【英国智库】中国在中亚的扩张-问题与观点 [英国媒体]

Chinese Expansion in Central Asia: Problems and Perspectives

中国在中亚的扩张-问题与观点



By Dr Catherine Owen.（作者）

Over the past two decades, China has been slowly but substantially increasing its presence in Central Asia. Most recently, it has initiated the ambitious new project, the Silk Road Economic Belt, which aims to connect Chinese and European markets via Central Asia. Having surpassed Russia as Central Asia's largest trading partner in 2009, China has invested billions into the economically ailing region and is the largest creditor to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

过去的二十年间，中国缓慢但是持续的扩大了自己在中亚的影响力，而正是最近，她发起了一个充满野心的计划-丝绸之路，目的是通过中亚将中国与欧洲连接起来。从2009年超越俄罗斯成为中亚地区最大的贸易伙伴以来，中国已经在这个经济困境中挣扎的地区投入了几十亿，也是塔吉克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦最大的债主国。

This short article summarises research into Chinese activity in the region, conducted on the ESRC-funded grant, 'Rising Powers and Conflict Management in Central Asia' led by John Heathershaw at the University of Exeter. The research team conducted approximately 50 interviews with cultural and political elites in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan between 2013 and 2015. Specifically, we wanted to find out how Chinese economic incursions into Central Asia are perceived locally and the extent to which they are countered or embraced. After summarising China's interests and activities in the Central Asian region, the article highlights both physical and discursive attempts by locals to undermine Chinese activity. It suggests that although nascent Chinese soft power initiatives have had some positive effects, on-going improvements to relations could be threatened by the economic downturn in China.

这篇短文总结了中国在这个地区的活动，具体项目“中亚地区崛起力量与冲突管理”由艾克赛特大学发起。在2013年到2015年间，项目组对50名来自塔吉克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦的文化、政治领域的精英进行了采访。关键点在于，我们想了解当地如何看待中国经济的入侵，以至于如何应对或接受。在总结了中国的在中亚地区利益着力点和具体活动，文章也重点罗列了当地人对中国（经济）活动毫无重点和粗暴的对抗。结论是萌芽中的中国软实力项目确有正面影响，但是后续的关系升温很可能被下滑的中国经济拖了后腿。
（译文中略项目负责人和出资方）

The Logic behind Chinese Interests in Central Asia

隐藏在中亚中国利益之后的逻辑

Although Chinese government rhetoric is unreservedly effusive about the growing cooperation with the region, two caveats are worth mentioning. First, Central Asia occupies a significantly lower status in Chinese foreign policy-making than other strategic areas such as the ASEAN and the South China Sea. Secondly, Chinese scholars and officials are aware that Central Asia forms part of Russia's area of special interest and that Russia is deeply mistrustful of Chinese activities in the region. Yet although its footprint is softer in Central Asia than elsewhere in the world, China has three very concrete reasons behind its interest in the region.

对于提升与该地区的合作，中国粉饰下的迫切已经是司马昭之心-路人皆知，仍有两点值得注意的地方。一是中亚地区在中国的对外政策制定的战略重要意义上远不如东盟和南中国海来的重要。二是中国学界和官方意识到中亚地区对俄罗斯而言是特殊和重要的利益所在，而且俄罗斯对中方在这一地区的动作抱有严重戒心。所以说中国在涉及中亚地区事务的做法上要比在（世界）其他地区来的柔和。中国对在中亚施展战略抱负这背后有三个非常现实的原因。

The first reason concerns energy security. China is the world's largest energy consumer but only has 1% of global reserves. According to the US Department of Defense, China has invested in the energy-related projects in over 50 countries. However, China has become dependent on politically unstable countries in the Middle East and Africa, which in 2014 supplied over half of its crude oil imports. Central Asia represents a more stable and more convenient source of energy for China's mushrooming domestic markets.

第一个理由是能源安全。中国是世界上最大的能源消耗国，但自身仅有1%的储藏。根据来自美国国防部的说法，中国已经在超过五十个国家投资了能源相关项目，但中国（能源）主要依赖于中东和非洲的政治动荡国家（例如2014年一半的原油来自上述国家）。对中国蓬勃的国内市场来说，中亚国家代表了稳定和便利的能源来源。

Secondly, China's interest in Central Asia stems from its desire to ensure stability in its restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which borders Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The region is plagued by ethnic tensions between the Uyghur Muslim and Han Chinese populations, and is home to a number of Uyghur independence movements. According to China's development logic, economic investment improves security by rendering separatist call less attractive. As such, the Central Chinese government has promised to invest nearly $25 billion in infrastructural projects in the troubled region in 2016.

第二个理由，中国的中亚抱负可以封堵中亚（势力）从而稳定与哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦相邻的新疆维吾尔自治区的不安局势。这一地区（指新疆）正被维族穆斯林和汉族人口之间的种族紧张所困扰，同时也是一系列疆独运动的大本营。根据中国的发展理念，经济投资会让分离主义缺乏市场。因此，2016年中国已经承诺投资约250亿美元提升地区基础设施。

Thirdly, China's expansion into Central Asia takes on a new significance as a means to sidestep US containment policies in the South China Sea. Russia has expressed support for China's stance vis-à-vis the US on this issue, and the joint desire to see a reduction of American influence in the Far East may facilitate greater collaboration in Central Asia. With the Chinese media of the view that tensions between the US and China are likely to increase in the short-term, the Central Asian region, now free from US influence since 2014, appears a relative playground.

