在打击达伊沙上，美国可从二战日本学到很多 [约旦媒体]

In the fight against Daesh, the US could learn a lot from WWII-era Japan

《中东新闻网》】在打击达伊沙上，美国可以从二战日本学到很多

【日期】2015年12月8日



Veterans pay respects at the Yasukuni shrine inTokyo, Japan. (AFP/File)

在日本东京，老兵向靖国神社致敬

Yesterdaymarked the 74th anniversary of Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Thatattack was designed to "shock and awe" an isolationist America intoan early negotiated surrender after its Pacific Fleet battleships were sunk orput out of action by the Imperial Japanese Navy, giving Japan free license toexpand its East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere as far as it liked. But the outcome was not theone expected by the military dictatorship in Tokyo.

昨天是日本偷袭珍珠港74周年纪念日。那次袭击意在通过武力震慑迫使奉行孤立主义的美国在它的太平洋舰队的战舰被击沉或是失去作战能力的情况下成为一个早期的协议投降者，从而使得日本能够畅通无阻尽可能的扩大它的东亚共荣圈。但是结果却并非东京的独裁军政府所预计的那样。

In fightingthe Islamic State, President Barack Obama's strategy has been roundlycriticized from many directions. In reality, Mr. Obama is confusing the slogan"to disrupt and destroy" with a real strategy in which aims and meansare closely aligned, coordinated and reinforce each other. In that regard, asthe attack on Pearl Harbor failed to make the Pacific war very brief, so toowill the Obama strategy fail to defeat IS (Daesh) on the current trajectory.

在对抗伊斯兰国的策略上，奥巴马总统受到了来自许多方面的严厉批评。现实中，奥巴马将“干扰和破坏”的口号与目的与手段紧密匹配、协调、相互强化的策略混为一谈。在这方面，就像珍珠港事件没能缩短太平洋战争一样，沿着目前的轨迹，奥巴马打击IS（达伊沙）的战略也将如此。

Instead of a viable strategy, the Obama plan isa series of tactical actions that, while seemingly sensible individually and intheory, are not coordinated with an overarching framework to ensure success. InWorld War II, that framework was to win in the Atlantic first; hold in thePacific until more resources became available; and mobilize America's "arsenalof democracy" to out produce and overwhelm the enemy with tanks, ships,planes, artillery and all the sinews of war in concert with dedicated alliesincluding the Soviet Union.

与可行的战略相悖，奥巴马的计划只是一系列的战术行动，这些行动在理论上或是单独看起来都非常明智，但是并未与一个总体的框架协调以确保胜利。二战时，大框架是要先赢得大西洋战场，在能投入更多的可用资源之前先稳住太平洋战场，然后与包括苏联在内的热诚的盟友合作，调动美国的“民主兵工厂”使得在坦克、船舰、飞机、大炮和所有战争的主要资源的生产上能够压制敌人。

Any war college graduate can easily draft threeor four strategic constructs for defeating and destroying IS. First is a majorground and air offensive against the territories controlled and occupied by ISin Syria, Iraq and Libya if needed. To succeed, especially since the occupationin Syria could last decades in transitioning to some degree of order andstability, that force would have to be largely Arab and Sunni.

任何一个军事院校毕业生都能够非常简单的起草三四个打败IS的战略构想。第一种战略是针对叙利亚、伊拉克和利比亚被IS控制和占领的土地实行大规模地面和空中攻势（如果有必要）。为了取得胜利，这股势力必须由阿拉伯和逊尼派主导，特别是在实现一定的稳定与秩序之前，对叙利亚的占领可能将持续几十年之久。

The second is a strategy of containment. Theassumptions here are that fielding a sufficiently large ground force isimpossible until the regional states actually regard IS as an existentialthreat and are prepared and willing to act accordingly. The current anti-IScoalition of 65 states would focus on stopping the flow of money and foreignfighters in and out of IS territory and taking on the responsibility ofcountering the IS propaganda and ideological messaging. Air and drone strikeswould continue but on a lower level of effort as the aim is to contain with theexpectation IS would ultimately implode.

