more favorable repayment terms on other loans owed to China."

根据先进防御研究中心的报告，“斯里兰卡同意了上述与中国招商控股公司和中国通信建筑公司在汉班托的泊位经营权协议。”当地媒体称，由于谈判一直持续到协议签署的前一天，斯里兰卡内阁不可能在签署协议前对协议进行适当审查。相反，当地媒体认为，该合同是拉贾帕克萨(当时的总统马欣达)和北京之间的幕后交易。斯里兰卡放弃了泊位，以换取对中国贷款的更优惠的偿还条件。

The report further reveals that, "All told,between 2005 and 2012, China is reported to have provided 4.761 billion USD inloans to Sri Lanka. Between 2012 and 2014, it pledged an additional 2.18billion USD. Many of these ventures, particularly those named in honor of thepresident, have been described as vanity projects rather than legitimatesources of economic development for Sri Lanka."

报告进一步披露，“2005至2012年间，中国已向斯里兰卡提供了47亿6100万美元的贷款。在2012至2014年间，它承诺再增加21亿8000万美元贷款。这些企业中的许多，尤其是那些以总统的名义命名的企业，被描述为“面子工程”，并不能合法地促进斯里兰卡经济发展。

China's influence in Sri Lanka, according to theC4ADS report, has, "seemingly resulted in a number of geostrategic winsfor Beijing through 2014. Achieving operational control of four of seven berthsat Hambantota coincided with port visits by the Chinese Navy's nuclear-poweredsubmarine and the "Warship Changxing Dao", which alarmed India, as ithad not been informed by Colombo ahead of time.

根据这份报告，中国在斯里兰卡的影响力“似乎让北京取得了在2014年之前制定的多项地缘战略的胜利。在汉班托塔港的7个泊位中，中国获得了四个泊位的操作控制权。与此同时，中国海军的核动力潜艇和”长兴岛“战舰也对该港口进行了访问，这让印度感到震惊，因为科伦坡并未提前将此事通知印度。

On the surface, the only objective of China's BRIis to increase infrastructure connectivity within Asia and beyond so as tofacilitate "win-win" economic development and prosperity. Officially,these maritime infrastructure investments do not indicate any strategic agenda,but Western analysts think otherwise.

从表面上看，中国“一带一路倡议”的唯一目标是增加亚洲内外的基础设施连通性，以促进“双赢”的经济发展和繁荣。官方认为，这些海上基础设施投资并不意味着任何战略议程，但西方分析家则不以为然。

The report conclusively warns that, "Ifstates do not heed the lessons of the Indo-Pacific, China will continue topursue a security strategy that utilizes infrastructure investments to generatepolitical influence, stealthily expand Beijing's military presence, and createan advantageous strategic environment."

报告最后警告说，“如果各国不注意印度洋-太平洋地区的教训，中国将继续奉行安全战略，利用基础设施投资产生政治影响力，悄悄扩大北京的军事存在，并创造有利的战略环境。”