第三个理由，中国在中亚的扩张，是中国对美国南海策略的一记“回身反打”。俄罗斯已经在南海问题上与中国站在一起，并且同样乐于看到美国在远东的影响力得到削弱从而促进中国与俄罗斯在中亚的进一步合作。中国媒体则认为中美冲突很有可能在短期内发生，中亚地区（2014年就摆脱了美国势力影响）正是一个合适的斗法之所。

China's Central Asian Projects

中国的中亚计划

China's flagship project in Central Asia is the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), that is, the land-based component of its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative (the other component being the Maritime Silk Road). Conceived in 2013, the SREB is an ambitious project to connect East Asian and European markets via Central Asia, increasing trade and connectivity, with Xinjiang seen as its core region. Currently, Chinese products are shipped 26,000 miles through the Suez Canal to Europe, a journey that takes up to 45 days. The SREB aims to reduce that journey time to less than two weeks and cut the mileage to 6,500. The SREB will be financed by the newly-created intergovernmental Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and by the Chinese venture, the Silk Road Fund.

中国在中亚的核心项目正是“丝绸之路”，同时也是“一带一路”计划的陆路部分。这个充满野心、始于2013年的的计划，目的在于通过中亚连接欧亚大陆市场，从而提升两地贸易和物品流通，新疆正是计划的核心地区。目前，中国商品通过苏伊士运河并长达26000英里的路途到达欧洲，花费45天。“一带一路”目标是将时间缩短至两周，路途缩短至6500英里。新成立的亚投行和丝路基金则会为“一带一路”提供资金支持。

There are too many individual China-funded infrastructural and energy projects already underway in Central Asia to list here. However, notable projects include the development of the Galkynysh oilfields in Turkmenistan; the Central Asia-China gas pipeline that runs from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Xinjiang; the Datka-Kemin electricity power line in Kyrgyzstan that allows the country energy independence from Uzbekistan; and the Khorgos Gateway on the China-Kazakh border, a key logistical hub for the SREB. This is in addition to the development of oil refineries in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the construction of a plethora of roads across the region. In the year to May 2015, total trade between China and the five Central Asian states totalled $41.7 billion. Central Asians have thus witnessed an enormous increase in the number of Chinese companies, workers and settlers in the region, with Chinese restaurants and cafes and springing up near construction sites, and other small businesses opening in the towns.

已经有太多中国基建和能源项目已经在中亚开工，在此也无法一一罗列，但包括土库曼斯坦的加基尼什油田在内的一系列项目值得一提，它始自土库曼斯坦，穿越乌兹别克斯坦和哈萨克斯坦直达新疆；Datka-Kemin的电力线路让吉尔吉斯斯坦从此不再依赖乌兹别克斯坦；还有就是中哈边境的霍尔果斯口岸，是“一带一路”的重要节点。项目中更有哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦的石油精炼产业和整个地区供大于求的道路。截止2015年5月，中国和五个中亚国家的贸易突破410亿美元，中亚人因此目睹了大量的中资公司、中国工人和定居者来到这一地区，形成了大量中餐馆、餐吧环绕建设工地、小生意开在城里的格局。

Local Reactions to Chinese Expansion

当地对中国扩张的反应

Although local Central Asians generally saw the financial aspect of Chinese presence as a positive thing, many struggle with a deep-rooted fear of their large neighbour, instilled from infancy. One Bishkek resident explained, 'In my childhood, if we didn't eat the food that our grandmother prepared, she would scare us by saying that the Chinese will come.' This Sinophobia manifests itself in Central Asia both physically and discursively.

尽管当地中亚人大体将中国存在视为经济上的正面利好，还是有很多人对这个庞然大物般的邻居有发自内心的恐惧。一个比什凯克的当地人解释道“小时候，如果我们不好好吃饭，奶奶就会说-中国人要来了!来吓唬我们”。这种中国恐惧症在中亚既是现实的又是漫无边际的。

Firstly, unfortunately, as Chinese presence increases, so do incidences of violence. Local media outlets have noted a wave of criminal attacks on Chinese businesses, often targeted by gangs demanding protection money. High profile cases include the 2013 murder of the owner of Bishkek-based Chinese optician for refusing to pay extortion fees and the 2014 deportation of a group of Chinese workers from Kyrgyzstan for rioting over a pay dispute. Ethnic violence has also periodically broken out, both in terms of larger-scale conflicts and attacks on individuals, in particular near Chinese construction projects. In April this year, protests erupted across Kazakhstan over land reforms allowing foreigners to rent Kazakh land for up to 25 years. Protestors cited fears that Chinese investors will purchase the land and never leave.