第二种是围堵策略。它的前提是在区域国家真正将IS视为实质性的威胁并有据此行动的意愿与准备之前，大规模的出动地面力量是不可能的。目前由65个国家组成的反IS联盟将集中精力阻止资金与外国武装人员进出IS控制区，并承担反击IS政治宣传和意识形态传播的责任。空中打击和无人机空袭将持续进行，但强度将有所降低，因为战略意图是在IS最终将内部崩溃的预计下进行围堵与遏制。

A thirdstrategy relies entirely on Iran and Russia to defeat IS in Syria and bydefault adapting as a sub-strategy elements of containment. Clearly, no guarantees would ensure either Russia andIran would actually focus engagement on IS. Hence, a further sub-element mustbe convincing both that IS the principal enemy. And, of course, the downsidesof expanding Russian and Iranian influence would have to be minimized,especially throughout the Gulf Cooperative Council where Iran is regarded asthe existential threat, not IS. The corollary is a US downsizing from thisfight.

第三种策略则完全依赖伊朗和俄罗斯去打败叙利亚的IS并适应缺席后的局势作为围堵的亚策略。显而易见，没有人能保证俄罗斯或是伊朗将专注与IS交战。因此，进一步的亚策略必须确信IS是我们头号的敌人，并且因俄罗斯与伊朗影响力的扩大所带来的负面影响将被最小化，尤其是通过将伊朗而非IS视为实质性威胁的海湾合作委员会。但这种策略必然导致美国缩减反IS的战争规模。

A further strategy that could be incorporatedinto the others is to create a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement that, almostcertainly, will be long-term. For those who think this is mission impossible,until 1979 and the overthrow of the Shah, Saudi Arabia and Iran were part ofthe US "Two Pillar" strategy in the Gulf. Both states viewed theSoviet Union as the greater, potentially existential threat. Indeed, theconcept of a Sunni-Shia war was confined to a few academic historians of Islamand few non-Muslims were even aware of the two sects.

可以被整合进其它战略的进阶战略是创造一个沙特-伊朗亲善关系（毫无疑问这需要长期努力）。对于那些认为这是一个不可能的任务的人，回顾一下在1979年伊朗巴列维王朝被推翻之前，沙特阿拉伯和伊朗都是美国在海湾地区“双重支点”战略的一部分。沙特和伊朗这两个国家都将苏联视作更强的潜在实质威胁。实际上，在那时逊尼-什叶的宗派战争也只局限于少部分的伊斯兰历史学家之间，当时甚至没什么非穆斯林听说过这两个教派。

The Obama administration is trapped betweenOptions I and II. It exercises the strongest rhetoric repeatedly acknowledgingthat IS can only be destroyed by ground forces. Yet, in practice, it does notfollow through with sufficiently tough actions and emulates what can be besttermed a Containment Plus approach.

奥巴马当局受限于选项一和选项二之中。它不断的重复着那些认为IS只能被地面力量消灭的最为强烈的说辞。可是，在实践中，它并没有贯彻以足够强硬的行动或是效仿被称为围堵+的方式。
（围堵+策略：将伊斯兰国驱逐出伊拉克，在叙利亚实现对其的遏制。：译者注）

As Japan could not change course after PearlHarbor, Mr. Obama seems determined to make only minor tactical alterations tothe rules of engagement for expanding air and drone strikes; adding handfuls ofspecial forces for kill and capture missions; and increasing the intensity ofair operations. But unless or until Iraqi ground forces can eject IS fromMosul, Ramadi and elsewhere and Kurdish forces assault and occupy Raqqa for thelong-term, the best likely outcome is stalemate.

就像日本在珍珠港事件之后已经无法改弦更张一般，奥巴马似乎决心只对扩大空中和无人机打击的交战规则做出一些细小的战术性改变：增加一些用于刺杀和俘获任务的特种部队，增强空中作战的密度。但是除非或是直到伊拉克的地面部队能够将IS驱逐出摩苏尔、拉马迪和其它一些地方，并且库尔德武装力量能够袭击并长期占领Raqqa（叙利亚北部城市：译注），否则最有可能的结果将是僵局。

It is tragic that the inflexibility of the WhiteHouse is matched by the absence of any better options offered by aspirants forthe presidency from both parties.

两党智识之士无法给总统提供的更好选择，与之相对的是白宫弹性的缺乏，这不能不说是一个悲剧。