首先，不幸的是，中国存在感的增强也带来了更多的暴力事件。本地媒体记录了一大波对中国商业的犯罪袭击，一般是要收取保护费的黑帮。典型性事件包括2013年一起中国眼镜商因拒绝被敲诈而被杀害，和2014年在吉尔吉斯斯坦一群中国工人因为劳资纠纷发起的骚乱而被遣返。在中国建筑工地附近，大大小小规模的种族冲突也周期性的爆发。今年四月，哈萨克斯坦全国都爆发了针对允许外国人租用土地多至25年的游行，游行者称害怕来自中国的投资人买了地就再也不走。

Secondly, conspiracy theories of Chinese intentions in Central Asia abound both online and in face-to-face discussions, and mostly consist of variations on the idea that China wants to 'take over' in Central Asia. For instance, the development assistance given by China in the south of Kyrgyzstan, such as hospitals and televisions, are 'all part of a plot to exploit some piece of land in Osh that the Chinese know about and that others do not'. There is a perception that a lot of outward migration from China is occurring, both through promotion by the Chinese government and illegal border crossings. Many locals fear that immigration to the region is 'out of control', and that Chinese men arrive in Central Asia with the aim of marrying local women to thereby 'dilute' the region. Some believe that Kyrgyzstan will eventually become the PRC's most westerly province. Others suggest that Russia and China are planning to take over the region together, which Russia providing the security and China the finance.

其次，中国意图在中亚掀起叛乱的说法一直在因特网和人们私下沟通中流传，基本上就是中国要“取而代之”的多种版本。例如中国在吉尔吉斯斯坦南部展开的援助项目包括医院、电视在内，都被认为是中国人通过医疗健康手段密谋剥削土地。当地有一种观念认为大规模的中国移民正在因为中国宣传或者非法偷渡涌入。许多当地人担心到当地的中国移民数量无法节制，而且中国男性在当地的嫁娶会“稀释”当地人口，更有人认为吉尔吉斯斯坦很快会成为中国紧西部的一个省份，还有人认为中俄正打算合力侵吞整个地区，大毛掏枪我兔掏钱。

Despite these problems, there is room for optimism regarding everyday relations between Chinese and Central Asians living in the region. For instance, local Chinese soft power initiatives are generally well received: the Kyrgyz language Chinese television channel is highly regarded and the Confucius Institutes are seen to provide exciting opportunities for students to obtain internships and travel abroad. The Chinese language is becoming an increasingly popular subject for study at university, and growing numbers of Central Asian young people are travelling to China on exchange or language programmes. Students invariably return with positive stories of their time in China, often surprised at the level of development in the country. This suggests that longer term investment by China in education and cultural exchange could reduce the fear and ignorance of China in the region.

除却这些问题，对于中国和当地日常生活的人们来说，仍有乐观的空间。例如中国在软实力方面的推广卓有成效：吉尔吉斯语中国频道被好评；孔子学院为学生们提供了良好的实习和海外旅行机会。普通话科目在大学里正越来越受到欢迎，越来越多的中亚青年通过交换、语言项目来到中国。学生们总是带着对中国的正面故事回来，也惊讶于中国取得的发展。这也证明了中国对教育和文化交流长期性投入可以减少这个地区对中国的无知和恐惧。

However, perhaps the most important question for local China-Central Asian relations concerns the nascent economic downturn in China. Although, Chinese construction companies will benefit from new building opportunities and, once completed, the SREB will substantially reduce transit costs for Chinese goods, the initiative requires a vast amount of capital injection to get the project off the ground: indeed, the China Development Bank recently revealed plans to invest $900 billion in a slew of projects connected to OBOR. However, Chinese premier Xi Jinping has indicated that he wants to check debt-fuelled growth. It is arguedthat a multi-trillion dollar bailout is required in order for the Chinese economy to stay afloat. And given that the South China Sea dispute takes clear precedency, in the event of a crisis, SREB funding will be the first to be cut. Will the ambitious vision for the region reach completion and enter operation, or will Central Asia begin to resemble the outskirts of a Chinese city: mile after mile of empty high rises and abandoned construction projects. If the latter turns out to be true, the level of discontent among Central Asians will, quite reasonably, be look set to rise.

但是，中国目前的经济下滑对于中国-中亚关系而言，恐怕也是最终、最重要的问题。尽管中国建设公司会从新建项目中受益，一旦完工，“一带一路”将会显着降低中国商品的物流成本，可这个项目的启动将需要投入巨量的资金，确实，中国发展银行声称将投入9000亿美元至连接“一带一路”的一揽子项目，但中国领导人习表示他将反思债务驱动型增长模式，有说法是中国需要数万亿规模的去杠杆使中国经济处于平稳运行。同时，将南海风波纳入考虑的话，“丝绸之路”的资金恐怕将会首先被砍。这个事关中亚的宏伟计划最终是得以完成并实现，还是将中亚地区会变成中国郊区那些荒无人烟的鬼城？如果后者成为事实，那么弥漫在中亚人中的不满显而易见的将会爆发。

July 2016/2016年7月